S.K.MAL LODHA, J.—This order will decide an important question relating to payment of court-fee on an appeal under s.l8(1) of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (for short "the Ordinance") against the judgment of a learned single Judge passed in an appeal under s. 96 Civil Procedure Code. 2. We may, succinctly, re-count the facts, which are necessary for deciding the question. 3. The plaintiffs-respondents suit for specific performance of an agreement was dismissed by the District Judge, Pali, vide judgment and decree dated June 4, 1983. The plaintiffs filed appeal in this court under s. 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. Learned single Judge, by his judgment dated November 17, 1983, accepted the appeal, set aside judgment and decree dated June 4, 1983 of the learned District Judge, Pali and decreed the plaintiffs suit for specific performance of the agreement Ex.2 dated April 25, 1967. A direction was made that the plaintiffs shall deposit the purchase money amounting to Rs. 12,-318.50 along with interest or rent within two months from the date of the judgement and on their so depositing the amount in the trial court, the defendants shall execute a sale-deed in respect of the shop in dispute in favour of the plaintiffs and got it registered. Certain other directions were also made. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed in appeal under s. 96, Civil Procedure Code of the learned single Judge, the defendants have filed this appeal under s. 18(1) of the Ordinance. The valuation of the appeal was the same which was of the suit, namely, Rs. 12,318.50. A fixed court-fee of Rs. 10/- was paid on the memorandum of appeal The appeal was filed on January 20, 1984. Office reported on March 28, 1984 that on further checking it was revealed that learned counsel had not affixed the court-fee ad-valorem against the decree and had paid the court-fee is accordance with Art. 3(iii);2)(a) of Schedule II of the Rajas-than Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), but the court-fee as held in Sohanlal v. Tulcha (1), payable on such memorandum of appeal is ad-valorem in accordance with Art. 1, Schedule I of the Act. As the deficit court-fee was not paid, the appeal has been listed for orders. Mr. R.C. Maheshwari, Additional Government Advocate has put in appearance, as the matter relates to the revenue of the State. 4. As the deficit court-fee was not paid, the appeal has been listed for orders. Mr. R.C. Maheshwari, Additional Government Advocate has put in appearance, as the matter relates to the revenue of the State. 4. We heard Mr. H.M Parekh and Mr. R.C. Maheshwari, Additional Govt. Advocate and Mr. R. Mehta for respondent (caveator) on the question of court-fee. 5. Mr. H.M. Parekh, learned counsel for the defendants-appellant submitted that the court-fee of Rs. 10/- paid on the memorandum of appeal is proper and adequate as it is in accordance with Art. 3(iii)(2)(a) of Schedule II of the Act. He referred to an order dated May 8, 1981 passed by a Division Bench in Sohanlal vs. Ishwarilal (D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 3/80), wherein an identical question arose and the Division Bench, after considering s. 47 of the Act, Art. 3(iii)(2) of Schedule II of the Act, s. 18 of the Ordinance, S.J. Bhogilal V. Temple Committee (2), C. Alexandar V. State of Rajasthan (3) and the order dated August 30, 1979 passed in Devi Singh V. Shushila Devi (D.B. Civil Special Appeal No 8/79, decided on January 18, 1980 held that the court-fee of Rs. 10/-, paid on the memorandum of appeal filed under s. 96, C.P.C. is not deficient whereby over-ruling the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the respondents and also on behalf of the State. It was also pressed for our consideration that if there is any vagueness or ambiguity in the provisions of the Act, with which we are concerned because of the bad drafting, an interpretation, which losses and does not add to the pecuniary burden of the litigant should be put, i.e. it should be interpreted in favour of the litigant who is required to pay court-fee. In this connection, reliance was placed on State of Maharashtra V. Mishrilal (4) and C.C. Rev. Vs. Fertilizer Corporation (5). Learned counsel for the appellant also urged that having regard to the use of the word "judgment" in the Art. 3(iii)(2) and the word "order" in Art. 3(iii)(2)(a), it is clear that the word "order" as used in Art. 3(iii}(2)(a) refers to all orders passed by a single Judge of the High Court in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction inclusive of the "decree" as such. Reference was made to Vastu Lal vs. Official Liquidator (6 and Natha Singh v. Financial Commissioner, Punjab (7). Reference was made to Vastu Lal vs. Official Liquidator (6 and Natha Singh v. Financial Commissioner, Punjab (7). The sheet-anchor of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that Art. 3(iii)(2)(a) of Schedule II of the Act embraces the judgment and decrees and orders of a learned single Judge of the High Court passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction whereas Art. 3(iii)(2)(b) of Schedule II of the Act is applicable to appeals against judgment and decrees and orders which are not passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction as the words used are "in any other case" and court-fee of Rs. 100/- is payable. 6. On the other hand, Mr. R.C. Maheshwari, Additional Govt. Advocate took pains to persuade us that the court-fee payable on a memorandum of appeal under s. 18(1) of the Ordinance filed against the Judgment passed by the learned single Judge in exercise of his appellate jurisdiction under s. 96, Civil Procedure Code should be accompanied by the payment of ad valorem court-fee as provided in Art. 1 of Schedule 1 of the Act. To support his contention, he drew our attention to the expression not otherwise provided for" occurring in the main part of Art. 3 of Schedule II of the Act and s. 47 of the Act. He invited our attention to Sohanlals case (1) and also to the order dated March 21, 1984, passed in Rudaram vs. Shri Meharsingh D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 57 of 1984. In both the aforesaid cases, identical question with which we are concerned relating to payment of ad-valorem court-fee on the memorandum of appeal under s. 18 (1) of the Ordinance arose and it was he!d that in an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by a learned single Judge in exercise of his appellate jurisdiction under s. 96 C.P.C, the court-fee payable is ad-valorem in accordance with Art. 1 of Schedule I of the Act. As regards the order passed in Sohanlals case (supra). Mr. R.C. Maheshwari argued that Sohanlals case (1) was not brought to their Lordships notice, and further that had it been brought to their notice, they would have either in case of disagreement referred it to a Larger Bench or would have followed the reasons given therein as laid down in V.R.G. & G.O. M.C. Co. V. State of A.P. (8). It was held therein, that one co-ordinate. V. State of A.P. (8). It was held therein, that one co-ordinate. Bench of the same High Court cannot take a view contrary to the decision given earlier by another Bench of that Court and that one is bound by such decision. V.R.G & G.O. MC. Co.s case (supra) was noticed by a learned single Judge of this Court in Deva Ram v. the State of Rajasthan (9). There were two conflicting decisions in Taju Khan vs. State of Rajasthan (10) and Manohari vs. State of Rajasthan (11). The learned single Judge after noticing V.R.G. & G.O.M.C. Co s case (supra) and Jaiwant Rao vs. State of Rajasthan (12), for deciding the case before him, followed the view taken in Taju Khans case (supra). 7. Now, we proceed to perform the difficult task which is before us. Before we do so, we consider it proper to read the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Ordinance and the Act. 8. Sec. 2(2), C.P.C. defines "decree" as under- "decree means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within sec. 144." 9. Sec. 2 (9), C.P.C, defines "judgment" to mean the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of decree or order. 10. "Order" has been defined in s. 2 (14), C.P.C. to mean formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree. 11. "Decrees" have been made appealable under s. 96 and 100, Civil Procedure Code. 12. There is good deal of distinction between "decree" and "order having the force of decree" and "order which is simply enforceable as a "decree". Reference in this connection may be made to Vastulals case (supra). 13. Sec. 18 of the Ordinance, deals with appeal to the High Court from Judges of the Court. It is provided in s. 18(1) that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from the judgment of the one Judge of the High Court. Reference in this connection may be made to Vastulals case (supra). 13. Sec. 18 of the Ordinance, deals with appeal to the High Court from Judges of the Court. It is provided in s. 18(1) that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from the judgment of the one Judge of the High Court. It was held in Kedar Nath vs. Sita Ram (13) that the word "Judgment" does not bear the meaning which has been assigned to it under s. 2 (9), C.P.C. but it has been used in the sense of a sentence of the law pronounced by the court and not in the sense of reasons, which have led to that pronouncement. 14. Sec. 3 of the Act deals with various definitions. S. 3 (ii) defines "court" to mean, amongst others, any civil court. s. 3 (iv) provides guidance for interpretation. It is as follows:- "expressions used and not defined in this Act or in the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 8 of 1955) but defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908), shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the said Code." The terms "decree", "judgment" and "order" have not been defined in the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955. It, therefore, follows that the words "decree,, "judgment" and "order" will have the same meaning as assigned to them in the Code of Civil Procedure unless the subject or context otherwise requires. 15. A careful reading of the main part of Art. 3 of Schedule II of the Act shows that this Article contemplates an appeal from an order as defined in s. 2 (14), C.P.C. and not decree. It is confined to an order which is not a decree inclusive of the order passed under section 47 and S. 144, C.P.C. The definition of the "decree" lays down that it shall be deemed to include rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within s. 144. Art. 3 (iii) of Schedule II of the Act deals with the memorandum of appeal from an "order" to the High Court. It is confined to an order which is passed by a subordinate court or other authority. Art. 3 (iii) of Schedule II of the Act deals with the memorandum of appeal from an "order" to the High Court. It is confined to an order which is passed by a subordinate court or other authority. S. 3(iii) (2) of Schedule II of the Act provides for an appeal from "judgment" of a single Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan, which he may pass under any law for the time being in force. The judgment of a single Judge may be in exercise of appellate jurisdiction or original jurisdiction (extraordinary or under special enactments . Art. 3(iii) (2) containe four clauses. Art. 3 (iii) (2) (a) is confined to an order passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction and appeal from judgment/order in any other case is governed by Art 3 (iii) (2) (b) of Schedule II of the Act. 16. The partinent question is whether the word "order" occurring in Art 3 (iii) (2) (a) of Schedule II of the Act also includes "decree". It is well settled that in deciding the true scope and effect of the relevant words, the context in which the words occur, the object of the statute in which the provision is included and the policy underlying the statute become relevant and material. We have to bear in mind three well lecognized principles of interpretation of fiscal statutes, viz. (i) such statutes are to be construed strictly; (2) the subject should not be made liable to pay enhanced court-fee unless such step is warranted by the clear provisions of the statute; and (3) where there is doubt in the mind, an interpretation favourable to the subject should be preferred. This has been held in the context in which the word order has been used. We may make it clear that this interpretation is not contrary to the accepted meaning of the word judgment used in. s. 18 (1) of the Ordinance. 17. The words "from an order passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction", in our considered opinion do not include decree passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 18. Sec. 47 of the Act deals with "appeals" and provides that on a memorandum of appeal, the fee payable shall be the same that would be payable in the court of first appeal on the subject-matter of the appeal. 18. Sec. 47 of the Act deals with "appeals" and provides that on a memorandum of appeal, the fee payable shall be the same that would be payable in the court of first appeal on the subject-matter of the appeal. So also Art. 1 of Schedule 1 provides for payment of court-fee, inter-aila on the memorandum of appeal and according to it, the court-fee payable on such appeal in ad-volrem. The memorandum of appeal", as used in Art. 1, Schedule I of the Act also includes memorandum of appeal filed against the judgment of a learned single Judge passed in exercies of appellate jurisdiction. Here S. 20 of the Act, which is charging section, may be noticed. According to it, computation of court-fee has to be made according to the provisions contained in Chaptar VI, Chapter VIII and the Scehdules I and 11. From the reading of s. 47 and Art. 1 of Schedule I of the Act, it is clear that on the memorandum of appeal against the judgment and decree of a learned single Judge, passed in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction, an ad-valorem court-fee is payable. 19. In Sohanlals case (supra), Ss. 4,20, 47, Art. 1 of Schedule I and Art.3 of Schedule II of the Act and s 18 of the Ordinance came up for consideration and the question was regarding payment of court-fee on memorandum of appeal filed against the judgment of a single Judge passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. After noticing the aforesaid provisions of the Act and the Ordinance, it was held in that case that a special appeal against the judgment of a learned single Judge of a High Court passed on appeal against the decree does not fall under the description "memorandum of appeal from an order inclusive of an order determining any question under s. 47 or s. 144 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (Central Act No. V of 1908) and not otherwise provided for" and that court-fee payable on such memorandum of appeal is as provided in Art. 1 of Schedule I of the Act and, therefore, Art. 3 of Schedule II of the Act has no application to it. It was observed as under :— "The word "judgment" under s. 18 is a comprehensive one. It was observed as under :— "The word "judgment" under s. 18 is a comprehensive one. It may be an appellate judgment of a learned Single Judge in respect of a decree or it may be a judgement in respect of an order having the force of a decree like the order under s 47 or s. 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the appellate judgment of the learned Single Judge is in respect of a decree then court fee would be payable on the memorandum of special appeal under Art. 1, Schedule I. If on the other hand the appellate judgment is in respect of the order which has the force of a decree like the order under s. 47 or s. 144, Code of Civil Procedure then the memorandum of appeal would be liable to a fixed court-fee as prescribed under Art. 3 of the Schedule II." 20. This is the earliest case of the Division Bench on the point. In Sohan Lals case (supra), s. 47. Art. (iii) (2) of Schedule II of the Act and s. 18 of the Ordinance were, of-course, examined, but as attention was not drawn to Sohan Lals case(1), it was held following the decision given in Devisingh s case (supra) that the court-fee payable on the appeal is in accordance with Art. 3 (iii) (2) (a) of Schedule II of the Act. There is no doubt that a view different from the one taken in Sohanlals case (supra), which should not have been taken view of V.R.G. & G.O.M.C. Co. s case (supra) for the later Division Bench which passed order in Sohanlals case (supra) was bound by the decision taken by the earlier Division Bench. Here we are tempted to quote para 9 from V.R.G. & G.O.M.C. Co.s case (supra): "It is stronge that a co-ordinate Bench of the High Court sholud have tried to sit on judgment over a decision of another Bench of that court. It is regrettable that the learned Judge who decided the latter case overlooked the fact that they were bound by the earlier decision. It is regrettable that the learned Judge who decided the latter case overlooked the fact that they were bound by the earlier decision. If they wanted that the earlier decision should be reconsidered, they should have referred the question in issue to a larger bench and not to ignore the earlier decision." An Sohanlals case (supra) was not brought to the notice of the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench which passed the order in Sohanlals case(supra), the question of referring the question in issue to a Larger Bench did not arise. 21. A similar question also arose in Ruda Ram v. Shri Meharsingh (D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 57/84). It was contended on behalf of the appellant in that case that the court-fee was payable on the memo of appeal under Art. 3 (iii)(2)(a) of Schedule II of the Act. The learned Judges of the Division Bench, while passing the order dated March 21, 1984, observed as followes:— "The present appeal has been filed against a judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge arising out of a civil suit and as such court-fees was payable ad valorem according to item I of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act. Learned counsel submits that the appellant is willing to pay court-fees on the ad-valorem basis, but prays for 15 days time to enable the appellant to make the necessary payment of court-fees " 22. In Devisinghs case (supra), an office objection was raised that an appeal under s. 18 of the Ordinance against the judgment/order of the learned single Judge passed in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction under s. 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, should be accompanied by stamps of Rs. 100/- and as the memo of appeal was accompanied by the stamp of Rs. 10/- only, there was deficiency of Rs. 90/-. This is amply borne out from the following extract of the order dated August 30, 1979, passed in that case:— "The contention raised by the learned counsel is well-founded inasmuch as the order under appeal is one passed in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction under sec. 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act." 23. In view of this, the payment of Rs. 10/- as court-fees was held to be proper. This is distinguishable. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in SohanlaPs case(1) and Ruda Rams case (supra). 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act." 23. In view of this, the payment of Rs. 10/- as court-fees was held to be proper. This is distinguishable. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in SohanlaPs case(1) and Ruda Rams case (supra). For the reasons aforesaid, we are of opinion that the question does not require reconsideration by a Larger Bench as we consider ourselves to be bound by SohanlaPs case (1), which is the earliest case and which was not noticed in Sohanlals case (supra). We hold that ad-valorem court-fee is payable on the memorandum of appeal filed against the judgment and decree dated November 17, 1983 of the learned single Judge, which he passed in exercies of his appellate jurisdiction under s. 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. The court-fee payable on such a memorandum of appeal is in accordance with Art. 1, Schedule I of the Act read with s. 47 of the Act. 24. In view of the aforesaid conclusion, we do not consider it necessary to examine the other contentions raised by the learned counsel for parties and the learned Additional Government Advocate. 25. The office objection that the court-fee of Rs. 10/- is deficient, is upheld. Ad-valorem court fee is payable on Rs. 12,138.50. 26. Mr. H.M. Parekh, learned counsel for the appellant prays for two weeks time to enable the appellants to make up the deficiency in court-fee. Time prayed for is allowed, subject to all just exceptions.