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1984 DIGILAW 209 (KER)

Rajesh Dagar v. University of Calicut

1984-07-27

U.L.BHAT

body1984
JUDGMENT U.L. Bhat, J. 1. Petitioner, a student of Government Engineering College, Trichur appeared for the first and second semester B.Sc. Engineering Examination conducted in March 1983 at the premises of the college. He had to write a paper on Mechanical Technology between 2 to 5 p.m. on 6th April 1983. At about 3.05 p.m., the two invigilators, Dr. K. Neelakandan (Assistant Professor) and P.G.R. Pillai (First Grade Instructor) saw two pieces of loose sheets of manuscript on the table of the petitioner and they were being referred to by the petitioner. They immediately took away the two loose sheets as well as the answer book and supplied a fresh answer book to him. They reported the matter to the fourth respondent, Chief Superintendent of the Examinations under Ext. R-2(a). The Chief Superintendent conducted preliminary enquiry on the spot and was satisfied that there was a prima facie case. He reported the matter to the University and was directed by the University to conduct a formal enquiry through an enquiry officer appointed by him. The duly appointed enquiry officer, 5th respondent j issued Ext. P-1 memo of two charges, dated 15th July 1983 to the petitioner who was given time to offer explanation and to specify the names of witnesses whom he desired to examine at the oral enquiry. The enquiry officer, after enquiry held on 28th July 1983 submitted a report, dated 30th July 1983 exonerating the petitioner of the charges. The Syndicate Standing Committee on examination considered the report and the records and found that the first charge namely that he brought into the examination hall written manuscript in violation of R.10(1) of the instructions has been made out and the explanation of the petitioner was not satisfactory, The Vice-Chancellor of the University, second respondent, in consultation with the Standing Committee, provisionally decided to cancel the first and second semester examination taken by the petitioner in March 1983 and to debar him from taking these two examinations for two more chances, Ext. P-2 memo, dated 13th December 1983 was issued to him by the third respondent, Controller of Examinations, to show cause why the provisional decision should note be confirmed. Petitioner submitted reply on consideration of which the Vice-Chancellor passed final order confirming the proposed punishment under Ext. R-2(c) (Ext. P-8) on 19th June 1984. P-2 memo, dated 13th December 1983 was issued to him by the third respondent, Controller of Examinations, to show cause why the provisional decision should note be confirmed. Petitioner submitted reply on consideration of which the Vice-Chancellor passed final order confirming the proposed punishment under Ext. R-2(c) (Ext. P-8) on 19th June 1984. Pending enquiry he was allowed to appear for the third semester examination in August 1983 (result withheld). He was provisionally prompted to V semester subject to his passing I and II semester examinations. He was not allowed to appear afresh for the first and second semester examinations or to appear for the fourth semester examination, as seen in Ext. P-4 memo, dated 16th March 1984. It is said the Principal of the College, provisionally allowed the petitioner to write IV semester examination, but the answer sheets have not been valued. Under Ext. P-7 notice, dated 13th June 1984, petitioner was removed from the rolls of the fifth semester. 2. Petitioner filed this Original Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on 27th June 1984. Evidently, on that day he was not aware of the final order Ext. R-2(c) (Ext. P-8) dated 19th June 1984. He prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing Ext. P-2 memo (finding him guilty and provisionally deciding on the punishment), writs of mandamus commanding the University not to disturb his continued studies in the College, to publish the results of first three semester examinations of the petitioner, to evaluate the answer sheets of the fourth semester examination and to declare his results, to compel the respondents to give a copy of the enquiry report along with testimonies of witnesses and the findings of the Standing Committee. After he was served with a copy of the final order, Ext. R-2(c), he amended the Original Petition challenging the order as also the new regulation of the University stipulating the passing of first two semester examinations in order to attend the fifth semester classes. On behalf of respondents 2 and 3, Section Officer in the Examination Section of the University of Calicut has filed counter affidavit. 3. The following grounds are urged in the Original Petition: 1. The delay in the final decision on the suspected malpractice is unreasonable, arbitrary and illegal. 2. Enquiry was conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. 3. 3. The following grounds are urged in the Original Petition: 1. The delay in the final decision on the suspected malpractice is unreasonable, arbitrary and illegal. 2. Enquiry was conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. 3. Conclusion reached by the Standing Committee of the Syndicate is illegal, arbitrary and mala fide. Petitioner has not been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause before arriving at the conclusion. 4 . He has not been given a copy of the enquiry report. 5. The report of enquiry officer is final. 6. Results of third semester examination cannot be withheld; his answer papers for the fourth semester examination have to be valued and results declared; he should be admitted to the fifth semester course and his name could not be removed from the rolls. 4. The regulation concerned is invalid. 4. The malpractice was indulged in on 6th April, 1983 and detected at 3.05 p.m. by the two invigilators and they immediately reported the matter to the Chief Superintendent who is the Principal, under Ext. R-2(a). On the very same day, Principal after a Preliminary enquiry at the spot reported the matter to the University as seen from Ext. R-2(c). The principal was asked to appoint an enquiry officer. Enquiry officer (R-5) was appointed. Memo of charges was issued. Enquiry was held. Enquiry Officer submitted report on 25th August 1983. Thereafter, syndicate Standing Committee on examination considered the matter and held the first charge provided. Vice-Chancellor in consultation with the Standing Committee took provisional decision and Controller of Examinations issued show cause notice on 13th December, 1983. Petitioner chose to deny the charges against him in Ext. P-1 memo of charge and therefore enquiry had to be conducted. Naturally, this led to some amount of delay. In the Original Petition, he alleged that in the case of one Abdul Lathief who indulged in misconduct on the same day final order was passed in February, 1984 itself. In the counter affidavit, it is explained that Abdul Lathief pleaded guilty and therefore there was no occasion for a formal enquiry. In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that there has been any unreasonable delay in completing the disciplinay proceedings. 5. It is alleged that enquiry was conducted in violation of principles of natural justice. In the counter affidavit, it is explained that Abdul Lathief pleaded guilty and therefore there was no occasion for a formal enquiry. In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that there has been any unreasonable delay in completing the disciplinay proceedings. 5. It is alleged that enquiry was conducted in violation of principles of natural justice. The Original Petition does not allege in what regard and in what aspects principles of natural justice were violated. In the petition, it is alleged in paragraph 5: "The petitioner gave his explanation before the enquiry Officer, 5th respondent herein. He later understood that the 5th respondent has taken evidence from other witnesses about which the petitioner was given no information and was not given an opportunity to cross examine them. In fact the petitioner was never informed of any further progress of the Enquiry for the next almost 6 months. This pretended ignorance of the enquiry proceedings is falsified by the averments in the counter affidavit. In paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit, it is stated that "the enquiry was conducted on 28th July 1983 in the presence of the petitioner. The two invigilators referred to above were also present at the time of enquiry. The enquiry officer examined two invigilators who detected the misconduct and the explanation of the petitioner was also sought". Evidently, petitioner did not choose to cross examine them. That was because the invigilators purported to go back on their first report, Ext. R-2(a). Petitioner did not examine any witnesses. These averments in the counter affidavit are not rebutted by the petitioner. Thus, it is false to say that the petitioner was not aware of the enquiry. Therefore, his present stand that the enquiry was conducted contrary to principles of natural justice could not be true. Petitioner has not come to court with clean hands. He has suppressed truth and indulged in falsehood. 6. In Ext. R-2(a), the two invigilators clearly stated that at 3.05 p.m. on 6th April 1983 they found two pieces of loose sheets on the table of the petitioner and the petitioner was referring to those sheets. They gave Ext. R-2(a) written report to the Chief Superintendent. The report contains a clear statement to this effect. The two loose sheets as well as the answer book were taken away and a fresh answer book was supplied to him. They affixed their signatures to Ext. R-2(a). They gave Ext. R-2(a) written report to the Chief Superintendent. The report contains a clear statement to this effect. The two loose sheets as well as the answer book were taken away and a fresh answer book was supplied to him. They affixed their signatures to Ext. R-2(a). However, when they were examined by the enquiry officer, they went back on Ext, R-2(a) and stated that the two pieces of manuscript paper were taken from the lower cup-board of the drawing I table occupied by the petitioner and they did not see the petitioner referring to the manuscript while writing the examination. The enquiry officer submitted report dated 30th July 1983 accepting the statement given by the invigilators during enquiry and not acting on Ext. R-2(a) and, concluding that the charges were not proved. Standing Committee of the Syndicate examined the report and the records of the enquiry, accepted the report regarding the second charge and rejected the report regarding the first charge. The first charge was that petitioner brought to the examination hall written manuscript in violation of R.10(1) of the Instructions to candidates appearing for the University Examinations. R.10(1) states that, "Introducing into the examination hall any book, manuscript, slate, photograph or other material except authorised ones". by a candidate is a malpractice. In consultation with the Syndicate Standing Committee, the Vice-Chancellor provisionally decided on the punishment on the first charge and consequently Ext. P-2 show cause memo was issued proposing punishment. 7. The earliest version of the invigilators is contained! in Ext. R-2(a) which bears their signatures. In Ext. R-2(a) they clearly stated that two pieces of loose sheets were found; on the table of petitioner and he was referring to those sheets of paper. The sheets of paper were seized. During the formal enquiry, the invigilators, strangely went back on their earlier version in Ext. R-2(a) and said that sheets of paper were found in the lower cup-board of the table. The Standing Committee evidently found the earlier version more reliable. I find nothing illegal, arbitrary of mala fide in the conclusion reached by the Standing Committee. Petitioner cannot insist on being heard by the Standing Committee before arriving at any conclusion. Even so, he had opportunity to show his innocence when he was given opportunity to show cause under Ext. P-2. 8. I find nothing illegal, arbitrary of mala fide in the conclusion reached by the Standing Committee. Petitioner cannot insist on being heard by the Standing Committee before arriving at any conclusion. Even so, he had opportunity to show his innocence when he was given opportunity to show cause under Ext. P-2. 8. The main stress laid by learned counsel for the petitioner was on the non supply to the petitioner of a copy of the enquiry officer's report. According to him, principles of natural justice required that a copy of the report should have been given to him before he was asked to show cause against the proposed punishment under Ext. P-2 and Ext, P-2 as well as the final order Ext. P-8 are therefore vitiated. To show that a person like the petitioner is entitled to a copy of the report, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in O.P. 7655 of 1983 (See 1983 KLT Short Notes 39). 9. We will have to look into the statutory provisions in this regard. There is no doubt that the Syndicate of the Calicut University is the body having authority in this matter. S.23 of the Calicut University Act, 1975 states that subject to the provisions of the Act and the Statutes, the executive power of the University shall be vested in the Syndicate. Clause (xii) refers to supervision and control over discipline. Clause (xiv) gives the Syndicate authority to conduct examinations and approve and publish the results. Clause (xix) authorises it to delegate it's power to the Vice-Chancellor or to a committee of it's members. Clause (xxi) authorises it to withhold or cancel result of any candidate at any University examination. Clause (xxiv) relates to exercise of such other powers and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Act, Statutes, Ordinances, Rules, by laws and orders. Chapter 6 of the Calicut University First Statutes deals with powers of the Syndicate. The powers and duties are laid down in Statute 3. Clause (vii) deals with the power to manage and regulate all executive affairs of the University and for that purpose to appoint such agents as it may think fit. Clause (xxi) gives the power to make arrangements for examinations to be conducted in accordance with the laws of the University and for supervision of such examinations. Clause (vii) deals with the power to manage and regulate all executive affairs of the University and for that purpose to appoint such agents as it may think fit. Clause (xxi) gives the power to make arrangements for examinations to be conducted in accordance with the laws of the University and for supervision of such examinations. Clause (xxii) gives the power to withdraw permission for a student to appear at an examination for conduct which in the opinion of the Syndicate justifies his exclusion, According to clause (xxiii), if a candidate is found guilty of using or attempting to use unfair means at an examination, the Syndicate may cancel his examination and also debar him from appearing at the examination of the University for one or more years according to the nature of the offence committed by the candidate. If the University intends to award any of the penalties, it shall give an opportunity to the candidate concerned to show cause in writing within a j week from the date on which the letter is served on him as f to why the proposed penalty may not be imposed on him and shall consider the explanation, if any, filed within the specified time before awarding the penalty. Under clause (xxiv), the Syndicate may cancel the examination of a candidate and debar him from appearing at an examination for one or more years if it is discovered afterwards that the candidate was in any manner guilty of mis-conduct in connection with his examination. Under Statute 4, the Syndicate may by resolution delegate such powers as it deems fit to the Vice-Chancellor. 10. Rules framed regarding misconduct in University examinations are also placed before me. Any misconduct must be immediately brought to the notice of the Chief Superintendent and the Principal of the College. The Principal shall send a detailed report containing specific charges. If the University after examining the report satisfied that there is prima facie case, it shall request the Principal of the College to appoint an enquiry officer and to submit a report of the enquiry. The Principal shall appoint an enquiry officer to conduct an enquiry. The Principal shall send a detailed report containing specific charges. If the University after examining the report satisfied that there is prima facie case, it shall request the Principal of the College to appoint an enquiry officer and to submit a report of the enquiry. The Principal shall appoint an enquiry officer to conduct an enquiry. The enquiry officer shall frame charges and a copy of the charges together with the statement of facts shall be sent to the examinee and he shall be called upon to submit his explanation within a specified date to be mentioned in the notice. If the enquiry officer, after perusal of the explanation, finds that further enquiry is necessary, he shall give notice in writing to the examinee stating that the oral enquiry will take place on a specified date and at a specified place and the examinee is expected to be present at the time. If witnesses are proposed to be examined, a list of such witnesses has to be supplied to the examinee, who shall have the right to cross examine them. If any document is intended to be used in the enquiry, the examinee should have access to such document. He shall have the right to let in oral or documentary evidence. The report of such enquiry together with the records of the enquiry and the recommendation of the enquiry officer shall be sent to the Controller of Examinations. The Vice-Chancellor in consultation with the Sub-Committee on Discipline constituted by the Syndicate shall take a provisional decision as to the penalty to be imposed on the examinee. The provisional decision shall be communicated to the examinee by the Controller of Examinations calling upon him to show cause within a reasonable time against the particular penalty sought to be imposed. The representation, if any, submitted by the examinee shall be taken into consideration before the final order imposing the penalty is passed by the Vice-Chancellor. There is no doubt that the above provisions have been followed in regard to the enquiry against the petitioner and the subsequent steps taken against him. The Act, Statutes or the Rules do not contain a provision requiring a copy of the enquiry officer's report to be given to the examinee. Nevertheless, it is the contention of the petitioner that principles of natural justice required it to be given. 11. The Act, Statutes or the Rules do not contain a provision requiring a copy of the enquiry officer's report to be given to the examinee. Nevertheless, it is the contention of the petitioner that principles of natural justice required it to be given. 11. Considering the provisions having a bearing on the question of action for misconduct at an examination, the serious and grave consequences flowing from such an action on the future of an examinee, the provisions regarding the nature of enquiry provided and the manner of disposal of the case, it could be said that the disciplinary authority is required to act quasi judicially. Broadly stated, principles of natural justice would apply to such a case. See Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas AIR 1950 SC 222 . Principles of natural justice, However, are not embodied rules. They cannot be put in a straight jacket. Which particular principle will apply to a given case depends upon the circumstances of the case. Each principle may have several shades, nuances or facets. Which shade, nuance or facet would govern a case will again depend on the circumstances. Tucker L. J., observed in Russell v. Norfolk 1949 (1) All ER 109. There are in my view no words which are of universal application to every action of enquiry and every action of domestic tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of enquiry", the rules under which the domestic tribunal is acting, the subject matter that is being dealt with and so forth." The nature and degree of compliance with principles of natural justice would not be uniform in all cases. Courts have always sought to distinguish between disciplinary proceedings in civil service, industrial employment and academic bodies. However, in all instances, reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and the insistence on the Authority to act fairly, impartially and reasonably are recognized. In cases of disciplinary action against civil servants, a high degree of compliance with principles of natural justice is insisted upon. (See State of Gujarat v. R. G. Teredesai AIR 1969 SC 1294 and State of Maharashtra v. B. A. Joshi AIR 1969 SC 1302 . 12. In disciplinary enquiries by academic bodies, certain other factors will have to be taken into consideration. The freedom of academic world has to be shown due respect. (See State of Gujarat v. R. G. Teredesai AIR 1969 SC 1294 and State of Maharashtra v. B. A. Joshi AIR 1969 SC 1302 . 12. In disciplinary enquiries by academic bodies, certain other factors will have to be taken into consideration. The freedom of academic world has to be shown due respect. Care must be taken to safeguard such institutions from any possible disruption which may be caused by requiring them to rigidly follow principles of natural justice. Their duty to maintain discipline and standards should not be ignored. In such cases strict application of rules of natural justice may not always be insisted upon. Principles of natural justice are not inflexible. What would normally be insisted upon is fair play in action. As Prof. H. W. R. Wade observed at pages 501 and 502 of Administrative Law fifth edition "Courts have in general held that academic disciplinary proceedings require the observance of the principles of natural justice; but equally they have refused to apply unduly strict standards, provided the proceedings are substantially fair. (See also Herring v. Dempleman and others 1973 (3) All ER 569, Raghavan v. D. E. O., Attingal 1971 KLT 658 , Hari Nath v. Rajendra Medical College AIR 1973 SC 1260 , Sudheer v. Headmistress, H. S., Panoor 1975 KLT 834, Thampan v. Principal, Medical College, Calicut 1979 KLT 45 , Principal, Govt. Engineering College v. John 1979 KLT 686 . 13. There are precedents where supply of copy of the enquiry officer's report has been insisted upon by courts. (See K. P. B. Nair v. The Director of Civilian Personnel 1970 KLJ 1041 , Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala 1962 KLT 740 . But these cases relate to disciplinary action against Govt. employees. This principle may not be applied to disciplinary proceedings against students by academic bodies for misconduct in examination or otherwise. This is the view taken by this Court in Jacob Mathew v. Professor of Medicine 1966 KLT 866 , University of Kerala v. Suresh Koshy George 1968 KLT 896 , and in Kurien v. Raghavan and others 1968 KLT 827 . The Supreme Court took the same view in confirming the judgment of this Court in. 1968 KLT 896 in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala 1969 KLT 290 . The problem of adopting unfair means at examination is a serious and grave problem in the academic world. The Supreme Court took the same view in confirming the judgment of this Court in. 1968 KLT 896 in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala 1969 KLT 290 . The problem of adopting unfair means at examination is a serious and grave problem in the academic world. Courts would be slow to interfere with the decisions of domestic Tribunals appointed by academic bodies. Of course, where there is justification to do so, interference is warranted. Enquiry held by the domestic tribunals in such cases also must be fair and the delinquent student must be given adequate opportunity to defend himself and fair play must be assured. 14. It is not a principle of natural justice that in every case where an enquiry is conducted by an enquiry officer, a copy of the report of the enquiry should be given to the delinquent. If he knew the case and evidence against him and if he had been given opportunity to contradict the evidence against him, then requirements of natural justice are satisfied. This is so in the case of domestic enquiries in the academic field. The fact that rules do not provide for a copy of the report to be given is relevant though not conclusive. (See the observations in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala 1969 KLT 896. 15. As against this, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in O. P. 7655 of 1983. The case related to tampering with mark lists by a member of staff at the instance of a student. An enquiry was ordered by the Registrar. Petitioner appeared before the Registrar and denied the charge. Registrar submitted report to the Controller of Examinations and to the police. The crime case was ultimately dropped. Thereafter, the Vice-Chancellor appointed an enquiry officer to conduct an enquiry. Memo of charges was served on the student, The enquiry officer submitted his report and the Controller of examinations issued memo requiring him to show cause why punishment should not be imposed on him. The Vice-Chancellor having considered the enquiry report, in Consultation with the Standing Committee, provisionally decided to impose a punishment. At that stage, the student came to this Court seeking to quash the entire proceedings. When the Original Petition was disposed of final order had not been passed by the Vice-Chancellor. The Vice-Chancellor having considered the enquiry report, in Consultation with the Standing Committee, provisionally decided to impose a punishment. At that stage, the student came to this Court seeking to quash the entire proceedings. When the Original Petition was disposed of final order had not been passed by the Vice-Chancellor. This Court found no substance in the contention that the petitioner had no opportunity to participate in the enquiry or to cross examine the witnesses. It was suggested to this Court that the final order should not be passed without a copy of the enquiry report being supplied to the student. The learned Judge after referring to Suresh Koshy v. University of Kerala AIR 1969 SC 598, Hari Nath v. Rajendra Medical College AIR 1973 SC 1260 and Swadesi Cotton Mills v. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 818 observed: "In the present case one of the grounds urged in this writ petition is of the violation of natural justice on account of the failure of the respondents to supply a copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner. In the circumstances it should be taken that there is a demand for a copy of the enquiry report. The punishment proposed as per Ext. P-4 is provisional and is based on the findings in the enquiry report. It is open to the petitioner to submit his explanation to Ext. P-4 and satisfy the authorities that the proposed punishment based on the findings in the enquiry report cannot be imposed on him, and in that context it is also open to him to challenge the correctness of the findings contained in the enquiry report. The respondents will have to furnish a copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner to enable him to make an effective representation against the proposed punishment." The Original Petition was, however, dismissed as premature. 16. The facts of the case are clearly distinguishable. What is the rationale in holding that principles of natural justice require a copy of the report to be given to the delinquent student? It is that the delinquent should know what exactly are the findings and how those findings have been arrived at so that he may meet them when he is called upon to show cause by the disciplinary authority. It is that the delinquent should know what exactly are the findings and how those findings have been arrived at so that he may meet them when he is called upon to show cause by the disciplinary authority. Assuming that in such circumstances he should be given a copy of the enquiry report (and the weight of authority is against any such assumption), that principle will not apply to the present case. Here, the enquiry officer's report was in favour of the delinquent. He did not have to challenge the report of the enquiry officer. He did not have to show why or how the enquiry officer's report should not be acted upon. Therefore, it cannot be said that natural justice demanded that a copy of the enquiry officer's report should have been given to him. The decision against him rested not on the report of the enquiry officer but in spite of it and on the materials on record, which were known to the petitioner. The materials are Ext. R-2(a), report of the invigilators, the report of the Principal, the manuscript papers seized from him and the like. All these materials were referred to during the enquiry conducted in the presence of the petitioner. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I am not able to agree that principles of natural justice required that the petitioner should have been given a copy of the report. I am not able to agree that the action taken against the petitioner is vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice. 17. It is contended for the petitioner that the report of the enquiry officer is final and could not be departed from. The argument is rested on the Rules. The Rules require the enquiry officer to submit to the Controller of Examinations his report along with the records of the enquiry and his recommendation. The Vice-Chancellor, in consultation with the Sub-Committee constituted by the Syndicate, is to take a provisional decision as to the penalty f to be imposed. The argument is that the Syndicate and f the Vice-Chancellor are to take a decision regarding penalty based on the conclusion of the enquiry officer. The argument does not stand to reason. The function of the f enquiry officer is fact finding. He has to gather the necessary materials and of course give his own conclusion. The argument is that the Syndicate and f the Vice-Chancellor are to take a decision regarding penalty based on the conclusion of the enquiry officer. The argument does not stand to reason. The function of the f enquiry officer is fact finding. He has to gather the necessary materials and of course give his own conclusion. The disciplinary authority is the Syndicate and it is for the Syndicate to take an appropriate decision on the question whether the charge has been proved or not, of course, after considering the report and the records. It is not possible to agree that the report of the enquiry officer must be treated as being final. 18. It is next contended that even accepting the punishment imposed namely cancellation of the first and second semester examinations and debarring him from taking these two examinations for two more chances, if the final order had been passed early, the petitioner could have appeared for the first two semester examinations in March, 1984 and for the third and fourth semester examinations in August, 1984. On account of the delay, petitioner has been prevented from writing these examination in 1984 and that would cause him irreparable injury. This relevant circumstances, it is said, has not been taken into consideration by the Committee or the Vice-Chancellor. Learned counsel for the petitioner also compared the petitioner's case with the case of Abdul Lathif. I have already indicated that in Abdul Lathif's case final order could be passed without delay because he admitted his guilt. Petitioner denied the charges and therefore oral enquiry had to be held. This contributed to the delay in the final disposal of the disciplinary proceedings. I do not find anything illegal or malafide in the punishment imposed on the petitioner. 19. The examinations taken by the petitioner for the first and second semester have been cancelled. He was allowed by the University to provisionally write the third semester examination. In spite of the embargo imposed on the petitioner, the Principal provisionally allowed him to write the fourth semester examination. The result of the third semester examination has been withheld. The answer sheets of the fourth semester examination have not been valued. He was provisionally, admitted to the fifth semester course. He applied to appear for the second and fourth semester examinations. The application was rejected under Ext. P-4 on 16th March 1984. The result of the third semester examination has been withheld. The answer sheets of the fourth semester examination have not been valued. He was provisionally, admitted to the fifth semester course. He applied to appear for the second and fourth semester examinations. The application was rejected under Ext. P-4 on 16th March 1984. On 13th June 1984 he was removed from the rolls of the fifth semester course. This is challenged by the petitioner. 20. The engineering course extends over four academic years divided into eight semesters. There is examination at the end of every semester. If a student does not take an examination at the end of each semester he will not be allowed to take the next semester examination. Examination for semesters 1 and 5 are held simultaneously. Similarly, examinations for semesters 2 and 6, 3 and 7 and 4 and 8. Under the regulations, to attend the fourth semester course, a student should, have passed the first semester, With the punishment imposed on the petitioner the result is that he did not pass the first and second semester examinations. Therefore, he could not attend even the fourth semester though actually he attended it provisionally and he was enabled to attend the fifth semester course also provisionally. This is certainly contrary to the regulations, That was why his name was removed from rolls of the fifth semester. This appears to be justified in view of the regulations. By way of amendment to the Original Petition, the regulations are also challenged. However, the O.P. does not state why or how the regulations must be deemed to be illegal. I do not find anything illegal in the regulations. It follows that the petitioner is not entitled to any reliefs in this Original Petition. However, I have to point out that if the punishment imposed on the petitioner is to have its full effect, petitioner would loose two years of academic life. The fact remains that the passing of the final order was delayed to some extent. It is for the Syndicate to consider whether some relaxation could be shown to the petitioner from the rigour of the regulations, if the Syndicate has power to do so. With this observation, the O.P. is dismissed.