JUDGMENT - Vaze V.V., J.: - Should an appellant in a Letters Patent Appeal arising in writ jurisdiction be permitted to raise a new legal ground, not pleaded by him herebefore, for the first time during the hearing of the Letters Patent Appeal?. 2. This is second round of litigation in respect of house No. 94, situated in ward No. 1 Tekdi Road, Sitabuldi, Nagpur, of which K.R. Chourasia was the previous owner and Mr. Shyamlal Gyarsilal Gogayan (Shyamlal) is the present owner. In the first round of litigation it was alleged that the appellant G.G. Chourasia (Gaurishankar) was unauthorisedly occupying the house having been inducted therein as a licensee by the previous landlord. As K.R. Chourasia had sold the house to Shyamlal, an interested person H.S. Bajpai had moved the house allotment Officer for allotment of the premises in question alleging that the occupation of Gaurishankar is unauthorised. The plea prevailed with the House Allotment Officer who ordered the eviction of Gaurishankar but that order was challenged in this Court in Writ Petition No. 2081/81. The matter was remanded to the House Allotment Officer with a direction to afford all opportunities to the parties to lead evidence. 3. Thereafter the House Allotment Officer on the basis of evidence tendered by Mr. K.R. Chousasia the former landlord held that Gaurishankar was not a tenant of the premises and ordered his eviction. Writ Petition No. 1810 of 1983 filed against this order having been dismissed summarily by a learned Single Judge of this Court, the present Letters Patent Appeal is filed. 4. Coming as it does from the mouth of the former landlord K.R. Chourasia who is related to the present occupier Gaurishankar that the present occupier Gaurishankar was inducted into the premisses a licensee for four months but stayed out therefore, we agree that the story of tenancy put up by Gaurishankar was plainly a moon-shine. The learned House Allotment Officer was right in passing an order of eviction against Gaurishankar as his occupation of the premises was unauthorised and in contravention of the provisions of the rent control order. 5. That brings us to an issue which has been raised for the first time in this letters patent appeal. It has been argued that the premises in question viz. 5. That brings us to an issue which has been raised for the first time in this letters patent appeal. It has been argued that the premises in question viz. House No. 94, Tekadi Road, Sitabuldi, Nagpur, feel in ward No. 1, Goulipura Tekadi and Goulipura has been declared to be slum area by the State Government vide its Gazette Notification No. SLM/1075-C.A. 5280 dated 5-2-1976. As a consequence of this declaration-so the argument proceeds an order evicting the occupier from the building situated in that area cannot be executed in view of the bar imposed by section 22 of the Maharahstra Slum Area (Improvement, Clearance and Re-development) Act, 1971, (“Slum Act”). Mr. Madkholkar on behalf of the respondent opposes the raising of a new ground at the stage of letters patent appeal which such a ground was not raised before the learned Single Judge who had summarily rejected the writ petition. 6. In support, Mr. Madkholkar relies on (Eklera China Clay Works and others v. M/s. Ashwin Co. and others)1, A.I.R. 1976 Delhi 283, in which a plea that before passing an order under Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, and Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, the State Government had not obtained a prior approval of the Central Government as required by the first proviso to Rule 32 of 1949 Rules was not allowed to be raised for the first time in the letters patent appeal. It would be seen from the scheme of the mineral concession Rules that revision lies to the Central Government against an order passed by the State Government and the rules themselves provide for obtaining an approval of the Central Government in a matter of allotment of mining leases to an applicant when there are more than one applicant. The revisional authority, and the approving authority are one and the same namely the Central Government. This peculiar feature of the Eklera case was too individual itself to constitute a ratio decidendi for that decision which any way was one of remand of the proceedings on other grounds. The question of the obtaining approval of the Central Government envisaged by the mineral-concession rules is a requirement which is different from a bar sought to be imposed by the Slum Act. The question of the obtaining approval of the Central Government envisaged by the mineral-concession rules is a requirement which is different from a bar sought to be imposed by the Slum Act. The Slum Act, in the very nature of things, does not question the legality or otherwise of an order or a decree of eviction passed by an authority or a Court. It only prohibits the execution of such a decree or offer provided the premises from which the opposite party is being evicted are saturated in a slum area. The philosophy of the Slum Act is akin to that of an act ordering postponement of execution of decrees in selected talukas which are affected by drought or famine. 7. The principles of judicial review of orders passed by administrative Tribunals are by now well settled. Australians have codified the judicial review system by their Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977. Though it is not usual to draw upon the statutory provisions of another Commonwealth country, the grounds listed therein deserve reproduction as they have the merit of affording a neat, little check-list. “(a) that breach of the rules of national justice occurred in connection with the making of the decision; (b) that procedures that were required by law to be observed in connection with the making of the decision were not observed; (c) that the person who purported to make the decision did not have jurisdiction to make the decision; (d) that the decision was not authorised by the enactment in pursuance of which it was purported to be made; (e) that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the enactment in pursuance of which it was purported to be made; (f) that the decision involved an error of law, whether or not the error appears on the record of the decision; (g) that the decision was induced or affected by fraud; (h) that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision; (i) that decision was otherwise contrary to law. 8. 8. The ground (e) referred above regarding improper exercise of power is construed as including a reference to: - (i) taking an irrelevant consideration into account in the exercise of a power; (ii) failing to take a relevant consideration into account in the exercise of a power; (iii) an exercise of a power for a purpose other than a purpose for which the power is conferred; (iv) as exercise of a discretionary power in bad faith; (v) an exercise of a personal discretionary power at the discretion or behest of another person; (vi) an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy without regard to the merits of the particular case; (vii) an exercise of a power that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power; (viii) an exercise of a power in such a way that the result of exercise of the power is uncertain; and (ix) any other exercise of a power in a way that constitutes abuse of the power. 9. Again, an uncertain result, in (viii) above shall not be taken to be made out unless: (x) the person who made the decision was required by law to reach that decision only, if a particular matter was established, and there was no evidence or other material (including facts of which he was entitled to take notice) from which he could reasonably be satisfied that the matter was established; or (y) the person who made the decision based the decision on the existence of a particular fact and that fact did not exist. Thereafter, comes the crunch, a canonical statement intended to set at rest any plea like the one raised in this appeal about the adjective law of pleadings in a writ proceeding. After listing the above grounds the act provides in section 11(6): (z) “the applicant is not limited to grounds set out in his original application”. 10. It is not suggested that the above codification is a deux ex machin to solve problems of judicial review machanically but do contain the quintessence of a long line of English decisions on the subject with certain modifications. Ground (f) above obliterates the doubtful distinction between jurisdictional and non jurisdictional errors while ground (h) above introduces the American” “substantial evidence” concept See (Universal Camera v. N.L.R.B.)2, 340 U.S. 474. Ground (f) above obliterates the doubtful distinction between jurisdictional and non jurisdictional errors while ground (h) above introduces the American” “substantial evidence” concept See (Universal Camera v. N.L.R.B.)2, 340 U.S. 474. The enumeration draws inspiration from (Aniaminic)3, 1969(2) A.C. 147 wherein at page 171 Lord Reid says: “But there was many cases where, although the Tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the inquiry it has done or failed to do something in the course of the inquiry which is of such nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith. It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of inquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith has misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something, which it was required to take into. Or it may have based its decision on some matters which, under the provision setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive. (emphasis supplied). 11. In the facts of our case the failure of the rent Controller to take into account the legal bar imposed by section 22 of the Slum Act makes the exercise of the power improper in asmuch as he failed to take a relevant consideration into account in the exercise of that power or as Lord Reid puts it “he refused to take into account something which he was require to take into account.” This being an error of law which goes to the jurisdiction the order of the Tribunal is vitiated whether or not much a ground was pleaded in the writ petition before the learned Single Judge. The principle of rigid insistence upon particular forms of action has died in England centuries ago. Shall we allow the ghost of forms to stalk our corpus juris? 12. The principle of rigid insistence upon particular forms of action has died in England centuries ago. Shall we allow the ghost of forms to stalk our corpus juris? 12. As the House Allotment Officer, Nagpur, has failed to take into account the legal bar imposed by section 22 of the Slum Act, we treat the present writ petition as one containing a prayer for certiorari as well as of mandamus allow the appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge as well as that of the House Allotment Officer and remand the matter to him in the light of observations above only for the purpose of determining the effect of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, on the order passed by him ordering non-applicant No. 1 G.G. Chourasia to vacate-the suit premises. No order as to costs. Appeal allowed. -----