Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff-appellant in the second appeal, lost his suit based on a promissory note. The court below took the view that the suit was barred by limitation. 2. The promissory note for Rs.5,300 was executed on 8-4-1972. The suit was instituted on 25-11-1976. On the date of the suit, a period of three years had clearly elapsed after the execution of the promissory note. In the absence of an acknowledgment of liability, the suit would therefore be barred. 3. Acknowledgment was pleaded by the plaintiff. There was a specific averment to the effect that the suit was not barred in view of the acknowledgment evident from the letters written by the defendant on 21-3-1973,4-8-1975 and 11-10-1975. In Para.4 of the written statement, the genuineness of the letter dated 21-3-1973 (Ext. A2) was disputed. The other documents were admitted to be correct. 4. According to the appellate court, the statements in Ext.A2 did not establish a reference to the transaction under the promissory note. A contention that the handwriting in Ext. A2 was similar to the handwriting in the admitted documents, and that the name in Ext.A2 would have been written by the defendant and that such a writing of name was sufficient to constitute signature, was also considered by that court. The court, however, observed: "However, it is necessary that there should be a conscious acknowledgment" According to the court, the absence of signature clearly signified that the defendant "did not intend to sign or verify the acknowledgment in the body of the document". 5. The view taken by the court below is not correct. 6. Whether the defendant had intended to acknowledge the liability or not is clearly ascertainable from the documentary evidence in the case. Even if the disputed document is excluded, the existence of a monetary transaction, the consciousness on the part of the defendant of his being under a financial obligation to the plaintiff, and the repetitive. assurances relating to payment of the amounts thus due to the plaintiff are clearly established. There could not be any doubt whatever that Ext.A2 had been written by the defendant in the case. The contents of Ext.A2, would clearly bring about the necessary nexus between the execution of the promissory note, and his intention to acknowledge the liability arising thereunder. assurances relating to payment of the amounts thus due to the plaintiff are clearly established. There could not be any doubt whatever that Ext.A2 had been written by the defendant in the case. The contents of Ext.A2, would clearly bring about the necessary nexus between the execution of the promissory note, and his intention to acknowledge the liability arising thereunder. It cannot then be said that for the only reason that the signature as such did not figure in Ext.A2, there was no acknowledgment. The legal position is clear in the light of the cantena of judicial decisions which have dealt with the question. 7. Cases starting from early times would show that any mark would be sufficient to constitute 'signature', if such a mark has the support of an intense intention. Case law here and abroad is referred to at pages 70-71 of 'The Negotiable Instruments Act' by Bhasuyam and Adiga (14th Edn.) Though in a different context the question has been considered by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Construction Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 526. The meaning of the term 'signed', in the background of a question arising under the Arbitration Act was considered therein. It was held that a full signature was not essential, for giving validity to an award of the Arbitrator. There are also some cases where a man is allowed to sign by the hand of another who writes his name for him. (See London County Council v. Agricultural Food Products Ltd. (1955) 2 Q. B. 218). That decision refers to to an illustration of such a signature, "when a man has broken his arm and cannot write his own name." In Dennison v. Jeffs, (1896) 1 Ch. 611, a husband signed on behalf of his wife, "in her presence, at her request, and by her authority." The signature was held to be sufficient to constitute the signature of the wife. Initials would be sufficient to constitute signature, as had been noted by the decisions reported in Meenakshi Achi v. P.S.M. Subramanian Chettiar, A.I.R. 1957 Madras 8 and Tevudu v. Venkataratnam, A.I.R. 1935 Madras 555. Even a rubber stamp would do, is the view taken by the Rangoon High Court reported in Vellayappa v. Somasundaram, A.I.R. 1935 Rangoon 160. Initials would be sufficient to constitute signature, as had been noted by the decisions reported in Meenakshi Achi v. P.S.M. Subramanian Chettiar, A.I.R. 1957 Madras 8 and Tevudu v. Venkataratnam, A.I.R. 1935 Madras 555. Even a rubber stamp would do, is the view taken by the Rangoon High Court reported in Vellayappa v. Somasundaram, A.I.R. 1935 Rangoon 160. Yet another decision which is relevant and material is that of the Patna High Court reported in Ramjan Ali v. Meer Ahmed, A.I.R. 1940 Patna 6. The following observations in that judgment are very pertinent: "The Section also does not say as to what should be the form of the signature, and it is now well settled that if the name of the debtor is introduced into the document of acknowledgment in such a way as to show that the acknowledgment was intended to be his own, such a name whether written or printed would constitute his signature within the meaning of the expression as used in S.19, Limitation Act." 8. In the light of the above principles of the aforesaid decisions there could not be any doubt whatever that Ext. A2 did contain the signature of the defendant and that it constituted a valid acknowledgment. 9. The learned judge sought to distinguish the decision of the Patna High Court on the ground that in the present case no intention for such acknowledgment could be inferred from Ext. A2. A reading of Ext.A2 either singly or alongwith the admitted documents, would clearly establish that the defendant did intend to acknowledge the monetary liability towards the plaintiff. There is no case of there having been any other transaction between the parties to which the transaction made mention of in Ext. A2 could possibly refer to. The plaintiff has given evidence that the reference to the liability of the defendant is one under Ext. Al. In the above circumstances, Ext. A2 does constitute a valid acknowledgment on the part of the defendant. If that be so, the suit is well within the time. The plaintiff would therefore be entitled to a decree as prayed for. 10. In the view that has been taken above, it is unnecessary to consider whether Ext. A8 would also constitute an acknowledgment. A2 does constitute a valid acknowledgment on the part of the defendant. If that be so, the suit is well within the time. The plaintiff would therefore be entitled to a decree as prayed for. 10. In the view that has been taken above, it is unnecessary to consider whether Ext. A8 would also constitute an acknowledgment. Though the defendant, conveniently enough, disputed his signature therein, a comparison of the writing and signature contained therein with those of admitted documents clearly makes out that it was written by the defendant and signed by him. The trend of the writing, the reference to the intimate personal details and the style of the writing, are so strikingly similar that no other conclusion is possible. In that view of the matter also, the suit would be well within the time. 11. In the result, the judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside. The second appeal is allowed. The appellant-plaintiff will be given a decree as prayed for. The plaintiff will be given a decree for the plaint amount together with interest at 6 per cent per annum on the principal amount from the date of decree. The appellant will get his costs throughout. Allowed.