Judgment :- 1. Judgment-debtors 2 to 5 in O. S No. 5/56 on the file of the Addl. District Court, Parur, are the revision petitioners. The decree is for recovery of possession of certain items of immovable properties on payment of value of improvements. In the final decree the value of improvements was shown as Rs. 86,157.55. The final decree is dated 16-3-1971. The decree-holder filed E. P. No. 22/80 on 10-6-1980 praying for recovery of possession and also for allowing him to recover the cost of the trees cut by the judgment-debtors after deducting the value of improvements due to the judgment-debtors. In the execution petition the cost of trees cut by the judgment-debtors is shown as Rs 1,05,000/- and accordingly the prayer in the E. P. is to grant delivery of the property and to recover from the judgment-debtors an amount of Rs. 19 183 35 after deducting from the said sum of Rs. 1,05,000/-the amount of Rs.86,157.55 due to the judgment-debtors as value of improvements as provided in the final decree. 2. The judgment-debtors filed objections stating that the allegation that the judgment-debtors cut and removed trees is false. The execution petition filed without depositing the value of improvements as provided in the final decree is not maintainable. It was also contended that subsequent to the final decree the judgment-debtors have effected valuable improvements in the property and they are entitled to the value of those improvements as wall. 3. The decree-holders filed E.A. No. 121/80 praying to issue a commission to assess the value of trees cut and to assess the damage done by the judgment-debtors subsequent to the earlier commissioner's report dated 24-2-1965. The judgment-debtors filed E.A. No. 169/80 praying that the Commissioner may be directed to value the improvements made subsequent to the decree and also to revalue the improvements which were valued in the final decree on the ground that their value has increased subsequently. The execution court allowed these applications and directed the Commissioner to value/revalue the improvements. The Commissioners filed Ex. Cl report. According to the Commissioners the present value of improvements which are cut and destroyed comes to Rs. 90,322.85. In the original report this was valued at Rs. 17,248.83 (page 38 of Ex. Cl). The Commissioners valued the improvements subsequent to the final decree at Rs 1,10,778.17 (page 58 of Ex. The Commissioners filed Ex. Cl report. According to the Commissioners the present value of improvements which are cut and destroyed comes to Rs. 90,322.85. In the original report this was valued at Rs. 17,248.83 (page 38 of Ex. Cl). The Commissioners valued the improvements subsequent to the final decree at Rs 1,10,778.17 (page 58 of Ex. Cl) The Commissioners have revalued some of the trees, the nature of which changed subsequent to the earlier assessment, at Rs. 85,902.63 (page 79 of Ex Cl). The new constructions in the property were valued by the Commissioners at Rs. 58,038.24 (page 112 of Ex Cl). The execution court estimated damages on account of cut or destroyed improvements at one-half of the amount estimated by the Commissioners, viz. Rs. 45,161.42. The Court also held that the provisions of Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act or S.51 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application to this case and on that basis denied to the judgment-debtors the value of improvements made by them subsequent to the final decree and also the value fixed on revaluation. Thus the decree-holders were allowed to set off an amount of Rs. 45,161.42 from the value of improvements of Rs. 86,157.55 and directed the decree-holders to deposit the balance amount and to take steps for delivery of property on 22-12-1983. It would appear that subsequently the execution Court extended the time for deposit to 2-2-1984. It is submitted on behalf of the decree-holders that this amount is deposited. This Civil Revision Petition is filed by the judgment-debtors challenging this order of the execution court. 4. According to the learned counsel for the judgment-debtors (revision petitioners) the decree-holders are not entitled to deduct any amount as value of destroyed trees. The improvements belonged to the judgment debtors till it is paid for. In any case, the deduction of one-half of the present value of the destroyed trees is highly arbitrary and unjust. In any case, at the most, the decree-holders are entitled to deduct the value of the trees as originally fixed. Alternatively the learned counsel for judgment-debtors submitted that the judgment-debtors were entitled to cut and remove any of the trees and the result in such a case will only be that the decree-holders will not be bound to pay the value of such trees. Alternatively the learned counsel for judgment-debtors submitted that the judgment-debtors were entitled to cut and remove any of the trees and the result in such a case will only be that the decree-holders will not be bound to pay the value of such trees. He also relied on the decision reported in Ghulam Rasool v. State of J. & K (AIR. 1983 SC. 1188) in support of his contention that the judgment-debtors are entitled to remove the trees raised by them if they so like. According to the learned counsel for the decree-holders, the decree-holders are entitled to deduct the value of such, improvements from the compensation payable by them. Now that the Commissioners have valued the improvements existing in the property and in view of the final decision I am making in this civil revision petition this point has to be decided in favour of the judgment-debtors. There is no necessity to deduct any amount as value of trees cut or removed or destroyed. The judgment-debtors will be entitled only to the value of improvements existing in the property at the time of delivery. Assessing the value of all the trees as on a prior date and assessing the value of the non-existing trees alone as on today in order that such value may be deducted from the total amount of compensation, will definitely be not a just proposition. As decided by the Supreme Court in the judgment cited supra, the judgment-debtors may be entitled to remove any of the improvements if they so choose. For that reason also it would appear that the contention of the judgment-debtors that no separate deduction on this account is to be made has to be accepted. 5. The lower court has disallowed the value of improvements effected by the judgment-debtors subsequent to the final decree. The prayer to reassess and grant the value of improvements which were originally valued under the final decree was also disallowed by the execution court. As stated above, the subsequent improvements is valued at Rs. 1,10,778.17. The building is valued at Rs. 58,033.24. The trees existing at the time of original assessment have changed its nature and character and their present value is assessed at Rs. 82,902.63. As stated above, the subsequent improvements is valued at Rs. 1,10,778.17. The building is valued at Rs. 58,033.24. The trees existing at the time of original assessment have changed its nature and character and their present value is assessed at Rs. 82,902.63. The execution court has relied on the decision reported in Narayanan Nair & another v. Kamalakshi Amma (1963 KLJ.1131), where Raman Nayar J. (as he then was) dealing with a case where a preliminary decree for partition was passed setting aside a sale in favour of the appellants therein. The final decree expressly disallowed any compensation for improvements. According to the learned judge the decree can be varied under S.5(3) of the Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, (Act XXIX of 1958), only if the conditions required by that sub-section are satisfied. The very first condition is that the compensation must have been adjudged in the decree. In so far as the final decree in that suit expressly disallowed any compensation, it was held that the appellant therein was not a tenant and cannot start effecting improvements after suffering a decree from eviction and claim the value thereof. According to me, that decision has no application in this case since under the final decree in this case the judgment-debtors are allowed to recover value of improvements. Learned counsel also cited the decision reported in Kochunni Kartha v. Balaraman (1966 KLT. 719) in support of his contention that the judgment-debtors are not entitled to claim value of improvements. In that case the court was considering the right of a transferee from a life tenant to claim compensation for value of improvements. S.51 of the Transfer of Property Act is limited in its application to transferees who in good faith believing themselves to be absolutely entitled to the property effect improvements. However, in order to avail the statutory benefit conferred under S.5(3) of the Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, the claimant need satisfy only the conditions prescribed in that statute. S.5(3) of the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958 (Act 29 of 1958) is as follows: "5. However, in order to avail the statutory benefit conferred under S.5(3) of the Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, the claimant need satisfy only the conditions prescribed in that statute. S.5(3) of the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958 (Act 29 of 1958) is as follows: "5. Decree in eviction to be conditional on payment of compensation: (3) The amount of compensation for improvements made subsequent to the date up to which compensation for improvements has been adjudged in the decree and the revaluation of an improvement, for which compensation has been so adjudged, when and in so far as such revaluation may be necessary with reference to the condition of such improvement at the time of eviction as well as any sum of money accruing due to the plaintiff subsequent to the said date for rent, or otherwise in respect of the tenancy, shall be determined by order of the court executing the decrees and the decree shall be varied in accordance with such order. 6. In Cheriyan Mathai v. Narayana Pillai (1960 KLT. 1192) a Full Bench of this Court has held that a tenant is entitled to get compensation for improvements effected subsequent to the valuation by Commissioner and that he is entitled to be in possession until he is paid such compensation. Another Full Bench of this Court had occasion to reconsider the earlier Full Bench, in Varkey Paily v. Kurian Augusthy (1967 KLT. 189). The following extract from Para.5 of this decision is relevant for this case: "In other words, the combined effect of the two sub-sections is that a tenant to whom compensation is due under sub-section (1) at the time or the determination of the tenancy is entitled, notwithstanding such determination, to continue in possession as a tenant. He becomes a statutory tenant notwithstanding that the contractual tenancy (which term we shall use to denote a tenancy as defined in S 2(d) and as including a mortgage tenancy) has determined. If, thereafter, he effects improvements he would be entitled to compensation for such improvements for they would be improvements effected by him while he was a (statutory) tenant. He becomes a statutory tenant notwithstanding that the contractual tenancy (which term we shall use to denote a tenancy as defined in S 2(d) and as including a mortgage tenancy) has determined. If, thereafter, he effects improvements he would be entitled to compensation for such improvements for they would be improvements effected by him while he was a (statutory) tenant. But a person to whom no compensation is due under sub-section (1) at the time of the determination of his (contractual) tenancy is not entitled to remain in possession under that sub-section and does not if he continues in possession, hold as a tenant under sub-section (2). Any improvements effected by him after the determination would not be improvements made by a tenant and therefore would not be entitled to any compensation under sub-s. (1)." In that decision this Court also considered the following question in Para.6 of the judgment: "When then does this statutory tenancy determine so as to disentitle the tenant to remain in possession and to compensation for improvements effected thereafter?" And the answer is as follows: "Once an order for delivery is made in execution and the statutory tenancy determined, there can be no question of the defendant being entitled to remain in possession as a tenant by effecting improvements thereafter (fur which again compensation has to be determined and paid) and thus, by a repetition of the process, indefinitely postponing eviction." Therefore, it has to be held that a person who has to receive value of improvements continues to be legally in possession and therefore he is entitled to receive value of the improvements effected by him subsequent to the decree, before he is actually evicted. 7. From the facts of this case as summarised by the Supreme Court in the judgment in appeal on the trial side of this case, reported in Mathai v. Varkey (1963 KLT 1133) it is clear that the judgment-debtors herein had substantial contentions in the suit. They even succeeded before the trial court. This court reversed the decree of the trial court only except in respect of items 3, 5,14 and 18. While granting a decree in favour of the decree-holders this Court also granted the judgment-debtors value of improvements. They even succeeded before the trial court. This court reversed the decree of the trial court only except in respect of items 3, 5,14 and 18. While granting a decree in favour of the decree-holders this Court also granted the judgment-debtors value of improvements. Therefore, it cannot be said that the judgment-debtors were in possession of the property and effected improvements without bonafides or without good faith or without believing themselves that they are entitled to make such improvements. Under the circumstances as explained by the Full Bench they are entitled to effect improvements till they are paid the value of their improvements. 8. In this connection, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in K. C Alexandar v. State of Kerala (AIR 1973 S C. 2498) by which the Supreme Court confirmed this Court's judgment reported in Rev. Fr. K. C. Alexandar v. State of Kerala (1965 KLT. 666). In that case the Supreme Court held that where a person deliberately and contrary to the provisions of S.5 of the Travancore Land Conservancy Act trespasses into Government land and plants trees it is not open to him to say that he entered the land with bona fide intention of improving it. As stated above, the revision petitioners cannot be said to be absolute trespassers. The Privy Council has held that under the laws and customs of India there is no absolute rule of law that whatever is affixed or built on land would become part of it or subject to the same rights of property as the soil itself. (See Narayan Das v. Jatindra Nath. AIR. 1927 PC. 135: Vallabdas v. Development Officer, Bandra, AIR. 1929 PC. 163). The Travancore High Court has held that even a trespasser is entitled to get value of improvements made after suit (vide Eravi Govinda Pillai v. Dummini Dummini,19 TLJ.156). In A. V. Mathew's 'The Law of Improvements and Compensation' there is an instructive passage at page 81, under the heading 'Treaspassers are entitled in Travancore to the value of improvements made subsequent to the suit, and even subsequent to the decree'. In that passage the learned author refers to the rulings of the Travancore High Court in Eravi Govinda Pillai's case (19 TLJ.156), Varkki Avira Tharakan v. Raman Neelakantan (29 TLR.129) and other cases in support of his above proposition. 9. In that passage the learned author refers to the rulings of the Travancore High Court in Eravi Govinda Pillai's case (19 TLJ.156), Varkki Avira Tharakan v. Raman Neelakantan (29 TLR.129) and other cases in support of his above proposition. 9. The learned counsel for the respondents (decree-holders) placed considerable reliance on the decision in Kumaran Rama v. Variathu (AIR. 1953 Tra. Co. 77 ((F B.). In that decision Sankaran and Gangadhara Menon JJ., in the majority judgment, held that if a decree awards recovery of possession of the property to the plaintiff-mortgagor, it means that the decree-holder is entitled to get the property in the state in which it was when the decree was passed and therefore in case of any deterioration caused by the wilful negligence or wilful act of the defendant-mortgagee compensation on that account should be provided for and that to the extent to which there is a diminution in value it should be taken to be a discharge or satisfaction of the decree as loss has to be adjusted against what is payable under the decree to the defendant-mortgagee. This decision was rendered before the enactment of the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act (Act 29 of 1958), and therefore the Court had no occasion to consider the applicability of the said Act. Therefore, the principle stated in the majority decision is not applicable to this case. In this connection, it is also pertinent to refer to the following passage from the minority judgment by Subramania Iyer J. (at page 79). "According to the customary law prevalent in Cochin, Travancore and Malabar, a tenant (including a mortgagee,) is entitled to improve the land, get compensation for unexhausted improvements existing at the time of delivery of possession back, and to retain possession thereof until such payment, even without a provision in that behalf but in the absence of a prohibition against effecting improvements. 'Chandi Avira v. Thomman Varkey',1951 KLT. 7 (F. B) at p. 26. This customary right was given statutory recognition in Cochin and Malabar. The statutes even invalidated agreements entered into after a specified date prohibiting the effecting of improvements or preventing a claim for compensation therefor. Madras Act I of 1887, was the earliest legislation in Malabar and Act II of 1090 in the Cochin State. 7 (F. B) at p. 26. This customary right was given statutory recognition in Cochin and Malabar. The statutes even invalidated agreements entered into after a specified date prohibiting the effecting of improvements or preventing a claim for compensation therefor. Madras Act I of 1887, was the earliest legislation in Malabar and Act II of 1090 in the Cochin State. Act I of 1887 was repealed by Madras Act I of 1900 which was amended by Act II of 1901. There was no legislation in the erstwhile Travancore State". 10. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Maddanappa v. Chandramma (AIR 1965 SC. 1812), especially on the following passage in Para.14 at page 1816: "No man who, knowing fully well that he has no title to property, spends money on improving it can be permitted to deprive the original owner of his right to possession of the property except upon the payment for the improvements which were not effected with the consent of that person". That judgment was rendered in a suit for possession of half share of the suit property on the allegation that the suit property was the absolute property of the plaintiff's mother and upon her death the property devolved on her and the first defendant. Since the 1st defendant did not want to join as co-plaintiff in the suit for possession she was joined as a defendant. In a notice sent to the 1st defendant before filing the suit the plaintiff requested her for her co-operation in order to effect division of the properties. A copy of this notice was sent to their father who sent a reply to it to the plaintiff. However, the 1st defendant did not send any reply. The father who was impleaded as second defendant, contended that he had spent more than Rs. 46,000/- towards improvements of the properties and claimed value of those improvements. It was in this context that the Supreme Court made the above said observation. 11. The facts of this care are entirely different. As stated earlier, the judgment-debtors in this case had a substantial contention to put forward in this suit. So also in the above cited case the Supreme Court was not considering any special statute like the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act. Under these circumstances, this ruling is also not helpful to the decree-holders. 12. As stated earlier, the judgment-debtors in this case had a substantial contention to put forward in this suit. So also in the above cited case the Supreme Court was not considering any special statute like the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act. Under these circumstances, this ruling is also not helpful to the decree-holders. 12. The result is that the order of the lower court is set aside. The judgment-debtors will be entitled to the present value of improvements existing in the property. No separate deduction for the improvements removed or cut or lost need be made under the circumstances. At page 58 of Ext. C1 Commissioners' report the value of additional improvements is assessed at Rs. 1,10,778-17. At page 79 of the report the additional value due to the change in the nature of improvements is assessed at Rs. 85,902.63. However, at page 80, the commissioners have noticed that out of this amount, the value originally fixed is liable to be deducted. The value fixed earlier has to be deducted from this amount. The value of additional constructions is assessed at Rs. 58,038 24 at page 112 of the report. Since it is not possible from the available records to refix the actual amount of compensation for all the improvements existing now the execution court is directed to do so. If it is felt necessary before such fixation the commissioners may be directed to file a supplementary report after going through all the commission reports in this case, assessing the present value of all the improvements in the property. The decree-holders will deposit the amount so fixed and take delivery of the property. The execution petition is posted in the execution court on 15-10-1984 for appropriate further proceedings pursuant to the above directions. The parties will appear before that court on that date. This civil revision petition is disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs.