JUDGMENT P.P. Desai, C.J.—Pursuant to the order made on April 23, 1984, the Inspector General of Prisons has filed an affidavit dated May 1, 1984 annexing thereto a letter dated April 30, 1984 received by him from the District Magistrate, Una, observing, inter alia that a fresh enquiry as ordered was held in the presence of respectable persons of the area to ascertain whether there was any justifiable reason for not releasing the petitioner on parole and that though the request of the petitioner for being released on parole on the ground of ill health of his wife and of carrying out repairs in his house appeared to the genuine, the release of the petitioner could not be recommended because the enquiry revealed that there was every apprehension of breach of peace in the event of his being released on parole and the possibility of his committing some heinous crime during the parole period could not be ruled out. 2. It would be worthwhile to recall that in the order dated April 23, 1984, the District Magistrate, Una and the Superintendent of Police Una, were directed to hold a fresh enquiry to ascertain whether there was any justiciable reason for not releasing the petitioner on parole bearing in mind the guidelines laid down in Rule 3 of the Himachal Pradesh Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") and it was clarified that both the authorities would have to specify in the reports whether the petitioners presence was likely to endanger the security of the State or be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The Court finds that despite the specific direction and clarification, the concerned authorities have failed to appreciate the true scope of the enquiry and made a report without appreciating the true legal effect of the relevant statutory provisions. 3. Section 3 of the Himachal Pradesh Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") empowers the State Government, or any officer duly authorised by it in that behalf, in consultation with the District Magistrate, to temporarily release for a specified period any prisoner, if the government is satisfied about the existence of the grounds mentioned in the said section. Section 4 empowers the State Government, or any officer duly authorised by it m that behalf, in consultation with the District Magistrate, to release temporarily, on furlough, any prisoner who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than five years, subject to and on fulfilment of certain conditions. The power to release a prisoner on parole or furlough is subject to such conditions and is exercisable in such manner as may be prescribed. Section 6 of the Act reads as under :— "6. Prisoners not entitled to be released in certain cases :— Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 3 and 4, no prisoner shall be entitled to be released under this Act, if, on the report of the District Magistrate, the Government or an officer authorised by it in this behalf is satisfied that his release is likely to endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of public order”. Section 10 of the Act confers upon the Government the power .to frame rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act and it specifically provides for the enactment of rules prescribing the condition on which and the manner in which prisoner can be released temporarily under the Act. 4. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 10, the Himachal Pradesh Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Rules, 1969 have been duly enacted. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules requires the Superintendent of Jail to forward the application of tire prisoner for temporary release with his report to the District Magistrate of the District to which the prisoner belongs. The District Magistrate, after consulting the Superintendent of Police of his District, is required to forward with his recommendations to the Inspector General of Prisons. The Inspector General of Prisons is then required to record his views on the case whether the prisoner is to be released or not and submit the same to the releasing authority, that is, the Government or the authority to whom the powers are delegated, for orders. The District Magistrate, before making any recommendation, is under a statutory duty to verify the facts and grounds on which release has been requested and to give an opinion "whether the temporary release on parole or furlough is opposed on grounds of prisoners presence being dangerous to the security of State or prejudicial to the maintenance of public order". The District Magistrate, before making any recommendation, is under a statutory duty to verify the facts and grounds on which release has been requested and to give an opinion "whether the temporary release on parole or furlough is opposed on grounds of prisoners presence being dangerous to the security of State or prejudicial to the maintenance of public order". Rule 4, inter alia, provides that if the prisoner commits any offence during the period of his temporary release, the officer in charge of the Police Station shall forthwith, and in any case not later than twenty-four hours of his coming to know of the commission of the offence, send a report thereof to the Superintendent of Jail and to the Superintendent of Police of the District. Upon receipt of such report, the Superintendent of Jail is to forward the same to the Inspector General of Prisons for being forwarded to the releasing authority and power is conferred upon the releasing authority to cancel the release warrant. 5. The provisions of Section 6 and sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 make it abundantly clear that no prisoner would be entitled to be released on parole or furlough if the competent authority is satisfied that such release is likely to endanger the "security of State" or the maintenance of "Public order". It appears to the Court that the true content and meanings of the material words, namely "security of State", and "public order", are not being appreciated by the authority while exercising the power under the Act and the Rules 6. The distinction between the concepts of "public order" and "law and order" is clearly drawn by a serious of decisions of the highest Court: (See : Ram Manohar v. State of Bihar, [AIR 1966 SC 640], Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, [AIR 1970 SC 1228], Wasi Uddin Ahmad v. District Magistrate, Aligarh, [AIR 1981 SC 2166] and Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, [AIR 1982 SC 1143]. In the leading decision in Ram Manohars case Hidayatullah, J., as he then was, speaking for himself and Bachawat, J., succinctly explained the meaning of the words "public order" in contradistinction to the expression "law and order. The learned Judges pointed out that "public order", if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. The learned Judges pointed out that "public order", if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is not the same as disturbances which subverts the public order. The , learned Judges went on to observe that to appreciate the extent and scope of three distinct concepts, namely, "law and order", "public order" and "security of State", it would be necessary to draw three concentric circles, the largest of them representing "law and order", the next representing "public order" and the smallest representing the "security of State". An act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of State. The true distinction between the areas of "public order" and "law and order" lies not merely in the nature of quality of the act but in the degree and extent of its reach upon the society. Acts similar in nature but committed in different context and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case, it might affect specific individual only and, therefore, touch the problem of law and order, while in another, it might affect public order. The clear distinction made between the concepts of "public order" and "law and order" in the decision in Ram Manohars case has been consistently followed and it is in the light of the tests evolved in that decision that the provisions of Section 6 of the Act and Rule 3 of the Rules are required to be implemented. 7. In the instant case, the report of the District Magistrate, which has been accepted by the releasing authority, proceeds upon a total misconception of the power exercisable under Section 6 of the Act in light of the relevant provisions of the Rules. The distinction between public order and law and order has become totally blurred and the question of grant of parole to the petitioner has been examined without properly appreciating the distinction between the concepts of "public order" and "law and order". The distinction between public order and law and order has become totally blurred and the question of grant of parole to the petitioner has been examined without properly appreciating the distinction between the concepts of "public order" and "law and order". An apprehended breach of the peace or the possibility of the petitioner committing a heinous crime during the parole period, without anything more, would constitute a law and order problem, but these factors have been taken into account as factors subverting public order. Be it appreciated that the maintenance of law and order by keeping under check the criminal activities of a convict, who is either temporarily released or released after serving out his sentence, is the responsibility of the State and that If the grounds put forward in the report of the District Magistrate were to be accepted as valid, no convict, who could be reasonably imputed with the propensity or proclivity to repeat the crime, can ever be temporarily released, even if there are otherwise strong grounds for such release. The proper course to be adopted in such cases is not to reject the request for temporary release outright but to keep surveillance over the prisoner during the period of his temporary release and to invoke the power conferred by Rule 4 of the Rules in appropriate cases, if an occasion therefor arises. 8. For the foregoing reasons, it appears to be expedient in the interest of justice to direct the State Government to re-examine the question of the release of the petitioner on parole afresh in accordance with law and in light of the observations made in this judgment. The State Government will arrive at its decision within 15 days of the receipt of the writ. 9. Let a copy of this judgment be circulated by the State Government to all Officers who are concerned with the question of grant of parole/furlough to convicts under the Act and the Rules, with instructions to them to follow the guidelines laid down in the judgment. Dasti order on usual terms. Adjourned to May 16, 1984. Order accordingly