G. T. NANAVATI, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant was appointed by the Deputy Salt Commissioner Ahmedabad as Inspector Or Salt by an order dated 29-8-1980. His appointment was temporary and on ad hoc basis till his replacement by a regular candi- date nominated by the Staff Selection Commission. His services were liable to be terminated at any time without assigning any reasons. He resumed his duties on 15-9- 1980. He remained on leave from 21-9-1981 to 7-10-81. Thereafter he again remained on leave from 8- 10- 1981 to 12- 10- 1981 on the ground that his health was not good. He also applied for leave for a further period of 10 days i. e. from 13-10-1981 to 22-10-1981. As the medical certi- ficate produced by him in support of his application was not in the prescribed form he was asked to produce such a certificate. It appears from the record that even thereafter he did not remain present and remained on leave from 25-10-1981 to 1 On 21-1-1982 he was served with a notice under Rule 5 or the Central Civil Ser- vices (Temporary Service) Rules 1965 (hereafter referred to as the CCS. TS. Rules) whereby his services were terminated with effect from the date of expiry of a period of one month from the date on which the notice was served upon him. It appears that (he notice was served upon him on the next day; and therefore the Assistant Salt Commissioner Jamnagar by a memorandum dated 22 declared that the services of the appellant were terminated with effect from that day. After giving a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure the appellant filed Civil Suit No. 3783 of 1982 in the City Civil Court Ahmedabad challenging the action of the respondents in terminating his services on the ground that it was il-legal arbitrary and mala fide. The learned trial Judge dismissed the suit holding that termination of services of the appellant was in the nature of termination simpliciter and not by way of punishment; and that it was not proved that the services of the appeal- lant were terminated either mala fide or arbitrarily. The appellant has therefore filed this appeal challenging the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge. ( 2 ) THREE contentions have been raised by Mr. Takwani the learned advocate for the appellant. The appellant has therefore filed this appeal challenging the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge. ( 2 ) THREE contentions have been raised by Mr. Takwani the learned advocate for the appellant. He sub- mitted that termination of appellants services was really by way of punishment as it was based on irregularities memos issued by the authorities in this behalf and his unsuitability to hold the post on which he was working. In support of his contention Mr. Takwani invited my attention to the averments made in paragraph 7 of the Written Statement wherein it has been stated that during the short spell of service the appellant was found in the habit of taking leave frequently and had remained absent from duty unauthorisedly on many occasions for which he was served with memos several times. It is also stated in the said paragraph The plaintiffs performance during the short spell he attended to his duties was far from satisfactory. It is no doubt true that the respondents-defendants have tried to justify their action on those facts and the learned trial judge has also referred to them in his judg- ment. It is pertinent to note that these facts have been stated for the purpose of pointing out that the whole purpose of appointing the appellant by way of stop-gap arrangement was frustrated because of his irregular attendance. In paragraph 7 of the written statement itself it has been stated that the very purpose for which the plaintiff was appointed was defeated by his frequent absence with or without leave. As pointed out earlier the appellant was appointed on ad-hoc basis and only by way of a stop-gap arrangement i. e. till a regular candidate became available. (If during this short period he remained absent either because of his illness or for any other reason the work of the department naturally suffered. In his evidence the appellant has admitted that in his office at Salaya he was the only responsible person and there was nobody else who could supply required information in his ab- sence. Therefore the whole purpose of appointing the appellant was frustrated because of his frequent absence; and that is the ground on which his services came to be termianted. Therefore the whole purpose of appointing the appellant was frustrated because of his frequent absence; and that is the ground on which his services came to be termianted. Memos were issued not for the purpose of tak- ing any disciplinary action against him but with a view to see that he became regular in attendance and performance of his duties. For these reasons it cannot be said that the services of the appellant were termi- nated by way of punishment and that this is not a case of termination simpliciter.) It is no doubt true that the learned trial Judge in her judgment has observed that the appellants work was in fact not satisfactory and that he was negligent in performance of his duties. This finding is again based on his conduct in remaining absent with- out getting leave sanctioned and without making any alternative arrangement. In paragraph 13 of his depo- sition the appellant has admitted that he had left the head-quarter without taking permission of his superior officer and without making any alternative arrangement. As stated earlier this conduct of the appellant is referred to not for any other purpose but for the purpose of showing that the very purpose of appointing him was frustrated. In support of his contention that termination of the appellants services was by way of punishment Mr. Tak- wani relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Bai Shanker v. State AIR 1966 SC page 492. That was not a case of a temporary employee. In that case it was held that removal of an employee by way of punishment for overstaying his leave is illegal. That is not the case here. The learned trial Judge has rightly followed the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj AIR 1968 SC 1089 which lays down the proposi- tions to be borne in mind while determining the question whether termination of service is by way of punish- ment or not. ( 3 ) MR. Takwani also relied upon the decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 1161 of 1972. In that case there was a complaint made against the employee concerned which was followed by an enquiry and a re- port; and it was held that the employee was not a fit person to hold the post which he was holding. Takwani also relied upon the decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 1161 of 1972. In that case there was a complaint made against the employee concerned which was followed by an enquiry and a re- port; and it was held that the employee was not a fit person to hold the post which he was holding. It was under these circumstances that this Court held that the termination of his service was by way of punishment. The facts of that case were quite different; and therefore it can be of no help to the appellant. ( 4 ) FOR all these reasons I am of the opinion that the learned trial Judge was right in holding that the order of termination in this case is not by way of punishment and that it is an order of termination simpliciter. Thus there being no substance in the first contention raised by Mr. Takwani it has to be rejected. ( 5 ) IT was next urged that the appointment of the appellant though temporary and on ad-hoc basis was to continue till his replacement by a regular candidate nominated by the Staff Selection Commission. Thus he was entitled to continue in service till a regularly selected candidate became available. His services came to be terminated not for that reason but for a different reason as pointed out earlier. Mr. Takwani therefore sub- mitted that the order of termination was contrary to the terms of his appointment and therefore it was illegal and arbitrary. There is no substance in this contention also. In the letter of appointment itself it is stated that the services of the appellant were liable to be terminated at any time without assigning any reason. Thus according to the conditions of service the department had a right to terminate his services without assigning any reason. The aforesaid condition is quite consistent with the fact that the appellants appointment was made on a purely temporary and ad-hoc basis and it was made only by way of a stop-gap arrangement. As pointed out above his services came to be terminated because the very purpose for which he was appointed was frustrated as he remained on leave frequently. There-fore if his services came to be terminated on this ground it cannot be said that it was done arbitrarily or mala-fide. As pointed out above his services came to be terminated because the very purpose for which he was appointed was frustrated as he remained on leave frequently. There-fore if his services came to be terminated on this ground it cannot be said that it was done arbitrarily or mala-fide. Merely because it was stated in the letter of appointment that his servi- were to continue till his replacement by a suitable candidate nominated by the Staff Selection Commission it cannot be said that he acquired a vested right to continue on that post till such a candidate became available Really that was the outer limit for which he could have been continued in service. ( 6 ) LASTLY it was urged that the order of termination was not passed in this case by an authority which ap- pointed the appellant; and therefore it is bad. Relying upon the definition of the term appointing authority as contained in the Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 (hereafter referred to as the CCS. CCA. Rules) it was urged that the Salt Commissioner being the highest authority must be regarded as the appointing authority; and as the order was passed by the Deputy Salt Commissioner it must be regarded as invalid. This contention is wholly misconceived because the said Rules have no application at all to the facts of this case. The case of the appellant is really governed by the CCS. TS. Rules where the term appointing authority is defined to mean in relation to a specified post the authority declared as such under the Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 The term specified post has been defined in CCS. TS. Rules to mean a particular post or the particular trade of posts within a cadre in respect of which a Government servant is declared to be quasi-permanent under Rule 3 of the said Rules. It is nobodys case that the appellant was holding a specified post. Therefore the definition contained in the CCS. CCA. Rules is not appli- cable at all. As the appellant was appointed by the Deputy Salt Commissioner he had the power to pass the order of termination. In the alternative it was urged that in view of Circular No. 6 (1) Vig. Therefore the definition contained in the CCS. CCA. Rules is not appli- cable at all. As the appellant was appointed by the Deputy Salt Commissioner he had the power to pass the order of termination. In the alternative it was urged that in view of Circular No. 6 (1) Vig. /66/1940 dated January 24 1980 issued by the Office of the Salt Commissioner Jaipur no appointment could be made by the Assistant Salt Commissioner without obtaining approval from the Salt Commissioner. Mr. Takwani there fore submitted that it is the Salt Commissioner who is the appointing authority in the present case and not the Assistant or the Deputy Salt Commissioner. Even this contention has no substance in it. The said Circular has been issued under the CCS. CCA. Rules and not under the CCS. TS. Rules. It has therefore no application to the present case. ( 7 ) IN this view of the matter the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. .