Kamal Lal v. Mohan Lal — 1984 DIGILAW 220 (ALL)

JUDGMENT M. Wahajuddin, J. - Criminal Misc. Application No. 8206 of 1982, for final hearing, has been preferred by Smt. Kamla Kumari, while Criminal Misc. Applications Nos. 2986 of 1983, 8337 of 1983 and 2775 of 1981 have been preferred by Pan Singh and others, Uma Shanker & others and Hari Shanker and others respectively and are for admission. In all these cases a common question of law is involved, so they are disposed of together. 2. One of the points raised in them by the concerned applicants is that Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act is ultra vires, and that section and Section 494, IPC, read together are violative of the Constitution. 3. Criminal Misc. Case No. 8207 of 1982 is for quashing the entire proceeding arising out of criminal case No. 496 of 1982, pending in the court of IV Judicial Magistrate, Hathras. The case is under Section 494, IPC. It would appear that the applicant has been summoned under Section , IPC, on a complaint of Mohan Lal, opposite party. It is maintained that the petitioner also filed a complaint under Sections 177, 323, 452 and 504, IPC against Mohan Lal and others and the accused persons in that case were summoned, and Mohan Lal has filed the complaint Under Section 494, IPC just as a counter blast. In addition to that the vires of Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act and Section 494, IPC has been challenged. 4. In Criminal Misc. Case No. 2986 of 1983, the prayer is for quashing the proceedings in criminal case No. 1143 of 1982, in which the applicants have been summoned under Sections 494 and 109, IPC on a private complaint filed by opposite party No. 1, who is the wife of applicant No. 1. It is maintained that the petitioner, which would mean petitioner No. 1, had filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, which was decreed, and he also filed a suit for the custody of the children tinder Section 10 of the Guardians and Wards Act. It is, further, maintained that none of the applicants have committed any offence and that the complaint is vague. In addition to that it is further maintained that the provisions of Section 17 of Hindu Marriage Act and Section 494, IPC are ultra vires. 5. In Criminal Misc. It is, further, maintained that none of the applicants have committed any offence and that the complaint is vague. In addition to that it is further maintained that the provisions of Section 17 of Hindu Marriage Act and Section 494, IPC are ultra vires. 5. In Criminal Misc. Case No. 8337 of 1983 there is a prayer for quashing the proceedings in criminal case No. 543 of 1979, initiated on the complaint of opposite party No. 1 Smt. Geeta Devi, wife of petitioner No. 1. It would appear that the applicants were summoned. Thereafter the opposite party No. 1 did not appear on 11-8-79 and it is urged that the applicants were discharged, but a fresh complaint has been filed and they have been summoned which could not be done. 6. In Criminal Case No. 2775 of 1981 there is a prayer for quashing the entire proceedings in criminal case No. 811 of 1980 and to quash the order of the Vth Additional Sessions Judge in Criminal Revision No. 27 of 1981 and the order of II Additional Sessions Judge, Aligarh, allowing the criminal revision No. 6 of 1980. It would appear that the Magistrate summoned only Bari Shanker, applicant No. 1, Sampi, applicant No. 10, and Brij Kishore, applicant No. 22, vide its order dated 10-11-1976. The II Addititional Sessions Judge in criminal revision No. 6 of 1980 vide its order dated 11-6-1980 directed that the Magistrate may consider the evidence against the rest of the accused persons, against whom the complaint has been dismissed. It would further appear that another criminal decision No. 27 of 1981 was preferred by Hari Shanker and that revision has been dismissed. All these orders are sought to be quashed. 7. It is, further, urged that Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act and Section 494, IPC, are ultra vires. While other pleas were also raised, I have not been addressed on those pleas. Apart from that, this Court will not look into question of facts, nor can it be considered at this stage in a proceeding wider Section 482, Cr. P. C. concerned with the exercise of inherent powers. 8. While other pleas were also raised, I have not been addressed on those pleas. Apart from that, this Court will not look into question of facts, nor can it be considered at this stage in a proceeding wider Section 482, Cr. P. C. concerned with the exercise of inherent powers. 8. I was held in the case of Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan, AIR 1983 SC 67 , which is the latest pronouncement, that the Court exercising inherent powers would simply consider the material which were before the Magistrate passing the summoning order, meaning thereby that it would not consider the possible defences and the matter of motivation, which all involve question of facts. Otherwise, also the ordinary procedure is to be observed and when a prima facie case is disclosed by the complaint and any other materials at the stage of Section 200 and 202 Cr. P. C., the Magistrate will be fully justified in summoning the accused persons involved and thereafter it is the trial court which has to proceed unobstructed and it can well examine at the stage of charge itself or at any later stage and if no case is made out or the case is not proved, obviously it would result in the discharge or acquittal. For a prosecution under Section 494 IPC. vital facts involved or whether the husband remarried in the life time of his legally and duly wedded first wife and whether any person or persons assisted, helped or acted in collusion with the husband and abated the offence. These are all serious questions of facts which have to be considered on the basis of the evidence that is lead and the cross-examination of the witnesses, which is conducted, and this is not possible in a proceeding under Section 482 Cr. P.C., here as this Court will not start discharging the functions of the Magistrate instead of leaving the matter of holding criminal trials to the Magistrate. Perhaps with that very consciousness I was addressed only on the matter of vires to the aforesaid Sections. 9. It was no doubt alleged in Criminal Misc. Case No. 8337 of 1983 that after the dismissal of the first complaint a second complaint does not lie. I have not been addressed by the Counsel on this aspect. That point can well be urged before of Magistrate after putting appearance. 9. It was no doubt alleged in Criminal Misc. Case No. 8337 of 1983 that after the dismissal of the first complaint a second complaint does not lie. I have not been addressed by the Counsel on this aspect. That point can well be urged before of Magistrate after putting appearance. On a perusal of the order (Annexure 'A') it appears that all the accused persons had not put in appearance and some were still to appear, when the accused persons were discharged, and in the second complainant it was expressly stated that on the date fixed earlier the complaint was ill and could not appear on account of his illness. When that is the position, at this stage this Court will not consider this aspect on merits and the matter can will be looked into by the Magistrate himself. 10. I now pass to consider the only point on which I have been addressed. Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act runs as follows : "17. Punishment of bigamy- Any marriage between two Hindus solcmrized after the commencement of this Act is void if at the time of such marriage either party had a husband or wife living, and the provision of Sections 494 of the Indian Penal Code shall apply accordingly. Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act lays down the conditions for a valid Hindu Marriage. Section 11 of the Act lays down if any marriage solemnized after this enactment contravenes any of the conditions specified in clause (i) (iv) and (v) of Section 5, such marriage will be void and will be nullity. It, thus, prohibits bigamy. Conditions (i) of Section 5 is that neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage. It is urged that Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act is discriminatory in the following manner : (a) The language used in marriage between two Hindus, hence if the marriage is solemnized between a Hindu and a person of a community other than Hindu it may not be attracted. (b) It is confined to marriage solemnized between Hindus alone and not marriages by persons of other religion and discriminatory on coi side rations of religions. (c) Section 494, IPC, provides punishment for such bigamous, marriage, while any penal provisions dicrininaing or grounds of religion, caste and creed cannot be made, and it would not be a reasonable discrimination. (b) It is confined to marriage solemnized between Hindus alone and not marriages by persons of other religion and discriminatory on coi side rations of religions. (c) Section 494, IPC, provides punishment for such bigamous, marriage, while any penal provisions dicrininaing or grounds of religion, caste and creed cannot be made, and it would not be a reasonable discrimination. It is urged that Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act is ultra vires of Articles 14, 15, 19, 20 and 21 of the Constitution and this Section read with Section 494, IPC, are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14 of the Constitution provides equality before law laying down that these or the equal protection of laws within the territory of India and would not be denied to any person by the State. Article 15 may be quoted verbatim and runs as follows: "15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds or religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth : (1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any one of them. (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability restriction or condition with regard to:- (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment ; or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public. (3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provisions for women and children. (4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citzens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes." Article 19 of the Constitution deals with: (a) to freedom of speech and expression; (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; (c) to form associations or unions; (d) to move freely throughout the territory of India; (e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; (f) to practise any profession, or to carry any occupation, trade or business. None of these provisions concern or relate to any right of marriage in any community. None of these provisions concern or relate to any right of marriage in any community. So this Article is not material in this case. Article 20 of the Constitution provides protection in respect of conviction for offences. There are three sub-clauses. The first clause forbids conviction of any offence, except for violation of law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence and also limits the punishment to the extent that a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at that time cannot be inflicted. Sub-clause (2) forbids prosecution and punishment for the same offence more tan once. Subdues (3) provides that no person accused of any offence shall he co spelled to be a witness against himself. Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. What is being urged is that any law itself, which may subject any person to punishment, cannot be enacted, discriminating between the religion professed by that individual and when penal consequences are to follow the law discriminating on grounds of religion cannot be made. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the applicant that while under the Mohanunedan Law a person can have a number of wives and will not be prosecuted for bigamy, any such provision made for the spouse who are Hindus is a clear discriminate non grounds of religion. 11. Except one ruling or Andhra Pradesh and an Allahabad case on the subject there is no direct authority cited by any side on the point of vires or otherwise of Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The learned Counsel for the applicants has cited a number of pronouncements, though not directly on the point, urging that the principles laid down therein support his stand. 12. The learned Counsel for the applicant relied upon the case of State of Rajasthan v. Pratap Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1208 . The learned Counsel for the applicants has cited a number of pronouncements, though not directly on the point, urging that the principles laid down therein support his stand. 12. The learned Counsel for the applicant relied upon the case of State of Rajasthan v. Pratap Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1208 . In that case levy of cost of additional force was imposed, but Harijan and Muslim inhabitants were exempted under Section 15(5) of the Police Act, 1867 and it was held that such exemption was violative of Article 15(l) of the Constitution, as it discriminated against the law abiding members of the other community and in favour of Muslims and Harijan communities on the basis of only caste and religion. It is noteworthy that it was further stated in the ruling that if there were other grounds, they ought to have been stated in the notification. This observation may mean that there must be a rational for such dis and otherwise there will be a violation of Article 15(l) of the Constitution. 13. Reliance is also placed upon the case of D S. Nakara v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130 . It is a pension case and the matter of grant of liberalised pension and the eligibility criteria device were considered. It would appear that the Government of India issued a memorandum on May 25. 1979, whereby the norm for computation of pension was liberalized, but it was made applicable only to the Government servants, who retired on March 31, 1979, or thereafter. It was held that while reasonable classification is nit forbidden under Article 14 of the Constitution, such classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out from the group and that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Statute in question. 14. Reliance was also placed upon the case of Ram Kishan Dabnia v. S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 . It was held there ought to be nexus, i. e., casual connection between the basis of classification and object of Statute. It was also held that any arbitrariness is bad because it would amount to negation of equality before law. 15. In the aforesaid pronouncement of D S. Nakara a number of rulings were considered. It was held there ought to be nexus, i. e., casual connection between the basis of classification and object of Statute. It was also held that any arbitrariness is bad because it would amount to negation of equality before law. 15. In the aforesaid pronouncement of D S. Nakara a number of rulings were considered. It was held that all pa isioners governed by the 1972 Rules and Arnv Pcnsioa Regulations shall also be entitled to pension under the liberalised pension scheme from the specified date irrespective of the date of retirement. 16. Reliance was further planed upon the case of Mithu v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 473, in which Section 303, IPC was held to be violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution as per majority judgment. Section 303 provided oily death sentence not life it, imprisonment as provided under section 102 IPC, for a previous convict 302, IPC. It was held that such law must necessarily be stigmatised as arbitrary and oppressive Reliance was placed in that upon the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 in which it was held that what is punitively out rangeous scandalisingly unusual or cruel and rechabitatively counter productive, is unreaso nabee and arbitrary aid is hit by Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The . expression 'procedure established by law' in Article 21 has been interpreted to mean in Maneka Gandhi's case that the law must be right, just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. 17. Reliance is also placed upon the case of State of Madras v. Smt. Champakan, AIR 1951 SC 226 , in which it was held that the classification in the communal G.O. fixing proportional seat, for different communities in Sate College; on the basis of religion, race and caste is opted to the Constitution and is a violation of fundamental rights. 18. Reliance was also placed upon the case of Tilakram Rambaksh v. Bank of Patiala, AIR 1959 Pub. 440, but it is hardly helpful in this case. Reliance was also placed upon the case of Smt. Anjali v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1952 Cal. 825 . That pronouncement deals with the scope of Article 15 of the Constitution laying down that Article 15(4) is an exception to Article 15(l). 440, but it is hardly helpful in this case. Reliance was also placed upon the case of Smt. Anjali v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1952 Cal. 825 . That pronouncement deals with the scope of Article 15 of the Constitution laying down that Article 15(4) is an exception to Article 15(l). In this ruling it was held that Sub-clause (3) of Article 15 is an exception of Sub-clause (1) and (2) and the State is not preventing from making any special provision for women and children. Sub-clause (4) was also emphasised providing for special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. This ruling in no way help the applicants, because socially and educationally backwardness can be a reasonable distinction and not arbitrary distinction as a classification. The State has relied upon this ruling. 19. Reliance was also placed upon the case of Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan (supra). It is simply an authority for the proposition that the scope of Section 482, Cr. P.C.. is wider and when no other remedy is available nor specific remedy is provided by the Statute, the Court can exercise inherent powers though sparingly. This ruling has no bearing upon the question of vires of Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Reliance was also placed upon the case of Zohara Khatoon v. Mohammad ibrahim, 1981 MLR 193 = AIR 1981 SC 1243 . This is a case regarding Section 125, Cr. P.C, and dealing with maintenance, in which it was held that notwithstanding any provisions of the Muslim Law, statutory obligation providing for maintenance of divorced wife as contained in Section 125, Cr. P.C., would prevail. It was argued on behalf of the applicant that not only discrimination in substantive law or such enactments, but even in the procedural law would violate the constitutional protection and the scope of constitutional protection has much widened after the later pronouncements of the Supreme Court, some of which have been referred above including Maneka Gandhi's case (supra). 20. Law is to be applied to the individual case and to the specific provisions which are being assailed. 20. Law is to be applied to the individual case and to the specific provisions which are being assailed. I, however, do not dispute that the angle of approach has to be very broad and this Court has nevertheless to exercise its mind whether Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act is violative of any of the Articles of the Constitution, even on taking any broad view. This matter arose for consideration directly in the case of G. Sambireddy v. G. Jayamn, AIR 1972 AP 156 . The vires of Sections 11 and 17 both of the Hindu Marriage Act were assailed and it was held that they were intra vices. It was, further, held that it will be a travesty of the truth to say that it is directed against that class and discriminates against them. It was also held that the classification was not based on religion only and in no way violates Article 15(l) of the Constitution. This ruling has been relied upon on behalf of the Attorney General as well as by the Advocate General. This ruling is subsequent to the enforcement of our present Constitution. So it cannot be distinguished on any such ground. The argument advanced by the applicant's counsel is that this was the earlier law laid down interpreting the Constitution, but since then there have beet, a number of pronouncements widening the scope of the various Articles of the Constitution, protecting certain rights and guarding against the discrimination of any kind to achieve equality before the law, and the procedure of law and the trend of the later pronouncements, relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants and which have already been dealt with, are that discrimination should be struck down. 21. I have considered the rulings cited by the learned Counsel for the applicants. The crux always is whether the classification has been based on any good and real relation or the discrimination is arbitrary. The Constitution provided for the amendment of personal laws as well. I may refer to the concurrent list contained in the Constitution. At serial No. 5 marriage and divorce ; infants and minors ; adoption : wills, intestacy and succession ; joint family and petition have all been included in concurrent list and the Union of India as well as the State both are, therefore, empowered to make any law concerning these matters. At serial No. 5 marriage and divorce ; infants and minors ; adoption : wills, intestacy and succession ; joint family and petition have all been included in concurrent list and the Union of India as well as the State both are, therefore, empowered to make any law concerning these matters. Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act introduces the principles of monogamy. It is noteworthy that Article 44 of the Constitution provides that the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform Civil Code. Christian, Parsis, Jews and Nayers happened to be already monogamous. If a similar provision for monogamy has been made for Hindus also, legislation is to be deemed for the ber:efit of class of persons to whom the Hindu Marriage Act is applicable and the argument that it is in fact directed against that class, making a discrimination, cannot hold water. The personal. laws called for amendment in the larger interest of the class of persons following that Personal Law. It cannot be treated as sacrosanct, which would not permit of any change. Rather Article 44 of the Constitution implies that amendment of such Personal Law were in contemplation and were in the mind of the framers of the Constitution and that is why such a provision was provided in the Constitution itself. In the old time Widow's re-marriage was not permissible under the Hindu Law. The Legislature enacted the Hindu Widow's Remarriage Act, as it was a step for social welfare and reform. Dissolution of Hindu Marriage Act has also been enacted. The framers of the Constitution being well conscious, while guaranteeing the right to freedom of religion under Article 25 of' the Constitution expressly provided under Sub-section (2) that nothing in Sub-section (1) shall prevent the State from making any laws providing for social welfare or reform. The crux of the matter is whether the provisions of Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act can be considered a matter of social welfare and reform amongst the Hindu Society. It will be futile to say that if earlier under any Personal Law bigamy was permitted, it should continue for time immemorial and no change in such laws can be made. It will be futile to say that if earlier under any Personal Law bigamy was permitted, it should continue for time immemorial and no change in such laws can be made. The rules of bigamy are unfair to the fair sex, i.e., female when even personal Laws would not permit the wife to have a second husband in the life time of first husband in absence of dissolution of that marriage. Monogamy on the other hand is a right step towards the advancement of the Society. True that such law has not been enacted for the Muslims as well. Thus. however, would not an aunt to making any discrimination against the If any good piece of legislation is made for their good to enforce monogamy on lager beneficial consideration it would be welcome to that Society as a social reform. It is one thing to say that there should be equality before the law and it is quite a different thing to say that the Personal Laws for all communities and religion should be identical necessarily. When that is the position, the wisdom of the Legislature conies into play. True that Article is (1) says that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of scion etc., but the crux of the matter is, as as rightly pointed out by the Andhra Court, whether the provisions of Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage At discrimiraies against the Hindus and is thereby it is a legislation directed against that class. It is also noteworthy that Hindu Law does not exclusively apply to Hindus, professing Hindu religion alone. In fact Hindu Law and Hindu Marriage Act are applicable to Hindus and some non-Hindus. It is also noteworthy that all discrimination' is not forbidden. A reasonable discrimination on some rational is always permissible. This matter has been dealt with in paragraph 5 of the Andhra Pradesh judgment and I also have the same view. The observations in the case of Anjali Rai v. State of West Benyal (supra) are important. If the discrimination is not based on grounds other than those laid down in Article 15(1) and the discrimination is based not on a rational, then Article 15(1) tray stand, in the way and not in all cases. Apart from that, discrimination and differentiation are two different things. If the discrimination is not based on grounds other than those laid down in Article 15(1) and the discrimination is based not on a rational, then Article 15(1) tray stand, in the way and not in all cases. Apart from that, discrimination and differentiation are two different things. If considering the needs for social reforms in a particular Society, professing particular religion, a differentiation is made it cannot be termed as a discrimination against that class. The position of Hindu Law as it existed when the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, was passed was that there were customary laws, which were equally prevailing in particular in Southern India, and the Personal Law known as Hindu Law was neither a Personal Law of all Hindus, nor a law exclusively of Hindus. If in the circumstances the Legislature thought of codifying the law relating to marriage amongst it Hindus, is no way discriminated as such solely on religion. It is noteworthy that in the definition of 'Hindu' contained in the Hindu Marriage Act, all Hindu including Lingayats, Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj Sect, Buddhists, Jains and 4 Sikhs and all other persons domiciled in India who are not Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews, have been included unless it is proved that such persons would not have been governed by Hindu Law. It also noteworthy that Section II of the Hindu Marriage Act read with 5(1) of that Act rendgrs a marriage void. if one of the parties to the marriage had a spouse living at the time of marriage. When the it is the position, even independently of Section 17 one would he guilty of bigamy, if the first wife or first husband is living. Actually, the objection is to forbid bigamy and when bigamy is forbidden, the penal provisions contained in Section 494, I.P C., would also not be violative. 22. It was argued that Section 17 forbids a second marriage amongst two Hindus. 'If ally of the party to the second marriage is a non-Hindu, he will not he covered. I have considered that aspect also. Hindu Law would not-permit such marriage, if the person is professing Hindu Law at the time of such marriage, because it would be void under Sections 11 & 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act. 'If ally of the party to the second marriage is a non-Hindu, he will not he covered. I have considered that aspect also. Hindu Law would not-permit such marriage, if the person is professing Hindu Law at the time of such marriage, because it would be void under Sections 11 & 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act. It was argued that if such law was to be introduced, it should have been uniform as to be rendered applicable to Muslims as well. I he Muslim Law itself also enjoins certain conditions which have to be fulfilled under the Sharist before taking a second or third or fourth wife in the life time of first one. So it is not an absolute right and sonic care has been taken by the very Personal Law already. Amongst the Muslim also the wife cannot marry a second husband in the life time of the first husband, unless the first marriage is dissolved. So certain restrictions are nevertheless contained in the Muslim Personal law also. Apart from that, the whole matter has to be approached from the angle whether the Legislation for Hindus alone as a step for social reform is permissible or not and I can safety say that it will be travesty to say that such reformative legislation or amendments will be against the provisions of spirit of the Constitution. In fact, it would to nullifying the solutary provisions of Article 44 of the Constitution itself. 23. I am also referred to two other pronouncements, namely, Ram Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 Alld. 334, and Vitthal Maruti v. State, AIR 1952 Bom. 451 . In the Allahabad case of Ram Prasad (supra) the implications of Section 5(1). 11 and 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act and U.P Government Servants Rule 27 (prohibition of bigamy) arose for consideration. It was held that prohibition of bigamy is invalid. In the concluding paragraph 11 it was held that the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act concerning bigamy do not infringe Article 25 of the Constitution and are clearly protected by Clause 2(b) of Article 25 of the Constitution. In that case also the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act prohibiting bigamy were assailed as an infringement to freedom of religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the constitution. In that case also the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act prohibiting bigamy were assailed as an infringement to freedom of religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the constitution. It was held in that case that the two clauses of Article 25, namely Sub-clauses (1) and (2) are to be so read as to he harmonious to each one and there is no real conflict between the two provisions. It was also held that Sub-clause (2) of Article 25 is an exception to Sub-clause (1) of that Article and will remain unaffected by the first clause and in fact the second clause really provides the additional restriction to Sub-clause (I). When that is the position of law, laws relating to social welfare and also relating to social reforms as covered by Sub-clause (2)(b) of Article 25 would be valid and not ultra vires. In fact, in the aforesaid Allahabad case the provisions rendering a second marriage in the life time of the first spouse were assailed and all provisions prohibiting bigamy contained in the Hindu Marriage Act also arose for consideration apart from Rule 27 of the Government Servants Conduct Rules, and the Division Bench view upholding such provisions against bigamy would be binding upon this court. In the case of Vithal Maruti (supra) the provisions of Bombay Beggars Act were assailed on the grounds that they are applicable to beggars not born and domiciled in Bombay. It was urged that the Act makes a discrimination between the beggars born in province of Bombay and house born outside Bombay province. The Bombay High Court held that the discrimination was not only on the ground of place of birth. This Bombay ruling is not much helpful and is simply an authority are to be heard by Single Judge. So I have complete jurisdiction to adjudicate upon all matters which are raised in connection with such proceedings before this court.