JUDGMENT O. P. Saxena, J. 1. THIS is a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act against the order dated 1-12-1983 passed by VIII Addl, District Judge, Allahabad striking off the defence under Order XV Rule 5 CPC. 2. THE admitted facts are that in a suit for arrears of rent, ejectment and damages for use and occupation, there was non-compliance of the provisions of Order XV Rule 5 CPC inasmuch as there was delay in depositing of rent for the months of June, July, August, September, and October 1983. THE rent for June and July was deposited on 27-9-1982. THE rent for August and September was deposited on 26-10-1983. THE rent for October and November was deposited on 28-11-1983. THE plaintiff opposite party gave application paper number 57-Ga for striking off the defence. Defendant applicant filed objection paper number 59-Ga. THE trial court found that no explanation for delay in depositing the rent was given either in the objection or even during the course of arguments. It, therefore, passed the impugned order and hence this revision. The learned counsel for applicant referred to the case of Bimal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal, 1981 AWC 529 in which the Supreme Court laid down the following proposition : (1) That the word 'may' in sub-rule (1) of Order XV Rule 5 CPC confers a discretion on the court to strike off the defence in case of default. It does not oblige it to do so in every case of default, (2) that the discretion has not to be exercised mechanically, (3) that the court has discretion not to strike off the defence if on the facts and circumstances of the case it finds good reason for doing so, and (4) that even in the absence of a representation under sub-rule (2), the court can decide on the material on the record whether or not the defence should be struck off. 3. IN Bimal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal, 1983 (1) ARC 203, an off shoot of the same case, the Supreme Court on the facts of the case condoned irregularity in deposit of rent. The appellant was directed to deposit advance rent for two years. No proposition of law has been laid down that the delay should be condoned even if no explanation has been offered for the irregularity in deposit of rent. 4. The appellant was directed to deposit advance rent for two years. No proposition of law has been laid down that the delay should be condoned even if no explanation has been offered for the irregularity in deposit of rent. 4. IN the case of Bhupendra Nath Rastogi v. Addl. Civil Judge, Bijnor, 1982 ARC 480, it was held that there was not a single month's rent which had become due and was not deposited within time. It was further held that the representation of the tenant was not decided in the light of observation made by Supreme Court. The dismissal of application for condoning delay on the ground that the application was moved after the expiry of the period provided in sub-rule (2) was held to be erroneous. In the case of Vishwanath v. Ist Addl. District Judge, Bijnor, 1982 U. P. RCC 517, it was held that Order XV Rule 5 CPC is not intended to be a trap for the tenant. It was further held that where there is no prejudice caused to the plaintiff and the rent has been deposited, the delay in deposit due to any reason should ordinarily be condoned. 5. IN the case of Puran Chand Gupta v. IINd Addl. District Judge, Agra, 1983 ARC 817, the court held that deposits made u/Sec. 7-C of U. P.. Act No. 3 of 1947 or 30 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 have to be excluded in calculating the arrears of rent while determining the question of striking off the defence. It was further held that the discretion of the court has to be exercised on the ground of bonafides. 6. IN none of these cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant it has been held that in case the rent has been deposited prior to an application for striking off the defence under Order XV Rule 5 CPC, the defence should not be struck off even if there is no explanation or material on record explaining the delay or irregularity in deposit. The learned counsel for the applicant referred to the affidavit filed by the applicant before this court and submitted that applicant's counsel wrongly advised him that all that he had to ensure was that rent for four months did not fall due and did not tell him that rent of each month had to be deposited by the first week of the following month. No such plea was taken before the trial court either in the objection or in oral submission made. It is not open for the applicant to set up a new case in revision. A reference may be made to cases reported in Baldeo Das Shivlal v. Filmstan Distributors (India) (P) Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 406 and Basti Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. M/s. Bharat Motor Stores, 1983 Alld. Law Journal 932. 7. ANOTHER aspect is that it is not for this court to decide as to whether the defence should be struck off or not. It has to be decided as to whether the trial court acted in accordance with law in the exercise of its jurisdiction when it struck off the defence of the applicant. For this the material placed before the trial court alone can be considered. 8. THE learned counsel for the opposite party placed reliance on the case of Uma Kant Mukerji v. IInd Addl. District Judge, Varanasi, 1983 AWC 653 in support of his plea that it is not the law that the delay should be condoned even if no adequate explanation is available. He also referred to (1) Baldeo Pd. v. Distt. Judge, Jhansi, 1982 ARC 208 (2) Mohd. Riaz v. IX Addl. Distt. and Sessions Judge Kanpur, 1983 (1) ARC 44; (3) Shanker Lal Gupta v.Vth Addl. District Judge, Agra, 1983 (1) ARC 204; (4) Smt. Padma Negi v. Giri Lal Jain, 1983 (1) ARC 244 (5) Uma Kant Mukerji v. IInd Addl. District Judge, Varanasi 1983 AWC 653 and (6) Prem Prakash Yadav v. Smt. Chandra Kala Devi 1983 (1) ARC 530 in which the scope of Order XV Rule 5 CPC has been discussed by this court. The learned counsel for opposite party assailed the alleged payment of Rs. 3000/- to Sri Sunder Lal clerk of Pt. Gajadhar Pd. Bhargava, Advocate and submitted that the receipt is forged one. There is, however, no material on the record to show this prima facie. 9. The learned counsel for opposite party assailed the alleged payment of Rs. 3000/- to Sri Sunder Lal clerk of Pt. Gajadhar Pd. Bhargava, Advocate and submitted that the receipt is forged one. There is, however, no material on the record to show this prima facie. 9. I have carefully considered the submissions before me. The legal position is that the defence will not be struck off merely on the ground that there is no representation explaining the delay or irregularity in deposit If there is an explanation or material on the record explaining the delay, the delay may be condoned. 10. THE applicant was a tenant @ Rs. 125/- per mensem. On 2-11-1982 the opposite party filed a suit for arrears of rent, ejectment and damages for use and occupation. A sum of Rs. 4500/- was claimed as rent and damages for use and occupation. THE written statement was filed on 22-1-1983. In para 21 of the written statement it was said that a sum of Rs. 3000/- was paid to Sri Sunder Lal in lieu of rent upto May 1983. THE rent for the period from 1-6-83 onwards had to be deposited. THE first deposit after the filing of written statement was made on 27-9-1983. No application for condoning the delay was given when the rent for June and July and so on was deposited. In para 2 of the objection it was said that the defendant had paid advance rent for 1983 to the clerk of the plaintiff's father as alleged in para 21 of the writtent satement. It appears that the word 'may' was omitted before 1983. In para 3 it was said that the defendant was depositing rent in court after the filing of the written statement. No attempt was made to explain the delay in deposit in the objection. THEre is no material on record on the basis of which the delay in deposit of rent could be condoned. It is not a case where the tenant may have deposited considerable amounts on the first date of hearing or may have made deposits even thereafter regularly and may have committed default in respect of rent of one or two months. In this case no amount was deposited on the date of first hearing. It is not a case where the tenant may have deposited considerable amounts on the first date of hearing or may have made deposits even thereafter regularly and may have committed default in respect of rent of one or two months. In this case no amount was deposited on the date of first hearing. According to the applicant's case the first deposit should have been made by the first week of July 1983 and it was made on 27-9-1983. There was default in subsequent deposits also. The applicant fails on the test of bonafides also. 11. IF the provisions of Order XV Rule 5 CPC imply hardship to the tenants it is a matter for the consideration of legislature. A Judge has certain limitations. He has to administer the law as it is and not as it should be. It is not the law that the delay or irregularity in deposit of rent in compliance of Order XV Rule 5 CPC has to be condoned as a matter of course if the entire admitted amount has been deposited prior to the consideration of the application for striking off the defence. In this case there was neither an explanation nor any material on record explaining the delay. The trial court was justified in striking off the defence. 12. THE revision fails and is dismissed with costs. Revision dismissed.