( 1 ) THIS petition, under Section 482 of the Code assails proceedings under Section 145, the preliminary order and the orderof attachment made in course thereof, even though it is formally directed against the order od 19/03/1983, made bythe Additional District Judge, upholding in revision the order of thetrial court, made on April, 1982, dismissing the application ofthe petitioner for residing the aforesaid orders and "dropping"the proceedings. Ordinarily, the short and simple question fordetermination in a petition of this nature would be if, havingregard to the material before the trial court, the procecdingsand/or the orders are liable to be quashed. There are, however,unusual features of this case, which have unfortunately widenedthe scope of controversy, added new dimension to the proceed-ings, besides throwing up for decision certain larger questions,as also exposing certain infirmities in our legal system callingfor a fresh look at the provisions, the problem of illegal orunauthorised occupation of immovable property, and possibleproceedings for dispossession of those in unauthorised occupation of 31, none of which appears to bs simple. Some of the unusual features are : The property in dispute is situated in theheart of commercial New Delhi, and is admittedly very valuable. The owner of the property, a joint stock company, isthe family concern of a person who is said to be very affluentand influential. The property has been in the occupation, forover 50 years, of a Madhya Pradesh Government Company. the petitioner, another joint stock company, claims to have paidover Rs. 13 lakhs to the owner towards part payment of theconsideration for its purchase. Local police has since registered a case of trespass against the petitioner, the owner, andcertain others. The petitioner Las, in turn. filed a complaintagainst the owner alleging fraud in inducing the petitioner toenter into the transaction. There are allegations by the Government company that the owner had procured possession ofthe property in dispute, apparently with a view to transferit to the petitioner, in collusion with certain minor officials ofthe Government Corporation. There are counter allegations thatthe dispute could not have been taken seizen of by the policeand the Magistrate s Court and the impugned orders could nothave been made but for the pressure exercised from higherquarters under the influence of a Government Company. Thepetitioner, as also the Government Corporations have filedcivil suits with regard to their respective rights to the possession of the property in dispute. Thepetitioner, as also the Government Corporations have filedcivil suits with regard to their respective rights to the possession of the property in dispute. Ths owner had also filed asuit earlier against the Govenrment Corporations, which hassince been withdrawn. . ( 2 ) PROPERTY No. 10-A, Scindia House, Connaught Circus,consisting of a showroom on the ground floor, and certainspace on the first floor, admittedly belongs to and, at the material time, belonged to Atma Ram Properties Pvt. Ltd, respon-dent No. 5 herin, for short "arp". It is also not in disputethat M. P. State Industries Corporation Limited, a joint stockcompany, promoted by the State of Madhya Pradesh, for short"m. P. S. I. C", had held this property for over 50 years as tenants. It is alleged that by an agreement of 17/08/1981,between M. P. S. I. C. and Madhya Pradesh State Textile Corporation Limited, another joint stock company, promoted bythe State of Madhya Pradesh. for short, "m. P. S. T. C. "m. P. S. T. C. appointed M. P. S. I. C as its agents for the marketing of the former s products in the aforesaid property. Theagreement purportedly provides that the M. P. S. T. C. wouldhave no right or interest in the aforesaid property and that itspossession shall always remain with the M. P. S. I. C. It is alleged that pursuant to the aforesaid agreement, renovation ofthe premises in dispute was in progress, during the month ofoctober, 1981, apparently to enable the M. P. S. I. C. to carryout its agency obligations, under the aforesaid agreement. It ishowever, not in dispute that on or abcfut 30/10/1981, asuit was filed in the District Court by A. R. P. , alleging attemted subletting of the premises by MPSIC tp MPSTC. with aview to restrain the M. P. S. 1. C. to sublet or part with posnession of the premises. Shri S. M. Gupta, Sub Judge Ist Class,delhi, to whom the suit was entrusted, granted an ex parte injunction in favour of A. R. P. The Court also appointed, on 7/11/1981, a local commissioner to inspect the premises and make a report. C. to sublet or part with posnession of the premises. Shri S. M. Gupta, Sub Judge Ist Class,delhi, to whom the suit was entrusted, granted an ex parte injunction in favour of A. R. P. The Court also appointed, on 7/11/1981, a local commissioner to inspect the premises and make a report. The local commissioner inspectedthe premises and submitted a report, inter alia, pointing outthat renovation work was in progress in the premises underamir Masani, contractor of Bombay, said to have been employed by M. P. S. I. C. The trial court took up the suitfor further proceedings on 16/11/1981 and still later 23/11/1981. This suit was eventually withdrawnin Match, 1982. It is alleged by A. R. P. , and allegedly on thebasis of what A. R. P. represented to the petitioner by thepetitioner, that the vacant possession of the aforesaid premiseswas duly surrendered by an officer of the M. P. S. 1. C. , M. B. Mohan, by written instruments drawn on behalf of M. P. S. I. C. on or about 10/11/1981, and that A. R. P. had sincebeen in peaceful possession, of the premises. It is then the common case of A. R. P. and the petitioner that, pursuant to negotiations between the petitioner and the A. R. P. , through a property broker of New Delhi, the officers erf the petitioner inspected the premises on 23/11/1981, and agreed to purchase the property for a consideration of Rs. 14 lakhs. It isfurther their common case that a sum of Rs 13. 95 lakhs waspaid by the petitioner to A. R. P. by cheques. The first chequeof Rs. 3 lakhs is said to have been given to A. R. P. on 23/11/1981; a further payment of Rs. 7 lakhs was madeon 28/11/1981; and a cheque for Rs. 3. 95 lakhs waspaid on 1/12/1981, when an agreement to sell is alleged to have been executed which, inter alia, provides forthe payment of the balance of Rs. 5,000. 00 at the time of execution and registration of the sale deed. It is further alleged thaton 1/12/1981, vacant possession of the premises wasdelivered by A. R. P. to the petitioner and that the petitionercommenced renovation work in the premises in the first week ofe January, 1982. 5,000. 00 at the time of execution and registration of the sale deed. It is further alleged thaton 1/12/1981, vacant possession of the premises wasdelivered by A. R. P. to the petitioner and that the petitionercommenced renovation work in the premises in the first week ofe January, 1982. On Janua 7/01/1982, the Cost Accounts Officer,wadhwa, of M. P. S. T. C. lodged a report with the Police thatthe Corporation had taken possession of the premises for redecoration on 20/08/1981 and when the Corporation scontractor was carrying out the work on " 31/10/1981",m. P. S. 1. C. received a stay order from the Court of Shri S. M. Gupta, on which the contractor "immediately stopped workand locked premises. " It is further alleged that on the date ofthe report "8110 unauthorised persons" were seen "working inthe premises". The report proceeds thus : "5. It is not known how and when these persons entered and started work when there were. clear order from the court. 6. On making enquiry our contractor has mentioned thatgoods worth Rs. 70,000. 00 were lying in the premises which aremissing now. So we request you to enquire the facts to get work stoppedand possession handed over to us immediately. " (emphasissupplied)It is also the case of the petitioner that on the aforesaiddate, certain representatives of M. P. S. I. C. and M. P. S. T. C. approached the petitioner "at the showroom and stated thatthe showroom was in their tenancy and that respondent No. 5 (ARP) had no authority to part with possession and to sell ortransfer the same to the petitioner". It is further alleged by thepetitioner that the petitioner informed the said representativesthat the showroom had been purchased by thepetitioner, andthe physical vacant possession of it had been handed over bya. R. P. to it and that "the petitioner was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the alleged claim of the saidrespondents". It is further claimed that the said representativesappeared to have been "satisfied with the genuine claim of thepetitioner over the showroom", and went away. It is, however,alleged by the petitioner that on 11/01/1982 representatives of the petitioner were called by the local police, whoexamined the documents in support of the petitioner s claim,recorded the statement of its director, Dhingra, and were satisfied about the bona fide claim of the petitioner. It is, however,alleged by the petitioner that on 11/01/1982 representatives of the petitioner were called by the local police, whoexamined the documents in support of the petitioner s claim,recorded the statement of its director, Dhingra, and were satisfied about the bona fide claim of the petitioner. By his communication of 14/01/1982, R. D. Vohra, Assistant Manager, M. P. S. 1. C. informed the local police that, pursuant tothe report received from officers of the M. P. S. T. C. to theeffect that the property in dispute had "been unauthorisedly andillegally locked by connivance and conspiracy of M/s. Atma Ramproperties Pvt. Ltd. , Atma Ram House, C-37, Connaughtplace, New Delhi, and landlord and the alleged purchaser M/s. Young Builders (P) Ltd. , 419, Asaf Ali Road. New Delhi". He was deputed and authorised by the Managing Director ofthe Corporation "to ascertain the position and to take all necessary legal steps to maintain our lawful possession of the showroom". It is further alleged in the communication that on feaching New Delhi on 13/01/1982, he "came to knowthat certain false and fictitious documents have been preparedby the landlord M/s. Atma Ram Properties (P), Ltd. to showthat certain person by the name of Shri M. B. Mohan had delivered vacant possession of the said showroom on behalf of M/s. M. P. State Industries Corporation Ltd. , to M/s. Atma Ramproperties (P) Ltd. , the landlord on 1-12-82. " The communication claims that no such person was "at any time authorisedto or had the legal authority to give vacant possession of thesaid premises" and "any such document is nothing but forgeryand fraud committed with the connivance and conspiracy"between A. R. P. and the petitioners. It is further alleged thatno officer of M. P. S. I. C. "has any authority to transfer ordeliver the vacant possession of the said premises withoutwritten permission or approval of the Board of Directors of thecorporation and in the instant case, no such permission wasever accorded". The communication also refers to the agreement said to have been entered into between the two Corporations on 17/08/1981 and claim that pursuant to theagreement, M. P. S. T. C. "was to carry out interior decorationin the said showroom and for this purpose they were givenpermission to enter the show room to get the needful done". It is further claimed that the showroom was never sublet tom. It is further claimed that the showroom was never sublet tom. P. S. T. C. or anybody else and possession was never partedby M. P. S. I. C. and any such allegation is nothing but "apeshbandi on behalf of the landlord". The communicationproceeds further thus: "7. That I have instructions from Head Office tomaintain our lawful possession and I have beeninformed by the opposit party that M/s. Youngbuilders and the Landlord are going to createtrouble and use violence so as to prevent us fromentering the said showroom and I apprehenddanger to my life and that of my co-worker. " (emphasis supplied)On this communication, a case under Sections 448/34i. P. C. was registered by P. S. Connaught Place against A. R. P. and certain others, On 15/01/1982, a furthercommunication was purportedly sent to the Station Houseofficer, P. S. Connaught Place, this time under the signaturesof six persons, including R. D. Vohra. This communicationrefers to the earlier report "regarding criminal trespass, conspiracy, cheating, theft act by Sarvshri Atma Ram, R. C. Sharma, M. B. Mohan Khosia, M. L. Dhingra and others inpremises 10a Scindia House, Connaught Circus, New Delhi",and points out that pursuant to the agreement of agency referred to above, renovation had been ordered "through Shri Amirmasani of M/s. Furntures Today, Bombay who were workingthere by the last week of November, 1981 when they left forbombay. " The communication further refers to the two reportsof 7/01/1982 and Jan 14/01/1982. This is how thecommunication concludes: "we all have gone to the premises and wanted to go init as a matter of our right. We were abused, manhandled, threatened and pushed us out by the persons, present there. Appreliending serious breachof peace and danger to our life we have come toreport to you for taking necessary action in thematter. We apprehened imminent danger to our property and lifefrom the abovesaid trespassers. " (emphasis supplied)Meanwhile, on the basis of the report of 14/01/1982,a Kalandra u/s. 145 had been drawn up by the local police on 15/01/1982 and was filed in the court of the Sub-divisionalmagistrate, New Delhi on 16/01/1982. The Kalandraand the entry in the daily diary dated 15/01/1982 arebased on the report of 14/01/1982. The Kalandra pointsout that it was "reported that he was informed by other partythat Mis. The Kalandraand the entry in the daily diary dated 15/01/1982 arebased on the report of 14/01/1982. The Kalandra pointsout that it was "reported that he was informed by other partythat Mis. Young Builders and the landlord are going to createtrouble and use violence so as to prevent us from entering thesaid showroom and apprehend danger to his life and his co-workers and to avoid any untoward incidents, and requestedthat the disputed property may be sealed. " The Kalandrafurther states that proceedings u/s 1071150 of the Code "arebeing filed before the A. Civil Procedure Codeoncerned". The police apparently did not forward to the learned Magistrate, along with thekalandra, either the first report of 7/01/1982 or thethird report of January 15, 1982, either because the report of 15/01/1982 and was received subsequent to the preparationof the Kalandra or for other reasons, a circumstance, on whichthere was considerable controversy. It, however, appears thatthere were quick development on 16/01/1982. Whilethe learned Magistrate made a preliminary order, as well asan order of attachment, the petitioner filed a suit for permanentinjunction in the District Court, to restrain the two Corporations from interfering with its peaceful possession of the prepertyshri S. M. Gupta, Sub Judge 1st Class, to whom this suitwas also entrusted, may be by a sheer coincidence, granted an interiminjunction and it is claimed by the petitioner that thetwo Corporations were served with the order by 4 P. M. thatvery day, through a local emporium, run by the State ofmadhya Pradesh, and that the Station House Officer concernedwas also informed of the said order in writing. Be that as itmay, the premises in dispute was attached, pursuant to the order of attachment, on 17/01/1982. The suit is stillpending. The composite order made by the learned Magistrateon the Kalandra is a cryptic one and runs thus : "received : 16-1-82. Seen perused the report P. O. under Section145 (1) Criminal Procedure Code. issued. In my opinion this is acase of emergency order under Section 146 (1)Cr. P. C. also issued for attachment. sd/- R. Chander Mohan S. D. M. New Delhi. "on the same date, the learned Magistrate signed two separate notices and/or orders, one purporting to be a preliminaryorder, and the other purporting to be an order of attachment. issued. In my opinion this is acase of emergency order under Section 146 (1)Cr. P. C. also issued for attachment. sd/- R. Chander Mohan S. D. M. New Delhi. "on the same date, the learned Magistrate signed two separate notices and/or orders, one purporting to be a preliminaryorder, and the other purporting to be an order of attachment. There was considerable controversy as to whether these weremerely "notices" of the cryptic order or were "orders" andwere capable of supplementing and/or validating the crypticorder or not. It would, therefore, be proper that these twonotices and/or orders are quoted in extenso. This ^ how theyrun : "preliminary order under Section 145 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. 1. Whereas a notice calendra has been received throughacp, Parliament Street, regarding the disputs forthe possession of the premises bearing No. 10-A,scindia House, Connaught Place, New Delhi (Showroom ). 2. Whereas after going through the Calendra and copyof the D. D. entries made at police station Connaught Place in respect of this dispute, I am satisfied that this dispute can induce a serious apprehension of breach of peace between the two partiesand therefore, this court has full jurisdiction toinitiate proceedings under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code. 3. And whereas I pass this preliminary order undersection 145 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. directing both therespondent/parties to appear in my court on19-1-1982 at 10. 00 A. M. and filing their respective writtenstatement in support of their claim forthe possession of the disputed premises namely10/a Scindia House, Connaught Place, New Delhi (show room ). The S. H. O. Connaught Place ishereby directed to effect the service of the copy ofthis order on each of the respondents and alsoaffix one copy at a conspicuous place on cr nearthe disputed premises. He is also hereby directedto report the compliance of this order on 18-1-82. Given under my hand and seal of this day of16th January, 19s2. "sd/- R. Chander Mohan,dated: J 6-1-1982 Sub-Divisiona Magistrate New Delhi "order under Section 146 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. 1. Whereas a police Calendra has been received through ACP, Parliament Street, New Delhi, preliminary order under Section 145 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. has been passed by me today regarding the dispute for the possession of show room bearing No. 10-A,scindia House, Connaught Place, between tho twoabove named parties which may indue a scriouapprehension of breach of peace. 2. Whereas a police Calendra has been received through ACP, Parliament Street, New Delhi, preliminary order under Section 145 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. has been passed by me today regarding the dispute for the possession of show room bearing No. 10-A,scindia House, Connaught Place, between tho twoabove named parties which may indue a scriouapprehension of breach of peace. 2. Whereas after going through the police Calendra, I find that this dispute between the two respondent parties is of a serious emergency nature and it can induce an apprehension of breach of peace at any moment. 3. Whereas from the police report it also appears that respondent party No. 1 has been dispossed forcibly by respondent party No. 11 through an element of conspiracy and deceit. 4. And whereas keeping the view of real estate in the area where the disputed premises is located and also in view of the report of the S. H. O. Connaught Place and ACP Parliament Street, I am satisfied that the said dispute for the possession of 10-A, Scindia House, Connaught Place, New Delhi between the two above named respondentparties, is a case of emergency which requires immediate preventive action under Section 146 (1)of the Criminal Procedure Code. directing the S. H. O. Connaughtplace to immediately attach the said premises. Heis also appointed as a receiver of the propertyafter attachment. The compliance of this ordershould be forwarded to this court on 18-1-82. Acopy of this order should be conspicuously affixednear the disputed premises. Given under my hand and seal of this day of 16/01/1982. sd/- R. Chander Mohandated : 16-1-82 Sub-Divisional Magistratenew Delhi. " ( 3 ) THE petitioner did not challenge the preliminary other,or the order of attachment, cither by a revision in this Court,or in the Court of Session, or in a petition to this Court undersection 482 of the Code. It, however, instead filed an application, on January 19, 1982, before the learned Magistrate invoicing sub-section (5) of Section 145, and proviso to sub-section (1) of S. 146 and prayed that the preliminary order by "vacated",the attachment order be "set aside" and the proceedings be "dropped". On 20/03/1982, the two Corporations filed a suit inthe District Court, under Section 6 of the Specified Relief Act,for recovery of possession of the premises, on the ground thatthey had been "illegally dispossessed" therefrom. On 20/03/1982, the two Corporations filed a suit inthe District Court, under Section 6 of the Specified Relief Act,for recovery of possession of the premises, on the ground thatthey had been "illegally dispossessed" therefrom. A. R. P. and the petitioner were impleaded as defendants in thesuit. This suit is still pending. Meanwhile, by an order of 14/04/1982, the learned Magistrate dismissed the petitioner s application for recalling the impugned orders, and for dropping theproceedings, on the ground that the preliminary order waspassed by the then Magistrate only when he was "satisfied"about it; that the then Magistrate was satisfied that "proviso tosection 145 (4) was applicable to the case"; that once the proceedings had been commenced "they could not be dropped inthe mid-way because the apprehension of breach of peace neednot exist at every stage"; and that the question of withdrawalof attachment and of dropping the proceedings "did not arise",otherwise, "it would mean that there was no emergency andthat there was no apprehension of breach of peace". Thisorder was challenged by the petitioner in a revision in the Session Court and by an order of 19/03/1983, now under formal challenge, the learned Additional Sessions Judge not onlyupheld the order of the learned Magistrate, challenged beforeit, but also expressed the view that the orders passed on 16/01/1982 were not illegal "prima facie in the eye of lawtaking into consideration the Stage of the case". The learnedadditional Sessions Judge further expressed the view that"there is no material or legal point involved just to disturbthe order of learned Sub-divisional Magistrate below", andadded that he was "hesitant to quash the proceedings beforethe learned Sub-divisional Magistrate below. " The learnedaddl. Sessions Judge, however, turned down the objection thatsince the petitioner had not challenged, in terms, the compositeorder of 16/01/1982, the legality of these orders couldnot be canvassed in the proceedings, on a challenge to theorder of 14/04/1982. ( 4 ) BY an order of 27/04/1983, the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, who was seized of the complaint of the petitioner against A. R. P. and others, under Section 420/120-B,i. P. C. dismissed the complaint on the ground that there wasno substance in it holding that from the material on record, itappeared that the circumstances leading to the transaction between the petitioner and A. R. P. and delivery of possession tothe petitioner of the premises in dispule had been fully disclosedto the petitioner. It was further held that the matter was of acivil nature and that civil court was the proper forum to decidethe respective rights of the parties with regard to the title tothe property. This order is the subject-matter of Cr. R. 295183,filed by the petitioner in this Court.-This petition is at theshow-cause stage, and its further consideration was held overpending final hearing and decision in the present petition. Thepresent petition was filed on 9/09/1983. ( 5 ) I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner, the twocorporations, as well as A. R. P. Learned counsel for the partieswere not unaware of the limited scope of the present proceedings but, having regard to the unusual features of the case referred to above, and in particular, the pendency of the proceedings in the Civil Court, of the prosecution against A. R. P. andothers, and the petitioner s own complaint against A. R. P. and others, did not, and perhaps could not confine to therather narrow question with which this Court is really concerned in a petition of this type at the present stage of the proceedings u/s. 145. In the course of their rather elaborate arguments, allegations and counter allegations were made suggesting that the petitioner was a party to the conspiracy to "trick"the Corporation out of the valuable property with the collusionof two employees of M. P. S. I. C. who must have been bribedto provide an apparently. legal cover to a blatant act of wrongful dispossession, and that to provide the cover of respectability and innocence, the petitioner and A. R. P. filed frivoloussuits and other proceedings and even procured injunction ordersfrom a common judicial officer, through exercise of undue influence. On the other hand, it was suggested that whatever bethe nature of the possession of the petitioner, and howsoeverwrongful and fraudulent may have been the manner in whichthe petitioner was. put in. actual physical possession by A. R. P. ,proceedings under section 145 were uncalled for and the twogovernment Corporations manipulated initiation of. proceedings,as indeed,. for the prosecution. On the other hand, it was suggested that whatever bethe nature of the possession of the petitioner, and howsoeverwrongful and fraudulent may have been the manner in whichthe petitioner was. put in. actual physical possession by A. R. P. ,proceedings under section 145 were uncalled for and the twogovernment Corporations manipulated initiation of. proceedings,as indeed,. for the prosecution. of A. R. P. and certain others,for an offence u/s 448/34 Indian Penal Code and procured wholly illegalpreliminary order and order of attachment from the Court byexercise of undue official pressure on the police and the Courtsconcerned by the misuse of their position and authority asgovernment Corporation, apparently through the then Homeminister, at the Centre, who was at one time the Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh. Allegations were also made that theagreement to sell entered into between the petitioner anda. R. P. mentioning a consideration of Rs. 14 lakhs was onlyan "apparent" consideration and that the "real" consideration was much higher and the difference must have been paidto A. R. P. "under the table", and that this was a practice forwhich A. R. P. and its promoters were known in Delhi, andthat proceedings under Section 269-A of the Income-tax Acthad already been initiated against the petitioner and A. R. P. by the Income-tax Authority concerned. There was some controversy if, having regard to the frame of th3 present petition,and the orders formally challenged by it, the petitioner couldhave canvassed before this Court, in the present proceedings. the validity of the composite order of 16/01/1982 andthere was considerable controversy if the proceedings undersection 145 were maintainable where the petitioner wasadmittedly in occupation of the premises, lawfully or otherwise, and the Corporation merely raised before the Police, asindeed, before the Court concerned, their right to oust thepetitioner from possession. It was alleged that the police, asindeed, the Court in proceedings u/s 145 was only concernedwith the dispute with regard to actual physical possession andany dispute with regard to "right to take possession" fromanother was outside the scope of such proceedings. It was alleged that the police, asindeed, the Court in proceedings u/s 145 was only concernedwith the dispute with regard to actual physical possession andany dispute with regard to "right to take possession" fromanother was outside the scope of such proceedings. A contention was also raised that where the two Corporations admittedthat the petitioner was in actual physical possession but complained that the Corporations were interested in securing therestoration of their possession and apprehended breach ofpeace from the petitioner, if the officials of the Corporationcarried out their intention to take possession of the property,or if the officials of the peitioner or their representatives hadthreatened, as alleged by the Corporations that if there wasany interference with the petitioner s possession, the petitionerwould be bound to protect its interest, it could be said thatthere was a "dispute" with regard to property which was likelyto cause breach of peace so as to attract the preventive pro-visions of Section 145. There was also considerable controversyas to the meaning of the expression emergency" and if, in theabsence of any material, indicating an urgency, an attachmentorder could be made merely because of the "stakes" involvedor the "location" of the property or its possible "value", as distinct from imminent danger of precipitable action. ( 6 ) IT would be proper to first deal with a preliminary pointwith regard to the maintainability of the present petition, andif in its present form the petition could be legitimately takenas assailing the validity of the proceedings under Section 145and of the composite order of 16/01/1982. The pointwas not raised by way of preliminary objection, and was noteven seriously agitated, but counsel for the Government Corporations, though lukewarm about it, did not give it up, apparently, to take its aid, should they need it in any further proceedings. The contentions were two-fold. In the first instance, it was urged that the petitioner never challenged thevalidity of the proceedings or of the composite order, either inrevision before this Court, or the court of Sessions, or in thiscourt u/s 482 earlier or in the present petition and that the orderhas, therefore, become final and would as such immune fromchallenge in the present petition. In the first instance, it was urged that the petitioner never challenged thevalidity of the proceedings or of the composite order, either inrevision before this Court, or the court of Sessions, or in thiscourt u/s 482 earlier or in the present petition and that the orderhas, therefore, become final and would as such immune fromchallenge in the present petition. Secondly, it was urged thatin any event, the petitioner challeges in the present proceedings the revisional order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge,upholding that of the learned Magistrate, refusing to "vacate"or rescind" the composite order and to "drop the proceedings" and that there was no formal challenge, in the presentpetition, either to the validity of the proceedings or of the composite order. Somewhat similar objection had been raised onbehalf of the Corporations even before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, when a plea was raised before him that the composite order, and the proceedings in which it was made, werenot under challenge before him in the petitioner s revisions. The contention was turned down by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, and rightly, in my view. The petitioner, nodoubt, had the option. to challenge the proceedings u/s 145,as indeed, the composite order either in revision in this Courtor in the Court of Session or even under Section 482 of thecode in this Court, instead of asking the Magistrate concernedto cancel or rescind the composite order and to drop the proceedings pursuant to what the petitioner thought were theremedies available to the petitioner, either under sub-section (5) of Section 145, or of proviso to sub-section (1) or Section146, or under both. There was some controversy if the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 145 or the proviso tosub-section (1) of Section 146 could beinvoked in a contentions matter and if these provisions could be invoked only ifall the parties concerned agreed before the Magistrate thatcontinuation of proceedings any further was unnecessary andthey be dropped and the orders be rescinded but it is hardlynecessary to go into this aspect of the matter because the contentions of the Corporations raise more matter of form thanof substance. The plea of the petitioner that the proceedingsbe dropped and the orders be rescinded, as indeed, its petition to the Additional Sessions Judge, when the plea did not prevail in the first court, was qualitatively no different than ae straight plea that the proceedings and the composite order werenot competent or justified, either on thematerial before thecourt, when they were initiated, or made, or in the face of anyfresh material that may be brought or of any subsequent developments. The challenge to the proceedings and the compositeorder was, therefore, quite implicit, both in the applicationbefore the learned Magistrate for dropping the proceedings, asindeed, before the Additional sessions Judge in revision, and whatis true of these is equally true of the petition before this Court. It is good to remember in this context that the procedural provisions and the form or norms laid down for legal proceedingsare after all hand made of justice and could not be allowed to supplant the substance or to frustrate the ends of justice unlessthere is something in the form or the procedure which is somandatory in its nature that a variation of it would defeat thevery object for which the procedure has been laid down. Butthat part, once a matter is brought before a Court the courtof Session or this Court, arising out certain proceedings in thecourt below, it is always open to the party aggrieved by anyproceedings or any orders to challenge the proceedings or theorders, as indeed, for the court to examine their validity andperhaps the only safeguard necessary is that the other sideshould not be taken by surprise and no prejudice should becaused to its interest. The basic controversy between the partiessince the initiation of the proceedings under Section 145 hasbeen not only in the first court, as well as the Session Court,but also in this Court, if, on the material on record, initiationof proceedings under Section 145 of, the Code, and the composite order, made by the Magistrate, could be justified withreference to the legal requirements. Any of the Courts couldrule on it irrespective of the form of the petition or the natureof the jurisdiction invoked by the petitioner. In any event,the inherent power of this Court u/s. 482 does not admit ofany limitation, if the conditions for the exercise of that power aresatisfied, except. tbose that are self-imposed. Any of the Courts couldrule on it irrespective of the form of the petition or the natureof the jurisdiction invoked by the petitioner. In any event,the inherent power of this Court u/s. 482 does not admit ofany limitation, if the conditions for the exercise of that power aresatisfied, except. tbose that are self-imposed. In exercising thisjurisdiction, this Court is expected to be circumspect and actswith restraint by virtue of judicial self-discipline. If thecourtfrowns at injustice, it would not cause it by its own act. Thereare no other fetters. There is, thus, no substance in the objection and I am not, surprised at the lukewarmth with which itwas raised so as to keep a controversy of jurisdiction alive,should its aid become necessary at a later stage of the proceedings. I have, therefore, no hesitation in, overruling it. ( 7 ) THE next question that calls for decision is as to thetrue meaning and scope of the words "a dispute. . . . . . . . . . . concerning any land or water or the boundaries: thereof" used insub-section (1) of Section 145. According to the Corporations, any dispute concerning immovable property, whether asto. the title to it, or as to right to its possession, would attractthe preventive jurisdiction under section. 145 of the Code, if suchdispute was likely to cause a breach of-peace: and the disputeneed not necessarily relate, to. actual possession of the propertyand the words "claims as respects the fact of actual possessionof the subject of dispute" occurring in the last para of subjection (1) merely indicates the extent of the limited function ofthe court without in any way fettering the width of the expression "dispute" occurring in the earlier part of the sub-section,which defies the condition for initiation of action in very wideterms so as to take within its sweep a dispute concerning immovable property, whether of title to it or right to its possession. On the other hand, the petitioner contents that the expression"dispute" occurring in the earlier part of sub-section gets itscolour, and is controlled by, the expressions "actual possessionof the subject of dispute" used in the latter part of the subjection and that the condition for initiation of action and the function of the court are co-extensive in their scope. On the other hand, the petitioner contents that the expression"dispute" occurring in the earlier part of sub-section gets itscolour, and is controlled by, the expressions "actual possessionof the subject of dispute" used in the latter part of the subjection and that the condition for initiation of action and the function of the court are co-extensive in their scope. It was, therefore, urged that a dispute with regard to actual possession ofimmovable property alone was capable of attracting the preventivejurisdiction under the sub-section and that a mere claim byone party, who is admittedly out of possession, that it is entitledon some reckoning, to the possession of the property would notjustify proceedings under that sub-section, whatever may be thecircumsrcumstances in which such person was dispossessed, and irrespective of the other remedies that a dispossessed person may havein relation to the property, including a civil action for recoveryof possession, as indeed, an action for damages. This contentionassume considerable importance because, even though the partieswere at considerable variance as to the manner in which thecorporations were "tricked" out of possession of the property. whether with or without the connivance of or collusion with thepetitioner and one or the other of the employee of the Corporations, there can be no doubt that when the proceedings undersection 145 were initiated by the Police, the representatives ofthe petitioner were in actual physical possession, even thoughthere is also a dispute as to whether the actual dispossession ofthe Corporations took place in the last week of November orlater. It is also obvious, and is borne out by the reports of thecorporations, that after they came to know of the dispossession or surrender of possession unauthorisedly on their behalf,their representative came to Delhi and claimed what in his ownterms, is described as the "right to maintain possession" or inother words to dispossess the petitioner otherwise than in ordinary course of law on the ground that the Corporations wereentitled to the possession of the property since the purportedsurrender of tenancy and delivery of actual possession by oneor the other of its employees was not the act of any of the Corporations, but was an "unauthorised act" of these individuals,who had no "authority" to act in the manner they purported todo. Alternatively, it is impliedly suggested that ARP, or the petitioner, or both acting in conspiracy, took wrongful possession ofa locked premises, and eventually gave the wrongful dispossession the colour of voluntary act of surrender on behalf of thecorporation, inter alia, by "fabricating" or "manipulating" certain documents said to have been signed by one of its allegedemployees. But either way, there is hardly any escape from theconclusion that on the two Corporations own showing they werenot in actual physical possession of any part of the property onthe material date even though the officers deputed by the Corporations were interested in asserting a legal right to "maintain"possession or take possession and sought police aid apprehendingthat an attempt to "maintain" or take possession was likely tobe met with resistance by the representatives of the petitioner,who were found to be on the premises, thereby causing a seriousapprehension of breach of peace. If that be the true factualposition, the proceedings, on one reckoning, will be clearly without jurisdiction, if the expression "dispute" used in the earlierpart of sub-section (1) of Section 145 was to be narrowly construed, in the context of what follows as the function of thecourt in the proceedings, that is, to determine which of the twoparties, if any, was in "actual possession" of the property onthe material date, or be deemed to be in such possession onsuch date. If the expression "dispute", however, was to be widelyconstrued, so as to include any dispute concerning immovableproperty, whether of title to it, or of right to its possession, asdistinct from adispute relating to its actual possession, the twocorporations certainly could seek the aid of the provision onany reckoning, if the other condition that the dispute was likelyto cause a breach of peace was satisfied. ( 8 ) IT would be useful to read at this stage Sections 145 to147. ( 8 ) IT would be useful to read at this stage Sections 145 to147. These three Sections, which are part of Chapter X of thecode, dealing with maintenance of public order and tranquility,and part of the Chapter s sub-division dealing with "disputes asto immovable property", and contain the preventive provisionsof the Code read thus : "section 145 (1) : Whenever an Executive Magistrateis satisfied from a report of a police officer of uponother information that a dispute likely to cause abreach of the peace exists concerning any land orwater or the boundaries thereof, within his localjurisdiction, he shall make anorder in writing; stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attendhis Court in person or by pleader, on a spacified dateand time, and to put in written statements of theirrespective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. (2) For the purposes of this section, the expression "landor water" includes buildings, markets, fisheries; cropsor other produce of land; and the rents or profitsof any such property. (3) A copy of the order shall served in the manner provided by this Code for- the service of a summonsupon such person or persons as the Magistrate maydirect, and at least one copy shall be published bybeing affixed to some conspicuous place at or nearsubject of dispute. (4) The Magistrate shall then, without reference to themerits or the claims of any of the parties to a rightto possess the subject of dispute, peruse the state-ments so put in, hear the parties, receive all suchevidence as may be produced by them, take suchfurther evidence if any, as he thinks necessary, and,impossible, decide whether any and which of theparties was, at the date of the order made by himunder sub-section (1), in possession of the subjectof dispute :provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that anyparty has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessedwithin two months next before the date on whichthe report of a police officer or other information wasreceived by the Magistrate, or after that date andbefore the date of his order under sub-section (1),he may treat the party so dispossessed as if thatparty, had been in possession on the date of his orderunder sub-section (1 ). (5) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party sorequired to attend, or any other person interested,from showing that no such dispute as aforesaid existsor has existed, and in such case the Magistrate shallcancel his said order, and all further proceedingsthereon shall be stayed, but, subject to such cancellation, the order of the Magistrate under sub-section (1) shall be final. (6) (a) If the Magistrate decides that one of the particswas, or should under the proviso to sub-section (4)be treated as being in such possession of the saidsubject, he shall issue an order declaring such partyto be entitled to possession thereof until evictedtherefrom in due course of law, and forbidding alldisturbance of such possession until such eviction;and when he proceeds under the proviso to subsection (4), may restore to possession the partyforcibly and wrongfully dispossessed. (b) The order made under this sub-section shall be served and published in the manner laid down in subjection (3 ). (7) When any party to any such proceeding dies, the Magistrate may cause the legal representative of the deceased party to be made a party to the proceeding and shall thereupon continue the enquiry, and if any question arises as to who the legal representative of a deceased party for the purposes of such proceeding is, all persons claiming to be representatives of the deceased party shall be made parties thereto. (8) If the Magistrate is of opinion that any crop or other produce of the property, the subject of dispute in a proceeding under this section pending before him, is subject to speedy and natural decay, he may make an order for the proper custody or sale of such property, and, upon the completion of the inquiry, shall make such order for the disposal of such property, or the sale-proceeds thereof, as he thinks fit. (9) The Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, at any stage of the proceedings under section, on the application of either party, issue a summons to any witness directing him to attend or to produce any document or thing. (10) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to be inderogation of the powers of the Magistrate proceed under section 107. 146. (10) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to be inderogation of the powers of the Magistrate proceed under section 107. 146. (1) If the Magistrate at any time after making theorder under sub-section (1) of section 145 considersthe case to be one of emergency, or if he decides thatnone of the parties was then in such possession asis referred to in section 145, or if he is unable tosatisfy himself as to which of them was then in suchpossession of the subject of dispute, he may attachthe subject of dispute until a competent Court hasdetermined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof. Provided that such Magistrate may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is nolonger any breach of the peace with regard tothe subject of dispute. (2) When the Magistrate attaches the subject of dispute,he may, if no receiver in relation to such subject ofdispute has been appointed by any Civil Court, makesuch arrangements as he considers proper for lookingafter the property or if he thinks fit, appoint areceiver thereof, who shall have, subject to the control of the Magistrate, all the powers of a receiverappointed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908;provided that in the event of a receiver being subsequently appointed in relation to the subject of disputeby any Civil Court, the Magistrate (a) shall order the receiver appointed by him to handover the possession of the subject of dispute tothe receiver appointed by the Civil Court and shalltherefore discharge the receiver appointed by him; (b) may make such other incidental or consequentialorders as may be just. 147. (1) Whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfiedfrom the report of a police officer or upon other information, that a dispute likely to cause a breachof the peace exists regarding any alleged right ofuser of any land or water within his local jurisdiction,whether such right be claimed as an easement orotherwise, he shall make an order in writing, statingthe grounds of his being so satisfied and requiringthe partiesconcerned in such dispute to attend hiscourt in person or by pleader on a specified dateand time and to put in written statements of theirrespective claims. Explanation The expression "land or water" has themeaning given to it in sub-section (2) of section 145. Explanation The expression "land or water" has themeaning given to it in sub-section (2) of section 145. (2) The Magistrate shall then peruse the statementsso put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidenceas may be produced by them respectively, considerthe effect of such evidence take such further evidence, if any, as he thinks necessary and, if possibledecide whether such right exists; and the provisionsof section 145 shall, so far as may be, apply in thecase of such inquiry. (3) If it appears to such Magistrate that such rightsexist, he may make an order prohibiting any interference with the exercise of such right, including,in a proper case, an order for the removal of anyobstruction in the exercise of any such right :provided that no such order shall be made where theright is exercisable at all times of the year, unlesssuch right has been exercised within three monthsnext before the receipt under sub-section (1) ofthe report of a police officer or other informationleading to the institution of the inquiry, or wherethe right is exercisable only at particular seasons oron particular occasions, unless the right has beenexercised during the last of such seasons or on thelast of such occasions before such receipt. (4) When in any proceedings commenced under sub-section (1) of section 145 the Magistrate finds thatthe dispute is as regards an alleged right of user ofland or water, he may, after recording his reasons,continue with the proceedings as if they had beencommenced under sub-section (1) ;and when in any proceedings commenced under sub-section (1) the Magistrate finds that the dispute shouldbe dealt with under section 145, he may, after recording his reasons, continue with the proceedingsas if they had been commenced under sub-section (1) Of section 145. " ( 9 ) I would first examine the question as to the true meaning,scope and ambit of the expression "dispute" in the earlier partof sub-section (1) of Section 145 in the context of internal aidsto interpretation of statutes. Chapter X, in which Sections 145to 148 occur, as part of its division-D according to its title,deals with "maintenance of public order and tranquility". Thevarious provisions in the Chapter are preventive in nature intendedto ensure maintenance Of public order and tranquility. Division-Dof this Chapter is entitled "disputes as to immovable property". The head-note Of Section 145 in this division is entitled "pro-cedure where dispute concerning land or water is likely to causebreach of peace". Thevarious provisions in the Chapter are preventive in nature intendedto ensure maintenance Of public order and tranquility. Division-Dof this Chapter is entitled "disputes as to immovable property". The head-note Of Section 145 in this division is entitled "pro-cedure where dispute concerning land or water is likely to causebreach of peace". The head-note Of Section 146 reads thus :"power to attach subject of dispute and to appoint receiver". Head-note of Section 147 is in these words : "dispute concerningright of use of land or water". While first part of sub-section (1)of Section 145 uses the unqualified expression "dispute", the latterpart of this sub-section, which deals with a requisition requiringthe parties concerned in the dispute to attend the Court, andto put in written. statements of their respective daims. the Legislaturequalified the expression "claims" by the words "as respectsthe fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute". If theintention of the Legislature was to use the expression "dispute"in the first part of the sub-section (1) in the restricted sense of. a dispute with regard to actual possessien of the property it wasopen to the Legislature to use in the first part of sub-section (1) the restrictive words, used in the latter part of it, and ifthe expression "dispute" is to be understood in the context ofthe restrictive expression, used in the latter part of the sub-section. one would necessary have to do violence to the expression"dispute" as also to look for a legitimate reason why the Legislature did not use the common expression in both parts of thesub-section. There can be little doubt that disputes with regardto immovable property may be of various types. The dispute mayrelate to title. It may relate to any other interest in immovableproperty, such mortgage rights, tenancy rights and licenseerights. It may also relate to the right to possession, on one basisor the other. Lastly, the dispute may relate as to who was inactual physical possession of the property at a particular pointof time and if more than one persons claim that they were inactual physical possession of it, the dispute may further relateas to the portion of which each of parties to the dispute were inactual possession. Lastly, the dispute may relate as to who was inactual physical possession of the property at a particular pointof time and if more than one persons claim that they were inactual physical possession of it, the dispute may further relateas to the portion of which each of parties to the dispute were inactual possession. From the last part of sub-section (1) of Section 145, it is obvious that, whatever other disputes may be incontemplation, the Section is certainly attracted if the disputerelates to actual possession of immovable property and the othercondition of the sub-section is satisfied, but is the sub-section inapplicable if there is no dispute with regard to the actual possession but extends, for example, to a right to possession ? Thiswould postulate that one of the two parties to the dispute isin actual possession, at a particular point of time, but the otherparty, claiming a right to take possession, wrongfully or forcibly,under the colour of title, or on any other legitimate basis, ispoised to take the law into its own hands, if necessary, to enforce its right, whether with or without the use of force. Sub-section (2) of Section 145 amplifies the words "land or water",used in the first part of sub-section (1) of Section 145 to includenot only building, markets, fisheries, crops or other produce ofland but also "the rents or profits of any such property". If theexpression "dispute" occurring in first part of sub-section (1) of Section 145 is read only in the context of the restrictive wordsappearing in the latter part of the sub-section, one won't knowhow to work out the expression "dispute" in the context of"rents or profits of any such properly". One could legitimatelysay that there could never be a dispute with regard to "actualpossession" of "rents" or "profits" of any property. The onlypossible dispute that could occur with regard to rents or profits of a property would be the right to receive the rents or profits or, if already received, the right to retain it. The restrictive expression "actual possession" insuch a case would appear to have no meaning. The onlypossible dispute that could occur with regard to rents or profits of a property would be the right to receive the rents or profits or, if already received, the right to retain it. The restrictive expression "actual possession" insuch a case would appear to have no meaning. Sub-section (4)of the Section enjoins the Magistrate to peruse the statementsput in by the rival claimants, hear the parties, receive all evidence and, if possible, decide whether any and which of theparties was, at the material time, in possession of the subject ofdispute but the sub-section cautions that this shall be done bythe Magistrate "without reference to the merits or the claims ofany of the parti to a right to possess the subject of dispute". It is quite legitimate to ask oneself the question that if the Section was attracted only if the dispute relates to the actual possession and in no other eventuality, where was the occasion forthe Legislature to caution the Magistrate that in discharging hisduty under sub-section (4), he would ignore the merits of theclaims to a right to possess, as distinct from the actual possession. If all other disputes with regard to immovable property areoutside the Section such a caution was otiose. Sub-section (4)of the Section also envisages when it uses the expression "whetherany" that none of the two parties may have been in actual possession. If the dispute must relate only to actual possession wouldthe Section have still. required the Magistrate to decide 'whetherany" and "which of the parties" was in possession. This wouldindicate that the matter may be before the court u/s. 145, eventhough none of the parties may have been in actual possessionof a property on a particular date. but the disputes relates toimmovable property and the other condition of the Section wassatisfied. This is possible only if the expression "dispute" hada wider meaning so that the dispute may relate to imaovableproperty, even though none of the parties were in actual possession of it. Proviso to sub-section (4) gives a further clue to thepossiblemeaning of expression "dispute" when it introduces alegal fiction of "deemed possession" if a party had been forciblyand wrongfully dispossessed within the requisite period before thedate on which the report of a police officer or other informationwas received by the Magistrate. Proviso to sub-section (4) gives a further clue to thepossiblemeaning of expression "dispute" when it introduces alegal fiction of "deemed possession" if a party had been forciblyand wrongfully dispossessed within the requisite period before thedate on which the report of a police officer or other informationwas received by the Magistrate. This also indicates that a party,who had been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed, would becapable of invoking Section 145 and the factum that he hadbeen so dispossessed, within the. requisite period, becomes relevant. It is obvious that once a person bad-been dispossessedfrom the immovable property, he could not possibly raise a dispute that he is in actual possession of the property. The onlything he could possibly complain of is that having been in peaceful possession on a particular date, he had been successfully dispossessed in a manner which was forcible-and wrongful that hewas entitled to be put back in possession: and that the right topossession was being denied; and that if he enforced it therewas likelihood of breach of peace. It would be impossible forhim to raise a dispute with regard to actual possession unless onewere to assume that the Section contemplates that to attract itsprovision, the person so wronged must take the law into his ownhands, manage to put himself in possession of the whole or partof the property to be able to raise the dispute tthe padestalof a dispute relating to actual possession. If the Section is thusconstrued, it would be clearly exposed to the criticism that thelegislative action was intended to encourage lawlessness so thataparty, who has been aggrieved by a forcible and wrongful dispossession, must either. go to the civil court to recover possessionor do what was done to him to set the speedy remedy under thissection. If the Section is thusconstrued, it would be clearly exposed to the criticism that thelegislative action was intended to encourage lawlessness so thataparty, who has been aggrieved by a forcible and wrongful dispossession, must either. go to the civil court to recover possessionor do what was done to him to set the speedy remedy under thissection. Sub-section (6) (a) further envisages the restoration ofpossession to the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed andforbidding all disturbance of such possession until eviction indue course of law thereby contemplating a party in actual posseslion and the other party threatening to dispossess pursuant toits claim to right to possess, even though the Section does notexclude the possibility that both parties' claiming right to possession may be in actual possession, either of the whole or of diffe-rent part of the property, but the possibility of actual possessionof one and the ciaim by the other as to the right to possess, andthe threat to dispossess, are certainly not outside the contemplation of the Section. Sub-section (1) of Section 146, which bythe very nature of these provisions, must be read together, givesa further indication that Section 145 may be attracted eventhough none of the parties was in actual possession when it provides that "if he decides that none of the parties was then insuch possession, as is referred to in Section 145, he may attachsubject of dispute until a competent court has determinedthe rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitledto the possession thereof. " The latter part of sub-section (1) ofsection 146 envisages the determination by a competent courtof the "right to the possession" of the property. This referencewould also be wholly superfluous if the dispute relating to mereright to possession, as distinct from a dispute with regard toactual possession, was outside the contemplation of Section 145. It is also good to remember in this context that there is a cleardistinction between grounds for initiation of proceedings in acourt of law, or the conditions that must be satisfied before aparty could invoke the jurisdiction of a court, and the limits ofthe relief that the court is empowered to give, on taking seizenof the matter. These need not be co-extensive. These need not be co-extensive. The conditionsfor initiation of proceedings may be wider than the limits ofthe relief, or even the scope of the proceedings and it is so inthe present case, so that proceedings could be initiated if thereis a dispute as to immovable property likely to cause a breachof peace, but the magisterial enquiry must be confined to thequestion of actual possession or deemed possession, without reference to the rights or title, for which parties must be relegated to a competent Civil court, and the purpose of the provisions is that so long as there is a dispute, as to immovable property and there is a likelihood of such dispute causing a breachof peace, a competent Magistrate can take seizen of the matterso as to prevent deterioration in the situation and, if necessary,subject to the conditions of Section 146 being satisfied, to attachthe property which is the subject-matter of the dispute. To restrict the meaning of expression "dispute" in the first part ofsub-section (1) of Section 145 would largely defeat the objectof the provision and the seeming inconsistency between the conditions for the initiation of proceedings and the scope of proceedings and the ambit of relief in the Magisterial court is not a goodreason to allow the object of the Section to be partly, if notsubstantially, frustrated and rendered nugatory. The applicationof known internal aids to interpretation to the provisions wouldthus justify a wider meaning being given to the expression "dispute" in the first part of sub-section (1) of Section 145, unfettered by the limited jurisdiction of the magisterial inquiry. While it is unnecessary for me to go into the question if suchdispute may legitimately relate to title to the property or otherinterests in the immovable property but it appears to me that theexpression "dispute", in the context in which it is used, is wideenough as not to be confined merely to a dispute with regard toactual possession, but extends to a claim or right to possession,as distinct from actual possession. ( 10 ) IT may be useful at this stage to consider how courts haveconstrued the expression "dispute" in Section 145 (1), asindeed, the conditions which would justify initiation of proceedings under the Section. ( 11 ) LEGISLATION regarding the dispute concerning land etc. ( 10 ) IT may be useful at this stage to consider how courts haveconstrued the expression "dispute" in Section 145 (1), asindeed, the conditions which would justify initiation of proceedings under the Section. ( 11 ) LEGISLATION regarding the dispute concerning land etc. likely to cause a breach of the peace, and of the adjustments ofthose dispute, and by such adjustment to prevent them fromculminating in a breach of the peace began with Regulation-49 of1793 and continued, in one form or the other, right to the present provision. The purpose of the provisions has been to bringbefore the court the disputing parties to ascertain, if possible,which of them was in actual possession, irrespective of any consideration as to which of them was entitled to possess, and to sayto the other disputants that the person found inactual possessionwas to be left in such possession and that such possession wasnot to be disturbed until that person was evicted in due course oflaw. The object to be attained was the prevention of the disputeculminating into breach of peace. The "object and method" havethroughout remind the same. The true meaning and scope ofthe successive provisions as indeed their object and conditions forinitiation of proceedings, have been subject-matter of judicial controvertysince before the tune of the century but it would besufficient to review some of the leading decisions. ( 12 ) IN the case of Krishna Kamni (1908.) 30 Cal. 155 (FB) (1) Hill J, speaking for a Full Bench of the Calcuttahigh Court said thus : "the two essentials are that there should be a dispute likelyto cause a breach of the peace, and that the disputeconcerns land etc. The Section does not primarilycontemplate cases in which there havealready been acts of violence. All the disputants maybe persons of peaceable disposition, but if the dispute is in its nature of such a kind that it is likely,having regard to the known conditions of Society, tolead a breach of the peace, that is enough to warrantthe Magistrate's intervention and to give him jurisdiction over the subject of dispute. The object, Ithink, is to take the dispute out of the hands of thedisputants, and to constitute one of them, whosepossession the law will protect, its custodian untilthe other has established his right (if any) to possession in a civil court. The object, Ithink, is to take the dispute out of the hands of thedisputants, and to constitute one of them, whosepossession the law will protect, its custodian untilthe other has established his right (if any) to possession in a civil court. " ( 13 ) IN the case of Shebalak Singh AIR 1922 Pat-435 (2) afull Bench of the Patna High Court held that where it wasclear on the material that one party was in possession andanother, whose claim to possession was a mere "pretence",was threatening to interfere with that possession the Magistrate was clearly entitled to resort to special summaryprocedure of Section 144, if immediate prevention or speedyremedy is desirable. It was further held that Section 144was a "larger" and "more general" than Section 145and that Section 145 was of "limited scope" andapplied only where "there was a danger of the breach of thepeace". It was further held that if the Magistrate finds thatthere is "real dispute" tending to a breach of the peace themagistrate is bound to institute proceedings under Section 145but when one party was clearly in the "wrong" and "threatening" to usurp the right of another who is in actual possession theproper remedy is an order under Section 144 or Section 107 ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure". ( 14 ) IN the case of Agni Kumar Das AIR 1928cal. 610 (3) a Full Bench oi! Calcutta High Courtcomprising of five Judges, was called upon to consider, inter alia, the following two questions: (i) Do thewords "actual possession" in Subjection (i) of Section 145 meanactual personal physical possession even though wrongfully i. e. that of a recent trespasser in actual physical possession at thetime of proceedings under Section 145 (ii) Does the word "dispute" in the same Sub-section mean actual disagreement existing between the parties at the time of the proceedings under Section 145 even though the question as to the right to possessionhas already been decided by a civil court. The main judgment isby the illustrious Judge Bankin-J, the then Chief Justice, whoachieved greater emminence in the years that followed. We arenot concerned in the present case with the first question, referredto the Full Bench. The Full Bench answered the second questionin the affirmative. The main judgment isby the illustrious Judge Bankin-J, the then Chief Justice, whoachieved greater emminence in the years that followed. We arenot concerned in the present case with the first question, referredto the Full Bench. The Full Bench answered the second questionin the affirmative. The contest in this case was between theperson in "actual physical possession" and a person, who hadbeen given symbolic possession, pursuant to a decree of a civilcourt and the contention was that the Section referred to bonafide disputes" and not the cases in which claim of one side is without any "rational ground" or !s made without any real belief inits validity and the section was intended to make interim provisionuntil disputes are determined by the civil court and that oncethe civil court has determined the matter the dispute was at anend, and at all events, there was no more scope for a summaryorder, which proceeds not upon title but on mere possession. The learned Chief Justice expressed the view that the words "dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace" did not refer only to"bona fide disputes" or only to "reasonable disputes" and that"the first sub-section is concerned with the maintenance of thepublic peace and with the reality of the disputes, the danger ofdisputes. It matters little to a broken head whether it be brokenin good faith or bad and the Magistrate can have no preference". The contention that if the Magistrate had jurisdiction to act, hewas bound in law to find possession according to the civil courtsdecree as against actual possession, was negatived. Suhrawardy-Jin a concurring judgment observed that the term "dispute" hadnot been defined in the Code but appear to have been "clearlyand sufficiently explained in the section ilself as meaning a disputewhich is likely to cause breach of the peace". "to add any otherexplanation to the term", added the learned Judge, "will not, inmy opinion be construing the Act but legislating". He also rejected the contention that the dispute must be "bona fide" or"reasonable". The learned Judge further expressed the view thatthe word "dispute" is used in its ordinary sense "meaning a disagreement, struggle, scramble or quarrel for possession of landetc. He also rejected the contention that the dispute must be "bona fide" or"reasonable". The learned Judge further expressed the view thatthe word "dispute" is used in its ordinary sense "meaning a disagreement, struggle, scramble or quarrel for possession of landetc. " Ghose-I, in another concurring judgment, reviewed moreor less the entire law on the subject, and also rejected the contention that the word "dispute" must be read as "bona fide dispute" and that there could be no dispute merely because the rightshad been determined by a civil court. It was observed that wheretwo parties were quarrelling "over possession" which is likely toon danger public peace there is a ''dispute" under this section. The plain meaning of the word in the section should be adoptedand there is no reason why there should be a strained and fictitious meaning given to the words where ths maintenance of peaceis concerned. Mukherji-J, however, struck a slightly different notewhen he observed, after a review of particularly the entire caselaw on the subject, that the expression "dispute" could not mean"all kinds of disputes" but only disputes as to "actual possession and that the words "dispute concerning land etc. " had tobe understood not quite "literally" but as a "dispute relating toactual possession". For a dispute as to actual possession to beeffectively determined it is not enough that there has been adecree determining the rights of the parties, unless it is a decreeby which asuit for declaration of right and recovery or confirmation of possession has been dismissed thus putting an endto the plaintiff's right and claim for possession for ever andbeyond all controversy, it was observed that in cases of decreeswhich merely determine the rights of parties, even if they decidethat one party is "entitled to possession" as against the otherthe dispute "as to possession" still remains and it is only bydelivery of possession in execution of such a decree and in favourof one party as against another that the disputs can be said tobe determined beyond any controversy. Such possession, however,must be "actual or khas possession" and not merely symbolicalpossession because it is "actual possession and not a right topossession that Section 145 is concerned with". In another concurring judgment Commiade-J expressed the view that the word"dispute", used in the Section means actual dispute, irrespectiveof the merits of the parties' claims to possess the land. Such possession, however,must be "actual or khas possession" and not merely symbolicalpossession because it is "actual possession and not a right topossession that Section 145 is concerned with". In another concurring judgment Commiade-J expressed the view that the word"dispute", used in the Section means actual dispute, irrespectiveof the merits of the parties' claims to possess the land. ( 15 ) IN the case of Fate Muhammad Khan Tiwana AIR (36)1949 Lahore-273 (4) the Lahore High Court was dealingwith the questions if the Section could be invoked incase where the contending parties were not in actualpossession but had been bona fide rights to succeed to theproperty and there was a serious danger of breach of peace ifaction was not taken, and if the word "dispute" meant a disputewithout reference to the claims of the contending parties as totheir actual possession. The case arose in somewhat unusualcircumstances. Sir Allah Bakhsh Khan Tiwana was lying in astate of coma and the report submitted by the police to thedistrict Magistrate was that the death was imminent, that he hadbequeathed his property among his sister, his niece and hiscollaterals, that the management of the properties was in thehands of his agents while the management of his household wasin the hands of his sister, but the collaterals were layingclaim to the property and both the groups were poisedto obtainforcible possession of the estate, and dispossess the sister from themanagement of the household and that a clash was, therefore,inviable between rival claimants. The contention before thelearned Single Judge, who made the reference to the large bench,as indeed, before the Division Bench, was that the dispute onthe existence of which proceedings could be started, must relateto the fact of "actual possession of the subject of dispute"because the enquiry has to be limited to the claims "as respectsthe fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute". The contention was negatived by Munir J. who spoke for the Divisionbench, holding that the word "dispute" was wide enough to cover"all kinds of disputes", not only dispute as to the fact ofpossession but also "disputes as to right to possess or right toown or use immovable property if they are likely to cause breachof the peace". The contention was negatived by Munir J. who spoke for the Divisionbench, holding that the word "dispute" was wide enough to cover"all kinds of disputes", not only dispute as to the fact ofpossession but also "disputes as to right to possess or right toown or use immovable property if they are likely to cause breachof the peace". It was observed that the making of the finalorder was not dependent upon a party to the dispute establishinghis possession and that even if neither party was found inpossession and apprehension of breach of peace still existed,the Magistrate could not discharge the proceedings on the finding that possession of neither of the parties was proved, and hecould still proceed to make an order of attachment until thecivil Court has determined the rights of the parties or of thepersons entitled to possession thereof. The learned Judgeexpressed the view that there was no warrant for "restricting theplain meaning of the word "dispute" to limit its application onlyto disputes as regards the fact of possession as distinct fromdisputes relating to right to possess and that disputes relatingto the right to possess are obviously within the meaning ofsection" because of the language emoloyed in sub-section (4) ofthe Section. It was observed that the plain intention of the Section was that though the dispute "may relate to or arise out ofthe right to possess", the Magistrate in making the final order"must only look to the fact of possession and not to the rightto possess". It was further observed that to hold to the contrarywould be unduly "straining the language of the Section and importing into it words that do not exist". The High Court, therefore, concluded that "all disputes whether they arise out ofactual possession or attempted possession or out of use of immovable property, are covered by the Section, if they were likelyto cause the breach of the peace. " The preliminary order, as wellas the order attaching the property, were accordingly upheld. ( 16 ) A large number of other decisions of the variouscourts, including the highest court, were cited but these cases,by and large, dealt with fact situations, which did not call fordecision of the question as to the meaning and scope of theexpression "dispute" and a restricted meaning of the expressionwas, therefore, assumed in most of those cases because of thecontext in which the cases arose. While it may, therefore, beunnecessary to review each of these decisions, it would beproper to deal with some of these decisions, notably those bythe highest court, which contain useful observations, eventhough not directly on the question, but may help in the determination of the question. In the case of Rajpati (5), thesupreme Court was concerned with the limited question thatonce the Magistrate recorded satisfaction, as to the existence ofbreach of peace in the preliminary order, it was not necessarythat the breach of peace should continue at every stage ofproceedings and a High Court in revision would not go intothe sufficiency or otherwise of the material on the basis ofwhich the satisfaction was based. The Court relied on anearlier decision of the Court in the case of R. H. Bhutani (6)in which the Court had observed that the Section required thatthe Magistrate must be satisfied before initiating proceedings"that a dispute regarding an immovable property exists andthat such dispute is likely to cause breach of peace. " In thecase of Mathuralal (7), the question before the Supreme Courtwas if after the attachment made on the ground of emergencythe Magistrate's jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry undersection 145 came to an end. The question was answered in thenegative. This decision is, however, of considerable assistancein understanding the scheme of the provisions, particularly, inthe context of the evolution of the preventive provisions because that Judgment is based on a comparative study of theprovisions, both before and after the amendment of the oldcode in 1955, and as they now stand under the new Code. Thecourt observed that Sections 145 and 146 constitute a schemefor the resolution of a situation where "there is a likelihood ofa breach of the peace because of a dispute concerning anyland or water or their boundaries. " On a comparative study ofthe two provisions, as they stood before 1955 and after 1955,under the old Code, and as they now stand under the Code of1973, it was held that the jurisdiction does not end as soon asan attachment is made on the ground of emergency and thatthe provisions of the Section of the new Code "are substantiallythe same as the corresponding provisions before the 1955 amendment of the old Code". In the case of Harijan Yellaiah andanother (8), a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh Highcourt held that the pendency of a civil suit between the partiesdid not take away the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to initiateproceedings if the conditions of the Section were satisfied. Itwas, however, observed that the Magistrate should not lightlyproceed in the matter, when the same is pending in the civilcourt, particularly, if the civil court has made an order inregard to the possession even by way of interim injunction. The same should be given due weight and it is expedient thatthe criminal court should uphold the order of the civil courtand it makes no difference whether the order of the civil courtwas passed before or after the initiation of the proceedingsbefore the Magistrate. The Court went as far as to hold thatthe criminal court should better drop the proceedings initiatedunder the Section if there is an order of injunction issued bythe civil court in regard to the possession. In the case ofashrafila (9), a Single Judge of this Court held that there mustbe good basis or foundation for the preliminary order whichmay be a police report and the Magistrate need not repeat inthe order what is stated in the police report. It was furtherobserved that the order of a Magistrate prevails over an interimorder of the civil court but final order of the civil court wasbinding. The contention that once the matter had been takenby one of the parties to the civil court, before or after themagistrate order, the Magistrate must hold his hands off wasrepelled. In the case of Mohd. Abbas and another (10), alearned Single Judge of the Patna High Court, relying on thedecisions of the Supreme Court, in the case of R. H. Bhutani (supra), held that mere failure to state the reasons when themagistrate was satisfied that there was an apprehension ofbreach of peace was nothing more than an "irregularity" andthat the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdictionwould not go into the question of "sufficiency" of materialalthough if the Magistrate has not mentioned at all that therewas any apprehension of breach of peace the omission wasfinal. In the case of Partap Singh (11), a Division Bench ofthe Punjab High Court, inter alia, held that Section 145 wasdesigned to protect deprivation of possession by persons takinglaw into their own hands and has no concern with determination of any legal right to possession. It does not seek toperpetuate illegal possession but merely directs the subjecttoassert their rights in accordance with law. The Section itself isindicative of the difference between actual possession and rightto possession maintained therein. It was further held that therewas no doubt that mediate or direct possession is on anyinterpretation actual possession within the meaning of theprovision. It was, therefore, held that mediate possession of thegovernment through an allottee was actual possession withinthe contemplation of the said provision and that when anallottee, who had once been put in possession and dislocated,seeks to recover possession, such allottee cannot be allowed totake the law in his own hands and if the burden of his act fallson peace, Magistrate can certainly step in. Such an allottee isas much bound to assert his right to recover possession inaccordance with law as any other person. He must also recoverpossession through channels of law and mere fact of his beingan allottee does not confer any such privilege as to enable himto break the law. These observations were, however, made inthe context of the power to make the final order and not asto the conditions for initiation of proceedings under the section. In the case of Padmaraju Subba Raju and others (12), adivision Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, while dealing with a final order under the provision, hel that the objectof the provision is to prevent breaches of peace pending asettlement of the rights of the parties in a civil court. The necessary condition under the Section, which confers jurisdiction ona Magistrate to make an enquiry, is that he should be satisfiedfrom a police report, or other information that a dispute likelyto cause a breach of peace exists concerning land or water andhis jurisdiction to make an enquiry is confined only to thefact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. He has nojurisdiction to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties to thepossession for such questions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts. He has nojurisdiction to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties to thepossession for such questions are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts. In the case of Tikuda (13), a Divisionbench of the Rajasthan High Court was concerned with anorder of attachment and held that if a dispute about immovableproperty was pending before a civil court, the Magistrate shouldnot lightly proceed in the matter. He should weigh and consider whether there is a real apprehension of the breach ofpeace and if there is such an apprehension, whether the samecannot be averted by proceedings under S. 107, of the Codebut the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is not ousted simplybecause a' suit is pending. In such a case, the Magistrate mustproceed with care and caution, after ascertaining full facts fromthe party which moves the Court. In the case of Jagarnathprasad Bhagat (14) the Patna High Court, while dealing withthe final order, observed that the proceedings are summary' proceedings calculated to prevent a breach of the peace and withthat end in view, a Magistrate is required to decide purely thefact of actual physical possession irrespective of the merits ofthe claim of any of the parties to a right to possess the subjectof the dispute and that it was not the function of the Court togo into complicated question of title and determine for himselfwho has got title to the disputed property, even though it isnot that under no circumstances should a Magistrate advert tothe question of title and that title in any shape or form isentirely irrelevant and of no value. In exceptional cases, titlemay be of value in appreciating the evidence of possession andreliance was placed on a Full Bench decision of that court inthe case reported as AIR 1949 Patna 146: In the case ofbhinka and others (15), Supreme Court was concerned with thequestion as to the true effect of a final order made under theprovision and held that under Section 145 (6) of the Code, amagistrate is authorised to issue an order declaring a party tobe entitled to possession of a land until evicted therefrom indue course of law and observed that the Magistrate does notpurport to decide a party's title or right to possession of the landbut expressly reserve that question to be decided in due courseof law. The foundation of his jurisdiction is on apprehensionof the breach of the peace and with that object he makes a temporary order irrespective of the rights cf the parties which willb have to be agitated and disposed of in the manner provided bylaw. The life of the order is co-terminus with the passing ofa decree by the civil court and the moment a civil court makesan order of eviction, it displaces the order of the criminal court. Supreme Court relied on the decision of the Privy Council inthe case of Dinomoni Chowdhrani, (16) and quoted with approval, the observations of the Privy Council to the effect thatthese orders are "merely police orders made to prevent breachesof the peace. They decide no question of title. " ( 17 ) THE decision of the Calcutta High Court in the caseof Agni Kumar D'ass (supra) and of the Lahore High Court inthe case of Fate Muhammad Khan Tiwana (supra) were perhapsthe only cases involving the question as to the construction ofthe expression "dispute". The decision of the Calcutta Highcourt, which is otherwise entitled to respect, as indeed, considerable weight, is really of little assistance in the context inwhich the question of construction arises in the present casebecause the question was considered in that case in the contextof the fact that a decree had already been made and symbolicpossession had been delivered in execution of it and the question that really fell for determination was, if notwithstandingthese circumstances, it could be said that there was a "disputewith regard to immovable property". There are no doubt references in some of the judgments to possession, as also to rightto possess, but that was not the real question before the Court. The real question was if actual dispute regarding possession survived a decree followed by symbolic possession. The case of Fate Muhammad Khan Tiwana (supra) on the other hand, directly posed the question if theexpression "dispute" was to be given a restricted meaning tobe confined to disputes relating to physical possession, as distinct from the right to possession, even though it must be conceded that the decision turned on the construction of thelanguage of the statute without the aid of any of the precedents, and none was cited by either of the parties. It is no doubttrue that the decision is of a foreign court but whatever maybe its effect on the binding nature of the decision, it ought notto be ignored so long as it illumines indicial path in its questfor truth, irrespective of the source of light. I have, therefore,no hesitation in holding that the expression "dispute" could notbe given a restricted meaning and must extend not only to adispute with regard to actual physical possession but also adispute as to right to possess, as distinct from thedispute as to actual physical possession, even though its meaning may not be stretched as far as has been done by the Lahorehigh Court, and I say so with utmost respect, partly because thefact situation in the present case does not necessitate such awide construction of the expression "dispute". ( 18 ) BUT having regard to the difficulty of construction ofthe word "dispute" and the paucity of direct decision on thequestion, except the decision of the Lahore High Court, I wouldnot rest my decision on this aspect of the case on the wideconstruction of the word "dispute", because even if the word"dispute" is narrowly construed, the conditions for exercise ofjurisdiction and for the preliminary order were satisfied. MPSICwas admittedly and tenant of the premises in actual physical possession of it upto a certain date, and I am not concerned atthis point of time as to the precise date. Tha contractor's menwere admittedly carrying on furnishing work at the instanceof one or the other of the Government Corporations and thiswork was allegedly suspended when the stay orders were received. The Corporations then suddenly find that one finemorning some persons, having no connection with either ofthe Corporations, were in possession and some work was goingon neither of which they hadauthorised. It is in that situationthat the officers of the Corporation decide to assert their rightto maintain their lawful possession or to put it differently, torestore the possession of the Corporations, which according totheir reckoning, was bound to be resisted by those in possession. It is in that situationthat the officers of the Corporation decide to assert their rightto maintain their lawful possession or to put it differently, torestore the possession of the Corporations, which according totheir reckoning, was bound to be resisted by those in possession. If the Corporation in the situation either challenges the authority of those in actual physical possession, either as trespassers,or as perpetrators of fraud, by themselves or in collusion withothers and claims the right to maintain their possession or asserttheir right to possession, the dispute would neverthelessstill relate to actual possession of the property, itbeing confined to the disputed nature of the possession of persons in actual physical possession as an invasion of the rightof the party disposed from it and the dispute would not ceaseto relate to actual physical possession of the property merelybecause owing to the constraints inherent in the status of apublic servant or an officer of a Government Corporation, thematter rested with the exchange of claims and counter claimsand of hot words and was confined to the region of cold warrather than breaking into the premises and/or of skulls. That isprobably what would have happened if the party dispossessedwrongfully, forcibly or otherwise, happened to be a 'privateperson rather than a government organisation or a juristicperson. But I am unable to see how merely for that reason whatis essentially a dispute with regard to possession of immovableproperty and within the provision, ceases to be so. ( 19 ) THUS, both on principle and preponderance of precedent, the first condition for taking cognizance under the Sectionwas fully satisfied in that on the material before the learnedmagistrate, it could be reasonably inferred that there was adispute relating to immovable property within the meaning ofthe Section. ( 20 ) WHETHER the second condition for initiation of proceedings was satisfied or not, hardly presents any difficulty. Thesecond condition postulates the existence of a situation that islikely to cause a breach of the peace. It envisages a potentialthreat of 'breach of peace. Actual disturbance of peace is nota pre-condition. ( 20 ) WHETHER the second condition for initiation of proceedings was satisfied or not, hardly presents any difficulty. Thesecond condition postulates the existence of a situation that islikely to cause a breach of the peace. It envisages a potentialthreat of 'breach of peace. Actual disturbance of peace is nota pre-condition. It is also not necessary that there has been anyviolent act, as was observed by Hill, J. , in the case of Krishnakamani (supra), parties may be of a "peaceable disposition",there may be no violence and yet if having regard to the "conditions of society", there is a situation in which breach ofpeace was likely to be caused, the second condition is fullysatisfied. The report of the police as also the kalandara, hardlyleave any doubt as to the allegation that the dispute was likelyto cause a breach of the peace. According to the material, thegovernment Corporation, which had been in possession of thepremises in exercise of their undisputed right, suddely foundthat they had been ousted from possession, whether wrogfully,forcibly or by a trick played in collusion with their staff orotherwise. The officers of the Corporation have instructions andhave come to Delhi to assert their right to the possession ofthe premises and to "maintain" their possession. The petitionerson the other hand, claim to be in possession as a bona fideprospective purchaser, who has already paid almost the entireallegedly agreed consideration, is determined to resist anyinterference with its rights to continue peaceful possession untilevicted in accordance with law. If on this material, the Magistrate feels that he is satisfied of the potential threat of breachof peace, it would be difficulat to find fault with it, havingregard to the known conditions of society, the characteristicsof the situation, and once there is material, which is relevantto the satisfaction of the Magistrate, and the Magistrate recordshis satisfaction, this Court, would not readily interfere, whatevermay be this Court's own disposition or assessment of the objective conditions, as disclosed by the material. ( 21 ) AN interesting point was raised on behalf of the petitioner that the other party being,' a juristic person, and thattoo a Government Corporation, both of which were bound toact in accordance with and in aid of law, could not be conceivedor be capable of taking the law into their own hands or tocreate a precipate situation which may pose a threat orbreach of peace and that such a conduct could only be associated with a natural person. This contention, however, suffers froma number of fallacies. In the first instance, how a party to thedispute, whether a juristic person or a natural person, mayeventually act in a given situation is not relevant to determineif the situation has the potential to cause a breach of the peace. Secondly, the potential threat need not come from the partiesto the dispute, whether a juristic or a natural person, so longas there are others who are willing or poised to take up cudgelfor the contending parties. Thirdly, what is conveniently ignoredis that even a juristic person, like a Corporation, acts throughthe natural persons, whether its principal officers, employeesor agents. To hold it otherwise would mean that in case ofdisputes of this nature between two corporate bodies, the policeand the magistracy would be merely mute spectators and suchan interpretation would render the provision nugatory. Lastly,a mere peaceable disposition or an obligation whether of agovernment Corporation or any other juristic or natural person to strictly remain on this side of ths law would not, by itselfdeflect from the possiblity of a breach even though a mere probability may perhaps be insufficient. One may reasonably expecta Government Corporation or a public servant or even other lawabiding citizen to abstain from taking the law into its or hisown hand or to assert a right except in the manner known tolaw but if such persons feel exercised over a situation in whichthey suddenly find that they have been grossly wronged or theyhave been wrongfully, illegally, forcibly of otherwise deprived ofpossession of immovable property over which they assert anundoubted legal right, it would be difficult to deny the existenceof a situation which has the potential of a threat of breach ofpeace. ( 22 ) WHETHER the preliminary order, even if otherwise justified on the material and on the satisfaction of the Magistrate astothe existence of the twin conditions to take cognizance, is nevertheless vitiated on the ground that the order does not state "thegrounds of his being so satisfied", is the next question that callsfor decision. The duty to give reasons may be implied orexpress. It may be implied in the very nature of the power inexercise of which an order affecting rights or interests of a citizen may be made in judicial, quasi-judicial and even in administrative proceedings. The principle that imposes the implied dutyto give reasons has a three-fold object. The duty constitutes aninbuilt safeguard against arbitrariness in the exercise of powerand ensures application of mind. Secondly, it is intended toinform the affected person as to why the power has been exercised in the manner it has been done. Lastly, it is intended tomake any further judicial scrutiny of the order of the decisioneffective and meaningful for, in the absence of reasons, therewould be a handicap in any judicial review of the order. Theimplied duty to give reasons on the basis of the well-establishedprinciple of law may, and is often, given legislative recognitionby an express provision in the Statute itself, which confers thepower to make an order or a decision when it provides in express terms that the authority making the order would state itsreasons in the order itself. The duty has, in the case of thisprovision, been made an express obligation because the Sectionenjoins that the Magistrate would make an order in writingstating "the grounds of his being so satisfied". When there is,thus, a statutory duty to set out the grounds of satisfaction, itis neither sufficient to merely repeat the provisions of the lawas to the existence of a dispute and that it was likely to cause. a breach of peace nor is it necessary to give elaborate grounds. When there is,thus, a statutory duty to set out the grounds of satisfaction, itis neither sufficient to merely repeat the provisions of the lawas to the existence of a dispute and that it was likely to cause. a breach of peace nor is it necessary to give elaborate grounds. Having regard to the object behind the requirement, what isfundamental is that the decision or the order is based on relevantgrounds and whether or not such grounds are spelt out in thebody of the order or elsewhere or not at all is more a matterof form so long as the material on record and the contemporaneous action of the authority leave no doubt that the order or thedecision was arrived at after an application of mind and therewere grounds which would justify the order or the decision,having regard to the legal requirements. The mere failure toset out the grounds or the reasons in the order itself in such acase would be a curable defect or irregularity which would beincapable by itself of vitiating the order or the decision. ( 23 ) IN the present case, the coyptic order, no doubt, doesnot mention the two requirements of the Section but a referenceto the more elaborate notice andjor order of the same date, asalso the police report and the kalandara, seen in their totality,however, leave no manner of doubt that the order was the resultof application of mind and the objective situation provided thenecessary ground for the satisfaction of the Magistrate, bothas to the existence of ai dispute concerning immovable property,and from the attitude of the parties and the position that theyhad taken up and the known conditions of society that the situation had a potential for. a, breach of peace calling for initiationof preventive action under the provision. It would no doubt beideal for a court to spell out the grounds or reasons for theorders in the body of the formal order itself but to vitiate anorder for such a failure would be taking too hypertechnical viewof the law and giving too much importance to the form of theorder rather than the. substance of the matter. It would no doubt beideal for a court to spell out the grounds or reasons for theorders in the body of the formal order itself but to vitiate anorder for such a failure would be taking too hypertechnical viewof the law and giving too much importance to the form of theorder rather than the. substance of the matter. There was nodoubt some controversy if the defect of the cryiyptic order couldbe cured with reference to either the more elaborate notice and/ororder of the same date, which has been quoted above, as well asthe police report and the kalandara, but I do not see any reasonwhy the cryptic order must be torn out of context and scrutinised in isolation and not read, analysed and understood in thetotality of the contemporaneous material before the Court andthe formal notice and/or order issued by the learned Magistrate. So examined, there is little doubt that the Magistrate was satisfied on both the counts and the material before him suppliedhim the grounds and the reasons for the satisfaction and I havealready held above that the two condtions were fully satisfiedon the material before the Court. I have, therefore, no hesitationin holding that in spite of the defective form of the cryptic order,the decision to initiate proceedings did not suffer from any legalinfirmity which may vitiate the initiation of proceedings or thepreliminary order based on it. ( 24 ) A contention was raised on behalf of the petitionerthat even if the preliminary order may, on some reckoning, beconsidered valid, having regard to the requirements of the law,the proceedings should nevertheless be quashed in view of theadmitted pendency of proceedings in the civil court, includingthe proceedings filed by the petitioner more or less contemporaneously with the initiation of the proceedings in the Magistratescourt. It is, however, well settled that mere pendency of civilproceedings regarding the same matter would not oust the jurisdiction of a Magistrate's Court even though the fact that proceedings are pending in respect of the dispute relating to immovableproperty in a civil court must be considered by the Magistrate,whether the proceedings in the civil court were initiated beforeor after the proceedigs in a criminal court, and a Magistrate mustbe circumspect in making orders in such a situation but thatdoes not impinge on the jurisdiction of the criminal court todeal with the matter. The two proceedings are distinct havingvery well defined and delineated scope. The two proceedings are distinct havingvery well defined and delineated scope. The criminal proceedingsare preventive in nature and purely summary in character. Proceedings in a civil court are essentially concerned with therights of the parties and involve inordinate delay even thougha simple suit for possession without reference to title, mayperhaps be closer to the scope of proceedings u/s 145, but evessuch proceedings take considerable time. The mere pendencyof the civil proceedings, therefore, would not be a ground to setaside the preliminary order, even though, having regard to thehigh stakes involved, the status of the parties arrayed againsteach other and the allegations and counter-allegations of undueinfluence, it is reasonable and proper that all the proceedingsaretransferred to one court in the interest of expedition. ( 25 ) WHETHER the order of attachment and appointment ofa receiver was justified, is the next question that calls for decision, and is a question, to my mind, which must be answered,on all reckoning, in the negative. The initiation of proceedingsand the preliminary order would not ipso facto justify deprivationof possession of the party admittedly in actual physical possession, irrespective of the nature of that possession, and irrespective of the fiendish, wrongful, forcible or illegal manner in whicha party may have come by such possession. The attachmentcould be made under Section 146 (1) at any time after themaking of the preliminary order if the Magistrate considers thecase to be, "one of emergency", or in oilier situations with whichi am not concerned in the present case. Reading the two sections together, and that is how they must be read, it is obviousthat the conditions for the making of the preliminary order areno co-extensive with the conditions which would justify theorder of attachment, if the order of attachment is to be basedon the existence of or in the situation which is one of "emergency". An "emergency" is not an ordinary exigency. It is the existenceof an emergent condition, asituation of urgency which calls forswift action and does not brook any delay. Mere existence of adispute concerning land or the existence of a situation in whichthere may be likelihood of breach of peace do not by themselves,constitute such an emergent condition. An "emergency" is not an ordinary exigency. It is the existenceof an emergent condition, asituation of urgency which calls forswift action and does not brook any delay. Mere existence of adispute concerning land or the existence of a situation in whichthere may be likelihood of breach of peace do not by themselves,constitute such an emergent condition. There must be somethingmore to it which calls for immediate action and that immediatemust justify not merely the initiation of proceedings or a requisition to the parties to come before the Court, but the attachment of the property itself so that it is put beyond the reachof the feuding parties. Such a situation could not be said to havearisen in the present case either on all the material before thecourt, or on the terms of the Magistrial order itself. I havealready quoted the cryptic order, as also the more elaborate orderand/or notice, and have also quoted the relevant portions of thepolice report and the Kalandara on which it is based. None ofthese give any indication whatsoever of the emergency or ofany ground how the emerging situation could be said to be oneof urgency. The cryptic order merely does lip-service to theprovision when it says that the Magistrate considers the caseto be one of emergency, leaving one no wiser as to howsituation is one of emergency, when there is no referenceto it either in the police report or in the kalandara. The noticeand/or the order of the same date, which is a little more elaborate makes matters worse, if it makes any change at all. Itpurports to justify attachment and the appointment of a receiveron the ground "of element of conspiracy and deceit" and becausethe property was of considerable value. These are wholly irrelevant for the purpose of determining or indicating the emergency nature of the situation. One of these may be a moralissue but would have no legal relevance. The other may beimportant because it highlights the stakes involved but thatby itself would not justify an inference of the existence of ane emergency conditions if the expression "emergency" is to havea real meaning. One of these may be a moralissue but would have no legal relevance. The other may beimportant because it highlights the stakes involved but thatby itself would not justify an inference of the existence of ane emergency conditions if the expression "emergency" is to havea real meaning. It may perhaps have weighed with the learnedmagistrate that, having regard to the manner in which thecorporations had been deprived of possession by practice offraud on it, and having further referred to the high stakesinvolved and the fabulous valuation of the property because ofits geographical situation, it was morally justified to undo whata trespasser had done, but, unfortunately, that could not havesatisfied the onerous condition of Section 146, whatever elsemay be the effect of these circumstances. A contention wasraised that the order of attachment could not be made by acomposite order as has been done in the present case but Isee no difficulty in both the preliminary order and the orderof attachment being made at the same time so long as thepreliminary order is made first and is followed by the second. In view, however, of the conclusion that the order of attachment could not possibly have been made in the situation thatexisted on the material, it is unnecessary for me to carry thatcontention any further. There is, therefore, no escape fromthe conclusion that in the face of the orders of the Magistrate,whether or not the cryptic order is read by itself or is readin the context of the more elaborate order and/or notice, thepolice report, and the kalandara, on which it is based, the orderof attachment is wholly without jurisdiction, even though theinitiation of proceedings and the making of the preliminaryorder was based on the satisfaction of the learned Magistrate. The order of attachment, and appointment of receiver is, therefore, liable to be quashed. ( 26 ) BUT should the order of attachment be set aside unconditionally, is the further question that must be considered. The property is decidedly very valuable. The stakes are admittedly very high. The property is situated in the heart of commercial New Delhi. The likelihood of the petitioner, is putback in possession, inducting someone else into it or otherwisetransferring his interest in the property or parting with its possession, could not be altogether eliminated. If the interest ofthe third party gets involved, it is bound to create furthercomplications. The property is situated in the heart of commercial New Delhi. The likelihood of the petitioner, is putback in possession, inducting someone else into it or otherwisetransferring his interest in the property or parting with its possession, could not be altogether eliminated. If the interest ofthe third party gets involved, it is bound to create furthercomplications. It would be controversial if any order that maybe made in the present proceedings before the Magistrate couldbind and be carried out against any third party. Such likelihoodmay not amount to an emergency situation and I have heldabove that to be so, but it certainly is not irrelevant in considering the question ifappropriate conditions should be imposed in setting aside the order of attachment so as to ensurethe preservation of the property and the status quo ante as itexisted when the order of attachment was made so that nothird party interest gets involved and there are no further legalcomplications in the situation, which may he capable of defeating the object of the proceedings. A mere restraint orderor the petitioner would be insufficient unless it is amply bookedby adequate security. It would be reasonable and proper thatthe possession of the property is restored to the petitioner subject, however, to the petitioner giving an undertaking that theproperty would be resorted in accordance with the terms ofthe order, that may be made in the proceedings, and the peti-tioner furnishes adequate security in the sum of Rs. 5 lakhs, tothe satisfaction of the Registrar of this Court, after noticeto the Government Corporations. ( 27 ) IN the result, the petition, in so far as it challenges theinitiation of proceedings, and the preliminary order, fails andis hereby dismissed. The petition, in so far as it is directedagainst the order of attachment and appointment of receiver,succeeds and the aforesaid orders are quashed, subject to theconditions of the undertaking and the security mentioned above. The impugned orders are modified accordingly. The securitymay be furnished within 2 weeks during which period theorder would remain in abeyance to enable the parties to takefurther proceedings, if they so desire. ( 28 ) IN the course of the proceedings, allegations and counter-allegations of undue pressure by one or the other of theparties were made either emanating from "money power",which was attributed to one of the parties, or of pressure fromthe centre of authority, attributed to the other. ( 28 ) IN the course of the proceedings, allegations and counter-allegations of undue pressure by one or the other of theparties were made either emanating from "money power",which was attributed to one of the parties, or of pressure fromthe centre of authority, attributed to the other. The proceedingsno doubt have unsual characteristics, having regard to thestakes and the status of the parties involved, and although Ihave held that the initiation of proceedings and the preliminaryorder were justified, I have a suspicion that even so, withsomewhat similar situation involving private parties on bothsides, proceedings under Section 145 would not perhaps havebeen initiated, and the order of attachment in any eventwould never have been made. I, however have no doubt inmy mind that even so, the courts, now seized of the proceedingsunder Section 145, as also of the two suits, would deal withthe matters with expedition, as also in an impartial manner. without in any way being influenced by one or the other ofthe above considerations. It would nevertheless, be reasonableand proper that, without implying any reflection on the presiding officers concerned, the proceedings, both in the criminalcourt, and in the aforesaid suits, are transferred to the District and Sessions Judge. I direct accordingly. The District andsessions Judge would conclude the proceedings with maximumexpedition, uninfluenced by any observations that may havebeen made by this Court on the merits. Parties are directed toappear before the learned District and Sessions Judge onseptember 27, 1984. ( 29 ) BEFORE parting with this case, it is necessary to allattention to the proliferation of proceedings u[s 145, as also incivil courts, arising out of forcible and wrongful possession ofprivate immovable property in a variety of situations which, asindeed, the sorded manner in which such property is beingillegally possessed and dispossessed, with or without the collusion of the variety of authorities concerned with the enforcement of law and order, have almost assumed the proportionof a scanded. For reasons which are obvious, the task of recovering possession of immovable property from tenants, licensees, trespassers and other, otherwise than in due course of lawin Delhi, as indeed, in the rest of the country, with the aidof undue pressure and assistance from one quarter or theother, involving a variety of interests, has almost developedas an industry. This is what I said of the sorry state of affairsin a recent cases (17 ). This is what I said of the sorry state of affairsin a recent cases (17 ). "before parting with this matter, it is necessary to callattention to the increasing resort to the criminalcourt system in disputes relating to immovableproperty to which I made a passing reference inthe earlier part of this order. Market value ofimmovable property has increased manifold in Delhiduring the last decade or so. Possession of immovable property is an important attribute of its ownership and the value of possession of immovableproperty atone has increased by astronomical proportions. Vacant possession of immovable propertyadds an entirely new dimension to any transfer inits title. It is, therefore, not surprising that thereis extensive litigation with regard to the immovableproperty, including its jpossession, between landlords and tenants, between landlords and licensees,between co-owners of the property inter so, asalso between owners of theproperty and personswho are otherwise in peaceful possession of it andthis frequently involves not only the owners butthe intending buyers of such property. It is notuncommon for the intending buyers to agree to buythe property on their own tems on the conditionthat they would be able to adequately deal withthe occupants, whatever may be the nature of theiroccupation. It is well known that for a variety ofreasons, the civil court system has ceased to beeffective in giving relief in such cases partly becauseof the heavy costs but mainly because of the inordinate delay involved which operates as a virtualdenial of justice. In any event, the protracted proceedings in civil courts have ceased to be even aninstrument of mild pressure on the wrongdoer. Theresult is that the civil litigants are fast losing faithin the process of the civil court and there is agrowing tendency to invoke the jurisdiction of thecriminal court system or of the police interventionso as to cut costs as also ensure expedition. Thismay be legitimate so long as a dispute constitutesa cause for criminal action and legitimately fallswithin the competence of the police administrationand of the jurisdiction of a criminal court. Thismay be legitimate so long as a dispute constitutesa cause for criminal action and legitimately fallswithin the competence of the police administrationand of the jurisdiction of a criminal court. Thereis, however, a danger that there may be attemptsto invoke the intervention of the police and to invite the process of the criminal court even in cases where such invocation or intervention may bewholly uncalled for and it is in such cases that thereis a real danger of the unscrupulous litigant gaining access to the police and criminal court systemby devious methods, not excluding the distortion offacts, perjury and even manipulation of the police as well as the magistracy. Unfortunately duringthe recent years, it has generally gone round that it is comparatively, easy to manage the police atcertain levels and to even manipulate the magistracy, to an extent. Such an impression, if wellfounded, would certainly call for introspectionamong the litigants, as well as the lawyers and strictvigilance on the part of the police administration, as well as the courts, including the magistracy andthe courts to which they are subordinate, in dealing with this class of criminal litigation. " ( 30 ) WHILE it is neither necessary nor proper for me torule as to what may have happened in the present case, as tohow things were managed, and as to who played what dirtypart in doing what is alleged to have been done, the observations made by me in the earlier case, as indeed, elsewhere withregard to the misuse of the police powers and the criminalcourt system, by and large, are reinforced. However, a merecondemnation either of the system or of the conduct of oneor other of the parties is not sufficient. The situation calls forprompt legislative action, apart from executive and judicialstreamlining of the procedure and practices. Criticism has tobe constructive and there is, therefore, need to make concretesuggestion as to the best way to solve the problems that arethrown up. However, some suggestions for the considerationof the authorities that be;the desirability of legislation dealing with unauthorisedoccupation of private premises on the lines of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants') Act. to be ad-ministered by the Rent Controllers andor the Rent Controltribunals, should be considered. However, some suggestions for the considerationof the authorities that be;the desirability of legislation dealing with unauthorisedoccupation of private premises on the lines of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants') Act. to be ad-ministered by the Rent Controllers andor the Rent Controltribunals, should be considered. Alternatively, the procedureand practice in suits, and the law relating to court fees in suchmatters, should be suitably modified so that all suits for recovery of possession from persons in illegal occupation ofprivate property do not attract any court fees, and are heardand decided in a summary manner and proceedings in such suits, as indeed, proceedings under Section 145 of the Code,are not triable by any court subordinate to the District andsessions Judge. The provisions of Section 145 and 146, as theystand at present appear to be too heavily weighed in favourof a trespasser, and even if liberally construed seem to providean incentive to take the law into one's own hands rather thantake the matter to a court in the first instance. The provisionsdeserve a second legislative look to make them less offensive. Procoadings u\s 145 should not be dealt with by any police officer below the rank of a DCP. ( 31 ) I must also express my deep appreciation of the assistance rendered by eminent counsel on both sides, and of theassiduous research but for which, a proper appreciation of therival points of view would not have been possible. It must berecorded particularly in the case of Mr. L. R. Gupta, for theadditional reason that he presumably made his doubt in theconduct of a criminal case in the present proceedings. Learnedcounsel for the parties referred to a large number of cases. Ihave dealt with some of these which deserved special mention. But it is unnecessary to burden this judgment with a discussionof the other cases for a variety of reasons.