Union of India v. P Sasikumaran Nair — 1984 DIGILAW 234 (KER)

JUDGMENT K. Bhaskaran, Ag. C.J. 1. The writ petition was filed for quashing Ext. P2 proceedings of the second respondent, the Administrator, Union Territory of Lakshadweep, which in its operative portion reads as follows: "As instructed by the Government of India, Ministry of Education and Social Welfare in their letters referred to above, all the posts of Lecturers of Jawaharlal Nehru College, Kavaratti are redesignated as 'Junior Lecturers' with effect from 20th May 1975, in the pay scales of Rs. 350-700 (unrevised). The pay scale of Rs. 350-700 is applicable to all Junior Lecturers from the date they joined or from 20th May, 1975 whichever is later." There are other incidental reliefs also sought in the writ petition. The main question that arose for decision in the writ petition was whether the petitioners who were appointed to the post of Lecturers under Ext. P1 proceedings dated 11-8-1972 (with effect from 15-7-1982) were to receive pay on a scale which is less than what was being paid to their counter parts in other colleges in other Union Territories, including Delhi. Ext. P-1 in its material portion reads: "Consequent on the re-designation of Post-graduate Teachers attached to the Government High Secondary School, Kavaratti as Lecturers and attachment to the Jawaharlal Nehru College, Kavaratti with effect from 15-7-1972 (i.e. the date of opening of the College) the following incumbents working in the posts are posted against the post of Lecturers, Jawaharlal Nehru College, Kavaratti as shown below." 2. This appears to have a history behind it. O.P. 1605 of 1975 was filed to allow the petitioners higher scale of pay. That writ petition was disposed of directing the petitioners to make representations; and one of those representations is Ext. P3. Ext. P2 was issued on 1-4-1976 equating the redesignated post of Lecturers with that of Junior Lecturers, and giving effect to that from 20-5-1973. O.P. No. 1752 of 1977 was filed to challenge Ext. P2. While that writ petition was pending, the Government passed Ext. P4 order dated 9-1-1980 directing the respondents to dispose of Ext. P3 representation; there were other representations also filed, Ext. P5 being one among them. Ext. P-6 is the proceedings of the Government of India, Ministry of Education and Culture, disposing of Ext. P3 representation. Therein it was stated in Para.2 as follows: "2. P4 order dated 9-1-1980 directing the respondents to dispose of Ext. P3 representation; there were other representations also filed, Ext. P5 being one among them. Ext. P-6 is the proceedings of the Government of India, Ministry of Education and Culture, disposing of Ext. P3 representation. Therein it was stated in Para.2 as follows: "2. As regards the revision of pay scales, the scale of pay of Junior Lecturer is being treated at par with post-graduate teachers of + 2 stages in Higher Secondary Schools and as such there is no justification to revise the scale of pay. The Jawaharlal Nehru College is affiliated to the Calicut University only for academic purposes and in the matter of pay and allowances and other service conditions, the staff of the college are to be governed by the Central Government orders and rules." 3. In view of the above, Government of India reject your representations for change in your designation from Junior Lecturer to Lecturer and revision of scale of pay which has already been revised on the basis of the recommendations /of the Third Pay Commission." It is to challenge Exts. P2 and P6 orders O.P. Nos. 2662 of 1980 and 497 of 1980 were filed. O.P. No. 497 of 1980 was disposed of by Chandrasekhara Menon, J. on 3-8-1982 directing the 2nd respondent therein to consider the petitioner's representation in the light of what has been stated in the decision of the Supreme Court in Randhir Singh's case ( AIR 1982 SC 879 ). The learned Judge had held that there was nothing on record to indicate that these persons performed dissimilar functions compared to the Lecturers working in the Delhi area. Though the respondents took up the matter in appeal in W.A. No. 772 of 1982, that appeal was dismissed and so far as the knowledge of the respondents goes that judgment has become final as it is not evident that the matter was pursued further by the appellants herein. The petitioners in O.P. No. 497 of 1980 took up the matter in appeal aggrieved by the finding of the learned Judge that the seniority in the cadre of Lectures was to be reckoned with reference to the grade or seniority held by them in the School. 3. The petitioners in O.P. No. 497 of 1980 took up the matter in appeal aggrieved by the finding of the learned Judge that the seniority in the cadre of Lectures was to be reckoned with reference to the grade or seniority held by them in the School. 3. This appeal is by the respondents in the writ petition, namely, the Union of India and the Administrator, Union Territory of Lakshadweep, and is directed against the direction of the learned Judge that for equal work equal salary had to be paid, and therefore, it is for the consideration of the appellants herein whether they were not entitled to the scale of pay that was being allowed to the Lecturers in other colleges run by the Central Government or by the Union Territories. 4. Sri. P. V. Madhavan Nambiar, the Central Government Pleader, submitted that the respondents herein could not claim parity in the matter of salary with the Lecturers in the other colleges because they had only been redesignated as Junior Lecturers, as was evident from Ext. P2; and, therefore, they could not claim the scale of pay just equal to that of the Lecturers in other colleges where the responsibilities and duties shouldered by the Lecturers were higher than those of the Junior Lecturers in the Junior Colleges. He also submitted that the U.G.C. itself had recommended different scales of pay to the Lecturers in the Junior Colleges on the one hand, and the Lecturers in fullfledged Colleges on the other. Reliance was placed by Sri. Nambiar on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Kishori v. Union of India ( AIR 1962 SC 1139 ); U. S. Menon v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1968 SC 81 ) and Randhir Singh v. Union of lndia ( AIR 1982 SC 879 ). None of these decisions, in our opinion, would advance the case of the appellants. In Kishori's case ( AIR 1962 SC 1139 ), no doubt, the observation in Para.2 is as follows: "Similarly, if the Income Tax Officers of the same grade, are eligible for promotion to a superior grade, and others are not, the question of contravention of Art.16(1) may well arise. In Kishori's case ( AIR 1962 SC 1139 ), no doubt, the observation in Para.2 is as follows: "Similarly, if the Income Tax Officers of the same grade, are eligible for promotion to a superior grade, and others are not, the question of contravention of Art.16(1) may well arise. But how can such, question arise at all when the rules make Income Tax Officers of Grade I, eligible for appointment as Assistant Commissioner, but make Income Tax Officers of Class II eligible for promotion as Income Tax Officers of Class I but not for promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioners?" The real reasoning behind this decision of the Supreme Court has been clarified by the Supreme Court in Randhir Singh's case ( AIR 1982 SC 879 ), wherein in Para.7 it is stated as follows: "It is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade. The higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the Officers into two grades with different scales of pay. The principle of equal pay for equal work would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Art.14 if sought to be applied to them." In Para.8, the principle of equal pay for equal work has been elaborated by the Supreme Court as follows: "8. It is true that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is not expressly I declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a Constitutional goal. Art.39(d) of the Constitution proclaims 'equal pay for equal work for both man and woman" as a Directive principle of State policy. 'Equal pay for equal work for both men and women' means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive Principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. 'Equal pay for equal work for both men and women' means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive Principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Art.14 of the Constitution enjoins the State not to deny any persons equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Art.16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay." As far as the decision in U. S. Menon v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1968 SC 81 ) is concerned, it is a case where posts for which different qualifications and different method of recruitment were prescribed, came up for consideration. Here there is no case that the qualification prescribed for the Lecturers in the Junior College is any the less than what is required to be possessed by those who are to teach in the full-fledged colleges in the pre degree classes. As a matter of fact, the counsel for the respondents would submit that a Commission had gone to the Island to interview and select those who were found more suitable for the appointment to the post of Lecturers, and it is after weeding out those were not found suitable that the petitioners has been appointed. It was also submitted by the counsel for the respondents that persons in polytechnics get a much higher salary even though they were not equated with the Lecturers of the full-fledged colleges. It was also submitted that Ext. P2 had no binding force, in as much as it was not the Government that had passed it, and the Deputy Secretary who signed it has no authority to pass an order of that nature. The stand taken in Ext. It was also submitted that Ext. P2 had no binding force, in as much as it was not the Government that had passed it, and the Deputy Secretary who signed it has no authority to pass an order of that nature. The stand taken in Ext. P6 by the Government is that for the purpose of salary the petitioners would continue to be teachers in Government schools which certainly is opposed to all principles of f airplay and justice. In the decision in Ramachandran v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Leccadives, Kavaratti and others ( 1984 KLJ 568 ) a Division Bench of this Court had held that the length of service in the college alone need be considered for the purpose of determining seniority between two persons who entered service on one and the same day. In other words, even though they might have been teachers in the school and even if their entering the College service was by what is known as the process of re-designation, the character entirely changes once they enter the college service, and they necessarily have to be treated as Lecturers, not as teachers of the school. There is no case that they are less qualified and so they are not capable of shouldering all the responsibilities and duties which their counterparts in the full-fledged colleges are shouldering. That would mean that persons having equal minimum qualifications and doing equal work, qualitatively and quantitatively, could not be denied equal pay. 5. For the foregoing reasons we do not think that any case for interference with the decision of the learned Judge has been made out. After all the learned Judge has only directed the appellants to consider the matter applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, and there is, therefore, no reason for the appellants to feel shy about doing it. The decision, by the appellants on a consideration of the material before it, in the light of the directions contained in the judgment under appeal would be taken by the appellants herein within six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is dismissed. No costs.