K. N. SHUKLA, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER Ratiram has been found guilty of contravention of clause 3 (1) of Madhya Pradesh Paddy Procurement (Levy) Order 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the Levy Order, by Judge Special Court, Balaghat, appointed under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. He has been sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months. Since the said special court is a court of Sessions and the sentence is for a period of three months only, no appeal lies in view of section 12ab of the said Special Provisions Act, 1981 read with section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 2 ) ON 1. 1. 1983 Abdul Sharif Khan, Probationary Sub Inspector Police, Police Station Lanji saw eight persons carrying paddy on head loads near village Dewalgaon which stands just on the border of the State of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. The petitioner was one of them The Sub Inspector seized the bundles of pandy carried by the said eight persons. ( 3 ) IT was alleged by the prosecution that petitioner Raliram had hired the services of seven labourers and each of them was carrying about 25 to 30 kilogrammes of paddy in small head loads. Since the petitioner was exporting paddy without paying levy as requirc:d by section 3 of the Levy Order he committed an offence punishable under section 7 (i) (a) (ii) of the Essential Commodities Act by contravening the said Order. ( 4 ) ACCUSED in his defence stated that he was not exporting paddy from the State of Madhya Pradesh to the State of Maharashtra nor the other persons accompanying him were his servants or labourers. He admitted that he was carrying 20 kgs. of paddy in a small bundle on his head but pleaded that he and other persons who were accompanying him had received paddy towards their wages and were carrying the same to Karanja for milling. Karanja falls within the State of Madhya Pradesh and, therefore, there was no question of any attempt on his part to export paddy from Madhya Pradesh to Maharashtra. ( 5 ) LEARNED lower court did not accept the prosecution case that the other persons accompanying the petitioner had been engaged by him for carrying paddy from Maddhya Pradesh to Maharashtra. It. However held that the petitioner was personally carrying 30 kgs. ( 5 ) LEARNED lower court did not accept the prosecution case that the other persons accompanying the petitioner had been engaged by him for carrying paddy from Maddhya Pradesh to Maharashtra. It. However held that the petitioner was personally carrying 30 kgs. of paddy without the certificate from the Purchase officer as required under the Levy order. Though I am unable to find a specific finding in the impugned judgment about the extact location where the Sub-Inspector had seized the paddy yet from the discussion of the prosecution and defence evidence in paragraphs 11 and 15. it may be inferred that according to the learned Judge the paddy was seized on the bed of river Bagh wihich demarcates the boundary between the Stales of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. Rejecting the defence version that the petitioner and his companions had been given paddy towards their wages which they were taking for milling to Karanja, learned Judge held that the place where the seizure was effected did not fall On the way to Karanja and, therefore, an inference was drawn that the petitioner was carrying 30 kgs. of paddy fur export from Madhya Pradesh to Maharashtra. ( 6 ) BEFORE embarking on the question involved in this revision, it may be noted that seven others who were said to be accompanying the petitioner and carrying about the same quantity of paddy were not prosecuted for contravention of the Levy Order. Secondly, the court below rejected the prosecution case that those seven other per sons accompanying the petitioner had been engaged by him as labourers for carrying paddy to cross the river. ( 7 ) IT may also be mentioned at this stage that the quantity of paddy seized from the possession of the petitioner was never weighed by the Sub-Inspector and the weight mentioned in the chargesheet was only approximate. The petitioner in his examination by the court admitted that he was carrying only 20 kgs. of paddy and in view of this admission the only permissible inference was that 20 kgs. of paddy had been seized from his possession, by the Sub-Inspector. ( 8 ) THERE are discrepancies in the statements of the prosecution witnesses about the place where the actual seizure was effected and the only independent seizure witness Shaligram was never put in the witness box. But assuming that 20 kgs. of paddy had been seized from his possession, by the Sub-Inspector. ( 8 ) THERE are discrepancies in the statements of the prosecution witnesses about the place where the actual seizure was effected and the only independent seizure witness Shaligram was never put in the witness box. But assuming that 20 kgs. of paddy had been seized from the petitioner on the border of State of Madhya Pradesh, the point which remains for consideration is whether this act of the petitioner amounted to contravention of the Levy Order rendering him liable for punishment under section 3/7 (I) (a) (ii) of the Essential Commodities Act. ( 9 ) THE object of the Madhya Pradesh Paddy Procurement (Levy) Order 19and1 as stated in the preamble is as follows: Whereas, the State Government is of the opinion that it is necessary to ensure availability of adequate quantities of paddy for milling into rice in the State for public distribution at fair prices and for that purpose it is necessary and expedient to take recourses to purchase of paddy under levy within the State of Madhya Pradesh. Clause 30) of which the contravention is alleged may be reproduced: 113 Levy on paddy. -. (l) No licensed miller or licenced dealer or any other person, shall export or attempt to export paddy outside the State of Madhya Pradesh unless 60 per cent of the total quantity to be exported is sold to the Purchase Officer in the form of levy at the rate specified in. Schedule subiect to the deductions as per specifications given in Schedule II. ( 10 ) KEEPING in view the object of the Order, normally clause 3 thereof will be applicable to millers or dealers who deal in purchase and sale of paddy. The words or any other person are preceded by the words licenced miller or licenced dealer. A question arises whether the words any other persont will meam any other person in general or will be referable. or connected with the words preceding them i. e. licenced miller or licensed dealer. In Selmonds Jurisprudence, 11th Edition, p. 153 the rule of construction noscitur a Socilis has been explained as follows: The meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps. or connected with the words preceding them i. e. licenced miller or licensed dealer. In Selmonds Jurisprudence, 11th Edition, p. 153 the rule of construction noscitur a Socilis has been explained as follows: The meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps. Maxwell in his Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition, p. 321 notes as under: This rule means that when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, they are, understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take as it were their colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to the less general. Examples of this rule have been given in G. P. Sighs Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Edition at pages 323 and 325. ( 11 ) THE rule of ejusdom Generis though narrower in, scope reflects the same rule of construction. Five guide lines for applying this rule have been stated in Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. The Collector of Excise Government of Tripura, Agartala and others. 1 (i) The Statute contains an enumeration of specific words; (ij) The subject of the enumeration constitutes a class or category; (iii) That class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) The general term follows the enumeration ; and (v) There is no indication of a different legislative intent. ( 12 ) IN short when particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus are followed by general words, the general, words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified. ( 13 ) A Division Bench of this Court in Rajya parivahan Karmachhari Mahasangh Ujjain v. State of M. P. and Qthers2 while construing section 5 (j) of the Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (M. P.) dealt with the words any other persont occuring therein. It held that: The words any other person are preceded by the expression the Commissioner of Labour. Therefore, even though the words Tany other persont are perfectly general they cannot be construed to mean any person. In the matter of Sir Stuart Samut, Member of Parliament (17 C. N. N. 735) the Privy Council had occasion to consider the scope of the expression. any other person or persohs whatsoever. Therefore, even though the words Tany other persont are perfectly general they cannot be construed to mean any person. In the matter of Sir Stuart Samut, Member of Parliament (17 C. N. N. 735) the Privy Council had occasion to consider the scope of the expression. any other person or persohs whatsoever. The Privy Council held that when and section of an Act after enumerating office holders proceeds to add the words any other persons or persons whatsoever, the doctrine of ejusdam generis applies and that any other persons meant anyone, who held an office of a similar kind to those enumerated. Applying the same principle it must be held that any other person means a person holding an office of a kind similar to one described earlier in section B. ( 14 ) IN State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan3 it was observed: It is requisite that there must be a distinct genus, which mul> t comprise more than one species. TI ( 15 ) APPLYING the rules of noscitur a sooiis and ejusdem generals light of the commentaries and cases referred to above, it will be seen that Clause 3 of the levy Order refers to the genus i. e. licenced miller or licenced dealer who are engaged in the business of purchase and sale of paddy and then this genus is followed by the words any other person. In this context and setting any other person will take colour from the preceding words and will person or persons engaged in the trade or business of paddy. ( 16 ) THIS inference is further strengthened by the use or the words Texport following the words licensed miller, licenced dealer or any other person. Export. has not been defined in the Levy Order or the Essential Commodities Act It, therefore, should be given its ordinary meaning as used in common parlance. According to Websters New World Dictionary, Second College Edition, export means I. to earry or send (goods etc) to another country or other countries, esp, for purposes of sale, 2. to carry or send (ideas, culture, etc.) from one place to another. The term is usually used in commercial context. It was not the case of the prosecution that the petitioner was carrying 20 kgs. of paddy for commercial purpose. to carry or send (ideas, culture, etc.) from one place to another. The term is usually used in commercial context. It was not the case of the prosecution that the petitioner was carrying 20 kgs. of paddy for commercial purpose. In fact, the time of seizure (5 P. M), the quantity of paddy and non-prosecution of Seven others who were accompanying the petitioner and Were carrying some quantity of paddy repelled the probability of export by the petitioner so as to bring him within the mischief of the Levy Order and with section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act. ( 17 ) FOR construing the provision the object of the Levy Order as reproduced above will also be relevant. Export of paddy out of Madhya Pradesh is not prohibited. What is required is that the miller, dealer or any other person shall sell 60 per cent of the paddy to the purchase officer and obtain a certificate. It is difficult to envisage that the Levy Order is inteded to cover persons carrying very small quantities of paddy beyond the frontiers of the State oven for personal consumption. The small quantity of the commodity itself contra indicates the possibility of its export for commercial purposes. ]f clause 3 of the Levy Order is so interpreted 3s to include any person carrying any quantity of paddy without payment of levy, then an extreme situation may arise when a person wanting to carry even one kilogram of paddy outside the State will be required to sell 600 grams thereof to the Purchase Officer and if he does not sell 600 grams of the paddy to the Purchase Officer at the appointed place which may be a far off mandi, be will expose himself to the, penalty of minimum imprisonment of three months as provided under the stringent provisions of the Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act, 1981. The legislature cannot be imputed with an intention which may lead to such a peculiar situation. ( 18 ) THE object of the Essential Commodities (special provisions) Act, 1981 may also be taken note of for appreciating the nature of the act, done by the petitioner. The legislature cannot be imputed with an intention which may lead to such a peculiar situation. ( 18 ) THE object of the Essential Commodities (special provisions) Act, 1981 may also be taken note of for appreciating the nature of the act, done by the petitioner. The preamble to the aforesaid Act is as follows Whereas for ensuring the availability of essential commodities at fair prices, it is necessary to curb the hoarding and black-marketing of and profiteering in such commodities; And whereas for dealing more effectively with persons indulging in such anti-social activities and the evil of vicious inflationary prices, it is necessary to make certain special provisions by way of amendments to the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955) for a period of five years. The learned Judge has exercised powers of Special Court constituted under section 12-A of the Act. If the object of this Act is kept in view, it will be apparent that isolated cases of persons carrying small quantities of paddy for personal consumption will not fall within the meaning of sec 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act. To hold otherwise will result in great harassment to poor bonafide consumers. This cannot be the object of the Levy Order or Essential Commodities (Special Provision) Act 1981. ( 19 ) THERE is one more facet to this question. In Nathulal v. State of M. P. 4 it was observed that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence. Referring to clause 3 (2) of the Madhya Pradesh Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1958 read with section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, the Supreme Court observed as follows: An offence under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 10 of 1955 for breach of section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Food Grains Dealers Licensing Order, 1958, necessarily involves a guilty mind as an ingredient of the offence. Considering the scope of the Act it would be legitimate to hold that an offence under section 7 of the Act is committed by a person if he intentionally contravenes any order made under section 3 of the Act. The object of the Act will be best served and innocent persons will also be protected from harassment, is section 7 is so construed. Neither the Levy Order nor sections 3 and 7 of the Essential Commodities Act expressly or impliedly rule oti! The object of the Act will be best served and innocent persons will also be protected from harassment, is section 7 is so construed. Neither the Levy Order nor sections 3 and 7 of the Essential Commodities Act expressly or impliedly rule oti! the existence of mens res for constituting an offence under the Act. In the present case in view of the specific finding of the learned lower court that the other seven persons who were accompanying the petitioner were not his servants and were not carrying the small hundies of paddy on his behalf, it could not be inferred that the petitioner had requisite guilty mind to contravene the Levy Order so as to be liable under section 7 (1) (a) (ij) of the Essential Commodities Act. ( 20 ) IN the light of the above discussion, I hold that petitioners conviction under section 7 (i) (a) (ii) of the Essential Commodities Act is not sustainable in law. The revision is allowed and the petitioners conviction and sentence are set said. He is hereby acquitted of the charge. His bail bonds are discharged. Conviction and sentence set aside .