JUDGMENT - Mohta, V.A. J.- By this writ petition, landlord Dhannalal Verma has challenged the appellate order passed by the respondent no. 1. Additional District Magistrate, Nagpur, rejecting his application for permission to terminate the tenancy of original respondent no. 2, Nokhelal Dhobi (since deceased) under clause 13(3) (vi) and (vii) of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (“The HRC Order” for short). 2. A preliminary objection is raised on behalf of the tenant to the effect that the proceedings initiated by the landlord in 1976 under clause 13(3) of the HRC Order are not maintainable at all in view of bar of section 22(1) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (“The Act” for short) and therefore, they should be quashed on this short ground without going into the merits of the matter. Submission is that house in question falls with “slum area*' as defined under section 2(ga) of the Act and as admittedly no previous permission of the Competent Authority as defined under section 2(c) is obtained, the proceedings are void ab initio. Section 22(1) reads thus: “ Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the Competent '. Section 22(1) reads thus: “ Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the Competent '. Authority- (a) institute, after the commencement of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of any occupier from any building or land in a slum area; or (b) where any decree or order is obtained in any suit or proceeding instituted before such commencement for the eviction of an occupier from any building or land in such area, execute such decree or order; or (c) apply to any Judge or the Registrar of the Small Cause Court under Chapter VIII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act 1982, in its application to the State of Maharashtra or to any Court of Small Causes under Chapter IV-A of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, in its application to the State of Maharashtra, for a distress Warrant for arrears of rent against any occupier of a house or premises in a slum area.” The crux of the matter is whether the proceedings for permission to terminate the tenancy under clause 13(3) of the HRC Order are “a suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for eviction” as contemplated under section 22(1) of the Act. My answer is in the negative; the principal reason being unlike majority of Rent Control legislations prevailing all over India the HRC Order is not a complete Code of eviction and it merely creates a barrier against giving notice of termination of tenancy by the landlord which is not lifted unless and until one or more of the nine grounds enumerated in clause 13(3) exist. These proceedings, therefore, do not terminate in the order of eviction and the permission if granted merely permits the landlord to give notice of termination, which he may choose not to give. . 3. My attention was invited to the case of Vs. (Dhanapal Chettier v. Yasoda Ammal)1in which it has been held that in respect of houses governed by certain Rent Control Legislations, giving of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not at all necessary and that the order of eviction can be passed straightway without such notice. My attention was invited to the case of Vs. (Dhanapal Chettier v. Yasoda Ammal)1in which it has been held that in respect of houses governed by certain Rent Control Legislations, giving of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not at all necessary and that the order of eviction can be passed straightway without such notice. I was also taken through the observations of the Supreme Court to the effect that the judgment governs all Rent Control Legislations and the difference in the language used therein makes no difference. It was canvassed that these observations do not admit of any exception irrespective of the scheme of particular legislation. It seems to me that this is superficial reading of that decision, which considered several Rent Control Legislations all over India (names specified) the scheme of which, by and large, contains a complete Code for eviction though the language used is different. 4. A Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the ratio in Dhanapal's case (supra) vis-a-vis the provisions of the HRC Order in the case of (Tantulal Bihahlal Parwar Vs. Purushottam Shankarram Purohit)2 and has taken a view that the ratio of the said Supreme Court decision does not apply to the HRC Order which in terms deals only with notice of termination of tenancy. It is observed:- “The perusal of this judgment will indicate that all the judgments and provisions . considered therein related to the Bihar Rent Act, Kerala Lease and Rent Control Act, Fast Punjab Urban Rent Registration Act, Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, Delhi and Ajmer Merwada Rent Control Act, M.P. Accommodation Control Act, Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, Saurashtra Rent Control Act and Andhara Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. All these Acts without exception provide for a complete Code for eviction and under their provisions alone a decree or order of eviction can be passed on proof of grounds enumerated in the Acts. All these Acts without exception provide for a complete Code for eviction and under their provisions alone a decree or order of eviction can be passed on proof of grounds enumerated in the Acts. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court was of the view that basic structures of all the aforesaid Rent Control Legislations are the same and the difference in the phraseology used therein leaves no scope for taking different view about requirement of giving a quit notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act which was considered an exercise in futility, in view of the position that landlord cannot get decree for eviction and tenant continues to be so even thereafter ………………………………………………………. This argument turns few lines of the judgment out of context and this is impermissible. Indeed, in this very judgment, it is observed that if any State law requires the giving of particular type of notice in order to get particular kind of relief, it will have to be given. If the House Rent Control Order provides only for permission to give quit notice and nothing further, it is wholly inconceivable as to how a decree or order for eviction can be obtained except by determining the lease. Understanding the conclusions arrived by the Supreme Court in relation to the provisions of the the House Rent Control Order and not de hors of it, and agreeing with the learned single Judge's view of which he has made no secret, we are inclined to hold that the said ruling does not take the House Rent Control Order in its sweep and valid quit notice is necessary for getting decree for eviction in such cases.” 5. It is contended on behalf of the tenant that the observations of the Supreme. Court do not at all refer to a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act as such a notice is not required to be given under the HRC Order. Now, in Tantulal's case (supra) whole position has been clarified and there seems to be no scope for having any genuine doubt on this point. This aspect of the matter has been further clarified more than once even by the Supreme Court. In the case Satpal Vs. Now, in Tantulal's case (supra) whole position has been clarified and there seems to be no scope for having any genuine doubt on this point. This aspect of the matter has been further clarified more than once even by the Supreme Court. In the case Satpal Vs. Hira Lal3 a decision reported after Tantulal's case was decided- it is observed :- “ We have heard counsel for the parties and have-gone through the judgments of the Courts below. We find no merit in this appeal. Special leave Appeared to have been granted only on the question of notice which no longer survives in view of a 7 Judge Bench decision of this court holding that in cases governed by the Rent Act, no notice under section 106 Transfer of Property Act is necessary unless expressly so provided.” (Emphasis supplied). In Krishanadeo Narayan Agarwal Vs. Ram Krishan Rai4 referring to Dhanapal's case it is observed- “ No notice is necessary under section 106 of the Transfer of Properly Act in cases where the possession of the tenant is protected by the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947.” (Emphasis supplied). It is thus clear that the view taken in Tantulal's case has been reinforced by Supreme Court and the submission that Dhanapal's decision applies without exception to all Rent Control Legislations is wholly misconceived. 6. A brief survey of the scheme of the HRC Order and its impact on the landlord-tenant relationship may be made. This relationship is essentially governed by the general law i.e. the Transfer of Property Act and procedure for eviction is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Rent Control legislation does not either abrogate or pro tanto repeal the general law and is merely supplementary. It has overriding effect but only to the extent provided for. It vests special jurisdiction in Rent Control Authorities, which have jurisdiction to decide only those matters which are specially taken within their sweep. For the rest of the matters, jurisdiction of Courts under Civil Procedure Code is kept intact. Section 6 of the C.P. and Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 (under which the HRC Order is made) reads thus : “Effect of orders inconsistent with other enactments. For the rest of the matters, jurisdiction of Courts under Civil Procedure Code is kept intact. Section 6 of the C.P. and Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 (under which the HRC Order is made) reads thus : “Effect of orders inconsistent with other enactments. Any order made or deemed to be made under section 2 shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any ejectment other than this Act or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act.” It is in the background of the aforesaid provision and the general principles that the subject of determination of lease and eviction of tenant will have to be dealt with. Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with eight modes of determination of lease. Clause 13(1) or any other clause of the HRC Order does not deal with all those modes; e.g. determination of lease by merger, surrender etc. are not touched at all. Those untouched topics thus are governed by the Transfer of Property Act and the procedure for eviction on those grounds will be governed by the Civil Procedure Code. Even clause 13(1) does not at all provide for eviction. It merely creates an embargo on the right of the landlord to give notice of termination of tenancy which embargo can be lifted only if any one or more of the nine grounds specified in clause, 13(3) exist. Jurisdiction to test correctness of those grounds- and nothing more- is vested under that clause in the Controller who is an officer specially appointed for the purpose. If he is satisfied, he may permit giving of a notice. This order is appealable and reviewable by the Collector of the district and has finality attached to it. Now it is not obligatory on the part of a landlord to actually give such notice. Choice is entirely his. Process for determination of lease is not started till he exercises that choice. Once a valid notice is given a landlord can file a suit for eviction in the ordinary Civil Court in which alone a decree for eviction can be passed. It is thus clear that proceedings under clause 13(3) of the HRC Order do not terminate in. an order of eviction at all and therefore section 22 of the Act cannot be attracted at that stage. It is thus clear that proceedings under clause 13(3) of the HRC Order do not terminate in. an order of eviction at all and therefore section 22 of the Act cannot be attracted at that stage. The preliminary objection raised by the tenant thus must fail. 7. Now, the merits of the matter. The substance of the case of the landlord is: That in the year 1973 he had filed a civil suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur, against Nokhelal for eviction but it was held that the tenancy was not illegal. He is carrying on Kirana business in his ancestral house having walls and a roof of tiles. Said house had become dilapidated. Its wall was reconstructed but in rainy season, the roof leaks. He, therefore, wants to shift that kirana shop to the premises in occupation of the tenant. Ancestral house is to be partitioned between himself, his brother and mother who are demanding the partition and therefore, he wants the premises in question for his bona fide business. This application was opposed as being malafide. In the trial, the parties entered into witness box and examined some witnesses. The landlord examined retired enginner Shri Kundalay. The Rent Controller granted permission as sought for but in appeal the landlords version was disbelieved. It was brought on record that the landlord had occupied the so called ancestral house only after the partition. In the face of the admitted position that wall was already repaired it was held the the tiled roof, even if leaking, could be easily repaired without the tenant vacating the premises. It was further held that the application was mala fide calculated to evict twenty years' old tenant. Shri Kukdey, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has taken me through both the judgments and also evidence on record and has argued that the findings recorded by the Appellate Authority are perverse. I do not agree. For valid reasons, the landlord's version has been accepted and his application rejected on both the' counts. Shri Munshi, the learned Counsel for the respondent no. 2 is right when he argues that this is a case purely of appreciation of evidence and therefore, no interference is called for in writ jurisdiction. 8. In the result, the petition is dismissed and rule discharged. I make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed ----