Judgment :- 1. This appeal arises from the judgment dismissing O. P. No. 872 of 1978. The petitioner in the Original Petition challenged Exts. P2 and P7. Ext. P2 is a notification dated 12-8-1977 published in the Kerala Gazette whereby minimum rates of wages were fixed in respect of employees employed in the manufacture of Ayurvedic and Allopathic medicines. Ext. P7 dated 6-3-1978 is a show cause notice issued to the petitioner by the 3rd respondent as to why action should not be taken for non-compliance of the provisions of the statute. 2. Ext. P1 dated 28-10-1972 is a notification published by the Government in the Kerala Gazette No. 44 dated 7-11-1972 whereby a committee was appointed to hold enquiries and advise the Government in the matter of revision of minimum rates of wages relating to the employment in shops and establishments and fixation of minimum wages relating to employment in the manufacture of Ayurvedic and Allopathic medicines. Representatives of employees and employers in the scheduled employments were members of the committee. A retired Additional District Judge was the Chairman of the committee. At the time of the constitution of the committee under Ext. P1, Ayurvedic and Allopathic medicines had not been included in the schedule to the Act. However, by a subsequent notification dated 27-5-1975, part I of the schedule was amended to include that particular employment also. A report of the committee dated 12-8-1976 (Ext. P3) was submitted to the Government on the basis of which notification dated 12-8-1977 (Ext. P2) was issued by the Government in the Kerala Gazette fixing the minimum wages applicable to the employees employed in the manufacture of Ayurvedic and Allopathic medicines. On 6-3-1978 the 3rd respondent issued Ext. P7 show cause notice to the petitioner. 3. The petitioner raised various contentions in support of his challenge against Exts.P2 and P7, but bis main contention has been that Ext.P2 was invalid for the reason that it was the result of a report prepared by a committee which was not constituted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the statute. Although the other contentions of the petitioner, with which we do not deal, for they are no longer pressed at the bar, were rejected by the learned judge, some of the observations in the judgment indicate that the main contention of the petitioner as to the invalidity of the notification, Ext. P2. Although the other contentions of the petitioner, with which we do not deal, for they are no longer pressed at the bar, were rejected by the learned judge, some of the observations in the judgment indicate that the main contention of the petitioner as to the invalidity of the notification, Ext. P2. appeared to be of some substance, but the learned judge dismissed the Original Petition on the ground that it was belated. The learned judge observed that the petitioner was guilty of laches in so far as he approached this Court only on 20-3-1978, whereas Ext. P2 notification bad been issued as early as 12-8-1977. In our view the delay was much longer, a point to which we shall presently revert. 4. S.3 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 provides: "3. Fixing of Minimum rates of wages: (1) The appropriate Government shall, in the manner hereinafter provided, (a) fix the minimum rates of wages payable to employees employed in an employment specified in Part I or Part II of the Schedule and in an employment added to either part by notification under S.27: Provided " S. 5 lays down the procedure for fixing and revising minimum wages. The present case is concerned only with the fixation of the minimum wages. This Section provides. "S. Procedure for fixing and revising minimum wages. (1) In fixing minimum rates of wages in respect of any scheduled employment for the first time under this Act the appropriate Government shall either, (a) appoint as many committees and sub-committees, as it considers necessary to hold enquiries and advise it in respect of such fixation ; or (b) S. 9 relates to the composition of committees which are contemplated under S.5 for the purpose of holding enquiries. This Section reads: 9. Composition of committees, etc. This Section reads: 9. Composition of committees, etc. Each of the committees, sub-committees, and the Advisory Board shall consist of persons to be nominated by the appropriate Government representing employers and employees in the scheduled employments, who shall be equal in number, and independent persons not exceeding one third of its total number of members; one of such independent persons shall be appointed the Chairman by the appropriate Government." The Advisory Board mentioned in S.9 is the Board which is referred to in S.7 as the body appointed for the purpose of co-ordinating the work of committees and advising the Government generally in the matter of fixing and revising minimum rates of wages. From the scheme of the Act it would thus appear that, while the committee conducts enquiries and advises the Government in respect of matters contemplated under S 5, the work of the committee is co-ordinated and advice is rendered to the Government by the Advisory Board on the basis of the committee's report and other material. The Advisory Board as well as the committee have to be composed in the manner laid down under S.9. They shall consist of persons to be nominated by the Government representing in equal number the employers and employees in the "scheduled employments". In addition to them, there will be independent persons not exceeding one third of the total number of members. 5. The report and advice of the committee and the general advice rendered by the Advisory Board are expected to be taken into account by the Government before fixing or revising minimum rates of wages in terms of S.5. The Government must apply their mind independently to the question on the basis of the advice and material rendered to them by the Advisory Board and the committee as well as any other material which may be available to the Government. It is however not incumbent on the Government to act solely on the basis of the advice of the Board or the report of the committee. It is open to the Government to accept or reject such advice or report wholly or partially or to make such suitable alterations as they may deem necessary. That this is the correct position is clear from the observations of the Supreme Court in M/s. B.Y. Kshatriya v. S. A. T. B Kamgar Union, AIR. 1963 SC. It is open to the Government to accept or reject such advice or report wholly or partially or to make such suitable alterations as they may deem necessary. That this is the correct position is clear from the observations of the Supreme Court in M/s. B.Y. Kshatriya v. S. A. T. B Kamgar Union, AIR. 1963 SC. 806; State of A. P v. N.V. Beedi Mfg. Factory, AIR. 1973 SC. 1307 and, State of Rajasthan v. Hari Ram, AIR. 1976 SC. 277. It is also clear from these decisions that the order made by the Government fixing the wages under S.5 will not be vitiated solely by reason of any illegality in the constitution of the Advisory Board or the committee. In so far as the Board and the committee are only competent to advise the Government, and their advice being not binding on the Government, an order made by the Government fixing or revising the wages is not any the less valid, whatever may be the defect in the composition of the Board or the committee. 6. The impugned notification prescribing the minimum rates of wages was issued by the Government in exercise of its powers under S.3 and 5. Its prescriptions, in so far as the employees in question are concerned, are as efficacious and imperative in character and as general and uniform in application as in the case of statutory rules. Power to make rules of a general application is a legislative power, and such a rule or regulation is legislative; whereas power to give orders in specific cases is an executive power, and any such order is executive. (see Griffith & Street, 'Principles of Administrative Law', 5th Edn., p. 48) Fixation of minimum rates of wages like, price or tariff fixation, "is a legislative measure eventhough it may be based upon objective criteria found in a report or other material": S. I Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR. 1975 SC. 460. See also 5. Narayan v. Union of India, AIR. 1976 SC. 1986; P. K. Porwal v. Stale of Maharashtra, AIR. 1981 SC. 1127; Akhila Bharatiya Grahak Panchayat v. A.P.S E. Board, AIR 1983 AP. 283; and, Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, AIR. 1975 SC. 1331. There is a higher degree of presumption of constitutionality in favour of statutory instruments than there is in the case of administrative orders. 1976 SC. 1986; P. K. Porwal v. Stale of Maharashtra, AIR. 1981 SC. 1127; Akhila Bharatiya Grahak Panchayat v. A.P.S E. Board, AIR 1983 AP. 283; and, Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, AIR. 1975 SC. 1331. There is a higher degree of presumption of constitutionality in favour of statutory instruments than there is in the case of administrative orders. Subordinate legislation is interpreted "benevolently", unless ultra vires or manifestly unjust and unreasonable. It is presumed, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, that the maker of a statutory instrument proceeded upon sufficient information and with correct motives.See S. I. Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR. 1975 SC. 460; P.C.S Mills v. Union of India, AIR. 1973 SC. 537; Shree Meenakshi Mills v. Union of India, AIR. 1974 SC. 366; Kruss v Johnson (1898) 2 QB 91; Mixnam Properties Ltd v Chertsey U.D.C., (1965) AC. 735 752, 765; Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Cure & Deeley Ltd, (1962) 1 QB. 340; Mc Eldowney v. Forde, (1971) AC 632; Cartlona Ltd. v. Commissioners of Works and others, (1943) 2 All ER. 560.564; Point of Ayr Collieries Ltd. v. Lloyd-George, (1943) 2 All ER. 546; Scott v. Glasgow Corporation, (1899) AC. 470,492; Robert Beird, L. D,. and others v. City of Glasgow, (1936) AC 32,42; Roberts v. Hopwood, (1925) AC. 578,596; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1947) 2 All ER 680, 685; Attorney-General for Canada v. Hallet Carey LD. (1952) AC. 427,444; United Buildings Corporation Ltd. v. City of Vancowver, (1915) AC. 345; Arthur Yates and Company Proprietary Ltd v. The Vegetable Seeds Committee, (72) CLR 37, 77 to 85; United States v. Constantine, (1935) 296 US 287 at 299; National Leed Company v. United States, 251 US. 140: 64 Law. ed 496; Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, (1936) 297 U. S.129.134; and, St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 US. 38-94: 80 Law. ed 1033,1057. 7. Ext. P2 is based on Ext. P3 report of the committee presided over by a retired judicial officer and composed of, among others, the representatives of the employers and employees in the scheduled employments. An elaborate enquiry was apparently conducted by the committee. A number of persons within the industry deposed before it on behalf of the employers and the employees. The President of the Kerala Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association, who sent Ext. An elaborate enquiry was apparently conducted by the committee. A number of persons within the industry deposed before it on behalf of the employers and the employees. The President of the Kerala Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association, who sent Ext. P4 to the Government protesting against Ext. P2, had himself deposed before the committee. The committee had dealt with all aspects of the problems connected with employment in that particular industry. It is on the basis of such elaborate study that the committee submitted its report and advice to the Government. Obviously the Government have also had the benefit of the advice of the Advisory Board rendered on the basis of such report. The Government must also have had other material and advice rendered by their competent officers. It is not contended to the contrary. A decision taken by the Government on such materia) can by no means be characterised as unreasonable or unjust or or unsupported by evidence. The petitioner has no case that the wages fixed by the Government are discriminatory or excessive in comparison to other industries of a like nature or that they do not qualify as "minimum wages" as postulated under the Act. In the circumstances we do not find any substance in the contention that the Government acted unreasonably in fixing the wages. 8. Nor do we find the argument that the committee should be composed of representatives of the employers and employees in that particular industry and not in any scheduled employment sufficiently convincing in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court. Dealing with the composition of the Advisory Board, the Supreme Court stated in M/s. B. Y. Kshatriya v. S. A.T.B Kamgar Union, AIR. 1963 SC. 806, that the representation provided is for the scheduled employments and not for any particular industry. See also State of A P. v N. V. Beedi Mfg. Factory, AIR. 1973 SC. 1307 and State of Rajasthan v. Hari Ram, AIR. 1976 SC. 277. It is true that the Supreme Court did not express any view as regards the committee, but, as the Government Pleader rightly points out, both the committee and the Advisory Board are dealt with under S.9 in regard to their composition. Factory, AIR. 1973 SC. 1307 and State of Rajasthan v. Hari Ram, AIR. 1976 SC. 277. It is true that the Supreme Court did not express any view as regards the committee, but, as the Government Pleader rightly points out, both the committee and the Advisory Board are dealt with under S.9 in regard to their composition. There is force in the submission of the Government Pleader that the decision of the Supreme Court as regards the composition of the Advisory Board must perforce apply to the committee as well. We do not however express any final view on this point, particularly because, as observed by the Supreme Court, a defect in the composition of the committee does not vitiate an otherwise valid order of the Government fixing the minimum wages under S.S. 9. We agree with the learned judge that the Original Petition was in any case unsustainable by reason of delay. As early as 28-10-1972 the Government notified the appointment of the committee to enquire and advise the Government in regard to the fixation of the minimum wages applicable to the employees employed in the manufacture of Ayurvedic and Allopathic medicines. It was, or ought to have been, known to the petitioner as soon as the notification was published in the Gazette that the committee was not composed of representatives of the industry, but only of the scheduled employments. If the petitioner had a case, as he now has, that the composition of the committee was invalid and irregular, he ought to have taken steps expeditiously to challenge the composition of the committee. It is true that, when Ext. P1 was issued, the particular industry was not included in the schedule and therefore the enquiry was not proceeded with in regard to that industry until 27-5-1975 when the defect was cured by an amendment of the schedule by a notification duly published in the Gazette. At any rate therefore on 27-5-1975 it was, or ought to have been, obvious to the petitioner that the committee, constituted as it was without the representatives of the particular industry, was ready to proceed with the enquiry into matters connected with the industry. He not only kept quiet, but to his knowledge various employers of the industry fully co-operated with the committee by deposing before it. He not only kept quiet, but to his knowledge various employers of the industry fully co-operated with the committee by deposing before it. It took another 3 years and more for the petitioner to come to this Court and say that, the committee having been irregularly constituted, the order of the Government made under S.5 on the basis of the report of the committee was invalid. All this was far too late. Neither the employers nor the employees had at any material time protested against the composition of the committee. Apparently both sides were perfectly satisfied with the committee's composition hoping that the report would be favourable. When the committee's report was acted on by the Government, the petitioner suddenly woke up to his rights and challenged the action taken. While we fully agree with the learned judge that the petition was belated, we are of the view that the delay was much longer than what the learned judge was willing to recognise. We see no merit in the appeal. It is dismissed. However the parties will bear their respective costs.