JUDGMENT : Satya Brata Sanyal, J. – This civil revision is directed against an ORDER :of the Court of Subordinate Judge asking the petitioner to furnish security to the extent of Rs. 55,00,000.00, failing which their properties described in the petition dated 7.10.1982 filed by the plaintiff shall be attached subject to the ultimate result of the money suit instituted by the State Bank of India. 2. This application arises out of a money suit filed by the State Bank of India for realization of a sum of Rs. 50,07,958.53. It is said that the petitioner in collusion and with the assistance of some of the Bank officials and by committing grave irregularities cheated it withdrawing more than Rs. 38,00,000.00 transferred to the account of the petitioners by debiting the office account styled as agricultural term loan account when the agricultural term loan budget of the plaintiff bank was Rs. 2,00,000.00 only, being ‘D’ Category Branch. According to the plaintiff, the petitioners opened a current account with the State Bank of India, Mahesh Kunt with a sum of Rs. 500/- only and on various dates between 31.3.1981 to 30.5.1981 different sums of money were transferred to the said account, with the Bank Office account with the help of some of the Bank officials totalling a sum of Rs. 38,82,384.00, and the entire sum was withdrawn by the petitioner within two months leaving a balance of a sum of Rs. 574/- on 10.6.1981. These sums were transferred to the petitioner’s account for supply of diesel pumps and other agricultural implements to farmers who were accorded loan by the Bank but no machine or agricultural implements were at all supplied by the petitioners to the farmers. The petitioners by submitting fraudulent list containing the names of non-existing farmers whose existence cannot be traced duped the Bank to grant loan of the aforesaid magnitude. The matter has been investigated and the investigation has unearthed swindling of the Bank to the tune of crores of rupees by different agencies. The fraud committed by the petitioner alone occasioned loss to the Bank to the tune of more than Rs. 38 lacs which is sought to realized by the institution of the present money suit. 3. The Bank, on the aforesaid allegation, has instituted the present suit for recovery of Rs. 31,81,773.80 by way of principal and another sum of Rs. 11,26,184.73 by way of interest. 38 lacs which is sought to realized by the institution of the present money suit. 3. The Bank, on the aforesaid allegation, has instituted the present suit for recovery of Rs. 31,81,773.80 by way of principal and another sum of Rs. 11,26,184.73 by way of interest. 4. Petitioner no. 1 is a firm and two other petitioner are said to be partners thereof. They have filed written statement and have raised all technical objections including non-maintainability of the suit as the firm is not registered and therefore no legal entity. They also denied their liability to pay any amount to the Bank. They however admitted that out of 530 cases of loanees they have not supplied machineries to 42 of them as that was stopped by the Bank, the value whereof is Rs.3,65,586/- approximately. They have also made a counter claim of about Rs. 8,00,000.00. 5. The plaintiff filed an application dated 7.10.1982 under ORDER :38, Rule 5 setting out all the circumstances in which the suit has been filed and particularly stating in paragraph 9 that the principal defendants are about to remove some of their properties from the local limits of the Court and if they succeed in their illegal game the plaintiff would be seriously prejudiced. It has also been stated that if no ORDER :is passed, even though a prima facie case has been made out any decree that may be passed in the suit will be infructuous. The defendants filed their show cause and, in paragraph 3, they denied the fact that they ever proposed nor they do propose to remove any property as alleged in paragraph 9. Their show cause; however, does not appear to be verified nor it is affidavited. 6. When the civil revision was listed for admission, the Bank made its appearance through their counsel and both the parties were heard at length. Mr. Kamal Nayan Choubey appearing on behalf of the petitioners contended that the ORDER :passed by the Court below to furnish security is, wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. He contended that the provisions for demanding security and/or attachment before JUDGMENT : is very harsh course and the Court should be very loath in allowing the plaintiffs to resort to the said provisions, merely on vague allegations. He contended that the provisions for demanding security and/or attachment before JUDGMENT : is very harsh course and the Court should be very loath in allowing the plaintiffs to resort to the said provisions, merely on vague allegations. According to the learned counsel, the power could only that the defendant is about to dispose of his properties or to remove it from the jurisdiction of the Court but also the object in so doing is to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may be passed. He contended that under the provisions of ORDER :38, rule 5, the Court cannot take into consideration any circumstance of disposal and/or removal of property prior to the institution of the suit but such positive steps which the defendants have taken or is likely to take to defeat a decree that may be passed. 7. Mr. Sidheshwar Prasad Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Bank, contended that the ORDER :of attachment and/or demand for security has, to be passed according to exigencies of situation, the object being that the ultimate decree that may be passed is not rendered infructuous. According to the learned counsel, the Bank is not like an ordinary litigant who will institute frivolous suits to harass a defendant customer. In the instant case, defendants’ account was credited with more than Rs. 38,00,000,00 between the period 31.3.1981 to 30.5.1981 and the entire amount was removed from their account with indecent haste and swiftness leaving paultry balance of Rs. 574/- only under an apprehension that the fraud committed by the defendants is likely to be detected any moment by the authorities, because of its grossness, and to nullify Banks taking any action for its recovery, the petitioners removed the money swiftly from their account. It is submitted by the learned counsel that even on defendants own case 42 farmers were not supplied with any machineries, but the amount credited to the account of the defendant with respect to those persons, amounting to more than Rs. 3,00,000.00 have also been removed from the account. It is submitted by the learned counsel that even on defendants own case 42 farmers were not supplied with any machineries, but the amount credited to the account of the defendant with respect to those persons, amounting to more than Rs. 3,00,000.00 have also been removed from the account. The ORDER :passed by the Court below in the face of these circumstances coupled with the statement made in paragraph 9 on affidavit by an officer of the Bank justify the ORDER :demanding security and the said ORDER :may not be interferred with in exercise of powers conferred under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Both parties have relied upon various authorities in support of their respective stands. The main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that an ORDER :under ORDER :38, Rule 5 could only be made when the Court is satisfied about the twin conditions of ORDER :38, Rule 5. (1) i.e., about to dispose of whole or any part of the property or about to remove whole or part of his property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court with the intent to obstruct or delay the execution of any decree that may be passed. Learned counsel submits that what has been stated in paragraph 9 of the petition for attachment is a vague allegation which has not been proved by any satisfactory evidence. This is only a mechanical repetition of the language of the Code without “an iota or substratum of truth underlying the allegation, is merely colourable and constitutes an abuse of process of Court.” In support of his said submission he relied upon A.I.R. 1965 Madras 212 (Nataraja V. Baugaru), A.I.R. 1951 Calcutta 156 Premraj V. Md. Maneck, A.I.R. 1938 Patna 161 Bedanand Rai V. Nabo Kumar Singh and Ratann Kumar Poddar V. Howrah Motor Co. (A.I.R. 1975 Calcutta 180). 9. The remedy of all attachment before JUDGMENT : is certainly extraordinary and, the Court has to act with utmost circumspection, and with maximum care and caution. The provision should not be a weapon of oppression in the hands of unscrupulous plaintiffs. It has, therefore, been laid down by high authorities that the Court has to be satisfied by the plaintiff before resorting to these, provisions that the belief as to inexecutability of anticipatory decree entertained by the plaintiff is a reasonable one. The provision should not be a weapon of oppression in the hands of unscrupulous plaintiffs. It has, therefore, been laid down by high authorities that the Court has to be satisfied by the plaintiff before resorting to these, provisions that the belief as to inexecutability of anticipatory decree entertained by the plaintiff is a reasonable one. This satisfaction, of the Court may be derived either from the affidavit filed or otherwise. 10. The satisfaction of the Court would only relate to defendants intent to obstruct or delay the execution of the decree. The word otherwise, in my opinion, will not mean of the same nature as that an “affidavit”. The rule of ejusdem generic strongly put forward by Mr. Choubey is not an inviolable rule of law but is only permissible inference in the absence of an indication to the contrary. (See Kochuni V. State of Madras- AIR 1960 S.C. 1080 ). In the said case the meaning of the word “or otherwise” was not confined to things analogus to specific words specified. In the case of Baijnath Prasad V. U.P. (AIR 1968 Allahabad 288) while interpreting the words “By public auction or otherwise” appearing in North India Ferries Act, it was held ‘otherwise’ does not mean “procedure of same nature” but any other procedure is open. For the applicability of principal “ejusdem generic” as held by the Privy Council in the case of United Towns Electric Co. Ltd. V. Attorney General Newfoundland (1939) 1 AER 423 at 424, the mention of single species does not constitute a genus. Therefore, there must be more than one species mentioned to constitute genus. This is another reason why the said principle will not apply. Maxwell (Interpretation of Statues, 11th ediction 331) observes “if it can be seen from a wider inspection of the scope of the legislation that the general words, notwithstanding that they follow particular words, are nevertheless to be construed generally, effect must be given to the intention of the legislature as gathered from larger survey.” The fundamental rule of interpretation is that a statute to be expounded “according to intent of them that made it” (Fordyce v. Bridges, (1847) 1 HLC, 4). It is desirable in all cases to adhere to the words of an Act, “giving to them that sense which is their natural import in the ORDER :in which they are placed” (R.V. Ramsgate, (1827) 6B and C 712 per Baley J). From the scheme of the ORDER :38, Rule 5 C.P.C., it appears that the object of the provision is to ensure that a decree that may be passed may not be rendered infructuous and at the same time the provision may not be handled to oppress and harass a defendant by unscrupulous plaintiff. The Court can, therefore, arrive at its satisfaction not only on the basis of affidavit but on any other reliable and cogent material and further take info consideration conduct of the parties both before and after institution of suit and other surrounding circumstances on the strength of the word “otherwise” appearing in ORDER :38, Rule 5(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. 11. It is well settled that no ORDER :under ORDER :38, Rule 5 ought to issue before the plaintiff satisfy the Court of practical certaintity of his success and the existence of grave danger and of a real fear that a dishonest defendant undoubtedly liable is getting away with the probable fruit of the JUDGMENT :. In other words, plaintiff must be able to show a strong prima facie case. Question which is being seriously canvassed before me is, can the Court take into consideration disposal of property and the conduct of the party prior to the institution of the suit. There is nothing in the plain words of ORDER :38, Rules 5 and 6 which makes a transaction subsequent, to the institution of suit condition precedent to plaintiffs application. In the case, of Bishambar Das and Company v. Sachoomal Kottomal (AIR 1941 S.C. 178 DB) it was observed that fact of removal after institution of the suit is Strong Circumstance. But transfers and disposal before the institution of the suit may be evidence of intention after the suit. The defendant is able to dispose of the property, may be established to the satisfaction of the Court not only by completed transaction of disposal prior to the application for the grant of prayer but by such evidence of intention prior to the institution of the suit. A matter to be inferred from surrounding circumstances. In the case of Girdhari Lal v. K.K. Co. A matter to be inferred from surrounding circumstances. In the case of Girdhari Lal v. K.K. Co. (AIR 1952 San 125) where during the course of about a month, plaintiff supplied goods worth more than 1 lac, yet when the attachment was sought, there were goods worth Rs.100-, it was held under the circumstances, the fraudulent intention to defeat the claim of the plaintiff by disposing of their remaining property is legitimately deducable. In the case of Megregor v. Cawnpur Sugar, (1910) 11 CLJ 19, it was held that the Court is entitled to look to the conduct of the parties, immediately before the suit and examine the surrounding circumstances and from this to draw inference as to whether the defendant is about to dispose of the property and if so with what intention. In the case of Premraj Mundra v. Md. Maneek Gazi (AIR 1951 Calcutta 156) it was observed where defendant had transferred major portion of his property shortly prior to the institution of the suit and is in an embarassed financial condition are facts from which an inference could be legitimately drawn that the object of the defendant was to delay and defeat the plaintiffs suit. The defendant has closed its business is also a relevant fact. In the case of Ratan Kumar (supra) referred to by Mr. Choubey, it was observed that the power should be exercised with maximum care and caution following the decision of Nataraja v. Bangaro supra). In the said case it was held closure of the business of the firm from which large amount is claimed to be due justify making an ORDER :of attachment before JUDGMENT :. Mr. Choubey has strongly relied upon the, case of Bedanand Rai v. Nabo Kumar Singh (supra), a division bench decision of this Court for the proposition that before the provisions of Rule 5 ORDER :38 C.P.C. would come into play the Court has to be satisfied that transactions are going to be made by the, defendant after the suit had been filed and that such transfers were with the object of defeating the plaintiff if he won the suit. Mere allegations to this effect are of no avail but facts must be proved by satisfactory evidence. Mere allegations to this effect are of no avail but facts must be proved by satisfactory evidence. In this case according to Verma J, an alienation previous to the suit is not enough, the Court had to be satisfied that transfers were going to be made after the suit has been filed. The statement of law-in Mc Gregor (supra) to the effect that Court can look to the conduct of parties immediately before the suit and to examine the surrounding circumstances was accepted. It was, however, further held that there must be transaction subsequent to the filing of the suit or “subsequent transfers were going to be entered into”. In Bedanand’s case, the Court was not impressed with the evidence as was available in the said case of such intention to defeat and/or proposed transaction in the anvil. The affidavit where upon the decision was based by the Court below was found to be highly defective and did not inspire confidence. This case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable on facts. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decided in particular facts of a case. 12. The fact that the defendant 'withdrew in course to two months the entire sum of Rs.38,00,000,00 credited to their account by way of loan and depressed it to a paultry sum of Rs. 500/- and odd without any other transaction and/or deposit in the background aforesaid do justify entertainment of a reasonable belief in the mind of a creditor. Even withdrawing the sums credited to their account with respect to machineries admittedly not supplied to the farmers by virtue of an instruction not to supply machineries, further fortify the satisfaction of the Court arrived at. The direction to the petitioner not to supply further machineries for which the accounts of the petitioners were credited was to prevent the Bank from incurring further losses but to me it appears that the defendant having scented unearthing of the fraud removed even the said amount from their current accounts. The involvement of huge sums of public money, the haste with which entire sums credited was removed from the account in a very short period, the mode adopted in managing loan from the Bank whose maximum loan budget was Rs.2,00,000.00 for the year, non-deposit of any sum in the said account and depressing the account to a paultry sum of Rs. 500/- and odd immediately before the institution of the suit, almost closing the business of the firm from whom sums are due to the plaintiff, removing even an admitted sum of Rs. 3,61,000/- for which no supplies were effected, the fraud investigated and unearthed by C.B.I. for which a criminal prosecution is in the anvil, coupled with the statement made in paragraph 9 of the affidavit in accordance with law to my mind justify the ORDER :passed by the Court below asking the defendant to furnish security and to direct conditional attachment of the properties listed in the petition dated 7.10.1982. From the show cause of the defendant it further transpires that defendant no.1 is an unregistered partnership firm and it has denied its liability from being sued. 13. Further the ORDER :s passed under ORDER :38, Rule 5 are discretionary and a revisional Court will not interfere with the exercise of Lower Court’s discretion unless the Court is satisfied that the Lower Court acted on wrong principle. Another view is permissible or obtainable is not sufficient ground for interference with the discretion exercised by the Court below. I am, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the ORDER :in my revisional jurisdiction, as the Court below has rightly appreciated the facts and applied to those facts the true principle. 14. In the result, the civil revision is dismissed but there will be no ORDER :as to costs. Application dismissed.