JUDGMENT : Lalit Mohan Sharma. J. - The Management of Muzaffarpur Goshala, the petitioner in this case, has filed the present application under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the Award of the Labour Court, Muzaffarpur in Reference No. 15 of 1977. Mr. Ranen Roy in support of the application, pressed the following four points- (i) In view of the provisions of the Bihar Goshala Act, 1950, governing the case, the Industrial Disputes Act is not applicable and the reference made by the State Government under section 10 (1) (c) of the Act was inconsistent. (ii) The Muzaffarpur Goshala is not an Industry and the reference and Award are therefore, without Jurisdiction. (iii) Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act is ultra vires and the dispute individually raised by the workman (Respondent no. 3) cannot be covered by the Act, and (iv) The findings given in the Award are perverse and fit to be set aside. 2. It was fairly conceded by Mr. Roy that in view of the Supreme Court decisions relevant to the points, it may not be possible for this Court to hold that the petitioner-Goshala is not an Industry within the Act and section 2A is ultra vires. He said that nonetheless, he is formally pressing these points so that the petitioner may be able to raise these questions before the Supreme Court. However, be strenuously contended that in view of the Bihar Goshala Act and the Rules and Regulations made thereunder, the Industrial Disputes Act must be held to be inapplicable to the case arising in connection with the employment under Goshalas in Bihar. 3. The petitioner-Goshala is a charitable institution established for the purpose of keeping breeding, raring and maintaining cattle for the purpose of protecting them from disease, neglect are being slaughted. It is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1881 and its name has been entered in the register of Goshala maintained by the Registrar of Goshalas appointed by the Bihar Goshala Act. According to the petitioner's case, the respondent no. 3 was employed as a clerk in the Goshala and he was incharge of Muzaffarpur god own in 1977 when he was ORDER :ed to hand over charge to another clerk and to look after another work as directed. According to the petitioner's case, the respondent no. 3 was employed as a clerk in the Goshala and he was incharge of Muzaffarpur god own in 1977 when he was ORDER :ed to hand over charge to another clerk and to look after another work as directed. The respondent did not obey the direction and on this account the Managing Committee of the Goshala decided to terminate his services by giving him one month's wages in lieu of notice. A copy of the resolution in this regard has been attached to the writ petition as Annexure 4', Accordingly, the letter of termination of his services (Annexure 5) was issued. The respondent ignored these ORDER :s and continued to forcibly enter into the Goshala premises which necessitated the Management to take police help. The respondent, thereafter, handed over charge of the Godown to Baleshwar Prasad and raised a dispute before the Labour Department of the State Government. 4. According to the workman's case, he was an active member of the Trade Union and the Management was, therefore, annoyed with him. He has denied the charge of disobedience. 5. The Bihar Goshala Act was passed in 1950 with a view to provide better management and control of Goshalas in Bihar. By section 17, the Director of Animal Husbandry Department, Government of Bihar (or any other officer appointed by the State Government to perform the functions of the Director under the Goshala Act) has been empowered to make Regulations with the previous sanction of the State Government for the matters enumerated in the section which includes the manner in which a Goshala has to be managed. Clause (f) of section 17 (1) states that regulations can be made for "any other matters which may be prescribed", Section 18 deals with the rule making power of the State Government. Clause (g) of section 18 (2) speaks of "any matter which may be prescribed to be made be regulations under section 17". The petitioner has annexed a copy of the duly framed Regulations to the writ application and has marked the same as Annexure 6. The Regulations direct the management of every Goshala to vest in a Managing Committee and prescribe the procedure for its constitution. The Regulations also deal with the maintenance of register of subscribers, term of the members of the Committee and several other and analogous matters. The Regulations direct the management of every Goshala to vest in a Managing Committee and prescribe the procedure for its constitution. The Regulations also deal with the maintenance of register of subscribers, term of the members of the Committee and several other and analogous matters. Regulation 12 which has been strongly relied on by Mr. Roy is in the following terms: "12. Appeal against ORDER :s of the Committee. The Manager or any other servant of the Goshala who is aggrieved by the ORDER :s of the Committee in respect of his reduction in rank or discharge or other punishments may appeal to the Registrar whose decision in the matter shall be final." It has been argued on behalf of the petitioner that remedy of the respondent no. 3 against the decision of the Managing Committee was by way of appeal to the Registrar which he ought to have availed of. This remedy has been described as a special remedy which excludes all other remedies including that under the Industrial Disputes Act. 6. Mr. Roy contended that if there are two statutes covering the same field, they must be held to be repugnant to each other and the later Act must be allowed to prevail. He relied on Article 254 of the Constitution and further argued that a special law shall exclude the general law on the same subject and applying this principle, Regulation 12 quoted above must be treated as a special law capable of excluding the application of the Industrial Disputes Act. He relied on the decisions in Sarat Chatterjee & Co. v. Central Government, Industrial Tribunal [ 1963 (1) L.L.J. 76 ] Bihar State Road Transport. Corporation v. Orang Bahadur (A.I.R. 1968 Patna, 200) and Samachar Bharti v. Kedar Nath (A.I.R. 1972 Patna, 397 : 1972 PLJR 365 .) Before considering these cases, I would like to refer to the Fun Bench decision of our High Court it The Managing I.O.C. v. C.D. Singh (1972 P.L.J.R., 124). The respondent in that case was a Sales Officer under the Indian Oil Corporation and was dismissed on grounds of misconduct. He made an application under the Industrial Disputes Act challenging the dismissal ORDER :before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Patna. After the attempt for conciliation failed, the dispute was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. The respondent in that case was a Sales Officer under the Indian Oil Corporation and was dismissed on grounds of misconduct. He made an application under the Industrial Disputes Act challenging the dismissal ORDER :before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Patna. After the attempt for conciliation failed, the dispute was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. In the meantime, the respondent filed an application under section 26 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi. In those circumstances, an argument similar to the one pressed by Mr. Roy before us was considered by the Full Bench. The Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh (A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 648) and held that the following three tests were relevant in this context. (a) Whether there is a direct conflict between the two provisions, (b) Whether the legislature passing the later Act intended to lay down an exhaustive Code in respect of the subject-matter replacing the earlier Act, and (c) Whether the two laws occupied the same field. After examining the Industrial, Disputes Act (after its amendment incorporating sections 2A) and the Bihar Shops Act, the Court held that on the aforesaid tests, it was not possible to hold that section 26 of the Bihar Shop Act was repugnant to the Central Act. In the case before us, the position is no better for the petitioner. The Bihar Goshala Act is dealing generally with the management and control of Goshalas and not with the relationship of management and workmen, the disciplinary proceedings and the solution of disputes between them. The Regulations also do not deal with this aspect at all excepting regulation 12 which has been quoted above. This regulation is a stray provision in this regard and does not provide with an exhaustive Code in respect of the disputes arising between the management and the workmen. 7. In Sarat Chatterjee & Co. vs. Central Government, Industrial Tribunal [ 1963 (1) L.L.J. 76 ] the question arose with regard to the payment of profit bonus and incremental scales of pay. 7. In Sarat Chatterjee & Co. vs. Central Government, Industrial Tribunal [ 1963 (1) L.L.J. 76 ] the question arose with regard to the payment of profit bonus and incremental scales of pay. In view of the previsions of Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act 1948 and Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme 1956, the Court held that there was no industrial dispute with regard to the claim and hence the Industrial Tribunal was not competent to decide the question referred to it. The decision is, therefore, of no help in the present case. 8. In Bihar State Road Transport Corporation v. Orang Bahadur (A.I.R. 1968 Patna, 200) and Amarnath Singh v. Industrial Tribunal (A.I.R. 1970 Patna, 269 : 1970 P.L.J.R. 486] the Workers Act was held to be a Special Act and the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act a General Act, operating in the same field and therefore, the Central Act was held to exclude the application of Bihar Act. The decisions rested on the interpretation of the two Acts and this Court referred to the detailed provisions of the Central Act running into many chapters and exhaustively dealing with the relevant subject-matter. As I have already pointed out earlier, the Regulations (Annexure 6) in the present case except Regulation 12, do not deal with the matter in any details. Similar was the position in Samachar Bharti vs. Kedar Nath (A.I.R. 1972 Patna 397) where the provisions of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act (1955) were considered. None of these cases, therefore, helps the petitioner. 9. Mr. Roy strongly relied on the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in The Visakhapatnam District Market Cooperative Society Ltd. vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (A.I.R. 1977 Andhra Pradesh, 241) where it was held that Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishment Act prevailed over sections 2A and 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. This decision appears to have taken a view contrary to the Full Bench decision of our High Court in The Managing Director, I.O.C. Vs. C. D. Singh (1972 P.L.J.R. 124-F.B.) referred to above. Mr. Roy urged that Patna view is incorrect. The decision is binding on us and must be held to conclude the point so far this Court is concerned. C. D. Singh (1972 P.L.J.R. 124-F.B.) referred to above. Mr. Roy urged that Patna view is incorrect. The decision is binding on us and must be held to conclude the point so far this Court is concerned. Besides, the case of the workman in the present writ petition is better than the case of the workman in the aforesaid reported decision as the Shops Act deals with the dispute between employers and employees at some length while the Regulations in the present case do not purport to do so except containing a single provision in this regard. I am, therefore, of the view that the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be held to be inapplicable in cases governed by the Bihar Goshala Act, 1950. 10. Mr. Roy challenged the finding of the Labour Court in the Award (Annexure 1) on the ground that it is perverse. On a consideration of the evidence led before it, the Labour Court held that the respondent-workman was not guilty of violation or disobedience of any ORDER :of the Management nor did he commit any misconduct. It was urged that the charge of disobedience was rejected by the Labour Court on the ground of non-production by the Management of a certain document. Mr. Roy urged that the explanation of the workman was palpably false and was not included in his written statement and was taken up and passed, for the first time at the hearing of the case as the Manager of the Goshala was by then dead. The non-production of the document in question therefore should not have weighed with the Labour Court for recording a finding against the Management. It is true that the workman's aforesaid plea was not mentioned in the written statement but the document was called for by him from the Management which was not produced. In the circumstances, I am not inclined to accept the petitioner's case and quash the finding in the Award on the ground of perverseness. 11. Mr. Roy lastly suggested that the direction in the Award for payment of full back wages to the respondent should be struck down. He argued that the workman was engaged in the milk business and was thus having alternative source of his livelihood. In reply, Mr. 11. Mr. Roy lastly suggested that the direction in the Award for payment of full back wages to the respondent should be struck down. He argued that the workman was engaged in the milk business and was thus having alternative source of his livelihood. In reply, Mr. Afatab Alam strenuously contended that the respondent was in great financial distress during the period of his unemployment and no interference with the Award is at all called for. It is true that the normal rule is that when a workman whose services have been illegally terminated is reinstated in service he is granted full back wages, as held by the Supreme Court in M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Its Employees (A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 75), but this rule is subject to the exception where the workman was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness (see para 9 of the JUDGMENT : of the Supreme Court). Mr. Alam urged that the plea of the workman being engaged in milk business was not pressed before the labour court and should not, therefore, be allowed here. The point has been considered at pages 62 and 63 of the impugned Award and it is true that the labour court has not referred to any relevant evidence about the respondent no. 3 maintaining cattle and selling milk. The petitioner has relied on the statement of Chandeshwar Tiwary, the workman's witness no. 1 as contained in his deposition (Annexure 12). He stated that the respondent no. 3 had taken a hut on rent near the Goshala itself where he maintained cow and buffaloes and met the costs of his livelihood from this business. It is significant to note that Chandeshwar Tiwary was a witness examined by the workman himself and he was net dec1ared hostile. The workman strongly relied on his evidence before the labour court. I have gone through his entire evidence and he appears to be telling the truth when he made the aforementioned statement. I, therefore, hold that the respondent no. 3 was meeting the costs of his livelihood by selling the milk of the cow and buffaloes he was maintaining if not for the entire period in question, then at least for a substantial portion thereof. 12. There is another circumstance in favour of the petitioner which is a charitable institution. I, therefore, hold that the respondent no. 3 was meeting the costs of his livelihood by selling the milk of the cow and buffaloes he was maintaining if not for the entire period in question, then at least for a substantial portion thereof. 12. There is another circumstance in favour of the petitioner which is a charitable institution. The statements in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the writ application indicate that the Goshala is dependent for its maintenance on the meagre income derived from the sale of the milk available only from some of the cows mid on public charity. It is well known that Goshalas have to maintain a large number of old cows which do not give any milk. The nature and financial position of an Industry cannot be ignored as irrelevant. In M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd.'s case, the Supreme Court considered this aspect and reduced the amount of back wages directed to be paid by the Award to 75 percent. All these relevant considerations have not been taken into account by the labour court at all. In a mechanical fashion, the labour court followed the general rule of granting full back wages in case of reinstatement The Award on this point, therefore, is illegal on account of non-consideration of the relevant factors. It was stated at the bar that in accordance with the ORDER :dated 11.1.82 passed in the present case by this Court, the workman was reinstated in service from 1st of February, 1982 and he was paid a sum of Rs. 1500/-towards the arrears of his salary. 13. Considering all the circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the respondent-workman should be allowed 50 percent of back wages for the period he was out of employment, and the amount of Rs. 1500/- already paid to him shall be adjusted against this amount. The impugned Award is accordingly modified and subject to this modification, the Award is confirmed. The writ application is accordingly disposed of in the above terms. The parties will bear their own costs of this writ case.