JUDGMENT : R.A. Mehta, J. In this Second Appeal the following substantial questions of law has been framed at the time of admission of the Second Appeal : "Whether on the facts and in me circumstances of the case, the lower appellate court was right in law in holding that no departmental inquiry could have been initiated or proceeded with against the respondent in view of the fact that in a criminal case based on similar charge he was acquitted on merits by the criminal court?" The simple undisputed facts and also findings of the lower courts are as follows : 2. The respondent is a bus driver of the appellant Road Transport Corporation. On 7th May, 1974 an accident occurred as a result of which a boy died. The respondent thereafter was prosecuted for rash and negligent driving. He was also departmentally charge-sheeted for gross negligence in discharge of his duties as the bus driver. Since the criminal charge as well as departmental charge were similar and based on same facts, and evidence, he prayed that pending the criminal prosecution the departmental inquiry may not proceed. He made such an application by Ex. 23 dated 28th July, 1974. He also filed h:s explanation and reply on merits which is at Ex. 29. In the departmental inquiry the statement of the respondent driver was recorded on 21st May 1975. It also appears that the statement of the Reporting Officer Shri A.B. Vaidya was also recorded. All these statements are in the record of the case. The driver only stated that it was a case of pure accident. From his evidence it is not possible to come to any conclusion about his negligence. The evidence of the Reporting Officer is also of no assistance because he was not an eye witness. However, the criminal prosecution had not yet ended. By letter Ex 32 dated 2nd July, 1975 the authorities asked the driver to furnish copy of the criminal judgment. By his letter dated 5th July 1975 Ex. 33 the appellant replied that the judgment had not been delivered. Without waiting for the termination of the criminal trial, by a letter dated 5th Aug. 1975 Ex. 34 the inquiry authority came to the conclusion that as a result of the inquiry, the charge is held proved and the findings are given at Ex. 33 the appellant replied that the judgment had not been delivered. Without waiting for the termination of the criminal trial, by a letter dated 5th Aug. 1975 Ex. 34 the inquiry authority came to the conclusion that as a result of the inquiry, the charge is held proved and the findings are given at Ex. 35 and the appellant was required to show cause against the proposed punishment of dismissal. The appellant replied by Ex. 36, dated 12th Aug. 1975. By Ex. 37, dated 17th Sept. 1975 he was required to furnish the judgment of the criminal court within 8 days. The judgment in the criminal case was rendered on 17th Sept, 1975 which is at Ex. 49 in the present case and the same was furnished to the Disciplinary Authority by Ex. 38. Yet the Disciplinary Authority passed the impugned order Ex. 39. 3. The judgment of acquittal Ex. 49 shows that the acquittal is on merits. The prosecution had examined 11 witnesses to prove the case against the appellant including the eye-witnesses. From their evidence the criminal court came to the conclusion that it was a pure and simple accident and the deceased boy all of a sudden came and dashed with the bus; and the criminal court finally observed that "now, analysing the prosecution evidence in nutshell, there is absolutely no evidence about either criminal rashness or criminal negligence on the part of the accused while driving the S. T. bus. It is in my opinion a pure and simple incident of accident and accused cannot be held criminally liable for the death of the deceased Ashok. The prosecution has failed to bring home the charge levelled against the accused as regards rash and negligent driving. Hence the accused deserves to be acquitted of the said charge." 4. Thus the acquittal is based on merits after examination of the eye witnesses. Now in the facts and circumstances, the question is whether departmental inquiry could have been proceeded with against the respondent-driver in view of his acquittal on merits by the criminal court in respect of the charge based on same allegations. 5. The answer is furnished by the judgment of this court in Abdul Hakim Ahmed v. Dist. Supdt. Now in the facts and circumstances, the question is whether departmental inquiry could have been proceeded with against the respondent-driver in view of his acquittal on merits by the criminal court in respect of the charge based on same allegations. 5. The answer is furnished by the judgment of this court in Abdul Hakim Ahmed v. Dist. Supdt. of Police, reported in 14 Guj LT 104 (M.P. Thakkar, J. as he then was) L.P.A. No. 43/78 against the said judgment was summarily dismissed by the Division Bench on 20th Feb. 1978. Thus the High Court has laid down that a departmental proceeding cannot be initiated as a matter of counts or without anything more when a court of law has acquitted the delinquent of the same charge and such disciplinary proceeding can be undertaken only if special circumstances are shown to exist. Some illustrative situations have also been indicated where the acquittal is based on want of requisite sanction; or the prosecution witnesses not remaining present; or charge being defective or when the benefit of doubt is given; when the case is of circumstantial evidence; where some of the witnesses have been believed and others are not believed and because of conflict of evidence benefit of doubt is given. But when the criminal court has appreciated and disbelieved the evidence same evidence cannot be believed by the disciplinary authority and it is not open to the disciplinary authority to take a contrary view. 6. In the present case there is a clear acquittal on merits after appreciating the evidence and examining eye witnesses and, therefore, the disciplinary proceedings could not have continued at all and, therefore, the lower courts were justified in holding against the appellant Corporation. 7. Even in the departmental inquiry no eye-witnesses are examined and it is surprising that without any evidence of negligence, the authority came to the conclusion of negligence. Such finding is without any evidence and, therefore, also the order of dismissal cannot stand for a moment. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant made grievance that the Road Transport Corporation is faced with a very peculiar and anomalous situation. Their driver is acquitted by the criminal court, they cannot proceed to hold a departmental inquiry and to hold that he was negligent. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant made grievance that the Road Transport Corporation is faced with a very peculiar and anomalous situation. Their driver is acquitted by the criminal court, they cannot proceed to hold a departmental inquiry and to hold that he was negligent. At the same time when the Corporation has to meet the .case in a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in spite of the judgment of acquittal by the criminal court the Tribunal not only comes to its own independent finding but comes to a contrary findings. Thus the Corporation is faced with the finding of the criminal court that the driver is not negligent and finding by the Claims Tribunal that the driver is negligent and yet the Corporation would not be in a position to take any proceedings against the driver. If the finding of the criminal court that the driver is not negligent is to have a binding effect on the Corporation similar effect has to be given to the finding of negligence given by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal; otherwise, inconsistent and anomalous situation would expose the legal system to in explainable and anomalous situation. In the present case no such situation arises because no finding of the Tribunal is referred to anywhere by either party and, therefore, that question does not arise at all in the present appeal. 9. In the result, the Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.