Victor Marian v. Rta — 1984 DIGILAW 240 (KER)

JUDGMENT N. Sivaraman Nair, J. 1. The petitioner was the holder of a stage carriage permit on the route Maliankara - Vypin touching Moothakunnam Ferry. That permit was issued in respect of bus No. KLE 7360. The permit was transferred in the name of the petitioner on 15th November, 1979. The permit was valid up to 26th June, 1981. It is the petitioner's case that since the vehicle KLE 7360 was an old model vehicle, he was maintaining the service since March, 1980 with another vehicle, No. KLM 153, by obtaining temporary substitute permits. The petitioner, in the meantime, applied for replacement of bus No. KLE 7360 by bus No. KLM 153 in the stage carriage permit. The application Ext. P1 is alleged to have been submitted in December, 1980. Apparently since the renewal of the stage carriage permit of bus No. KLE 7360 was due on 26th June, 1981, this application for replacement does not appear to have been considered. The petitioner then applied for renewal of the stage carriage permit on 26th February, 1981. Both these applications were kept pending for a long time for reasons best known to the 2nd respondent. 2. It appears that bus No. KLM 153 which the petitioner was plying as substitute for bus No. KLE 7360 was not available for service for some time in February, 1982 and therefore the 2nd respondent invited applications for the grant of a substitute temporary permit. The petitioner had made the vehicle KLM 153 available for operation in the meantime and obtained a permit on 12th May, 1982. There appears to have been default again about one year later. 3. Application for renewal of the stage carriage permit filed by the petitioner was published in the Gazette dated 31st May, 1983 under S.57(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. No representations were filed objecting to the grant of renewal. As already stated, when the vehicle KLM 153 which was plying on a substitute temporary permit was defaulted, the petitioner obtained temporary permit in respect of another vehicle, KRD 853. It appears that the petitioner disposed of the bus KRD 853; and consequently there was no vehicle available for operation in the place of the bus KLE 7360 which was covered by the stage carriage permit. The 2nd respondent therefore invited applications for the grant of a substitute temporary permit. It appears that the petitioner disposed of the bus KRD 853; and consequently there was no vehicle available for operation in the place of the bus KLE 7360 which was covered by the stage carriage permit. The 2nd respondent therefore invited applications for the grant of a substitute temporary permit. The 4th respondent applied for the permit for his vehicle KRF 8620. The petitioner had not applied for any substitute temporary permit. 4. The petitioner's application for renewal of the stage carriage permit, his application for replacement and the 4th respondent's application for substitute temporary permit were all considered in the meeting of the first respondent on 13th December, 1983. By Ext. P5 order, the renewal and the replacement were granted by the R.T.A. In another item, the 4th respondent's application for temporary permit was granted by Ext. P6 order. The term of substitute temporary permit was for four months or till bus No. KLM 153 resumed service. The 4th respondent filed M.V.A.R.P. 17/84 before the 3rd respondent State Transport Appellate Tribunal against Ext. P5 order. He also filed M.V.A.A. 34/84 against the condition in Ext. P6 order that the permit would be valid for four months or till the bus KLM 153 resumed service. The 3rd respondent granted interim stay of the condition contained in Ext. P6 order. By Ext. P11 order, dated 14th March, 1984, the 3rd respondent disposed of the revision petition and the appeal setting aside Ext. P5 order and directing the first respondent to invite applications for the grant of stage carriage permit in the place of the petitioner's permit under S.57(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act and to delete the condition contained is Ext. P6 order. The petitioner submits that Ext. P5 order was not liable to be set aside at the instance of the 4th respondent; and in any case, the direction to invite applications for a fresh stage carriage permit under S.57(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act in the place of his stage carriage permit is not sustainable. He also maintains that the deletion of the condition contained in Ext. He also maintains that the deletion of the condition contained in Ext. P6 order to the effect that the substitute temporary permit granted would be valid only till the bus KLM 153 resumes service is unsustainable in view of the fact that the very invitation of the application had indicated that the permit would be valid only till the resumption of service of the bus KLM 153, which was ordered to be replaced by Ext. P5 order at the same meeting of the R.T. A. Now that the period of the temporary permit granted to the 4th respondent by Ext. P6 order have expired and the 4th respondent having availed of the temporary permit issued pursuant thereto for the entire period, the legality of the order Ext. P11 need not be considered is so far as it deals with the appeal filed by the 4th respondent against Ext. P6 order. Any application for substitute temporary permit for any subsequent period may have to be considered without being inhibited by the observations contained in the judgment of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal disposing of the 4th respondent's appeal against Ext. P6 order. 5. The substantial grievance of the petitioner relates to the manner in which the revision petition filed by the 4th respondent against Ext. P5 was dealt with by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. It is submitted that an order granting renewal is an order against which an appeal is provided for by S.64(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act; and such being the case, the revisional jurisdiction of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal under S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act should not have been exercised to interfere with the order granting renewal and replacement. If this submission is accepted, the order Ext. P11 in so far as it relates to Ext. P5 may have to be vacated. Counsel for the petitioner submits that in terms of S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, a revision lies only against an order from which no appeal lies and if the order is one such against which an appeal lies because of the provisions contained in S.64(1) of the Act, the revisional jurisdiction of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal is excluded. He further submits that in such a case, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal should not have interfered in revision even in exercise of suo motu jurisdiction. 6. He further submits that in such a case, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal should not have interfered in revision even in exercise of suo motu jurisdiction. 6. Counsel for the 4th respondent submits that he could not file an appeal against Ext. P5 order for two reasons viz. (1) he had not submitted any representation objecting to the grant of the renewal and (2) Ext. P5 order was a composite order relating to renewal as well as replacement and such an order is not appealable, but only revisable. 7. The point for consideration in this case is as to whether Ext. P5 order was appealable or not, and whether the 3rd respondent State Transport Appellate Tribunal was right is the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction in interfering with Ext. P5 order. 8. The two relevant statutory provisions with which we are concerned in deciding this question are S.64(1) and 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act. S.64(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act is in the following terms: "64. Appeals. P5 order. 8. The two relevant statutory provisions with which we are concerned in deciding this question are S.64(1) and 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act. S.64(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act is in the following terms: "64. Appeals. - (i) Any person - (a) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any conditions attached to a permit granted to him, or (b) aggrieved by the revocation or suspension of the permit or by any variation of the conditions thereof, or (c) aggrieved by the refusal to transfer the permit to the person succeeding on the death of the holder of a permit, or (d) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to countersign a permit, or by any condition attached to such counter signature, or (e) aggrieved by the refusal of renewal of a permit, or f) being a local authority or police authority or an association which, or a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any conditions attached thereto, or (g) aggrieved by the refusal to grant permission under sub-section (1), or sub-section (2) of S.59, or (h) aggrieved by a reduction under sub-section (1-A) or S.60 in the number of vehicles or routes or area covered by a permit or (hh) aggrieved by an order of forfeiture passed under sub-section (4) of S.45 or under sub-section (9) of S.63, or (i) aggrieved by any other order which may be prescribed, may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal constituted under sub-section (2), who shall, after giving such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard, give a decision thereon which shall be final." Even though clause (e) provides for an appeal against the refusal of renewal of a permit, it has been held that an order granting a renewal is appealable under clause (f) in view of the fact that the procedure for the grant of a stage carriage permit and its renewal are the same. 9. S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act which is the other relevant provision, provides: "64A. Revision. 9. S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act which is the other relevant provision, provides: "64A. Revision. - The State Transport Appellate Tribunal may, either on its own motion or on an application made to it, call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the order made by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit and every such order shall be final." The three provisos which are not material for the purpose of the present case, are not extracted. 10. According to S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act a revision lies only against an order made by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority in which no appeal lies. The question for consideration is whether Ext. P5 fills the bill of an order made by the Regional Transport Authority in which no appeal lies. In case if it is found that Ext. P5 is an order in which an appeal lies, the State Transport Authority may have no jurisdiction to interfere in revision either on its own or on an application made to it. If, on the other hand, it is found that Ext. P5 is an order made by the Transport Authority in which no appeal lies, Ext. P11 order in so far as it interferes with Ext. P5 order will be fully within the jurisdiction of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. As is evident from S.64(1)(f) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the person who is entitled to file an appeal is either a local authority or a police authority or a person providing transport facilities, who, having opposed the grant of permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof. The 4th respondent is not a person who is qualified to file an appeal, since he had not opposed the grant of the renewal and he was not aggrieved by the grant thereof. It is, of course, true that the 4th respondent may not be a person who is qualified to file an appeal. The 4th respondent is not a person who is qualified to file an appeal, since he had not opposed the grant of the renewal and he was not aggrieved by the grant thereof. It is, of course, true that the 4th respondent may not be a person who is qualified to file an appeal. The availability of the power of revision for exercise by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal is to be decided not with reference to the question whether the person who invoked the jurisdiction is one who is entitled to file an appeal under S.64(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, but whether the order is one in which an appeal lies. Obviously an order granting permit and an order granting renewal are both appealable, in other words, an order in which an appeal lies. This is laid down by a Bench decision of this Court reported in Gopalan v. S.T.A.T., Trivandrum ( 1965 KLT 1165 ). That decision was followed in Harichand v. R.T.A., Sambalpur ( AIR 1973 Ori. 107 ). To the same effect is the decision of a Division Bench of the Patna High Court reported in 1956 Pat. 437. 11. If an order granting renewal is appealable, can a person who had disabled himself from filing an appeal by not opposing the grant of the permit or its renewal by his own omission, qualify himself as a person entitled to invoke the revisional jurisdiction? If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, any person who could have filed an appeal by opposing the grant of a permit or its renewal can avail of the revisional jurisdiction by refusing to oppose the grantor renewal of the permit. This question had been considered in a number of decisions. 12. In relation to the revisability of an order attaching conditions to a permit, it was held by this Court in 1960 KLT 108 that a person who disabled himself from filing an appeal against an order which was otherwise appealable cannot invoke the revisional jurisdiction under S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Vaidyalingam, J., as he then was held: "The second respondent could have filed an appeal under that sub clause, if she had opposed the grant of a permit. Vaidyalingam, J., as he then was held: "The second respondent could have filed an appeal under that sub clause, if she had opposed the grant of a permit. It may be that she has still got some of those remedies in consequence of orders passed by the R.T.A. at Alleppey under S.63(2) of the Act. Not having challenged the proceedings before the R.T.A., it is not open to the second respondent to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the first respondent under S.64A. The first respondent will have jurisdiction only if the order is not appealable. In this case, as stated earlier, the order fixing timings at the time of the grant of permit is a condition of the permit and as such, it is an appealable order and therefore, the first respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain a revision against this order at the instance of the second respondent. Therefore, it follows that the first respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain a revision at the instance of the second respondent regarding the fixation of timings by the R.T A. at Kottayam when granting the permit in favour of the petitioner. As the first respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain a revision itself under S.64A, it follows that the interim order, Ext. P1. dated 2nd May, 1959, is also equally without jurisdiction." 13. Counsel for the petitioner referred to the decisions reported in AIR 1969 Mad. 55 and AIR 1968 Raj. 334 in support of the proposition that an order granting renewal is appealable, and an order granting replacement cannot be called in question by another operator. He also referred to the decisions reported in AIR 1967 Raj. 208, ILR 1965 (2) Mad. 410, AIR 1968 AP 319 and AIR 1973 Ori. 107 , in support of the proposition that in a case where a person providing transport facilities who did not file objections to the grant of permit or renewal and therefore could not file an appeal, would not be permitted to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the authority under S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act. 14. In AIR 1967 Raj. 208 , a Division Bench of the Rajastan High Court held: "In a case where the party, on account of his own lapse, has not filed any objection then, he will not be entitled to maintain an appeal before the Transport Appellate Authority. 14. In AIR 1967 Raj. 208 , a Division Bench of the Rajastan High Court held: "In a case where the party, on account of his own lapse, has not filed any objection then, he will not be entitled to maintain an appeal before the Transport Appellate Authority. In such a case to hold that though that party may not have the right of appeal he would still be having a right to maintain a revision application, may lead to an odd result which may not have been intended by legislature". 15. To the same effect is the decision reported in AIR 1968 AP 319 . It was held with reference to the same controversy as is involved in this case as follows: "Wide as the revisional powers are under S.64A, they must be confined to the limits within which the Subordinate Authorities could deal with the matter. It is true as pointed out by the learned Government Pleader, that the Government can always exercise its powers of revision suo motu. I have already stated that in the present case, the Government has not purported to act suo motu; on the other hand, it expressly declared that it was dealing with the revision petition of the third respondent. I have no doubt that the Government was wrong in entertaining a revision at the instance of the 3rd respondent and that G.O. (Ms.) No. 336, dated 29th February, 1964 should be quashed." 16. The effect of the decision of the Madras High Court reported in ILR 1965 (2) Mad. 410 is also the same. It was observed therein: "Even granting that the right of representations under S.47(1) is not confined to the categories of persons mentioned therein, and the petitioner was entitled to make representations, that in itself, in my opinion, would not entitle her to be heard by the Regional Transport Authority, and if the order went against her, she could not take the order in revision". In AIR 1977 Raj. 29 , it was held: "A person who, by his own fault, has disentitled himself from filing an appeal by not having opposed the grant of a permit when he had the full opportunity to do so, cannot be allowed to avail the remedy of revision, which only lies, where no appeal lies". 17. In AIR 1977 Raj. 29 , it was held: "A person who, by his own fault, has disentitled himself from filing an appeal by not having opposed the grant of a permit when he had the full opportunity to do so, cannot be allowed to avail the remedy of revision, which only lies, where no appeal lies". 17. Counsel for the 4th respondent submits that he was not interested in the matter at the time when the petitioner's application for renewal was notified under S.57(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act and that he became interested in the matter only when the temporary permit on the route was granted to him. He further submits that his grievance is only confined to the condition in the order granting him the temporary permit limiting the period of its operation till a vehicle other than the stage carriage covered by the regular permit resumed service. He submits that he was only incidentally interested in the renewal and replacement, since but for those orders, he could have operated his vehicle on the route until after a regular permit was granted afresh. Obviously, what the petitioner seeks to maintain is not a right but a windfall. If the 4th respondent was not a person aggrieved by the renewal and replacement, the S.T.A.T. should not have entertained the revision petition at all. 18. Counsel submits that in view of the following observations of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in AIR 1962 SC 1135 at 1137, the power of the S.T.A.T. under S.64A was available for exercise: "The Regional Transport Authority not having done its duty under law, the appeal Board was entitled, when the record was before it, to revise the order of the Regional Transport Authority, even if the appeal was incompetent in view of the vast powers of revision under S.64A." In the above case, an appeal was incompetent, because of the provisions contained in S.68F(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. That observation does not help in resolving the question whether a person who disabled himself in filing an appeal, could, for that reason, qualify himself to invoke the larger power under S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act. 19. That observation does not help in resolving the question whether a person who disabled himself in filing an appeal, could, for that reason, qualify himself to invoke the larger power under S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act. 19. Counsel for the 4th respondent next submits that at the time when the petitioner's application was notified under S.57(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, he was not plying stage carriage on the route of any route nearby and he could not therefore have filed an objection under S.47(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to qualify himself to file an appeal against the order granting renewal, even assuming an order granting renewal was appealable. He refers to the decision reported in AIR 1975 Patna 134 in support of this proposition. Admittedly, the petitioner was providing transport facilities atleast in the same area, as understood in S.44(1) read with S.2(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. As a matter of fact, in Ext. P7 memorandum of appeal filed by him before the S.T.A.T., he had claimed over 1 year of experience of plying his bus on routes Vypin-Maliankara, Vypin-Munambam, Manjali-Alwaye etc., which were neighbouring routes. It is evident therefore, that he was a person providing passenger transport facilities along the neighbouring routes and could therefore have opposed the grant of the permit. Evidently, he did not oppose the renewal and hence could not file an appeal against Ext. P1 order. 20. Reference is then made to the decision reported in AIR 1970 AP 220 . The observations in that decision do lend considerable support to the respondent's contention that the revisional power under S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act may be exercised by the Government suo motu, even if the Government was alerted about the illegal order of the Subordinate Authority by a petition filed by a party out of time or the same was otherwise incompetent. But the provisions of S.64A of the Act which fell for consideration in that decision did not contain the restrictive phrase "and in which no appeal lies" as qualifying the order which was liable to be revised. The power under that provision was therefore far more comprehensive than under S.64A with which we are concerned, and we cannot obliterate the specific statutory limitation restricting the scope of the revisional jurisdiction. 21. The power under that provision was therefore far more comprehensive than under S.64A with which we are concerned, and we cannot obliterate the specific statutory limitation restricting the scope of the revisional jurisdiction. 21. The decision reported in AIR 1971 Punjab 331 deals with the case of a person who could not oppose the grant of a temporary permit because he had no information about the same. The question which arose was whether he could file a revision against the order granting the temporary permit, since he could not file an appeal under S.64(1)(f) of the Motor Vehicles Act, as he had not opposed the grant. In those special circumstances, the Punjab High Court held that: "The aggrieved party in such circumstances has a clear remedy of approaching the revisional authority under S.64 A of the Act, under which a very vide power has been given to the appropriate authority to revise suo motu or on an application of an aggrieved person to test the impropriety or legality of any order passed by a Regional Transport Authority in cases where no appeal lay. In my view, the only possible conclusion on the combined reading of the relevant provisions of the statute is that against an order granting permit passed without having been opposed, no appeal lies under Clause. (f) but a revision lies under S.64A of the Act." The petitioner does not fall in the category of persons who did not object, because he did not have an opportunity. The notification under S.57(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act is sufficient notice to all to oppose the application and affords opportunity to all concerned. If inspite of such notice, a person choses not to oppose the application, he cannot thereafter turn round and say that he did not oppose the grant and therefore he should be able to invoke the revisional jurisdiction because he could not file an appeal. 22. It is true that there are other orders of the Regional Transport Authorities about which notice is not to be given in advance and therefore other operators cannot oppose before the Transport Authority. 22. It is true that there are other orders of the Regional Transport Authorities about which notice is not to be given in advance and therefore other operators cannot oppose before the Transport Authority. In such cases and subject to the all important fact that the person who approaches the revisional authority is a "person aggrieved", a revision may be maintainable but not in a case where in spite of statutory notice and an opportunity to oppose, a person who is otherwise entitled refuses to oppose the grant. 23. The proposition that a person who disabled himself from filing an appeal by not opposing the grant of the permit or renewal, and who thereby disentitled himself to obtain the appellate remedy, would nevertheless be entitled to invoke the larger revisional jurisdiction seems to me to be entirely unacceptable. Had he been prompt and filed his objections, he could have availed only of the appellate remedy, which is restricted in scope. But he who refuses to oppose the grant or renewal, in spite of opportunity in that regard, becomes entitled to invoke the revisional jurisdiction which is wider in scope. I am of the opinion that the default of a party to qualify himself to invoke the appellate remedy shall not entitle him to invoke the wider revisional jurisdiction only due to such default. I have, therefore, no hesitation in accepting the submission of the counsel for the petitioner that the revisional jurisdiction of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal could not have been invoked by the fourth respondent and should not have been exercised by the Tribunal in aid of a person who by his default disabled himself from availing the appellate remedy. 24. The next question to be considered is whether the revision petition could have been entertained since Ext. P5 order was a composite order which also allowed replacement of the vehicle while renewing the permit? If the 4th respondent could have opposed the replacement of one vehicle with another in a permit of another, it may be possible to hold that he would have been a "person aggrieved" and therefore entitled to invoke the revisional jurisdiction against the composite order. The only effect of a replacement is to authorise the use of one vehicle in the place of another subject to compliance with S.59(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The only effect of a replacement is to authorise the use of one vehicle in the place of another subject to compliance with S.59(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. If the 4th respondent was not - it is admitted that he was not - aggrieved by the grant of renewal, it passes my comprehension how he can be aggrieved by the replacement which was combined with the renewal. I am therefore, of the view that the 4th respondent could not have invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the S.T.A.T. in any case, not even for the reason that Ext. P5 was a composite order combining renewal and replacement. 25. Counsel for the 4th respondent submits that even if an appeal did lie against Ext. P5 order and the invocation of the power of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal under S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act was not sustainable, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal could have interfered with Ext. P5 order in exercise of its power of revision on its own motion. It is clear that the power of revision under S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act is exercisable only in case if the order made by the Subordinate Transport Authority is one in which an appeal does not lie. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal cannot exercise its revisional jurisdiction, even suo motu, in case if the order of the subordinate statutory authority is one in which an appeal lies. It is not as if the revisional power of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal is unrestricted and it can interfere with any order irrespective of the question whether an appeal lies or not. In some other statutes providing for revision or appeal there are provisions to the effect that the power of the revisional authority is available only if an appeal has not been filed. But in S.64A, the exclusion is not for the reason whether an appeal has been filed or not, but for the reason whether the order is one in which an appeal lies or not. In such cases where the revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised by reason of the limitation in the statutory provision itself, there is no scope for exercise of the power of revision suo motu. 26. It is admitted that Ext. P1 application for replacement was filed by the petitioner as early as on 31st December, 1980. In such cases where the revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised by reason of the limitation in the statutory provision itself, there is no scope for exercise of the power of revision suo motu. 26. It is admitted that Ext. P1 application for replacement was filed by the petitioner as early as on 31st December, 1980. The permit of Stage Carriage KLE 7360 was valid till 27th June, 1981. Admittedly again, the application for renewal was submitted after Ext. P1 and was notified only in Ext. P3 on 31st May, 1983. No steps were taken by the 1st and 2nd respondents for about 3 years to deal with the application for replacement and renewal. The lethargy of the 1st and 2nd respondents in dealing with and disposing of those applications cannot be blamed on the petitioner as the 3rd respondent has done. Nor can the petitioner be found fault with - In a strict legal sense - For not operating on substitute temporary permits at least after October, 1981 since not more than one temporary permit could have been granted by the R.T.A. pending renewal of the permit in view of the provision contained in S.62(1) proviso of the Motor Vehicles Act. Had the 1st respondent dealt with the application for replacement promptly, the petitioner could have obtained renewal of permit for the replaced vehicle before or immediately after the expiry of the permit on 27th June, 1981. The 4th respondent has no case that had that been done he could or would have invoked the revisional jurisdiction. His case, with which, the 3rd respondent has agreed in Ext. P4 order was that the replacement could not have been granted because KLE 7360, the vehicle to be replaced, had long service ceased to exist. It does not seem to be essential for the grant of an application for replacement of a vehicle covered by a permit by another vehicle that the former must be in existence. The only requirement is that the former must be covered by a permit and the latter must satisfy the other condition of S.59(2) of the Act. Any difficulty in giving effect to the replacement after its grant cannot deprive the transport authority of its power to grant the replacement. The decision reported in AIR 1968 Raj. 334 also supports this proposition. Any difficulty in giving effect to the replacement after its grant cannot deprive the transport authority of its power to grant the replacement. The decision reported in AIR 1968 Raj. 334 also supports this proposition. Delay or default on the part of the 1st and 2nd respondents in dealing with and disposing of those applications could not have been used as a justification for exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction of the 3rd respondent to interfere in revision. The delay on the part of the 1st and 2nd respondents being admitted, the only order which could have been passed by the 1st respondent to mete out justice to the petitioner was the order granting the renewal and replacement. The jurisdiction of the 3rd respondent under S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, however wide the amplitude of that jurisdiction be, should not have been used to nullify an order, which in the circumstances, met the requirements of justice, though after an inexcusably long delay. 27. Counsel for the 4th respondent invited my attention to a decision of Chandrasekhara Menon, J. In O.P. No. 351/80 where it was held that: "........ As regards the locus standi of respondents 4 and 5 to move the revision petition before the S.T.A.T., whether they have got the locus standi or not, the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal can be exercised under S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act even on its own motion and whenever it appears to the Tribunal that the order made by the Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, it is open to the Tribunal to interfere with the same order and pass such order in relation to the case as it is being fit." In that case, Chandrasekhara Menon, J. did not have to consider the inherent restrictions to the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. Nor had Menon, J. occasion to consider the restrictions involved in S.64A itself that the revision is entertainable only if an order is made in which an appeal does not lie. The observations contained in the above extract have to be confined only to the facts of that case on a strict interpretation of the statutory provision, viz., S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act with which we are concerned. The observations contained in the above extract have to be confined only to the facts of that case on a strict interpretation of the statutory provision, viz., S.64A of the Motor Vehicles Act with which we are concerned. It cannot be held that even if the order of the subordinate transport authority is one in which an appeal lies, it can be interfered with in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. 28. In this view of the matter, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to exercise its power of revision on its own motion or on an application, since Ext. P5 order, viewed as an order granting renewal, is one in which an appeal lies to the same Tribunal. Viewed as an order granting replacement under S.59(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act simultaneously with renewal of the permit, Ext. P5 order only meted out justice to the petitioner, though only after a delay of three years, and hence, the discretionary jurisdiction of the 3rd respondent could not have been exercised even suo motu. The order in so far as it directs cancellation of Ext. P5 order granting renewal and replacement in favour of the petitioner and directs the Regional Transport Authority to invite fresh application under S.57(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act is unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. I do so. The Original Petition is allowed as above. There will be no order as to costs. Issue carbon copy of this judgment to counsel for the petitioner on usual terms.