ORDER In this writ petition the members of the Managing Committee of Donachak Deshapran Birendra Memorial School which in all aided school (hereinafter referred to as the School) have challenged the order dated 16.10.1978 of the body functioning as Appeal Committee of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education (Annexure 'H' to the writ petition) allowing the appeal of the respondent No. 7 Nilmani Gouri, an Assistant Teacher of the School and ordering his reinstatement without back pay from the date of his discharge that is 7.8.1968. 2. The respondent No. 7 was appointed Assistant Teacher of the School on 1.2.1966. A show cause notice dated 5.6.1968 was served on him to explain his conduct of absenting himself from the school from 6.3.1968 and having talks with Sumoti Manna a gal student of the school sent up for School Final Examination on 1.3.1968 at about 1 A.M. past midnight in a close room of the school building. The respondent No.7 denied the charges in the explanation submitted by him. Thereafter the Managing Committee in its meeting held on 6.8.1968 considered the explanation, found it unsatisfactory and resolved to dispense with the services of the respondent No.7 with effect from 7.8.1978 by giving one month's salary in lieu of notice. The respondent No. 7 filed writ petition against the said order of the Managing Committee which was C.R. 7751 (W) of 1968. The said writ petition was dismissed on 17.9.1974 on the ground no writ lies against the Managing Committee of the School. Thereafter the respondent No. 7 filed appeal before the body functioning as Appeal Committee of the Board of Secondary Education on 14.10.1974. The Appeal Committee after hearing both sides held that the charges against the appellant could not be proved and that as previous approval of the Board as required under the existing rules was not obtained the appellant is entitled to reinstatement. 3. The petitioners have challenged the decision of the Appeal Committee on several grounds urged at the time of the hearing of the present Writ Petition, which is opposed by file respondent Nos. 1 to 7 including the State of West Bengal and the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education (hereinafter called the Board). 4. 3. The petitioners have challenged the decision of the Appeal Committee on several grounds urged at the time of the hearing of the present Writ Petition, which is opposed by file respondent Nos. 1 to 7 including the State of West Bengal and the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education (hereinafter called the Board). 4. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that although statutory rule 25 of the Rules for management of non-government High Schools including aided schools provides that in the case of aided schools the power of the Managing Committee of appointing and removing teachers shall be exercised subject to the approval of the Board of Secondary Education, in the present case the said rule does not apply as it is a case of termination of service of a teacher and not a case of removing him from service. But in my view this contention is not acceptable. It has been clearly pleaded in paragraphs 2 and 4 of the writ petition that the service of the respondent No. 7 was terminated on grounds of moral turpitude and for charges framed and proved against him. The form of the order is not decisive as to whether the order is by way of punishment and even an innocuously worded order terminating the service on account of alleged misconduct is a cloak for an order of dismissal. It has been held in Lilabati Kanjilal v. Administrator 71 CWN 216 that the exercise of the power of removal is completed as soon as the man is thrown out on the streets by the order or notice issued by the Managing Committee. In such a case it is immaterial at what point of futurity the Boards approval is sought for or is available. The approval which is required by the second paragraph of rule 25 aforesaid must be a previous approval to the action proposed by the committee. The enforcement of the order of removal in whatever language it is couched, without prior approval of the Board is ultra vires rule 25 of the said rules which continued in operation during the relevant time by virtue of S. 25 of the Bengal General Clauses Act after the repeal of the West Bengal of Secondary Education Act, 1950 by the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act 1963. 5. 5. It is next contended on behalf of the petitioners that the body which exercised powers of the Appeal Committee of the Board was not properly constituted and had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the respondent No. 7 as it was not constituted by Sri Bhabesh Moitra, the Administrator who was appointed after the death of the provious Administrator Sri Satya Priya Roy. The relevant facts in this connection may be stated Admittedly the Board was superseded and Sri Satya Priya Roy was appointed Administrator on 14.9.1977, Sri Roy by an order dated 28.1.78 delegated all the powers and functions of the Appeal Committee of the Board to the body constituted with three persons viz. Sri Pratap Kumar Ghosh of West Bengal Higher Judicial Service, Chairman, Sm. Anila Debi and Sri Salil Kumar Ganguli along with Secretary to the Board as Secretary to the Appeal Committee in exercise of the powers conferred on the Administrator by clause (b) of sub-s. (1) of S. 50 of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1953 as amended by the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education (Amendment) Ordinance 1978. Thereafter Sri Roy died on 11.2.1978. Sri Bhabesh Moitra was appointed Administrator of the Board and he assumed charge on 17.2.1978 Sri Moitra delegated all the powers of the Appeal Committee to the aforesaid three persons by the following order dated 17.2.1978:- "I, Bhabesh Moitra, Administrator, West Bengal Board of Secondary Education do hereby delagate all the powers of the Appeal Committee to the same three persons appointed by late S.P. Roy, Administrator of the Board by order dated 28.1.1978 with the same terms and conditions as mentioned therein, in exercise of the powers conferred upon me under the provisions of law. The body constituted with all the power's of the Appeal Committee will continue to function. Sd/- B. Moitra 17.2.72" 6. It is submitted by Mr. The body constituted with all the power's of the Appeal Committee will continue to function. Sd/- B. Moitra 17.2.72" 6. It is submitted by Mr. Chakraburty on behalf of the petitioners that the proviso to clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S. 50 of the Act of 1963 says that an Administrator appointed under the said clause may delegate any particular powers, duties or function to such person as he may think fit or to such body as may be constituted by him and that in the present case Sri Moitra, the Administrator did not constitute the body of three persons afresh to whom he purported to delegate all the powers of the Appeal Committee and therefore the Appeal Committee not being properly constituted, its order is without jurisdiction. No doubt the appointment of the body of three persons and delegation of the powers of the Appeal Committee to them by the pervious Administrator Sri S.P. Roy came to an end with his death. But in this case the next Administrator Sri B. Moitra delegated all the powers of the Appeal Committee to the same three persons and instead of naming them he described them as persons appointed by late S.P. Roy, Administrator of the Board by order dated 28.1.1978. In the last sentence of his order dated 17.2.1978 as quoted above it was mentioned that the "body constituted" with all the powers of the Appeal Committee will continue to function. Thus he impliedly reappointed the same three persons to constitute the body of persons to whom ho delegated all the powers of the Appeal Committee. Even assuming that the Administrator Sri Moitra did not constitute the body under S. 50(1)(b) afresh, the function of the aforesaid persons as Appeal Committee of the Board and the decision rendered by them should be held to be within jurisdiction by the application of the de facto doctrine. They were de facto holders of the office of members of the body having powers of the Appeal Committee under colour of right and perform the functions with public acquiescence. The petitioners submitted to jurisdiction of the said Appeal Committee and participated in the proceedings before them. They were de facto holders of the office of members of the body having powers of the Appeal Committee under colour of right and perform the functions with public acquiescence. The petitioners submitted to jurisdiction of the said Appeal Committee and participated in the proceedings before them. In view of the decision in Hanuman Foundries Ltd. vs. Hem Ranjan Deb of this Court reported in 1967 (15) FLR 122 and Pulin Behari Das vs. King Emperor 15 CLJ 517 the Officer de facto is one who by some colour of right is in possession of an office and for the time being performed its duties with public acquiescence though having no right in fact and the decision of such an officer cannot be challenged on the ground of jurisdiction. The decision in Ujjambai v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1962 SC 1621 that a Tribunal which is improperly or imperfectly constituted lacks jurisdiction and its decision is void and liable to be quashed on certiorari referred to on behalf of the petitioners, does not apply in this case as the decision of a de facto judge or member of a tribunal is as valid and binding as that of a judge or tribunal de jure and for this reason the decision of the latter cannot be quashed on certiorari. So the ground of challenge on account of lack of jurisdiction falls. 7. It is next contended on behalf of the petitioners that there was inordinate delay in filing the appeal by the respondent No. 7 before the Appeal Committee of the Board as under Regulations 4 of the Appeal Regulations the appeal was to be filed within one month of furnishing a copy of the impugned decision which in this case was furnished to the said respondent by a letter dated 7.8.1968. It is pointed out that although in the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the Board it is stated that an application for condonation of the delay was filed by the appellant along with the petition of appeal, the respondent no. It is pointed out that although in the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the Board it is stated that an application for condonation of the delay was filed by the appellant along with the petition of appeal, the respondent no. 7 in his affidavit has stated that there was no necessity of making any application for condonation of delay, as he filed the appeal within one month from the date of discharge of the Rule and dismissal of his writ petition before this Court through which he first sought remedy against the order of the Managing Committee removing him from service Admittedly the respondent No. 7 filed Writ petition being C.R. No. 7751(W) of 1968 seeking remedy against the order of the Managing Committee in December 1968 and the said Rule was discharged on 17.9.1974. Thereafter he filed appeal before the Board on 17.9.1974 i.e. within one month of the date of the dismissal of his writ petition. It cannot, therefore, be said that the respondent No. 7 was guilty of laches in filing the appeal before the Board. It has been held in P. Sen Gupta v. W.B. Secondary Education 1975 (1) CLJ 57 that there is no limitation of an appeal provided for by S. 22(3) of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963 and that on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in 1972 Lab I.C. 753. Regulation 4(2) of the Appeal Regulations if construed to be a rule of limitation, it would be ultra vires the power of the Board to make Regulations conferred by S. 27(3) read with S. 22(3) of the Act. It has been observed by the learned Judge A.K. Sen J. in the said decision that delay in the matter of preferring an appeal under S. 22(3) of the Act may not render the appeal barred by limitation and the committee itself would be well within its powers to take into consideration the delay in deciding what actual relief is to be given in terms of Regulation 9 (see paragraph 14). The aforesaid decision has been followed in A.K. Ghosh v. West Bengal Board of Secondary Education & Ors 1975(1) CLJ 295 I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the aforesaid two decisions on the point of limitation. I therefore, hold that the contention rasied on behalf of the petitioners cannot prevail. 8. The aforesaid decision has been followed in A.K. Ghosh v. West Bengal Board of Secondary Education & Ors 1975(1) CLJ 295 I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the aforesaid two decisions on the point of limitation. I therefore, hold that the contention rasied on behalf of the petitioners cannot prevail. 8. It has been further urged on behalf of the petitioners that as the Appeal committee did not comply with Regulation 7(1)(b) of the Appeal Regulations which enjoins that the Secretary to the Board shall place all records of the case with or without the comments of the Managing Committee and the explanation of the appellant as the case may be, before the Appeal Committee for a decision whether further enquiry into the case is necessary or not and the decision of the Appeal Committee in this regard shall be final. It is argued that in the present case the Appeal Committee did not decide whether further enquiry into the case was necessary or not and so the entire proceeding is vitiated for non-compliance with Regulation 7(1)(b). In this connection reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of Radharaman Das v. The Appeal Committee of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education & Ors 79 CWN 31. On the other hand it is submitted on behalf of the respondents that the question of deciding whether further enquiry into the case is necessary or not will arise only when the Managing Committee held an enquiry into the charge against the appellant and if no such enquiry in the true sense of the term was held by the Managing Committee Regulation 7(1)(b) is not attracted at all. In support of this contention reference has been made to the decision in the case reported in 1975(1) CLJ 295 in which the learned Judge Amiya Kumar Mookerjee J. after noticing the decision in Radharaman Das's case has held that the provisions of Regulation 7(1)(b) are attracted only to those cases where there was a previous enquiry in a disciplinary proceeding I, with respect agree with this view. I cannot accept the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that there was some sort of enquiry by the Managing Committee in this case Enquiry in a disciplinary proceeding commences when the disciplinary authority or the enquiring authority starts taking evidence in support of the charge after giving notice to the delinquent to appear for the purpose of cross-examination of such witnesses. It the present case no enquiry was held at all. All that was done was that a show cause notice was issued to the respondent No. 7 briefly stating the allegations against him and an explanation from him was obtained in which the allegations were denied. The Managing Committee after considering the explanation resolved to dispense with the service of the teacher. Such order of dismissal was made in violation of the principles of natural justice and is therefore, void. In this connection I refer to the observations of Lord Wilberforce in Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn. (1971) 1 W.L.R. 1578 at pp. 1595-96 that one may accept that requirements of rules of natural justice are excluded only in "pure master and servant cases" by which is meant cases in which there is no element of public employment or service no support by statute, nothing in the nature of an office or a status which is capable of protection and that if any of these elements exist essential procedural requirements are to be observed and failure to observe them may result in a dismissal being declared to be void. The Supreme Court has referred to and approved the principal laid down in the aforesaid decision in U.P. Warehousing Corporation's case 1980(3) SCC 459 . In my view in the present case, it cannot be said that in the absence of any enquiry by the Managing Committee it was incumbent on the Appeal Committee to decide in the first instance whether further enquiry was necessary or not as Regulation 7(1)(b) is not attracted to this case. 9. The last contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the Appeal Committee did not consider all the materials before it for deciding whether payment of gratuity instead of reinstatement would be the appropriate relief to be granted to the appellant as required by Regulation 9(1)(b) of the Appeal Regulations and therefore the order of reinstatement passed by the Appeal Committee cannot be sustained and should be quashed. In this connection comments of the Managing Committee on the petition of appeal the observations of the Appeal Committee in the impugned order and the manner in which it arrived at a decision to grant the relief of reinstatement have been placed before this Court. On behalf of the Board the explanation of the appellant in relation to the comments of the Managing Committee on the petition of appeal has been produced from records of the Board for perusal and return. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondent No. 7 that as the Managing Committee did not specifically raise the point that it would not be in the interest of the school to grant reinstatement to the appellant the Appeal Committee was justified in directing reinstatement which should automatically follow when the dismissal or discharge is contrary to law. In this connection reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of Mohan Lal v. Bharat Electronics Ltd. 1981 (2) SLR 11 in which there was termination of service of a workman by way of retrenchment contrary to the provisions of S. 25F of the industrial Disputes Act and the Court observed that where the termination in illegal specially where there is an ineffective order of retrenchment, there is neither termination nor cessation of service and a declaration follows that toe workman concerned continues to be in service with all back wages and consequential benefits. But the distinctive point is that the present case is governed by Regulation 9(1)(b) of the Appeal Regulations which cast a duty on the tribunal to form an opinion on consideration of all the materials before it as to whether reinstatement is appropriate and proper relief where an appeal against an order of discharge or dismissal is allowed and if not whether payment of gratuity could be the appropriate relief instead of reinstatement it has been held in the Bench decision in the case of Motilal Kala v. Harigovind Rai 1978 CHN 635 that rule 9(1)(b) requires the Appeal Committee to consider all materials before it and that the materials relating to unhappy or unsatisfactory relationship between the teachers and the management is a relevant factor to be taken into consideration by the Appeal Committee. It must be satisfied that an order of reinstatememt is proper and appropriate and once it allows the appeal it cannot pass an automatic order of reinstatement. It must be satisfied that an order of reinstatememt is proper and appropriate and once it allows the appeal it cannot pass an automatic order of reinstatement. The Division Bench after noticing the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1964 SC 1264, 1969 (3) SCC 653 , 1971 LIC 1235 and AIR 1970 SC 1041 observed that the principles of smooth and harmonious working of an industrial establishment which the Supreme Court invoked in the last two cited cases applies with equal if not greater force to an educational institution. The manner in which rule 9(1)(b) has been drafted fully supports this view. In directing reinstatement of a teacher the interest of the institution cannot be ignored which is essentially a relevant factor. In the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court the trend of decision is that although the normal rule is that in case of invalid orders of dismissal industrial adjudication directs reinstatement of a dismissed employee nevertheless there would be cases where it would not be expedient to adopt such a course. In the present case it appears from the impugned order of the Appeal Committee that there was serious allegation of conspiracy by the Headmaster of the school against the appellant. In the comments of the Managing Committee on the petition of appeal it was stated that as the appellant had troubles in connection with the affairs of Kumari Sumati Manna, the then sent up candidate, she could not come to school for fear of being chastised by the relations of Kumari Sumati Manna and along with the said comments in writing a copy of the complaint of Sm. Snehalata Manna, mother of the said girl was enclosed. The appellant in his explanation of the said comments made serious allegations against the Secretary of the school to the effect that the charge against him touching the said girl was fabricated and invented by the Secretary of the school. It appears that the Appeal Committee has brushed aside the charge against the teacher that he had called the girl Sumati Manna and had talks with her within close door in a room of the school building at about 1 A.M. midnight on 1.3.68, as flimsy. It is difficult to accept this view of the Appeal Committee regarding the said charge which was a grave one, involving moral turpitude on the part of the teacher. It is difficult to accept this view of the Appeal Committee regarding the said charge which was a grave one, involving moral turpitude on the part of the teacher. It appears that papers were produced before the Appeal Committee to show that the appellant was convicted in a criminal case in 1976. It appears that the Appeal Committee did not consider all the relevant materials and specially the relationship between the appellant and the management of the school emerging from such materials and the interest of the school in coming to a decision on the appropriate relief to be granted to the appellant in allowing the appeal. It has been observed by the Division Bench in Motilal Kala's case that the Appeal Committee cannot order reinstatement unless it thinks that reinstatement is proper and appropriate and has to give its reasons for doing so (vide 1978 CHN 635 paragraph 11 at page 639). In the present case, no reasons have been given by the Appeal Committee for directing reinstatement I therefore, find that the order of tile Appeal Committee directing reinstatement of the appellant made without compliance with the provisions of Regulation 9(1)(b) of the Appeal Regulations is illegal and must be quashed, although its order allowing the appeal cannot be interfered with. 10. The writ petition, therefore, succeeds in part. The Rule is made absolute to the extent indicated below. The impugned order of the Appeal Committee in so far as it directs reinstatement of the respondent No. 7 is quashed and the Appeal Committee is directed to decide the question of granting appropriate and proper relief to the said respondents in accordance with law within three months from date. The petitioners shall go on paying to the respondent No. 7 Rs.200/- per month towards salary till the decision of the aforesaid matter by the Appeal Committee. Such payments made to the respondent No. 7 under order of this Court shall not be refundable or adjustable irrespective of the decision by the Appeal Committee. The sum of Rs.1000/- already paid to him towards arrears of salary for the period of actual service will, however, be adjusted against the amount due on that account. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal made absolute in part.