Judgment :- 1. Defendants 1 and 2 in O. S.182 of 1975, Munsiff's Court, Payyannur are the appellants. The plaintiff in the suit is the 1st respondent and the 3rd defendant is the 2nd respondent herein. The suit is for recovery of a sum of Rs. 300/-by way of damages. By Ext. A1 dated 22-7-1974 the 3rd defendant granted a 'melpattom' authorising the plaintiff to collect the usufructs in the property for five years. The plaintiff alleged that on 5-4-1975 defendants 1 and 2 trespassed into the property and unauthorisedly plucked cashewnuts and jack-fruits worth Rs. 300/. They are liable to pay this sum of Rs. 300/. Defendants 1 and 2 contended that the plaintiff had no right to the usufructs. Ext. Al 'melpattom' executed by the 3rd defendant in favour of the plaintiff on 22-7-1974 was cancelled by Ext. B2 dated 21-8-1974. The property was assigned to defendants 1 and 2 by Ext. B1 dated 17-3-1975 stating that there was no encumbrance or charge on the property. The alleged plucking of cashewnuts and jack-fruits were also denied. It was averred that if at all, the 3rd defendant alone was liable. The 3rd defendant contested the suit on the ground that Ext. A1 was executed due to misrepresentation made by the plaintiff. So, she cancelled Ext. Al'. She herself was collecting the usufructs from the date of 'melpattom' till the date of assignment to defendants 1 and 2. The plaintiff had not collected any usufructs. The suit is not maintainable. 2. The trial court held that Ext. Al was validly cancelled and the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. The liability of the 3rd defendant was left open. On appeal by the plaintiff, the lower appellate Court held that Ext. A1 was a "lease-deed" and the cancellation was invalid. Defendants 1 and 2 were made liable to pay a sum of Rs. 162.51. Defendants 1 and 2 have come up in second appeal. As many as six questions of law have been formulated as substantial questions of law arising for consideration at the time of admission of the second appeal. They are as follows: "(i) Has the lower appellate Court kept in view the distinction between a lease and a licence in construing Ext. As many as six questions of law have been formulated as substantial questions of law arising for consideration at the time of admission of the second appeal. They are as follows: "(i) Has the lower appellate Court kept in view the distinction between a lease and a licence in construing Ext. Al; (ii) Is not the lower appellate Court bound to consider the decisions which lay down the principles in deciding whether a document is a licence or a lease; (iii) Has not the lower appellate court misconstrued Ext. A1 in holding Ext. A1 creates an interest in immovable property; (iv) In view of the definite terms of Ext. Al, does Ext. A1 create an interest in immovable property? (v) Should not the lower appellate court consider whether the 3rd defendant is liable and is not the lower appellate Court wrong in holding that defendants 1 and 2, who are not parties to the contract, are liable; and (vi) Should not the lower appellate court have considered whether defendants 1 and 2 are entitled to relief under the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act 1970 and Ordinance 1 of 1977." 3. In the final analysis, the sole question of law that arises for consideration and argued before me, is whether Ext. A1 document is one creating a lease or is only a licence and it has been expressly stated in the document that possession of the property has not been handed over. This vital factor was ignored by the lower appellate Court. On the other hand, counsel for the plaintiff (1st respondent) argued that on the face of Ext. Al, there is no restriction, with regard to the number of trees and it is implicit from the document, that possession was given, though it was stated to the contrary in the document. In so far as it is implicit from the document, that exclusive possession was given, Ext. A1 creates a lease and not a licence. On this basis, the lower Appellate Court was justified in holding that the cancellation of Ext. A1 by Ext. B2 is incompetent and the 1st defendant-assignee takes the property subject to Ext. A1 right created in favour of the plaintiff and also in awarding the plaintiff the damages to be realised from defendants 1 and 2. 4. The relevant portions of Ext. A1 by Ext. B2 is incompetent and the 1st defendant-assignee takes the property subject to Ext. A1 right created in favour of the plaintiff and also in awarding the plaintiff the damages to be realised from defendants 1 and 2. 4. The relevant portions of Ext. A1 document are extracted herein-below: It is undoubted law that it is open to the parties to enter into any jural relationship. It may be either that of lessor and lessee or licensor and licensee. A licensee gets no interest in immovable property. The right obtained by him is only personal. He will not be entitled to transfer it. He is entitled to 'possession' of the licensed premises as is required for the exercise of his right as a licensee. That possession will not be normally exclusive. The possession that is given to the licensee is only such, as is necessary to effectively use the premises for the purpose for which the licence was given. Even in cases where the transfer of possession is exclusive, it need not necessarily be an indicia of the creation of a lease; for, even in a licence there should be some transfer of possession. Possession is necessary even for a licensee to do such acts on the land as he is permitted to do. The nature of the possession given has necessarily to be tested with reference to the various recitals and stipulations in the document. The document should be read as a whole, fairly and reasonably. The nomenclature of the document, the fact that the person was only permitted to use the property, that there was prohibition either expressly or impliedly from putting up structures, the restrictions in the normal enjoyment of the property and the context, circumstances and the time, at which the document was executed are very relevant. Two unreported Bench decisions of this Court in C. M. A. No.1 of 1981 dated 2-6-1981 and A. S. No. 31 of 1977 dated 8-10-1982 provide ample guidelines, on the lines stated above. The document in this case in dated 22-7-1974. At a time when fixity of tenure was provided by various legislations, Ext. A1 expressly stated that possession of the property was not handed over. This is a vital factor. What was intended was the right to collect the usufructs alone. On a fair and proper interpretation of Ext. The document in this case in dated 22-7-1974. At a time when fixity of tenure was provided by various legislations, Ext. A1 expressly stated that possession of the property was not handed over. This is a vital factor. What was intended was the right to collect the usufructs alone. On a fair and proper interpretation of Ext. Al, I have no doubt, that it creates only a licence. Even in cases where a 'melpattom' or a lease of trees, accompanied by a right or duty to do necessary tillage was provided, it was held by Raman Nair J; that there was no creation of a lease of the land. Vide Lakshmi Warassiar v. Gopalakrishnan Nambiar (1968 KLJ 494.). I respectfully adopt the reasoning of the said decision. 5. In the light of the above, I hold that the lower Appellate Court was in error in holding that Ext. A1 creates a lease and so the 3rd defendant was incompetent to cancel it and by the assignment Ext. B1 the 1st defendant takes the property subject to Ext. Al. Ext. Al creates only a licence. The 3rd defendant was competent to cancel it. She did so. The 1st defendant got the assignment validly without any restriction. The judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court are unsustainable and are set aside, and the judgment and decree of the trial court are restored. 6. The Second appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.