Judgment 1. THIS application under Sections 401 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is directed against an order dated 7. 10. 80 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 3rd Court, Alipore in Complaint case No. 3037 of 1977 (T. R. 883/78) discharging the accused/opposite party No. 1, holding that the case was not maintainable. 2. ON the basis of a First Information report lodged by the petitioner against the opposite party No. 1, G. R. Case No. 111 of 1974, was started before the Judicial Magistrate, 8th Court, Alipore on a charge sheet submitted by the Polios under Section 406 I.P.C. On 25.3.77 the learned Magistrate discharged the opposite party No. 1 on the ground that the case was barred by limitation under the provisions of Section 468 of the new code of Criminal Procedure. Thereafter the petitioner filed a petition of complaint against the opposite party No. 1 and process under Sections 468/420 I. P. C was issued in the said Case No. 3037 of 1977 by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate against the opposite party No, 1, which ultimately resulted in the impugned order of discharge dated 7. 10. 80 of the opposite party No, 1. In the said impugned order of discharge dated 7. 10. 80 it was held that as the case was not maintainable, the accused (opposite party No. 1) was discharged, since the charge-sheet in G. R. Case No. 111 of 1974 and the present complaint arose out of the same incident, between the same parties. 3. IN the impugned order of discharge dated 7. 10. 80, the leamed Magistrate relied upon the decisions reported in 1979 Calcutta Law Journal 539 (Hasim abdul Halim vs. Syed Ellahi Buksh and anr. In this case it was held by A. N. Banerji, J, that a second complaint on the same allegations and facts as in a previous complaint was hot entertainable as the complainant had no right to file a fresh complaint on the same facts when the first complaint had been rejected even though on a technical ground (noncompliance with the provisions of Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. MR. 4. MR. Bose, learned Advocate for the petitioner has sought to distinguish this case on the ground that in the present case there is only one complaint, the first proceeding having been instituted on a charge-sheet submitted by the police after investigation on the basis of a first information report lodged by the petitioner against the opposite party No. 1. Mr. Roy, learned Advocate for the opposite party No. 1, apart from relying on the aforesaid decision has also relied on the case reported in 31 Criminal Law journal 687 (Emperor vs. Alias. In this case a Division Bench of the Sind Judicial Commissioner's Court held that though there is no absolute bar to an accused person being again put in perie of a fresh trial in respect of the same offence in a case where the first trial has ended in an order of discharge, it is a well recognised and salutory rule of law that a magistrate of Co-ordinate jurisdiction should not entertain a fresh complaint, in respect of the same offence when it is based on facts which are known to the complainant and an evidence which was available when the first trial was held. A departure from this rule is in effect an assumption by the Magistrate of the powers of the Appellate Court and is utterly contrary to sound principle. 5. WHEN the police submitted a charge-sheet against the opposite party No. 1 only under Section 406 I. P. C. in G. R. Case No. 111 of 1974, the petitioner accepted that position and did not move any court. When the learned Magistrate thereafter discharged the opposite party No. 1, the petitioner did not move any Court for the purpose of setting aside the said order of discharge. Instead the petitioner filed the petition of Complaint (Complaint Case No. 3037 of 1977) against the opposite party No. 1 relating to the same incident and facts out of which G. R. Case No. 111 of 1974 arose, which ended in the impugned order of discharge dated 7. 10. 80. It is true that in the present case there was no previous complaint to any Court, but the principles laid down in the two cases discussed above apply, broadly speaking. 6. 10. 80. It is true that in the present case there was no previous complaint to any Court, but the principles laid down in the two cases discussed above apply, broadly speaking. 6. REVISIONAL Jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to be exercised normally only tin exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in procedure or there is a manifest error of a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice (AIR 1973 Supreme court 799-Amar Chand Agarwalla vs. Shanti Bose and anr. It has been also held in the same case by the Supreme Court that inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In my view, the facts of the present case and the conduct of the petitioner as discussed above, do not justify either the exercise of any inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure or any interference with the impugned order of discharge dated 7. 10. 80 in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the said code. This application fails and is dismissed. The Rule is discharged.