JUDGMENT M. P. Menon, J. 1. This Writ Appeal arises from O. P. No. 4169 of 1980 disposed of by Khalid, J. (as he then was), along with O. P. Nos. 1535 and 2480 of 1980. The facts of all the three cases are set out in detail in the judgment under appeal; we will recapitulate only such of them as are essential for the present. 2. Under the Special Rules of 1967 vacancies in the cadre of Assistant Directors in the Bureau of Economics and Statistics were to be filled up in the ratio of 1:1 between direct recruits and promotees. On 24th June 1977 the Kerala Public Service Commission initiated steps for directly recruiting candidates to this cadre. The ranked list was published on 28th March 1978, and it was due to expire on 27th March 1980. A few candidates were advised from this list, but other vacancies in the direct recruitment quota were not reported to the Commission in due time. It appears that the vacancies were being provisionally filled up with promotees. Some of the candidates included in the ranked list (including the two petitioners in O. P. No. 4169 of 1980) thereupon approached this Court, early in 1980, with O. P. No. 195 of 1980 seeking appropriate directions in the matter of filling up the vacancies in accordance with the Rules. By judgment dated 20th March 1980, this Court directed the Government to look into the matter and expressed the hope that the rules would be complied with. Taking due note of the judgment, the Government requested the Commission by letter dated 27th March 1980 to advise six candidates to the post of "Assistant Directors (Statistics)". Though the letter was received by the Commission on the same date, it could not straight away act on it for the reason that the ranked list in existence was of "Assistant Directors" as specified in the Rules, and not of "Assistant Directors (Statistics)", as described in the requisition. Consistent with its practice, therefore, the Commission kept the ranked list alive for the limited purpose of making advice to the six vacancies already reported, and sought a clarification from the Government. By reply dated 10th June 1980, the Government clarified that the requisition was for advice from the list dated 28th March 1978. 3. Consistent with its practice, therefore, the Commission kept the ranked list alive for the limited purpose of making advice to the six vacancies already reported, and sought a clarification from the Government. By reply dated 10th June 1980, the Government clarified that the requisition was for advice from the list dated 28th March 1978. 3. But before the Commission could comply with the request (as clarified), an employee of the Bureau who had obviously come to learn how things were moving, and who was anxious to prevent the induction of direct recruits, rushed to this Court with O. P. No. 1535 of 1980 and sought an order of interim injunction against filling up the six vacancies in accordance with the requisition dated 27th March 1980. This Court, however, indicated in its order dated 9th August 1980 that the direct recruits could be appointed provisionally, subject to the result of the writ petition. Accordingly, the Commission issued advice memoranda in favour of the two petitioners in O. P. No. 4169 of 1980, on a provisional basis, on 9th July 1980. 4. It was then the turn of another employee of the Bureau to approach this Court with another Writ Petition - O. P. No. 2480 of 1980 - challenging the advice given by the Commission on 9th July 1980; but in the C. M. P. filed along with the O.P., the Court stuck to the position that the advice could be given effect to on a provisional basis. 5. In the meanwhile, on 2nd September 1980, the Special Rules were amended to provide that direct recruitment could be made only in the absence of suitable candidates for promotion. Earlier the Government had also instructed the Director of the Bureau that direct recruits could be appointed only against future vacancies, so as to protect the interests of persons already promoted. A controversy also arose as to whether the Director had exercised his power under the Special Rules to specify the particular qualification required for each of the direct recruit. 6. It was in the above background that O. P. No. 4169 of 1980 was filed in November, 1980 for a declaration that the petitioners therein were entitled to be regularly appointed into vacancies which had arisen prior to 2nd September 1980, and for mandamus to compel Government to recognise and give effect to this claim. 7. 6. It was in the above background that O. P. No. 4169 of 1980 was filed in November, 1980 for a declaration that the petitioners therein were entitled to be regularly appointed into vacancies which had arisen prior to 2nd September 1980, and for mandamus to compel Government to recognise and give effect to this claim. 7. Khalid, J. found that the following four points arose for consideration in the three writ petitions: - (i) whether the Commission could make any advice from the list drawn up on 28th March 1978, after its expiry on 27th March 1980? (ii) whether advice could be made to posts requiring qualification in Statistics, when the ranked list consisted only of candidates with qualification in Economics? (iii) could direct recruitment be made at all, on the basis of the ranked list dated 28th March 1978, after the Special Rules were amended on 2nd September 1980? and (iv) could the Government have ignored the Director's specification regarding qualification in exercise of his power under the Special Rules, in making requisition to the Commission in respect of the six vacancies? Even before examining these points, the learned Judge noticed that O.P. Nos. 1535 and 2480 could be dismissed, the first for the reason that material facts had been suppressed, and the second for the reason that the petitioner therein had really no locus standi. His lordship, however, did not follow this course and proceeded to consider all the three cases on merit; and after so doing, O.P. Nos. 1535 and 2480 of 1980 were dismissed, and the declaration prayed for in O.P. No. 4169 of 1980 was granted. It was also clarified that the petitioners in the said O.P. would be entitled not only to vacancies which had arisen prior to 2nd September 1980, but also to those which had arisen afterwards. 8. The points now raised in appeal are almost the same, and we shall therefore examine them one after another. 9. It was also clarified that the petitioners in the said O.P. would be entitled not only to vacancies which had arisen prior to 2nd September 1980, but also to those which had arisen afterwards. 8. The points now raised in appeal are almost the same, and we shall therefore examine them one after another. 9. As for the first point, it is common ground that under R.13 of the "K.P.S.C. Rules of Procedure" a ranked list would be in force only for a period of two years, But under R.14, the Commission was obliged to: "advise candidates for all the vacancies reported and pending before them and the vacancies which may be reported to them for the period during which the ranked lists are kept alive..............." The above provision can mean only one thing: If during the currency of a ranked list requisitions are received in respect of a few vacancies, the Commission will be bound to advise candidates from the said list, even if the list happens to expire before actual issue of such advice. In other words, the list will continue to operate for the limited purpose of supplying requisitions received before the end of the two-year period. In this sense, R.14 operates as a proviso to R.13. To hold otherwise would be to make a mockery of the rules and the ranked list. For example, if a requisition for a dozen vacancies is received by the Commission a month before the expiry of the two year period, and if due to administrative delay in the Commission's Office, no advice is made before the dead line, the vacancies will remain unfilled, and the chances of the eligible candidates in the ranked list will be blasted. The effective duration of the two year period will, in such cases, depend, not upon the calendar, but upon the convenience or pleasure of the staff in the Commission's Office. It is precisely to avoid such an arbitrary effect that R.14 specifies that requisitions received within the normal period will be honoured, irrespective of whether the list survives for other purposes or not. 10. It is useful to remember in this context that the Procedure rules of the Commission are not framed in exercise of any specific power under the Constitution or a statute, in order to call for a rigid or technical approach. 10. It is useful to remember in this context that the Procedure rules of the Commission are not framed in exercise of any specific power under the Constitution or a statute, in order to call for a rigid or technical approach. They are instructions or guides for the orderly discharge of the duties of the Commission; and if R.14 was being understood by it all the while as a provision which obliged it to honour all requisitions received within the two year period, it cannot be said that it has acted arbitrarily or mala fide or in a manner totally inconsistent with its own rules. Admittedly, the requisition for the six vacancies in this case was received on 27th March 1980 i.e. before the expiry of the list, and we see nothing wrong in the Commission acting on it in accordance with the rules, or the appointing authority respecting such advice. 11. Points (ii) and (iv) are connected, and the contentions in this regard rest on a provision in the Special Rules authorising the Director to "determine" the proportion in which Statistics and Economic hands are to be directly recruited. Khalid, J. was unable to come to a conclusion from the records of the case, that any such firm determination had been made by the Director. Concededly, the 'appointing authority' for the purposes of the rules is the Government, and in this view of the matter, the prescription in question could only have been in the nature of a recommendation to the appointing authority. At any rate, the Commission was bound to advise candidates included in its ranked list, when a requisition was received from the appointing authority. It is also possible to construe the provision as one authorising the Director to determine the proportion before the Commission is asked to notify the vacancies, and not after the process of recruitment is practically completed by the preparation of the ranked list. 12. The third point relating to the effect of the amendment of the Special Rules from 2nd September 1980 does not really arise in this appeal because the petitioners in O.P. No. 4169 of 1980 were advised ia July, 1980 into vacancies which had arisen before 2nd September 1980 and which were obviously in existence when the requisition was made in March, 1980. It appears that despite the advice given by the Commission on 9th July 1980, the petitioners were actually appointed only after 2nd September 1980, by reason of some intervening circumstances. That is not sufficient to show that there were no vacancies prior to 2nd September 1980; it is impossible to assume that there were no vacancies in existence when the requisition was made on 27th March 1980. The vacancies could probably have been filled up provisionally by promotion, but the provisional promotees were liable to be reverted when advise for regular appointment was made by the Commission. The amendment was not retrospective; and the question whether vacancies which had arisen after 2nd September 1980 could also have been filled up from the list in question, had not really fallen for consideration. 13. In exercising power under Art.226, we should take care to see that legal technicalities are not pressed into service for defeating justice. The candidates in the list were, in the normal course, entitled to be advised long before its expiry on 27th March 1980. There were sixteen vacancies at the time. The circumstance that the Department and the Government did not act in time, or that some persons interested in thwarting the claims of the direct recruits obtained some interim orders from this court, are not sufficient to deny the rightful claims of the latter. Khalid, J. has only rendered justice, on the facts and circumstances of the case, and we are not persuaded to interfere in appeal. The Writ Appeal is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.