JUDGMENT V.N. Khare, J. - This is a second appeal against the judgment dated 6-4-1976 passed by the learned District Judge. Shahjahanpur affirming the judgment dated 3.9.1975 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Shahjahanpur dismissing the plaintiffs suit for injunction restraining defendant from transferring the property in suit. 2. One Ram Lal had two sons, Gopal Ram and Shyam Lal Both the sons died in the life time of Ram Lal. Ram Lal died in the year 1946. The plaintiff-appellant is the widow of Gopal Ram and defendant-respondent is the widow of Shyam Lal. Both the pre-deceased sons widow's inherited property left by their father-in-law, Ram Lal, indisputably, under the provisions of Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937. The defendant-respondent instituted a suit for partition of her share in that property. Ultimately a compromise decree was passed. As a result of the compromise decree defendant-respondent got half share in the residential bouse and a shop was allotted to her share but she was given no right to dispose of property. 3. The suit giving rise to this second appeal was filed by the appellant for injunction to restrain the defendant-respondent from disposing of the interest in the property, viz., half share in the residential house and shop. It was alleged in the suit that under the terms of compromise between the parties in the partition suit defendant-respondent had no right to sell the property. The suit was contested primarily on the ground that under Section 14, sub-section (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the defendant became absolute owner of the property inherited by her as pre-deceased sons widow and, therefore, had a right to dispose it of in the manner she likes. 4. The sole question that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether it is sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 that applies where property is given to a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance under an instrument which in so many terms restricts the nature of the interest given to her in the property. If sub-section (1) applies, then the limitations on the nature of her interest are wiped out and she becomes the full owner of the property, while on the other hand, if sub section (2) governs such a case, her limited interest in the property is not enlarged and she continues to have the restricted estate prescribed by the instrument. Section 14 of the Act reads as follows :- "14 (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation. - In this sub-section, "Property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gilt, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribed a restricted estate in such property." 5. It has been noticed earlier that a compromise decree was passed in the partition suit and the compromise decree provided that the plaintiff of that suit, viz., the present defendant-respondent will have no right to dispose of a property which had fallen in her share in private agreement reached outside the court. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that in view of the consent decree the defendant-respondent possessed a limited right and thus the provision of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act will apply. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant has no merit and must be rejected. 6. In the present case the defendant-respondent had acquired interest in the property by inheritance under the provisions of Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937. It cannot be said that the interest in property acquired by the defendant-respondent was under compromise decree of the court. 6. In the present case the defendant-respondent had acquired interest in the property by inheritance under the provisions of Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937. It cannot be said that the interest in property acquired by the defendant-respondent was under compromise decree of the court. Asa matter of fact the decree passed in the partition suit recognised defendants independent right in the disputed property. In Vaddeboyina Tulassmma and others v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi (dead) by L. Rs., ( AIR 1977 SC 1944 ) it was held that if the properties were acquired by the appellant under the compromise decree in lieu of satisfaction of her right of maintenance, it is sub-section (1) and not sub-section (2) of Section 14 which would be applicable. 7. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above case is fully applicable in the present case. The defendant-respondent was widow of the pre-deceased son of Ram Lal. The compromise decree passed in partition suit in the year 1950 was nothing but recognition of her right in the property acquired by her and thus she became full owner of properties. 8. In view of the above there is no merit in the second appeal. It is accordingly dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.