Judgment S.S.SANDHAWALIA, J. 1. Can a Special Court take cognizance of offence under S.11 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 , upon the complaint preferred by a public servant - is obviously the significant question necessitating this reference to a Division Bench. 2. As is apperent, the issue aforesaid is pristinely legal and, therefore, the facts giving rise thereto may be noticed with relative brevity. On 18th Jan, 1983 Sri Ram Naresh Singh, Marketing Officer, Chapra, along with Sri R.S. Das, Magistrate Chapra, inspected the kerosene oil shop of the petitioners and found from the cash memos, the sale register and physical verification of the stocks that the accounts aforesaid were not genuine and kerosene oil was being sold in the blackmarket by showing the sales in the names of fictitious persons. The authorities seized the entire stock of kerosene oil and later on 21st Jan 1983, a detailed complaint was filed by the aforesaid Ram Naresh Singh Marketing Officer, Chapra, before Sri A.N. Jha Special Court, Chapra, under S.7 of the Essential Commodities Act, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The Special Court took cognizance of the offence and registered the same as Trial No.63 of 1983. Aggrieved by such cognizance, the present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition was preferred challenging the very jurisdiction of the Special Court to take cognizance of the offence otherwise than on a police report under S.12AA (1)(e) of the Essential Commodities (Special provisions) Act, 1981. It was alleged that S.11 of the Act still continued on the statute book and thereunder only a Magistrate of first class, who was empowered to take cognizance under S.190 of the Criminal P.C., could possibly take cognizance thereof. A specific supplementary affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioners alleging that Sri. A.N. Jha, Special Judge of the Court at Chapra had not been vested with powers of the first class Magistrate for the purpose of taking cognizance under S.190 of the Code on the basis of a complaint filed before him. 3. In the counter-affidavit filed by Sri Ram Naresh Singh, Marketing Officer, District Supply Office, Chapra, allegations of fact sought to be raised on behalf of the petitioners have been specifically controverted. The legal position taken is that the Special Court is competent to take cognizance of the offence under the Act even after the enforcement of the Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act 1981. 4. The legal position taken is that the Special Court is competent to take cognizance of the offence under the Act even after the enforcement of the Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act 1981. 4. This criminal miscellaneous petition originally came up for hearing before a learned single Judge. It was strenuously contended on behalf of the petitioners before him that under Cl.(e) of sub-sec.(1) of S.12AA of the Act a Special Court could take cognizance only upon a police report and has no power to take cognizance upon a complaint even though the same is preferred by a public servant in conformity with S.11 of the Act. The learned single Judge noticed that an identical question had been raised in Criminal Miscellaneous No.7260 of 1983 which had been referred for an authoritative decision by a larger Bench. Accordingly he directed that the present case should also be placed before the same Bench. 5. It would appear that Nawal Kishore Agrawals case Criminal Misc. No.7260 of 1983 : (1985 Cri LJ 254) (Pat) along with five similar criminal miscellaneous petitions was heard by a Division Bench but the present case could not be placed before the same. Therein after a reference to principle and precedent and an exhaustive discussion of the rival contentions the Division Bench has held as follows : "To finally conclude : The answer to the question posed at the outset is rendered in the affirmative and it is held that a Special Court under the Act can take cognizance of offences thereunder upon a complaint preferred by a public servant even after the enforcement of Cl.(e) of sub-sec.(1) of S.12AA of the said Act." I am wholly in agreement with the aforesaid conclusion and indeed nothing whatsoever was brought to our notice to take a contrary view. 6 In fairness to Mr. Tara Kant Jha, learned counsel for the petitioners herein, I must notice that he raised two ancillary, though brief, contentions. Somewhat curiously he attempted to place reliance on para 14 of the judgment in the case of A.R. Antulay V/s. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak AIR 1984 SC 718 : (1984 Cri LJ 647). On a close perusal of the judgment, however, I find not the least foothold in the said judgment which can possibly aid the stand of the petitioners. Somewhat curiously he attempted to place reliance on para 14 of the judgment in the case of A.R. Antulay V/s. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak AIR 1984 SC 718 : (1984 Cri LJ 647). On a close perusal of the judgment, however, I find not the least foothold in the said judgment which can possibly aid the stand of the petitioners. Indeed the Division Bench in Nawal Kishore Agrawals case (supra) had expressly referred to A.R. Antulays case (supra) and quoted para 18 of the Report for supporting the stand of the respondent State. I am myself of the same view and consequently find no merit in the submission of learned Counsel on this point. 7. Relying on the averments in paras 13 and 14 of the petition, it was strenuously sought to be argued that S.11 of the Act still continues on the statute book and thereunder only a Magistrate of the first class could take cognizance of an offence under S.190(1)(a) of the Code upon receiving a complaint of facts which constituted such an offence. It having been specifically averred that Sri A.N Jha, Special Judge under the Act, was not vested with the powers of a first class Magistrate, it was submitted that he could not take cognizance of the offence. 8. I am afraid that the contention aforesaid must fail both on principle and on precedent. It is undisputed that by virtue of S.12AA(1)(e) all offences under this Act are now triable only by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence had been committed. It has been forthrightly held in Nawal Kishore Agrawls case (supra) (1985 Cri LJ 254) (Pat) that the jurisdiction to try an offence carries with it the implicit power to take cognizance thereof unless expressly taken away by the mandate of a statute. Herein I find, nothing whatsoever and indeed no provision could be brought to our notice which in any way bars the Special Court from taking cognizance of an offence which is exclusively triable by it. 9. Herein I find, nothing whatsoever and indeed no provision could be brought to our notice which in any way bars the Special Court from taking cognizance of an offence which is exclusively triable by it. 9. Apart from the above, it would appear that a similar contention was sought to be raised in A.R. Antulays case (1984 Cri LJ 647) (SC) (supra) that the Special Judge under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1952 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 being more or less comparable to the Court of Session, he could not take cognizance of an offence directly as a Magistrate under S.190 of the Code. Rejecting such a doctrinaire stand after an exhaustive discussion their Lordships concluded as follows: "The entire argument inviting us to specifically decide whether a Court of a Special Judge for a certain purpose is a Court of Magistrate or a Court of Session revolves round a mistaken belief that a Special Judge has to be one or the other, and must fit in the slot of a Magistrate or a Court of Session. Such an approach would strangulate the functioning of the Court and must be eschewed. Shorn of all embellishment, the Court of a Special Judge is a Court of original criminal jurisdiction. As a Court of original criminal jurisdiction in order to make it functionally oriented some powers were conferred by the statute setting up the Court. Except those specifically conferred and specifically denied, it has to function as a Court of original criminal jurisdiction not being hide-bound by the terminological status description of Magistrate or a Court of Session. Under the Code it will enjoy all power which a court of original criminal jurisdiction enjoys save and except the ones specifically denied." I am inclined to take the view that the aforesaid authoritative enunciation by way of analogy equally covers the present situation. The Special Court under S.12AA (1)(e) is equally a Court of original criminal jurisdiction. It had to be conceded before us that no question of any commitment to the Special Court under the Act at all arises. Indeed far from being so, the Special Court is enjoined to try offences under the Act in a summary way. Consequently the Special Court under the Act is also not to be hide-bound by the terminoligical status description of either a Magistrate or a Court of Session. Indeed far from being so, the Special Court is enjoined to try offences under the Act in a summary way. Consequently the Special Court under the Act is also not to be hide-bound by the terminoligical status description of either a Magistrate or a Court of Session. It must exercise all powers which a Court of original criminal jurisdiction enjoys and undoubtedly the power to take cognizance of an offence is one of them. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners must, therefore, be rejected. 10. No other argument was raised. Following the view in Nawal Kishore Agrawals case (1985 Cri LJ 254) (Pat) (supra) and for the additional reasons recorded above, I would answar the question posed at the outset in the affirmative and hold that Special Court can take cognizance of an offence under S.11 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 upon a complaint preferred by a public servant. 11. Once it is held as above, the criminal miscellaneous petition, directed as it is against merely a taking of the cognizances of the offence at the threshold stage by the Special Court, is plainly without merit. The same has to be necessarily dismissed. B.P.GRIYAGHEY, J. 12 I agree.