J. D. JAIN, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against judgment and decree dated 30th August 1982 of an Additional District Judge whereby he dismissed the petition of the appellant-wife for divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion falling under sub-cl. (ia) and (ib) of S. 13 (1), Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). ( 2 ) THE undisputed facts of the case are that the marriage between the parties was solemnised on 21st March 1972 at West Patel Nagar, New Delhi, in accordance with the Hindu rites and ceremonies. Thereafter, they lived together as husband and wife up to 7th August 1977 when they parted company of each other. A daughter by the name of Nancy Handa was born out of the wedlock on 28th July 1974. The wife is presently employed as a clerk in the customs Department and is drawing about Rs. 900. 00 per mensem. The respondent is employed in Punjab National Bank and is drawing more than a thousand rupees per mensem The respondent was employed in Punjab National Bank even at the time of marriage with the appellant, but it would appear that she got employment in 1973 i. e. soon after the marriage. ( 3 ) ON 5th March 1981. the appellant moved a petition for divorce against respondent on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. She averred that from the beginning of 1973 the respondent started forcing her to hand over her entire salary to him. As an obedient wife she complied with his wishes as she had no other option and she did not want to embitter her relations with respondent It was with great difficulty that he would give her a petty amount for her day-to-day expenses. With the passage of time, the attitude of the respondent became more and more harsh towards her and he would grudge giving her any money even for her personal expenses. At the time of the birth of their daughter she was admitted to Kapoor Hospital, Pusa Road, for delivery, but even then the respondent did not bear the expenses of her labour and medicines, etc. He managed to get even the salary for three months to which the appellant was entitled during her maternity leave from her friend. But he did not spend a single penny towards hospital bills and medicines etc. for the baby. He managed to get even the salary for three months to which the appellant was entitled during her maternity leave from her friend. But he did not spend a single penny towards hospital bills and medicines etc. for the baby. Another grievance of the appellant is that on 15th August 1975 their child fell seriously ill She requested the respondent to call a doctor and get some medicine. However, the respondent slipped away and did not come hack for more than two hours. Left with no other alternative she herself went to the doctor and brought some medicines, etc. . by borrowing money from her neighbour. On her way back home, she found the respondent sitting in a restaurant with his friends. She went to him and asked about the medicine for the child. However, the respondent insulted her there and told her that he was not bothered about the child or the appellant ( 4 ) YET another grievance of the appellant is that the respondent would leave the house early in the morning and come late at night sometimes at 12-30 A. M. /1-30 A. M. in drunkard condition. Whenever she objected to the same, the respondent would insult and abuse her. He would even beat her sometimes and would threaten that in case she objected in future she would be thrown out of the house. On occasions, she was beaten mercilessly even with a stick. Although she tolerated all these acts of cruelty and tried to control the respondent, but the latter was determined to create conditions for dissolving the marriage. During her five years stay with the respondent, the latter never took her for outing or for social functions. He would not sit at home even on holidays and she came to know that the respondent would even take leave from his office without informing her about it and then keep away from home. On 25th April 1977. at about 4. 30 A. M. when the appellant was asleep, the respondent brought one big utensil (Patila) from the kitchen and threw the same on her. It hit her on her back causing injuries to her body and as soon as she got up from the bed, the respondent without any rhyme or reason started beating her and then left the house. The appellant sent a message to her brother who came there in the evening. It hit her on her back causing injuries to her body and as soon as she got up from the bed, the respondent without any rhyme or reason started beating her and then left the house. The appellant sent a message to her brother who came there in the evening. As she was afraid of physical injury at the hands of the respondent, her aunt was requested to stay there for (a) few days. Eventually on 7th August 1977, some relatives were called, an agreement was drafted at a meeting held in their presence and the appellant was compelled to leave the matrimonial home. ( 5 ) THE appellant further alleged that the behaviour of the respondent towards her parents was harsh callous and even insolent According to her. on 1st May 1977 her mother suffered a severe heart attack when she came to know (of) maltreatment meted out to her by the respondent She was admitted to G. B. Pant Hospital However, the respondent did not even bother to visit the hospital After her departure from the matrimonial home, the respondent happened to meet her father on 14th January 1978 at Patel Nagar Market He then hurled abuses upon her father in the presence of his brother-in-law and other members of the public and misbehaved with him. The father of the appellant too could not stand humiliation and suffered a heart attack. On 14th October 1978 the respondent came to the house of the appellant s parents, She and her brother, and his wife were away to Vaishno Devi temple. However, her father was there. The respondent abused him and misbehaved with him On return from Vaishno Devi they had to take their father to Willingdon Hospital for treatment as he had another stroke. Eventually, he died on 6th December 1978, but the respondent did not bother even to attend his Kirya ceremony or come for condolence even-after coming to know of the same. The sum and substance of the appellants contention, therefore, is that she was treated by the respondent with cruelty for a period of 4-5 years and eventually the respondent succeeded in his game of driving her out of the matrimonial home. Consequently, the parties have been living separately since 7th August 1977. The sum and substance of the appellants contention, therefore, is that she was treated by the respondent with cruelty for a period of 4-5 years and eventually the respondent succeeded in his game of driving her out of the matrimonial home. Consequently, the parties have been living separately since 7th August 1977. The efforts made by the brother of the appellant for reconciliation during this period bore no fruit as the respondent was determined to spoil her life. ( 6 ) IN his written statement, the respondent refuted all the allegations made by the appellant in the petition. Of course, he admitted that a baby named Nancy Handa was born out of the wedlock on 28th July 1974. According to him, the appellant had never been sincere and faithful to him as she used to pick up quarrel purposely and become violent She caused even physical harm to the respondent on a number of occasions as she intended to break the marriage. Ultimately, therefore, he was left with no option but to agree to the breakdown of the marriage. A meeting of relatives and friends was thereupon arranged on 7th August 1977 and an agreement was executed in writing which was signed by both the parties and also their kith and kin. Consequently, both the parties separated and the question of his misbehaving with the father or any other relative of the appellant did not arise. As for the death of her father, he contended that it was never brought to his notice. In nutshell his stand is that it was the appellant who had always been cruel to him and her behaviour towards him was intolerable. ( 7 ) EX. RW 1/1 is the photostat copy of the agreement dated 7th August 1977 which was admittedly executed between the parties in the presence of their relatives and friends. It was, inter alia, signed by Shri Sant Ram Vohra. father of the appellant, Dharamvir, maternal uncle of the appellant and Satish Kumar Vohra, brother of the appellant Its perusal would show that the meeting of the relatives and friends of both the parties was held in order to settle the disputes and differences between the parties and a settlement was arrived at by mutual consent of the parties. father of the appellant, Dharamvir, maternal uncle of the appellant and Satish Kumar Vohra, brother of the appellant Its perusal would show that the meeting of the relatives and friends of both the parties was held in order to settle the disputes and differences between the parties and a settlement was arrived at by mutual consent of the parties. Its para 1, when translated, reads as under: "after considerable deliberations and taking stock of all the circumstances, it was decided and agreed between the parties that they would separate from each other and their separation would be given a legal shape afterwards. Some settlement was also arrived at regarding the return of articles belonging to the appellant. It was further agreed that the custody of the baby Nancy would remain with the appellant who would be her guardian and the respondent would have no right to see her. " ( 8 ) THE learned Additional District Judge has adversely commented upon the conduct of the appellant vis-a-vis the settlement He has observed that she deliberately suppressed the factum of settlement in her petition and even when the respondent specifically adverted to it and placed on record a photostat copy thereof, she gave an evasive reply in her replication. So, he remarks "that being so, it seems understandable as to when the parties vide an agreement dated 7th August 1977 mutually decided to separate and in fact also made arrangements of their main belongings such as T. V. and Cooler, besides the ornaments, how could the petitioner expect the respondent to. go to her. Where was the question of desertion? The separate living of the parties was with mutual consent Not only this, they also decided in this agreement that it would be given a legal shape. In fact there is no legal desertion of the spouse by each other. What is factually established is that the parties started living separately with mutual consent as per agreement. In the wake of this agreement many other factors lose their importance such as the noncare of the child by her father or the absence of the respondent at the time of the obseques of the petitioner s father. What is factually established is that the parties started living separately with mutual consent as per agreement. In the wake of this agreement many other factors lose their importance such as the noncare of the child by her father or the absence of the respondent at the time of the obseques of the petitioner s father. " The learned Judge goes on to observe that "the respondent husband was ostensibly deprived of this right as in no uncertain words, it has been stated there "baby Nancy will remain with her mother and Baldev Raj will not have any right to meet her. . . . . " Let it not be forgotten that once the relations between the husband and wife are so strained that the husband has been deprived even of the right to see his only daughter, there would not be much unnaturality if he does not go to attend the last rites of his father in-law. " ( 9 ) AS for the ground of cruelty, the learned District Judge has disbelieved the appellant and has, inter alia, observed that for reasons best known to her she did not examine her brother Satish Vohra or any other witness in whose presence the alleged acts of cruelty took place or who were called by her when she sustained physical injury on account of the respondent hitting her with a utensil He also disbelieved the appellant that she was given beating on 7th August 1977 itself when the aforesaid agreement was eventually arrived at between the parties. ( 10 ) ON a consideration of whole of the evidence on record, I find that the learned Additional District Judge has missed the real point in controversy between the parties. He seems to have been much impressed by the fact that the agreement dated 7th August 1977 was arrived at by mutual consent and volition of the parties because it had been signed not only by the appellant but also by her kith and kin. No doubt, ostensibly that is so but it does not solve the real problem which is quite deep rooted and complex. The fundamental question which falls for determination is whether she had any option but to swallow the bitter pill and accord her consent to the settlement arrived at the meeting of the relatives and friends of both the parties. No doubt, ostensibly that is so but it does not solve the real problem which is quite deep rooted and complex. The fundamental question which falls for determination is whether she had any option but to swallow the bitter pill and accord her consent to the settlement arrived at the meeting of the relatives and friends of both the parties. She had to choose between the two evils, Perhaps she had no other, choice, but to agree to separate living. The Court has, therefore, to find out the root cause and the genesis of the problem which eventually culminated in their separation. Unfortunately, the trial Court has failed to direct its judicial mind to resolve this crucial question ( 11 ) THE first ground for divorce is persistent cruelty on the part of the respondent. I have briefly adverted to the allegation made I by the appellant in this behalf Significantly. the respondent in his written statement did. not make specific denial of each and every averment of fact contained in the petition. For instance, the appellant had specifically contended that she was forced by the respondent to hand over her entire salary to him and only a small amount out of the same was given to her for her day to day expenses but I have looked in vain for specific denial of this allegation in the corresponding para of the written statement. He has simply dubbed this allegation as wrong and baseless. Order VIII Rule 4, Civil P. C. , lays down the where a defendant denies an allegation of fact in the plaint, he must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance. The principle underlying this rule is that pleadings should be specific. Rule 5 of the same Order further lays down that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication or stated to be not admitted in the pleadings of the defendant, shall be deemed to be admitted. In such an event the admission itself being proved, no other proof is necessary. See Badat and Co. v. East India Trading Co. , AIR 1964 SC 538 , in which it was held that : "if his denial of a fact is not specific but evasive, the said fact shall be taken to be admitted. In such an event the admission itself being proved, no other proof is necessary. See Badat and Co. v. East India Trading Co. , AIR 1964 SC 538 , in which it was held that : "if his denial of a fact is not specific but evasive, the said fact shall be taken to be admitted. In such an event, the admission itself being proof, no other proof is necessary. But under the proviso to R. 5 the Court may. in its discretion, require any fact so admitted to he proved otherwise than by such admission. " ( 12 ) IT would, however, appear that the respondent became wiser by the time he appeared in the witness-box as RW1. He deposed that "we used to mix our salary and I used to spare Rs. 700. 00 to the petitioner to arrange the household goods and I used to keep Rs. 200. 00 as my pocket expenses. " Evidently this assertion is just an afterthought Such a plea is not to be found in the written statement. It was not even put to the appellant when she was in the witness-box although she was cross-examined at considerable length. All that was suggested to her was that she had opened a bank account and she had been depositing Rs. 100. 00 per mensem. She admitted having got a bank account and having deposited Rs. 100. 00 per mensemfor some time She also admitted that a cooler and a T. V. were purchased in 1974. However, she asserted that whatever money she had saved she gave it to the respondent for purchase of T. V. and cooler. Anyhow, the aforesaid allegation of the appellant remains substantially uncontroverted and I see no reason to disbelieve the appellant on this point Of course, it is quite comprehensible that a husband may ask his wife to contribute to the household expenses, but he has to be just and reasonable. In itself, this fact may not amount to cruelty. However, the whole course of conduct of the respondent leaves no room for doubt that he was harsh, aggressive, overbearing and sometimes even oppressive to her. He asserted during the course of his examination- in-chief that the expenses for the birth of the child were borne by him and he met the same out of Rs. 1,100. 00 which he received by way of bonus. He asserted during the course of his examination- in-chief that the expenses for the birth of the child were borne by him and he met the same out of Rs. 1,100. 00 which he received by way of bonus. However, no such plea was taken by him in the written statement and no reliance can be placed on the same. It is significant to note further that even though the respondent asserted that he had never assaulted the appellant and that he used to take his meals and breakfast etc. at home, there is not even a whisper about the circumstances which led to the convening of the meeting of the relatives and friends on 7th August 1977 and their eventual decision to part with company of each other. It may be noticed that he has not uttered a single word about the ailment of their daughter and the medical treatment provided to her on 15th August 1975 although the appellant specifically alluded to the same in her testimony as Public Witness. Similarly, he is conspicuously silent about the incident on 25th April 1977 in which he allegedly hurt the appellant with some utensils. Marriage amongst Hindus is looked upon as a sacrament and not a contract Notwithstanding deep inroads made by western civilisation and social thought sanctity still attaches to the institution of marriage amongst Hindus by tradition and social outlook except, of course, in very rare cases of highly modernised and westernised people. It is seldom that mere incompatibility if temperament leads to schism in the matrimonial bond It is, therefore, beyond one s comprehension as to why a Hindu wife unless hard pressed would be disposed to seek separation from her husband. It is nobody s case that she had developed abhorrence or aversion or cold feet for the respondent, it is rather astonishing that the respondent has not given any explanation whatsoever as regards the Circumstances which led to the convening of meeting on 7th August 1977 and the settlement embodied in RW 1/1. Rather he has feigned ignorance about the convening of the meeting on that day, and has stated. " meeting on7th August 1977 was called at the instance of the petitioner s people. Before that there was no quarrel among us. I was not told anything about the meeting. Rather he has feigned ignorance about the convening of the meeting on that day, and has stated. " meeting on7th August 1977 was called at the instance of the petitioner s people. Before that there was no quarrel among us. I was not told anything about the meeting. " One has certainly to strain one s sense of credulity a lot before accepting such a statement as correct The respondent is either a naive or a hypocrite Evidently, the respondent had tried to suppress the truth and has not come out with true facts. On the contrary the version of the appellant appears to be truthful and worthy of credence having regard to the totality of circumstances. ( 13 ) THE word "cruelty" has not been defined in the Act Clause (ia) of S. 13 (1) of the Act simply uses the phrase " treated the petitioner with cruelty". No one has ever attempted to give a comprehensive definition of cruelty and I do not intend to try to do so either. In other words, the question whether the acts or conduct of the party charged were cruel will have to be answered in accordance with the ordinary sense of that word. So whilst the court should pay regard to the changing social conditions they should be alert not to open the door too wide so that incompatibility of temperament and every defect of behaviour comes to he regarded as ground for relief under the guise of cruelty. It is now well accepted that to constitute cruelty the conduct complained of must be grave and weighty and every matrimonial conduct which may cause annoyance to or resented by the other spouse does not amount to cruelty. ( 14 ) THE facts of this case appear to me to go well beyond the "ordinary wear and tear of the married life" adopting Lord Asquith s phrase in Buchler v. Buchler, (1947) 1 All ER 319 (A ). In Gollins v. Gollins 1964 AC 644, Lord Reid observed that: "a judge does and must try to read the minds of the parties in order to evaluate their conduct In matrimonial cases we are not concerned with the reasonable man as we are in cases of negligence. We are dealing with this man and this woman and the fewer a priori assumptions we make about them the better. We are dealing with this man and this woman and the fewer a priori assumptions we make about them the better. In cruelty cases one can hardly ever even start with a presumption that the parties arc reasonable people, because it is hard to imagine any cruelty case ever arising if both the spouses think and behave as reasonable people. "his Lordship enunciated the position further saving that: "in matrimonial affairs we are not dealing with objective standards, and it is not a matrimonial offence to fall below the standard of the reasonable man for the reasonable woman ). We are dealing with this man and this woman. " ( 16 ) THESE observations were quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Dr. N. G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534 . The Supreme Court further observed that generally cruelty does not consist of a single isolated act but consists in most cases of a series of acts spread over a period of time. Reference in this context may also be made to a couple of decisions of this Court, viz. , Neelam Kalra v. Vinod Kalra, (1981) 1 DMC 42 and Satinder Lal Gupta v. Swarna Lata Gupta, (1981) 1 DMC 92 . In the former case, Ms. Leila Seth, J. observed that : "as has been said over and over again, the conduct should be "grave and weighty" so as to make cohabitation virtually unendurable. It must be more serious than the ordinary wear and tear of marriage. The cumulative conduct taking into consideration the circumstances and the background of the parties has to be examined to reach a conclusion. However, the conduct need not be aimed at the other party. " ( 17 ) SIMILARLY, in Satinder Lal Gupta (supra), Avadh Behari Rohatgi, J. , adverting to the speeches of Lord Reid and Lord Pearce, said that : "the conduct must be such that no reasonable person would tolerate it or consider that the complainant shall be called upon to endure it. Before conduct can be called cruel, it must touch a certain pitch of severity. " ( 18 ) WITH respect I may say that these observations correctly enunciate the legal connotation of the word "cruelty". Before conduct can be called cruel, it must touch a certain pitch of severity. " ( 18 ) WITH respect I may say that these observations correctly enunciate the legal connotation of the word "cruelty". ( 19 ) COMING to the facts of the instant case, it has been seen above that the husband did little or nothing to help the appellant in running the household. He was rather a constant drain on her income in the sense that he would take away her entire salary leaving behind only a meagre amount for domestic and her personal use. It would appear that he was incorrigibly and inexcusably late comer and whenever she raised her little finger to point out the same, he would react sharply; not only would he snub her but he would even abuse her and slap her. It looks that he did not think of anyone else but himself. It may be that he did not intend to be cruel but it is manifest that his intentional acts amounted in fact to cruelty. Indeed, the intention is not an essential ingredient of the matrimonial offence of cruelty. Looking to the overall demeanour and conduct of the respondent, one cannot escape the conclusion that he was not only over-bearing, harsh and abusive, but he resorted even to violence on occasions. Certainly the appellant could not be expected to endure such kind of humiliation and assaults indefinitely. ( 20 ) AS required by S. 23, before a decree can be passed for divorce on the ground of cruelty, the court has to be satisfied that the petitioner has not in any manner condoned cruelty on the part of the other spouse. It has further to be satisfied that the petitioner is not, in any way, taking advantage of his or her own wrong. No plea of condonation has been raised in the instant case. Even otherwise condonation means forgiveness of the matrimonial offence and the restoration of the offending spouse to the same position as she or he occupied before the offence was committed. To constitute condonation, there must be, therefore, two things forgiveness and restoration. (See Dr. N. G. Dastane ( AIR 1975 SC 1534 ) (supra ). Even otherwise condonation means forgiveness of the matrimonial offence and the restoration of the offending spouse to the same position as she or he occupied before the offence was committed. To constitute condonation, there must be, therefore, two things forgiveness and restoration. (See Dr. N. G. Dastane ( AIR 1975 SC 1534 ) (supra ). In the instant case, there is no iota of evidence to warrant an inference that the appellant had connived at or condoned the cruelty, rather the evidence unmistakably goes to show that it led to rupture of their marital life and the appellant had per force to live separately. Hence, the appellant is entitled to relief of divorce on the ground of cruelty alone. ( 21 ) COMING to the ground of desertion, it is well settled that the question of desertion cannot be decided by merely ascertaining which party left the matrimonial home. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily a deserting party. That party may have been forced by the conduct of the other to leave home. It may ,be that the spouse responsible for the driving out is guilty of desertion. There is no substantial difference between the case of a man who intends to cease cohabitation and leaves his wife; and the case of a man who, with the same intention compels his wife by his conduct to leave him, or to put it another way, the case of one who persists in treating his wife in a way which he knows she probably will not tolerate, and which no ordinary woman would tolerate, and she leaves him. This is called constructive desertion. (See para 56, "rayden on Divorce", 13th Edition, which contains the aforesaid statement of law ). In Eric Lang v. Jean Wauchope Lang, 1955 AC 402, which is a decision of the House of Lords and a leading case on the subject, the husband was undoubtedly cruel. But cruelty without more was not a ground of divorce in the State of Victoria (Australia) and it was necessary to establish constructive desertion. So, the question was whether the constructive desertion was wilful, whether there was anumus deserendi. But cruelty without more was not a ground of divorce in the State of Victoria (Australia) and it was necessary to establish constructive desertion. So, the question was whether the constructive desertion was wilful, whether there was anumus deserendi. Their Lordships observed that: "since 1860 in England, and for a long time in Australia, it has been recognised that the party truly guilty of disrupting the home is not necessarily or in all cases the party who first leaves it. The party who stays behind (their Lordships will assume this to be the husband) may be by reason of conduct on his part making it unbearable for a wife with reasonable self-respect, or powers of endurance, to stay with him, so that he is the party really responsible for the breakdown of the marriage. He has deserted her by expelling her : by driving her out. In such a case the factum is the course of conduct pursued by the husband something which may be far more complicated than the mere act of leaving the matrimonial home. "it may be pertinent to notice here that in the aforesaid case it was the wife who had finally left the house. The husband wrote a number of letters begging of her to return but not expressing any intention to treat her differently if she did. Even taking this circumstances into consideration their Lordships observed that: "her patience was not unnaturally exhausted, and even if he had expressed penitential sentiments it would not have been unreasonable for the wife to doubt their sincerity. " ( 23 ) THE principle that the party who intends bringing a cohabitation to an end and whose conduct in reality causes its termination commits an act of desertion has been in terms approved by the Supreme Court in Bipinchandra Shah v. Prabhavati, AIR 1957 SC 176 . Lang v. Lang (supra) being one of the many English cases adverted to by the Supreme Court therein. ( 24 ) I have already observed that separate living in the instant case was forced on the appellant by the persistent harsh and cruel treatment of the appellant by the respondent. The agreement dated 7th August 1977 reflects merely culmination of that behaviour. ( 24 ) I have already observed that separate living in the instant case was forced on the appellant by the persistent harsh and cruel treatment of the appellant by the respondent. The agreement dated 7th August 1977 reflects merely culmination of that behaviour. Once it is held that the respondent had the requisite animus deserendi the matrimonial offence of constructive desertion on the part of the respondent was complete as soon as the de facto separation commenced. The presumption about the animus deserendi is not rebutted by evidence that the spouse guilty of expulsive conduct in fact had no desire to cause the other spouse to leave or in fact desired the other spouse not to leave. This is specifically made clear by the House of Lords in Lang v. Lang, Their Lordships observed that : "if the husband knows the probable result of his acts and persists in them, in spite of warning that the wife will be compelled to leave the home, and indeed, as in the present case, has expressed an intention of continuing his conduct and never indicated any intention of amendment, that is enough however passionately he may desire or request that she should remain. His intention is to act as he did, whatever the consequences, though he may hope and desire that they will not produce their probable effect. To say that it is not enough unless he knows that separation must inevitably result from his actions is to ask too much. " ( 25 ) HAVING regard to the overall conduct which was harsh, over-bearing, selfishly indulgent and even aggressive on occasions, I entertain to doubt in my mind that the respondent was guilty of the matrimonial offence of desertion and he cannot take refuge under agreement, Ex. RW 1/1. It is always open to the Court and indeed it is duty bound to pierce the veil and look for itself the real goings on behind the curtain. ( 26 ) BEFORE concluding it may also be pertinent to note that even the subsequent conduct of the respondent was throughout of callous indifference. He did not show any sign of penitence or remorse. Admittedly, he did not visit the house of the appellant for condolence on the death of her father. Of course, his stand is that he never had any information about the same. He did not show any sign of penitence or remorse. Admittedly, he did not visit the house of the appellant for condolence on the death of her father. Of course, his stand is that he never had any information about the same. He has asserted that after the appellant left the matrimonial home on 7th August 1977 he went once to the house of her parents with a view to enter into some compromise. It was sometime in the year 1979 or 1980 that he met the brother and sister-in-law of the appellant and he also talked to the appellant for compromise. However, there is not a whisper about it in his written statement. He has frankly admitted that he did not make any effort to call back the appellant to her matrimonial home except in his aforesaid visit. He denies having ever met the appellant s father after 7th August 1977. As for his child, he has deposed that he could not see her after 7th August 1977 as he was never allowed to see her by the appellant when he had gone to the appellant s parents hose for compromise during 1979-80. However, he admitted that he did not make any effort between 7th August 1977 and 1980 for seeing the child. The whole of his conduct thus leaves no room for doubt that he had no love or yearning either for the appellant or for his daughter after the so-called separation deed Ex. RW 1/1 was written. Obviously, he thought it to be good riddance. It is well settled that once a party has so conducted himself as to disrupt cohabitation, the consequent desertion for which that party is responsible continues until that party takes appropriate steps to terminate it. (See para 58 of "rayden on Divorce", 13th Edition ). ( 27 ) BEFORE concluding I may also make a passing reference to the observations of the learned Additional District Judge that the appellant had committed undue delay in making the petition for divorce. (See para 58 of "rayden on Divorce", 13th Edition ). ( 27 ) BEFORE concluding I may also make a passing reference to the observations of the learned Additional District Judge that the appellant had committed undue delay in making the petition for divorce. He has observed that: "even if the general desire of a Hindu wife to join back her husband is taken into account, there is nothing on record which goes to suggest that any sincere or weighty efforts were made by the wife s side for a reconciliation which having failed, she was left with no option but to knock the doors of a matrimonial court. " ( 28 ) OBVIOUSLY, his observation stems from the conclusion that the appellant was the deserting spouse. The circumstances adverted to above prove it otherwise. Hence, she had to wait for at least two years before knocking the doors of the court for dissolution of her marriage on the ground of desertion. However, she waited in vain for any endeavour on the part of the respondent to take her back to the conjugal fold. As stated above, the petition was filed on 5th March 1981. So, the appellant cannot be held guilty of undue delay in the matter. ( 29 ) TO sum up, therefore, the impugned judgment and decree cannot be sustained. The matrimonial tie between the parties has been snapped since long. The respondent is clearly in desertion and continues to be so. He was also guilty of matrimonial offence of cruelty as observed earlier. Hence, this appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and decree are set aside and the marriage of the parties is hereby dissolved by a decree of divorce under S. 13 (l) (ia) and (ib) of the Act. However, no order is made as to costs.