J. D. Join, J. ( 1 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents has made a two fold submission. In the first instance, he has urged that the petitioner did not approach the Sub-Divisional Magistrate with clean hands inasmuch as he suppressed some vital facts in order to obtain a favourable order. As pointed out by him, the petitioner suppressed the fact that Karan Singh, respondent No. I was father of the deceased tenant. He also suppressed the fact that Smt. Krishna Devi, being widow of the deceased, was in possession of the plot in dispute. Secondly, the petitioner has tried to take advantage of his own wrong inasmuch as after the death of Ramesh Kumar he made frantic efforts to somehow dispossess his widow and father. So, he concocted the story of his being in possession of the rest of the plot excluding the tenanted room although the fact was that the whole of the premises were in the tenancy and possession of Ramesh Kumar, deceased. He has also invited my attention to para 4 of the application of the petitioner under Section 145 of the Code in which he had stated that the petitioner tried to get the room vacated from respondent Nos. I and 2. Thus, the precise argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents is that he had no right or justification to get the demised premises vacated and this paragraph shows clearly the malafide intention of the petitioner that his prayer for initiation of proceedings under Section 145 was just a subterfuge to somehow throw out the respon- dents from the plot in question. The further argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate should have taken into consideration all these facts which were speaking eloquently about the evil design of the petitioner and as such the Sub-Divisional Magistrate committed a serious error in discarding the police report which reflected the true state of affairs. There was hardly any justification or basis for the learned Magistrate to discard the police report as being biased or partisan. ( 2 ) ON a consideration of the whole matter, I am unable to find any fault with the approach of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate. Admittedly, there was a fight between the parties on the night between 28/29th June 1983 in which two persons one from each party sustained injuries. ( 2 ) ON a consideration of the whole matter, I am unable to find any fault with the approach of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate. Admittedly, there was a fight between the parties on the night between 28/29th June 1983 in which two persons one from each party sustained injuries. It is true that on the basis of the report lodged by respondent No. I a case under Section 452 Indian Penal Code has been registered against the sons and son-in-law of the petitioner. However, it is difficult to infer from this fact alone that the allegations. contained in the FIR must be correct as the same have yet to be substantiated at the trial. Mere pendency of a criminal case under Section 452 IPC does not stand in the way of the Magistrate assuming jurisdiction under Section 145 of the Code and drawing up a preliminary order provided, of course, the conditions laid therein are satisfied. The petitioner has come out with a parallel version that in fact he was in actual physical possession of the plot in question excepting the room and his sons used to sleep there. So, according to him, it was the party of the respondents who were aggressors and tried to throw them out of the plot on the aforesaid night. Under these circumstances, the conclusion drawn by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate that there did exist a dispute between the parties which was likely to cause breach of peace cannot be said to be ill-founded or untenable. As stated above, the question whether upon the materials placed before him proceedings should be instituted under Section 145 is one entirely within the Magistrate s jurisdiction and the revisional court can interfere with. the Magistrate s discretion only in exceptional cases when the order is patently unreasonable and unjustifiable. ( 3 ) THE learned Additional Sessions Judge has referred to some documents including a receipt dated 25th February 1971 which was placed- by the respondents on record alongwith their written statement etc. Obviously, the learned Additional Sessions was not justified in looking to documents and other material on record on which the satisfaction of the Magistrate did not rest. He could examine the legality and validity of the preliminary order only on the basis of the material which had influenced the satisfactio. i of the Magistrate. Obviously, the learned Additional Sessions was not justified in looking to documents and other material on record on which the satisfaction of the Magistrate did not rest. He could examine the legality and validity of the preliminary order only on the basis of the material which had influenced the satisfactio. i of the Magistrate. , Even then as a revisional court he could not go into the sufficiency of the information which had satisfied the Magistrate. (See R. H. Bhulani v. Manij. Desaiandohers, AIR 1961 SC 1444, wherein it was held that: "the satisfaction under Sub-section (1) of Section 145 is of the Magistrate The question whether on the materials before him, he should initiate proceedings or not is, therefore, in his discretion which, no doubt has to be exercised in accordance with the well recognised rules of law in thatbehalf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The language of the sub-section is clear and unambiguous that he can arrive at his satisfaction both from the police report or "from other information" which must inchide an application by the party dispossessed. The High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, would not go into the question of sufficiency of material which has satisfied the Magistrate. " ( 4 ) IT is thus manifest that the impugned order is vitiated by this material irregularity on the part of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and as such it cannot be sustained. An argument was also advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents that the preliminary order was drawn up by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate after about three months of the application made by the petitioner and in the absence of any recurrence of breach of peace since 29th June 1983 the Magistrate could not justifiably take the view that there was likelihood breach of peace. In other words, likelihood of breach of peace should have existed not only on the date of application under Section 145 but also on the date of preliminary ordpr under Section 145 (1 ). This argument, to my mind, is utterly misconceived. In R. H. Bhutani s case (supra) the Supreme Court observed that: "therefore, it was said, there was no longer any dispute on the date of the order likely to lead to breach of peace and consequently the order did not comply with the requirements of Section 145 (i) and was without jurisdiction. This reasoning would mean that if a party takes the law into his hands and deprives forcibly and wrongfully the other party of his possession, the party so dispossessed cannot have the benefit of Section 145, as by the time he files his application and the Magistrate passes his order, the dispossession would be complete and, therefore, there would be no existing dispute likely to cause breach of peace. Such a construction of Section 145, in our view, is not correct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The proviso is founded on the principle that forcible and wrongful dispossession is not to be recognised under criminal law. So, that it is not possible to say that such an act of dispossession was completed before the date of order. To say otherwise would mean that if a party who is forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed does not in retaliation take the law into his hands, he should be at disadvantage and cannot have the benefit of Section 145. In view of this clear enunciation of law on the subject, there is no room for entertaining such a plea. Facts . ( 5 ) THE petitioner, in his application submitted that he was the owner of plot No. 1598 Basti Bhoop Singh, Nangal Raya, New Delhi, and one Late Shri Ramesh Kumar was in possession of a part of the said plot as a tenant. After the death of Ramesh Kumar, two Respondents Karan Singh and his son Trilok Chand took possession of the portion in which Ramesh was a tenant. Petitioner alleged that the two respondents tried to take illegal possession of the portion-in-possession of the petitioner on 14-1-1983 but the attempt was foiled. After the death of Ramesh Kumar, two Respondents Karan Singh and his son Trilok Chand took possession of the portion in which Ramesh was a tenant. Petitioner alleged that the two respondents tried to take illegal possession of the portion-in-possession of the petitioner on 14-1-1983 but the attempt was foiled. The petitioner further alleged that on the night of 28/29-6-1983 respondents took illegal and forcible possession of the entire demised plot. The petitioner apprehended breach of peace and therefore moved on application before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The Sub-divisional Magistrate called for a report from the Station House Officer, Delhi Cantonment and the latter submitted his report on 6-9-1983. ( 6 ) AFTER persuing the complaint as well as the police report the learned Magistrate was of the view that the police report was biased and irrelevant. He observed that it had exceeded its mandate inasmuch as the police had virtually given findings as to who was in actual possession of the land whereas the task of the police was simply to inform the court if any dispute likely to cause breach of peace existed or not. So, he dubbed the police report as highly partisan and unreasonable and observed that he was satisfied that there did exist apprehension of breach of peace arising out of the dispule between the parties over the possession of the plot in question. Hence, he passed a preliminary order under Section 145 (1) of the Code of 22nd November 1983. ( 7 ) FEELING aggrieved by the said order the respondents filed a revision petition in the Court of Session who vide impugned order dated 9th February 1984 set aside the preliminary order and quashed the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code. ( 8 ) IN the present petition, against the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the Hon ble High Court set aside the order of the learned Additional Session Judge and restored the order of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate.