ORDER C.P. Sen, J.- l. This is an application under section 256 (2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, by the Department for a direction to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to state the case and refer the following question of law : "Whether on the facts and in the circumstance of the case the Tribunal was justified in holding that the reopening of assessment under section 147 (b) of the I.T. Act. 1961, was bad in law'?" 2. The respondent assessee is a Hindu Undivided Family and the assessment year in question is 1974-75 for the accounting year ending 31-3-1974. For this year, the assessment was completed on a total income of Rs. 23,368/- on 26-2-1977 by the ITO. In that year the assesse had sold certain land measuring 9800 sq. feet for Rs. 66,000/- and it claimed that since the land was appurtenant to the residential house and since it has incurred expenditure more than the sale price, the capital gains on the sale of the land was exempt under section 54 of the Act. The contention was accepted by the ITO. However, on making enquiry subsequently in respect of the nature of the land sold by the assessee and the legal position in respect of applicability of section 54, it was found that the land was not appurtenant to the house and section 54 has no application to Hindu Undivided Family. It appears during audit inspection a note was appended by the auditor that section 54 - has no application to HUF. Accordingly, a notice under section 148 read with section 147 (b) was issued to the assessee. In response to this notice, the assessee did not file any additional return but relied on the return already filed. The Income-tax Officer held that the land was not appurtenant to the house and section 54 was not applicable to Hindu Undivided Family and, therefore, reassessment was made. Aggrieved by this order, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who by his order dated 16-9-1980 held that it was not open to the ITO to reopen the question as to whether the land was appurtenant to the house or not as reopening cannot be based on mere reappraisal or re-appreciation of the same facts. Aggrieved by this order, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who by his order dated 16-9-1980 held that it was not open to the ITO to reopen the question as to whether the land was appurtenant to the house or not as reopening cannot be based on mere reappraisal or re-appreciation of the same facts. But it appears that the correct position of law that S.54 does not apply to HUF was rightly pointed out by the auditor to the I.T.O. and this constitute a patent error of law which can justify reopening of the case under section 147 (b). The Department preferred an appeal before the Income-tax Tribunal who on 17-7-1982 reversed the findings of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by holding that though the Appellate Commissioner referred to the decision in Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT. (1979) 119 ITR 996 (SC) but reopening on the sole ground of audit pointing out a mistake was not justified under section 147(b). The Department then tiled an application for reference which has been rejected by the Tribunal on 14-2-1983. So the present application has been filed. 3 The learned counsel for the Department contended that the audit only pointed out the correct position of law and not interpreted the law and, therefore, this amounts to information within the meaning of section 147 (b) and the case could be reopened by the ITO. According to the learned counsel for the assessee, there is no question of making a reference as no question of law arises in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Indian & Eastern Newspaper Society v. C.I.T. (Supra). Further there is a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal that the ITO reopened the assessment solely on the basis of the note of the audit objection which is not permissible in view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. . 4. After having heard the parties, we are of the opinion that the question of law does arise and requires to be referred by the Tribunal to this Court for opinion. It is true that the Supreme Court in Mathura Prasad v. Commr. . 4. After having heard the parties, we are of the opinion that the question of law does arise and requires to be referred by the Tribunal to this Court for opinion. It is true that the Supreme Court in Mathura Prasad v. Commr. of Income Tax (1966) 60 ITR 38 has held that the Tribunal is entitled to reject an application for reference, If the question of law, even though arising from its order, is academic or is concluded by a judgment of the highest Court. The same view has been taken by the Supreme Court in C.G.T. v. Smt. Kusumben D. Mahadevia (1980) 122 ITR 38 that there must be a question of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal before a reference can be made, but it is not every question of law that is required to be referred by the Tribunal to the High Court. Where the answer to the question is self-evident or is concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court it would be futile to make a reference and in such a case the Tribunal would be justified in refusing to refer the question to the High Court. It is also true that unless a finding of fact is specifically challenged by the assessee and a question is raised and referred incorporating such challenge, the Court would not suo motu go in to the validity of tile finding of fact, [1983) 139 ITR 288]. The same is the view taken in Addl. CIT v. R.D. Ram Nath & Co. (1983) 141 ITR 897 that when the finding of the Tribunal that business was not distinct was not challenged, the Tribunal's order cannot be set aside even if Court held the transaction to be speculative. The question referred was academic and cannot be answered. So we have to see whether the decision of the Supreme Court in Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT (Supra) concludes the matter. The Supreme Court in that case held that the opinion of an internal audit party of the Income-tax department on a point of law cannot be regarded as information within the meaning of section 147 (b) of the I.T Act for the purpose of reopening the assessment. But although an audit party does not possess the power to pronounce on the law, it nevertheless may draw the attention of the ITO to it. But although an audit party does not possess the power to pronounce on the law, it nevertheless may draw the attention of the ITO to it. Law is one thing, and its communication another. If the distinction between the source of the law and the communication of the law is carefully maintained, the confusion which often results in applying section 147 (b) may be avoided. While the law maybe enacted or laid down only by a person of body with authority in that behalf, the knowledge or awareness of the law may be communicated by anyone. No authority is required for the purpose. That part alone of the note of an audit party which mentions the law which escaped the notice of the ITO constitutes "information" within the meaning of S.147(b). In view of this observation, the appellate Assistant Commissioner rightly held that the audit party only brought to the notice of ITO the correct position of law and this constitutes "information" and on this basis the ITO could act upon. Therefore, it was not correct on the part of the Income-tax Tribunal to hold that, in fact, the audit party has given its opinion on a point of law. There is no question of any finding of fact. The observation of the Tribunal that the ITO reopened the assessment on the sole ground of audit pointing out a mistake that the assessee being HUF was not entitled to exemption from capital gains u/s 54, helps the revenue and not the assessee and there is no question of disturbing the finding fact. This Court in Shrigopal Rameshwardas v. Addl. CIT 1978 CTR MP 293 has held that the word "assessee" occurring in S.54 is applicable only to a living person and not to an artificial juridical person. Assessee, a HUF, seeking exemption from capital gains in respect of a house property, it was held that that the same is not allowable. 5. Accordingly, the application is allowed and the Tribunal is directed to refer the case to this Court for its opinion on the question mentioned above. Under the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.