Brahama Deo Prosad Bhakat v. State of West Bengal — 1984 DIGILAW 256 (CAL)

JUDGMENT 1. The two Civil Rule Nos. being 3756 (W) of 1969 and 3332 (W) of 1968, were heard and disposed of together by Anil Kumar Sen, J. on 10.2.1972. Those two Rules, which were obtained by the respective petitioners, disputing the validity of certain orders passed in proceeding under section 44(2a) as also in proceeding under section 6, being B.R. Case No. 101 of 1961, were so heard an analogously, as the points involved in those Rules were thought to be the same. In fact, the learned Judge, while disposing of the appeals observed that the entire dispute rested on an issue as to whether the petitioners in those Rules were entitled to retain individually more than one unit of total agricultural and non agricultural lands permissible under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (hereinafter be referred to as the said Act), or they were entitled together to retain one unit. FMA No. 75 of 1972 has been preferred against the order made in Civil Rule No. 3756 (W) of 1969 and since in the said appeal, lands at Murshidabad are involved, the same would hereinafter be referred to as the said Murshidabad appeal. The other appeal being FMA No. 76 of 1972 has been preferred against the determinations in Civil Rule No. 3332 (W) of 1968 and the same relates to lands at Birbhum, as such, the said appeal would hereinafter be referred to as the said Birbhum Appeal. Petitioner/Appellant Nos. 1 to 4 in the said Murshidabad appeal have been claimed to be the sons of late Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat and petitioner/appellant Nos. 5 and 6 therein, have been stated to be the sons of the petitioner No.1, Brahma Deo Prosad Bhakat. The petitioner/appellant Nos. 7 and 8 have also been stated to be the sons of petitioner No.2, Parashuram Bhakat. Their predecessor-in-interest, late Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat has also been stated to be the son of Ramcharit Ram Bhakat, who died long ago and it was the case of the petitioner/appellants that they were governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu Law. 2. It has been stated that the said late Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat and the petitioners, as members of a Mitakshara joint family, held lands in khas possession and those lands have also been stated to be situated in the districts of Birbhum and Murshidabad. 2. It has been stated that the said late Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat and the petitioners, as members of a Mitakshara joint family, held lands in khas possession and those lands have also been stated to be situated in the districts of Birbhum and Murshidabad. The petitioners have also stated to be the coparceners on the vesting of their estates under the said Act. It has also been stated by them that the lands as indicated above, were the only lands held by them on the date of vesting, within the State of West Bengal. 3. In the said Murshidabad appeal it has also been stated, that by mistake the lands as above, were recorded in the record of right of the last revisional settlement in the name of two members of the concerned joint family viz. Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat and Brahma Deo Bhakat. It has further been stated, that thereafter, B.R. Case Nos. 96 and 101 were initiated. The said case No. 96 was directed against Brahma Deo Bhakat and the other one was initiated against Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat under section 6(5) read with section 6(1) of the said Act. Such initiation was made in the year 1961 by the Revenue Officer, Nalhati, Birbhum. It has been alleged that those cases were initiated on the allegations that the two persons as mentioned above, were the owners of all the lands and consequently they had no right to retain excess areas beyond the permissible ceiling under section 6(1) of the said Act and two ceilings were offered them separately. It would appear that those persons against whom the proceeding was initiated, appeared in the proceedings and claimed that all male members of the concerned Mitakshara family comprising with them and the said Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat, were the owners of the lands in question and each one of them would be entitled to retain a separate ceiling and that the records as prepared, were erroneous, apart from claiming that the proceedings as initiated were misconceived. 4. It has been stated that after this B.R. Case No. 96 was dropped and the other B.R. Case No. 101 had proceeded against Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat. 4. It has been stated that after this B.R. Case No. 96 was dropped and the other B.R. Case No. 101 had proceeded against Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat. It was the case of the petitioner that by an order of 16.3.1961, the concerned Revisional Officer No. II, Rampurhat, held that the record of rights require to be corrected, in view of the position as indicated above and by his order dated 21.3.1961, he held that the question whether the concerned coparceners should be granted share in the Column 14, should be decided as per departmental instructions as contained in General Order No. 48 dated 28.7.1956. It was the further claim of the petitioners that thereafter, the approval of the Charge Officer was obtained and after elaborate enquiry and investigation on affidavits, as suo motu case was started under section 45 of the said Act and the record of rights were corrected by inserting 9 names viz. the name of the petitioners and the said Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat and 1/9 undivided share was allotted to each of the coparceners in all the khatians in respect of the concerned lands. 5. It has also been stated that after such correction the record of rights, the B.R. Case was again taken up for consideration on 16.9.1965 and notices were directed to be issued on the parties and by a letter of 29.9.1965, they were directed to submit fresh returns in Form-B with Form-I, showing details of lands of all categories as held by them. Such opportunity was also directed to be availed of by 15.11.1965. The petitioners have stated that on that date, the petitioner No.2, Parashuram Bhakat, appeared on behalf of all the coparceners and prayed for time, which was allowed till 10.1.1966. It has been stated that the said Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat died on or about 2.7.1966. 6. It has been alleged that suddenly thereafter, on or about 21.4.1967, some of the petitioners received by registered post, copies of orders of the Revenue Officer-in-Charge of the Rampurhat Settlement Camp calling upon them to appear before him on 24.4.1967, with necessary papers, for the preparation of compensation assessment rolls. Such notices have been said to be sent in B.R. Case No. 101. Such notices have been said to be sent in B.R. Case No. 101. It was also the case of the petitioners that after this, on or about 7.6.1967, they filed 9 separate returns in Form-B, showing the lands they wanted to retain in both the districts of Murshidabad and Birbhum and subsequently, they had also sent separate statements in Form-I, by registered post, showing all their lands in the State of West Bengal and more particularly in the districts as mentioned above. It was the case of the petitioners that in those returns, they had claimed to retain a separate unit or ceiling under section 6(1) of the said Act, apart from claiming one unit or ceiling for Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat, since deceased. The petitioners have also stated to have filed on 7.6.1967, before the Revenue Officer concerned, an application stating that they were entitled to separate, ceilings and so also the said deceased Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat. The petitioners have stated that if they are allowed to retain separate ceilings, then the aggregate of the lands, they would !be entitled to retain, would considerably exceed the total lands held by their Mitakshara family on the date of vesting under the said Act and none of their lands could vest in the State. It hall further been stated that ultimately, the Additional Settlement Officer and the Revenue Officer-in-Charge, Rampurhat Settlement-B. Camp, started a suo motu proceeding under section 44(2a) of the said Act, being suo motu Case No. 581 of 1967, for revision of the concerned khatians, as they stood after the abovementioned revision and by an order of 28.7.1967, it was directed that in the concerned Khatians, names of the coparceners should be recorded and all will be governed together as one unit holding in 16 annas share with Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat as the Karta of the family and with a note that Mitakshara Law would be applicable. The petitioners have claimed that the effect of such order was to cancel the entries regarding entries in the Khatians previously revised. They have also stated that thereafter, by an order passed in the said B.R. Case No. 101, only one ceiling bas been allotted to them and the rest of the lands have been directed to be vested in the State. 7. They have also stated that thereafter, by an order passed in the said B.R. Case No. 101, only one ceiling bas been allotted to them and the rest of the lands have been directed to be vested in the State. 7. It should be noted that the statements upto the point and as mentioned hereinbefore, are the same in the two appeals under consideration. It would appear that against the order of the Revenue Officer, Birbhum, this Court was moved and the petitioners obtained Civil Rule No. 352 (W) of 1958, with the corresponding and necessary interim order, restraining the authorities concerned from disturbing their possession in respect of the lands in question. It was against the order made in that Civil Rule the said Birbhum appeal was preferred. 8. It has been stated in the Rule giving rise to the said Murshidabad appeal that in or about the latter part of 1969 suo motu proceedings were filed under section 44(2a) of the said Act, through the respective notices in respect of the lands at Murshidabad and those proceedings were heard together. It has been claimed that in these proceedings like the proceedings in Birbhum case, the petitioners contended that they were governed by the Mitakshara Law and were entitled to separate ceilings. It was stated that the petitioners were coparceners and they were so on the date of vesting. It would appear that by an order of 31.3.1969 the Respondent No.1, Assistant Settlement Officer held that the petitioners were coparceners and governed by Mitakshara Law, but following the observations of the Revenue Officer, Birbhum to the effect that unless there was registered partition deed before the date of vesting, the petitioners would not be entitled to separate ceilings, the contentions as raised by the petitioners were not accepted. It has also been stated that in the concerned order, it has further been recorded that it was admitted that there was no such document and as such, only one ceiling could be allowed to the petitioners as the consequence thereof, necessary directions for revision of the khatians, by canceling the entries therein were given. It was also directed that the names of all the petitioners to be shown together as entitled to have one unit. It was also directed that the names of all the petitioners to be shown together as entitled to have one unit. The petitioners have further claimed that at the time of obtaining the concerned Rule the Respondents were collecting rents from them in respect of the lands covered by the khatians in question and necessary receipts for such collections were granted. 9. In the said Birbhum appeal, the petitioners have stated that on 7.6.1967 the Assistant Settlement Officer concerned adjourned the hearing for one month and on the said adjourned date, the learned pleader attending on their behalf was told to file a return in Form-I on behalf of or for the estate of Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat. The petitioners in that appeal have stated that on such, they became apprehensive and on legal advice, they, through their agent made successive applications for certified copies of the entire order-sheet in the concerned B.R. Case. They also asked for the copies of orders passed on their applications and the papers filed by them, on 7.6.1967, apart from asking for copies of the returns in Form-B. It has been alleged that excepting the returns in form-B, certified copies of no other documents were supplied to them. 10. It is the case of the petitioners that thereafter, on or about 11.6.1967, petitioner No.2, Parashuram Bhakat, No.5 minor Mohan Ram Bhakat and No.7 minor Babluram Bhakat, again received notices from the Assistant Settlement Officer concerned, for appearing before him on 25.7.1967, with necessary papers for preparation of compensation assessment rolls. It was their case that the earlier notices were purported to be issued under section 57 of the said Act. It has been stated that on 25.7.1967, the petitioners filed an application before the said Respondent No.2, referring to the papers already filed by them and praying for time to file further papers, if any, and that apart on 28.7.1967, they made an application for giving them a hearing and fixing a date for the same. It has been alleged that the said Respondent No.2 verbally told the officer representing the petitioners, that he had already passed the order allowing them to retain only one ceiling. It has been alleged that the said date of passing the said order was not communicated to the petitioners. It has been alleged that the said Respondent No.2 verbally told the officer representing the petitioners, that he had already passed the order allowing them to retain only one ceiling. It has been alleged that the said date of passing the said order was not communicated to the petitioners. In such circumstance and for moving this Court, the petitioners have claimed to have been made application for certified copies of the entire order-sheet of the concerned B.R. Case without any due response form the authorities concerned, within a reasonable time. 11. It has been stated that it would appear from the copies of order No.20 dated 25.7.1967, that Respondent No.2, the Assistant Settlement Officer concerned adjourned the case for further hearing till 28.7.1967 and directed the petitioners to submit return in Form-I for Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat by that date and thereafter by order No.21 dated 28.7.1967, the said Officer accepted the return in Form-I of the estate of the said Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat and took up the case for further consideration. The petitioners have alleged that the officer concerned demanded a partition deed, but on being told by the representative of the petitioners that there was no such deed, he held that a partition deed was a factor to be considered and to be seen therefrom whether each coparceners were entitled to have a separate ceiling so far as the retentions of the lands were concerned. It has been alleged that thereafter, the officer concerned has observed that the record of rights, which had been revised by suo motu case in 1961, by entering the names each of the petitioners was contrary to the Departments instructions as mentioned hereinbefore and require revision and consequently, the officer concerned, has observed that as the parties representative Madan Mohan Bhattacharjee was present, suo motu case under section 44(2a) of the said Act would be taken up for revision of the record of rights and as a result thereof, the said officer adjourned the B.R. case till the disposal of the said suo motu case and until further notice to the petitioners. 12. The petitioners have claimed that it would appear from the copy of the order-sheet in that B.R. Case No. 101 of 1961 that on 28.7.1967, a suo motu case under section 44(2a) of the said Act was started bearing No. 581 of 1967. 12. The petitioners have claimed that it would appear from the copy of the order-sheet in that B.R. Case No. 101 of 1961 that on 28.7.1967, a suo motu case under section 44(2a) of the said Act was started bearing No. 581 of 1967. It has further been claimed by the petitioners that from the certified copies of the order-sheet which were granted to them on 2.12.1967, they have learnt that the case as mentioned above, was started in respect of all the lands in all the khatians and Mouzas and the said order further directed to issue notices on Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat and others to appear before him on that very day i.e. 28.7.1967 and to produce records, if any, in connection with the revision of entries in the record of rights and by a subsequent order passed on that very day, the Assistant Settlement Officer concerned held that the parties concerned could not claim individual shares in the properties and they were not entitled to remain lands under section 6(1) of the said Act as separate units in the absence of registered partition deed, even though it was held that they were governed by the Mitakshara Law. The petitioners have stated that after such holding, it has been ordered that in the khatians, the names of the coparceners should be recorded as, holding together one unit i.e. 16 annas interest. 13. It was the further allegation of the petitioners that no copy was issued to them in respect of the concerned suo motu proceedings under section 44(2a) of the said Act and as such, they were not conscious of what was happening in the office of the Assistant Settlement Officer concerned. 13. It was the further allegation of the petitioners that no copy was issued to them in respect of the concerned suo motu proceedings under section 44(2a) of the said Act and as such, they were not conscious of what was happening in the office of the Assistant Settlement Officer concerned. It has further been alleged that no written notice was also served on Shri Madan Mohan Bhattacharjee, the representative of petitioners in the B.R. Case and in any event, the said Shri Bhattacharjee had also no authority to receive such notices on their behalf it has been stated that after this, by order No. 22 dated 21.8.1967, passed in the concerned B.R. Case, the Assistant Settlement Officer directed notices to issue on the parties for final disposal of the case, fixing the dated on 29.8.1967 and by subsequent order No.22 dated 29.8.1967, he disposed of the cases in the absence of the petitioners and treated the Form-B return submitted in respect of the estate of Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat, since deceased, as the only return submitted in the case and proceeded as if the parties had filed their option by the same. The petitioners have stated that by such act their other returns have been discarded and disregarded and that too without any basis and without following the principles of natural justice. It was the case of the petitioners that no notice in pursuant of order No. 22 dated 21.8.1967 was actually served on them and they are still in possession of the entire lands. It was also their case that if they are retained units individually the total area of their holdings and entitlements would be much above the prescribed ceiling and no portion of their land can be vested in the State. 14. The affidavit-in-opposition in the Rule wherefrom the said Murshidabad appeal has arisen was filed by Shri Bishnupada Saba, the Assistant Settlement Officer, Berhampur, Murshidabad. In fact, he has also stated to be the Special Revenue Officer Grade-II, Berhampur. He has claimed that the statement as made in the concerned petition to be misleading and it was his specific case that even if the petitioners were guided by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, there was no valid partition by metes and bounds among them before the date of vesting. He has claimed that the statement as made in the concerned petition to be misleading and it was his specific case that even if the petitioners were guided by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, there was no valid partition by metes and bounds among them before the date of vesting. He has stated that Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat was the owner of certain agricultural and non-agricultural lands in both the districts of Murshidabad and Birbhum and besides the lands recorded in his favour, he had managed to get some lands recorded in favour of Brahmodeo Prosad Bhakat, Kedar Nath Bhakat, Madan Mohan Bhakat and Parashuram Bhakat, for the purpose of evading the provisions of the said Act and to retain more lands than one would be entitled to under section 6(1) of the same. He has stated that the records in favour Brahmodeo Bhakat and others were revised under section 44(2a) of the said Act on service of due notice on the parties. It was his case that the petitioners failed to prove that there was a valid partition prior to the date of vesting and as per decisions of the said 44(2a) cases, it was finally held that there was no valid partition by the metes and bounds among the coparceners before the date of vesting and so, the properties in question could not be recorded separately in the names of some of the coparceners and therefore it was ordered that the properties owned by the joint Mitakshara family should be recorded in favour of Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat as Karta and that 16 annas share be mentioned against him in column 14 and consequently the names of other coparceners could be recorded in column 13 in a bracket without any specific share. It was also the case of the deponent that when section 6(1) proceeding at Rampurhat was disposed of, all the lands could not be detected. He has further stated that as per decision in 44(2a) cases of Jangipur B-Camp. Murshidabad, 87.99 acres of agricultural lands and 0.71 acres of non agricultural lands were detected in the district of Murshidabad and the additional lands as detected were vested, as no option was exercised for their retention. 15. He has further stated that as per decision in 44(2a) cases of Jangipur B-Camp. Murshidabad, 87.99 acres of agricultural lands and 0.71 acres of non agricultural lands were detected in the district of Murshidabad and the additional lands as detected were vested, as no option was exercised for their retention. 15. The deponent has admitted that B.R. Case No. 96 of 1967 and B.R. Case No. 101 of 1967 were started to assess the lands retained by Brahma Deo Bhakat and Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat, but he denied that both cases were started on the same allegations. It has been stated that both the persons as mentioned above, had lands in excess of ceiling under section 6(1) of the said Act on the date of vesting and as such, two separate cases had to be initiated and he has also admitted that the two persons as mentioned above had submitted their applications. The deponent has also admitted the filing of affidavits by the owners, but he has denied that the names and shares of the owners were corrected under section 45 of the said Act. It has been stated that the order dated 11.8.1965 in B.R. Case No. 101 would show that the suo motu case was to be started, but it appeared from the order-sheet, no formal proceedings under section 46 was ever started to consider the issue after examining the documents and other evidence and in fact the record was purported to be corrected only on the basis of a note in a mistake list, kept and maintained for departmental works. The deponent has stated that the relevant notices which were issued were returned unserved as Shaw Prosanna Ram Bhakat was died by that time and such notices on the petitioners, as heirs of the said Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat, were issued thereafter. It was the case of the deponent that the petitioners were absent on successive hearing in B.R. Case No. 101 and further obtained adjournments through their lawyer till 7.6.1967. The deponent has further stated that it would appear from order No. 20 dated 25.7.1967 in B.R. Case No. 101 that the learned lawyer on behalf of the petitioners were heard on main contentions that Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat and others as coparceners, were entitled to retain lands separately. The deponent has further stated that it would appear from order No. 20 dated 25.7.1967 in B.R. Case No. 101 that the learned lawyer on behalf of the petitioners were heard on main contentions that Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat and others as coparceners, were entitled to retain lands separately. It has been pointed out that the learned lawyer appearing at that time was asked to prove partition and defined share of each coparceners and to produce the registered partition deed but he expressed his inebriety in that matter, as there was no partition deed till then. It was the case of deponent that Form No.1 was not submitted and the learned lawyer for the petitioners appearing at that time prayed for time, which was granted till 28.8.1967. He has stated that the learned lawyer of the petitioners took notes of the order by putting his endorsement below the concerned order and on 28.7.1967, another petition for time was filed, but as many adjournments was already granted, the said petition was rejected. The deponent has also stated that the petitioners at that time was represented by Shri Madan Mohan Bhattacharjee, who was informed about the order passed in Case No. 581 of 1967 under section 44(2a) which wag disposed of on 28.7.1967, after hearing him. 16. It has further been stated by the deponent that after the disposal of the section 6(1) proceeding at Rampurhat Camp, as more lands were found to be retained by the petitioners, suo motu proceeding under section 44(2a) were started, with the notices on the petitioners and the cases were heard and disposed of analogously and on such disposal, it was found 87.99 acres of agricultural lands and 0.71 acres of non-agricultural lands were found to be recorded in favour of the joint coparcenary and all other lands as detected were ordered to be vested in the state. Such vesting has been claimed by the deponent to be lawful and the said deponent has further denied the other contentions as sought to be raised by the petitioners in the Rule. 17. The affidavit-in-opposition in the Rule wherefrom the said Birbhum appeal has arisen was filed by Shri Suhas Chandra Sen, who at the relevant time was the Assistant Settlement Officer and Revenue Officer of Rampurhat Settlement Camp. 17. The affidavit-in-opposition in the Rule wherefrom the said Birbhum appeal has arisen was filed by Shri Suhas Chandra Sen, who at the relevant time was the Assistant Settlement Officer and Revenue Officer of Rampurhat Settlement Camp. He has stated that in the finally published record of rights during the last settlement, Shri Ramcharit Bhakat and Ramsabak Bhakat, sons of Gatilal Bhakat were recorded in equal shares and from those records it appeared that the predecessor in interest of the petitioners adopted the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law when they came here. He has further stated, the names of the sons of Ramcharit and Ramsabak did not appear in .the last settlement record and the District Compensation Officer, Birbhum also paid ad interim payment of compensation to Shaw Prosanna Ram Bhakat in Case No. 27(1) of 1958-59, which according to him proved and established that the tenancy existing in the name of Ramcharit upto 1361 B.S. The deponent has stated that during the present settlement, the family was considered as Mitakshara joint family having been undivided up to the date of vesting in Case No. 581 of 1967 under section 44(2a). He has stated that as per the order dated 28.7.1967 in Case No. 581 of 1967 as mentioned above, the family has been treated as joint and undivided one, governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law of which Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat was shown as Karta with the eight petitioners as other coparceners. He has further stated that the application in Form-B was filed by Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat as Karta for self and others, for ad interim compensation and he also filed the application dated 26.5.1958 before the Sub-Divisional Compensation Officer, Rampurhat, for self and as Karta praying that compensation may be paid to him as such Karta. The deponent has also pointed out that a letter of 18.3.1958, addressed to the Sub-Divisional Compensation Officer, Rampurhat would of course show that the family was claimed to be guided by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law and it was the case of the deponent that from other intrinsic evidence and more particularly of the Agricultural Income-Tax Officer, Burdwan, would appear that the said Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat was assessed as Karta of the Hindu undivided family during 1950-52 to 1956-57 i.e. up to the date of vesting. If was his further case that since both the persons as mentioned above, had lands in excess of the prescribed ceiling, soon the date of vesting, two separate cases were started. It was the further case of the deponent that two applications were filed by Shri Brahmadeo Bhakat and Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat on 11.8.1961 in B.R. Case Nos. 96 and 101, stating that the family was governed by Mitakshara Law and the coparceners be recorded with separate shares. The deponent has stated that B.R. Case No. 96 was not dropped as claimed, but the same was analogously heard with the Case No. 101. It was his further case that the two persons as mentioned above had filed two applications on 9.8.1961, stating that they were governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law and the records should thus be prepared allotting shares to each individual as coparceners. The initiation or starting of suo motu case under section 45 has been denied and it has been stated that the entries as mentioned above, were done without any notice to the superior landlords and the Collector. The correction under challenge, as made have been claimed to be due, legal and proper. The deponent has further stated that the concerned B.R. Case was adjourned till 1.10.1961 and the same could not be taken up for consideration before 4.2.1967. He has stated that notices were issued, but they were returned unserved as Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat was reported to be dead. On such, it has been claimed by the deponent that notices were issued and served on the heirs of the said deceased. He has further claimed that throughout the proceedings, the petitioners were represented by Sri Madan Mohan Bhattacharjee and on 28.5.1967 they were represented by a learned Lawyer, who again prayed for time, which was allowed. According to the deponent, the petitioners were and are governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law and belonged to a coparcenary at the time of vesting of the estate and as such they would jointly be entitled to one ceiling only. 18. The deponent has stated that there has been no irregular or illegal use of power or any inaction on the part of the respondents in not supplying the certified copies of the documents as was asked for. 18. The deponent has stated that there has been no irregular or illegal use of power or any inaction on the part of the respondents in not supplying the certified copies of the documents as was asked for. He has further stated that the learned lawyer representing the petitioners were asked to prove partition and defined shares of each coparceners in the proceedings on production of registered partition deed, but he expressed his inability to produce the same, as there was no such deed. According to him, return in Form-I was not submitted and a prayer for accommodation was made by the learned lawyer, which was allowed till 28.7.1967. The deponent has further stated that the learned lawyer took notes of the order by putting his endorsement below the order dated 28.7.1967 and on that date, he filed a further petition for time, but the same was not allowed. According to him, on 28.7.1967, Shri Madan Mohan Bhattacharjee also represented the parties and he was informed about the order passed in Case No. 581 of 1967 under section 44(2a), which was disposed of on that date after hearing the said Shri Bhattacharjee. It was the further case of the deponent that the representative of the parties was not present on the date fixed for hearing and such fear was also made known to him, as on being asked, he signed at the relevant record. According to him the parties were heard through their representative and there was no objection raised by them for continuing with the hearing. It has been stated by the deponent that as the estate of Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat was not partitioned, so the coparceners were justifiably allowed one ceiling. 19. As indicated hereinbefore, since the facts and point of law to be decided in the two appeals under consideration were found to be the same, so they were heard and disposed of by one judgment. The main point for determination as indicated hereinbefore, was found to be, as to whether the petitioners would be entitled to retain individually more than one unit of both agricultural and non-agricultural lands permissible under the said Act or they would be entitled to retain only one unit as they were governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. The main point for determination as indicated hereinbefore, was found to be, as to whether the petitioners would be entitled to retain individually more than one unit of both agricultural and non-agricultural lands permissible under the said Act or they would be entitled to retain only one unit as they were governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. Such being the position, after testing the facts of the two cases on the basis of the determinations in the case of Fate Chand Maheswari & other vs. State of West Bengal & other, AIR 1972 Cal. 177 , the Rules have been discharged. In that case, it has been observed that joint family (not each coparcener) is an intermediary under the said Act and such family should, therefore, be treated as the single individual or a single unit, for the purpose of retention of land and also for compensation under the said Act. It has also been observed in that case that the vesting of coparcenary property under the said Act cannot be regarded as effecting partition of the coparcenary and the joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law is a person under the definition of the term as given in section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act and a single coparcener out of the body of the coparceners constituting the coparcenary cannot be held to be a person or a co-sharer tenant. It has also been observed in that case that under section 6 of the said Act, no provision has been made for retention of lands by the coparceners governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law and such fact points to the intention of the legislature that the legislature did not intend to treat each coparcener as an intermediary under the said Act. It has also been observed that section 14(3) of the said Act clearly indicates that the intermediary for assessment of compensation must have a share in any estate or interest, so that he may be treated separately for assessment of compensation. The share referred to in sub-section (3) means a defined share as the coparcener to have a defined share in the coparcenary properties, he cannot be treated separately for the purpose of assessment of compensation under section 14(3). The share referred to in sub-section (3) means a defined share as the coparcener to have a defined share in the coparcenary properties, he cannot be treated separately for the purpose of assessment of compensation under section 14(3). The said determination has further observed that partition is a severance of joint status and all that is necessary to constitute partition is definite and unequivocal indication of the intention of a member of a joint family to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severality. But this intentions has to be communicated to the other members of the family. 20. It should be noted that from the determinations as impeached in these two appeals, it would appear that apart from the right of the parties to hold separate units as coparceners of the Mitakshara family, no other point was urged and following the Division Bench judgment in the Court as referred to hereinbefore, the Rules were discharged holding that in view of the law as laid down, the petitioner's were not entitled to claim any right to retain any individual units. 21. Mr. Dutt, appearing in support of the appeals contended that the law as laid down in the case of Fate Chand Maheswari & other vs. State of West Bengal & other (supra), would not apply or would be available in the facts of these cases and if the facts of these cases are scanned and applied duly, there would be no doubt about the above position or at least to return a verdict that these appeals are distinguishable on facts. The law as laid down in the abovementioned case was of course stated by Mr. Dutt, in his usual fairness, is the law, as enunciated by this Court and more particularly when the said determination has not, to his knowledge, set aside or upset in appeal. Mr. Dutt, claimed that the law relating to Mitakshara or the entitlement of the right to hold one unit as observed in Fate Chand Maheswari's case (supra), should be tested firstly, on the basis of coparcenary right or the entitlement of holding on that basis and secondly, on the basis of coparcenary property. Mr. Mr. Dutt, claimed that the law relating to Mitakshara or the entitlement of the right to hold one unit as observed in Fate Chand Maheswari's case (supra), should be tested firstly, on the basis of coparcenary right or the entitlement of holding on that basis and secondly, on the basis of coparcenary property. Mr. Dutt stated that even though there is no evidence of partition or any formal evidence of the same, but in fact there has been a partition, if not by any actual deed, by a partition of the coparcenary property or the disruption of the coparcenary, either by the act of parities or by their conduct or at least when such partition has been shown, without any objection from or by the coparceners, in the relevant khatians or records in Annexure "A" where respective shares of the coparceners have been recorded. It was Mr. Dutt's specific submissions that no formal partition, to establish partition of the Joint property in Mitakshara Hindu family, is necessary and so also, no declaration to that effect is necessary. 22. In support of his submissions as above, Mr. Dutt firstly, referred to the case of Katma Natchier vs. Srimut Rajah Mootoo Vijaya Ragandha Bodha Gooroo Swamy Periya Tavar, 9 MTA 539, where it has been held amongst others that in a united Hindu family where there is ancestral property, and one of the members of the family acquires separate estate, on the death of that member, such separate acquired estate does not fall into the common stock, but descends to the male issue, if any, of the acquirer, or in default to his daughter, who, white they take their father's share in the ancestral property, subject to all the rights of co-parceners, inherit the self-acquired estate free from such rights. Where property belonging in common to a united Hindu family has been divided, the share of a deceased member of the family goes in the general course of crescent of separate acquired property, but if there is a co-partnership between the different members or the united family survivorship follow and upon the principle of the survivorship, the right of the co-partners in the undivided estate overrides the widow's right of succession, but with respect self-acquired property of a member or the united family, the other members of the family have neither community or interests, now unity or possession, therefore, the foundation of the right to take by survivorship fails. Secondly, Mr. Dutt referred to the observations, that according to the true constitution of an undivided Hindu family, no individual member of the family, whist it remains undivided, can predicate of the joint and undivided property, that he has a certain denture share and the proceeds of undivided property must brought to the common chest or purse, and there dealt with according to the modes of enjoyment by the members of the family. But if the members of an undivided family agree among themselves with regard to particular property, that it shall thenceforth be the subject of ownership in certain defined shares, then the character or undivided property and joint enjoyment is taken away from the subject matter so agree to be dealt with and each member has thenceforth a definite and certain share in the estate, which he may claim to receive and enjoy in severalty, although the property itself has not been actually served and divided, apart from holding that where, therefore, a deed of partition was made and executed by the members of an undivided family, dealing with and making actual partition of a portion of the joint estate, but leaving the remainder to be divided at a future period in the same manner, such deed, being a division of right operated as a conversion of the tenancy and a change of status in the family, quoad the property specified, changing, as it were the joint tenancy thereof into a tenancy in common, and by operation or law making the members of the previously undivided family a divided family in respect of such property, as made in the case of Appovier altas Seetaramier vs. Rama Subla Aiyan, Venkatrana Aiyan Anantammal, Anna Aiyan & Anantana Raiyana Aiyan, 11 MIA 75, and thirdly, to the observations in the case of The Collector of Madusa vs. Mootoo Rainsingh Sathupathy, 12 MIA 397. Mr. Dutt, apart from his claims as indicated above and that too in support of his claim of partition, contended that filling of returns in Form "B" by the coparceners has in this case proved and established the intention to have the properties partitioned and, he could not contend otherwise on the contentions of Mr. Basu, appearing for the respondents, that in these cases there has been no agreement amongst the co-shares to prove such partition or ate least the intention of the same. In fact, Mr. Dutt depended on the recordings made by the Revenue Officer in the Annexure as mentioned above, to establish the case of partition or the intention of the same and there was or has been no evidence produced to establish the actual fact of partition or any declaration intention for the same. 23. The submissions on the incidents of Mitakshara, were further sought to be substantiated by Mr. 23. The submissions on the incidents of Mitakshara, were further sought to be substantiated by Mr. Dutt, on reference to section 214 and 235 of Hindu Law, which respectively deals with formation or coparcenary and the rights of the coparceners. As appeared from the pleadings, there has in fact been no evidence or disruption of the coparcenary or any expression, of the intention of the coparceners, to have their properties partitioned, of their own, but such partition has been claimed to have actually happened or taken place on the basis of the determinations of the shares by the Revenue Officer concerned. The validity of such determination or the bond fide and property of the same has been denied and doubted by Mr. Basu and he further claimed that steps for correction of such mistakes were not initiated under section 45 of the said Act. The holding by the officers concerned as mentioned earlier, were on the basis of a Government order. Mr. Dutt questioned in these appeals, the validity, bona fide and so also the authoritative character of the same, even though there was no challenge to that Government order in the Rule, either directly or indirectly. That order or the contents thereof are really in the light of the determinations in Fate Chand Maheswari's case (supra) or the terms thereof and as such have received the sanction of law in view of the determination. The concerned Government order was produced at the time of hearing of these appeals and the same has been looked into after Mr. Dutt took inspection of the same. The terms of that order, which would be of relevant consideration are:- (i) Where there is a proper instrument of partition or a decree of Court, the coparceners who have separated must be regarded as individual owners. (ii) Where there is no such instrument of decree, such evidence as may be offered may be considered, and the Revenue Officer may decide as to whether any separation or partition has taken place. Such evidence may consist of separate possession and enjoyment of specific properties or specific shares in the property. The manner of separate management, such as separate occupation of portion of joint property, definement of shares in the joint property in the Revenue and Land Registration records, separate collection, payment of outgoing and liabilities in respect of the properties, may be relevant evidence. The manner of separate management, such as separate occupation of portion of joint property, definement of shares in the joint property in the Revenue and Land Registration records, separate collection, payment of outgoing and liabilities in respect of the properties, may be relevant evidence. (iii) It must be remembered that under Mitakshara Law, partition among coparceners consist in splitting up the joint ownership and ascertaining and defining the shares of the coparceners. Once the shares are defined, whether by agreement between the coparceners or otherwise, the partition is complete. A definite and unequivocal indication of the intention of a coparcener to separate himself from the family and enjoy his property communicated to other coparceners constitutes partition and severance of the joint status. After the shares are defined, the partied may divide the property by metes and bounds or they may continue to live together and enjoy the property in common. 24. Section 21 of the Bengal General Clauses Act lays down, where, by any Bengal Act or West Bengal Act a power to issue any order, scheme, rule, by-law, notification or form is conferred, then expressions used in the order, scheme, rule, by-law, notification or form, if it is made after the commencement of this Act, shall, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, have the same respective meanings as in the Act conferring the power and on the basis those provisions, Mr. Dutt claimed that the entire proceedings as initiated in these cases were null and void, apart from being without jurisdiction and authority and such being the position, the appellants would be entitled to urge new points or such points of law as involved, even though they were not argued at the time of the hearing of the Rules. The submissions as sought to be made now being questions of law or being purely of construction of statute, Mr. Dutt claimed that there would be no bar for the appellants to urge them on the basis of determinations in the case of T.G. Appanenda Mudaliar etc. State of Madras, AIR 1976 SC 2450 . 25. Thereafter, Mr. The submissions as sought to be made now being questions of law or being purely of construction of statute, Mr. Dutt claimed that there would be no bar for the appellants to urge them on the basis of determinations in the case of T.G. Appanenda Mudaliar etc. State of Madras, AIR 1976 SC 2450 . 25. Thereafter, Mr. Dutt argued and that too as a point of law for the first time in these appeals that initiation of suo motu proceedings under section 44(2a) of the said Act as involved in these appeals and specially the said Murshidabad Appeal was improper, as such initiation was void abinitio, being in excess of powers competence, jurisdiction and authority. On the powers of the authorities concerned and specially in view the use of the words "revise and entry" as used in section 44(2a) of the said Act, Mr. Dutt contended that such power of revision was not all inclusive, but a restricted one, and in support of such submissions, he referred to the observations of the Supreme Court, that whenever a power is conferred on an authority to revise an order, the authority is entitled to examine the correctness, legality and propriety of the order and to pass such suitable orders as the authority may think fit in the circumstances of the particular case before it. When exercising such powers the authority is entitled to hold an enquiry or direct an enquiry to be hold, and for that purpose, admit additional material. The proceedings for revision, if started suo motu not, of course, be based on a mere conjecture and there should be some ground for invoking the revisional powers. Once those powers are invoked, the actual interference must be based on sufficient grounds and if it is considered necessary that some additional enquiry should be made to arrive at a proper and just decision, there can be no bar to the revising authority, holding a further enquiry or directing such an enquiry to be held by some other appropriate authority, as made in the case of Swastick Oil Mills Ltd. vs. H.B. Munshi, Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay, AIR 1968 SC 843 . Several amendments to 44(2a) of the said Act have been made since incorporation and it was the specific submission of Mr. Several amendments to 44(2a) of the said Act have been made since incorporation and it was the specific submission of Mr. Dutt, that since all the amendments have not been duly made or the extensions of the periods, not having been on due notifications, the reopening as sought to be made in this case, was void and such defective initiation on the basis of a notification duly extending the necessary period, has vitiated the entire proceeding. It was claimed by Mr. Dutt that West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Amendment) Act, (West Bengal Act IX of 1967) having been promulgated without the assent of President, in terms of the requirements of Article 31(3) of the Constitution of India, all acts taken on that basis or thereafter, were inoperative, void and without jurisdiction. In support of his submissions, Mr. Dutt referred to the Special Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ananda Kumar Chakraborty & another State of West Bengal & other, 1977(1) CLJ 1 . In that case, the questions which were formulated for decision were (a) whether the West Bengal Act IX of 1967 was an Act which required under Article 31(3) of the Constitution to be reserved for consideration by the President of India and his assent thereto in order to become law; and (b) whether the President having given his assent to the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Amending) Act of 1973, can be said to have given his assent to the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1967 (West Bengal Act IX of 1967) and if so, with effect from what does? and these questions have been answered in the manner as under:- (a) The West Bengal Act IX of 1967 being inextricably linked up with the scheme of acquisition comes within the purview of clause (2) of Article 31 of the Constitution and without the assent of the President the same is unenforceable. The question (a) as formulated above has, therefore, been answered in the affirmative. (b) As the President had given his assent to the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1969, it can be said that the President had given his assent to the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1967, being the West Bengal Act IX of 1967, must be deemed to have been given when the President assented to the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1969. The second question has been thus answered. 26. It has also been held in that case, that when the suo motu proceedings for rectification of the record of rights were taken up, the proceedings were initiated beyond the time and as such without jurisdiction. The subsequent assent of the President to the subsequent Amending Act can only be effective from the date of subsequent assent to the subsequent Amending Act. Inasmuch as the said proceedings have been initiated before that date, it must be held that the proceeding and the impugned order were without jurisdiction. The said proceedings and the rectification orders mentioned in the writ petitions were therefore quashed and set aside. Mr. Dutt stated that the challenge as indicated above would of course be available from the writ application, even though specific facts have not been pleaded. It was also the contention of Mr. Dutt, that on the basis of the interpretation of the word revise, as in section 44(2a) or the guideline as indicated therein, the proceedings as in these cases, could not be used for revision of the records already prepared or to give a go by to such recording. The specific terms as used in the concerned orders or the orders requiring to reopen, being to regularize the records as was on the date of vesting, such regularization would not come within the purview of the word revise and as such also, the impugned proceedings was liable to be set aside. The word revise according to the observations in the case of Must. Hasuear Khatun vs. Revenue Officer, Midnapur & other, AIR 1971 Cal. 105 , means to re-examine/review amend. The said word, in terms of the decision is also used in an ordinary sense and means to re-examine the finally published record of rights or review or amend any entry in the finally published record of rights. The said word, in terms of the determinations in Ramsarup vs. Sikhar Chand, AIR 1961 All 221 , in the wider sense covers not only the power to confirm or set aside the order of an authority, but also to issue a fresh permission. The above case has also observed that the word revise should be construed in its plain dictionary meaning, which again is a wide one. The word revise according to Oxford's Dictionary means to examine and amend faults. The above case has also observed that the word revise should be construed in its plain dictionary meaning, which again is a wide one. The word revise according to Oxford's Dictionary means to examine and amend faults. The said word, in terms of the determinations in the abovementioned Allahabad case, has been observed, in terms of the Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, to mean to go through carefully and correct where necessary. The above being the specific and categorical meaning of the word revise, it would be very difficult to hold in agreement with Mr. Dutt, that the word regularize which also means to regulate and further means to control by rule, subject to restrictions and adapt to requirements, would not come within the wider definition and meaning of the term revise. In the case of Babaji Kondaji Gavad vs. Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. Nasik & other, (1984) 2 SCC 50 , to which reference was made by Mr. Dutt, it has been observed that where statute prescribed procedure for doing a thing, it must be done accordingly unless there is any contrary indication. We feel, in the special facts of those cases that determination would not be of any help or assistance to the appellant, and any action to regularize word some within the meaning and purview of the words to revise. As such, the initiation of proceedings for the purpose of regularization of the records in the facts of this case could not be said to be improper, invalid or without jurisdiction. 27. Even though there has admittedly been no appropriate pleading on mala fide with necessary particulars or any pleading on malice in law against the respondents, yet, Mr. Dutt contended that arguments on that score would be available to the appellants in the facts of this case and in view of the determinations of the Supreme Court in the case of S.R. Venkataraman vs. Union of India & another, (1979) 2 SCC 491 . That was a case where the appellant, a Central Government Officer, was retired prematurely from service public interest. The High Court dismissed her writ petition in limine and on appeal before the Supreme Court, she made an allegation of malice against her by one of her superiors under whom she served for a very short period and got an adverse report. The High Court dismissed her writ petition in limine and on appeal before the Supreme Court, she made an allegation of malice against her by one of her superiors under whom she served for a very short period and got an adverse report. She also contended that the Government did not apply its mind to her service record and in the facts and circumstances of the case the power under Rule 56(j)(i) was not exercised for the furtherance of public interest and that the order was based on extraneous considerations. The respondent Government conceded that there was nothing on record which could justify the order and allowing the appeal in view of the concession as indicated above, the Supreme Court has observed that in the present case, there was nothing on record to show that the appellants superior was able to influence the Central Government in making the order of premature retirement. It was, therefore, not the case of the appellant that there was actual malicious intention on the part of the Government in making the impugned order so as to amount to malice in fact, and malice in law is different from malice in fact and may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable or probable cause. Mr. Dutt also contended that malice in fact is required to be pleaded but not malice in law. On the pleadings and available materials before us, we do not find any mala fide intention in these cases, to have the proceedings intiated. 28. As mentioned hereinbefore, there has been no evidence of cessation or disruption of the joint coparcenary and that too in our view on partition or otherwise of the joint properties and in fact there has been no definite and unequivocal indication of the coparceners in that respect and thus to enjoy the respective shares individually, which intention was again required by law, to be communicated to the other members of the joint family. There has in fact been no evidence of partition. While on this point, we thus find justification in the submissions of Mr. There has in fact been no evidence of partition. While on this point, we thus find justification in the submissions of Mr. Basu that there has actually been no such statement of such severence of the joint status of the coparcenary before the coming into force of the said Act or prior to the date of vesting of the lands under the same. It was the specific contention of Mr. Basu that necessary declaration of the disruption of the coparcenary or the breaking of the jointness of the same should have been made before the date of vesting of the lands under the said Act and not after, as in this case, and if such subsequent declaration is allowed or considered or given effect to, that would frustrate the very purpose of the said Act which provides for the State acquisition of estates, of rights of intermediaries therein and of certain rights of raiyats and under-raiyats and of the rights of certain other persons in lands comprised in estates and in terms of the said Act the redistribution of the surplus agricultural lands will be effected under the provisions of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. After vesting of the estates of the intermediaries in the State, the intermediaries who will be allowed to retain agricultural lands, as permissible under the Act, shall hold such lands on the same terms and conditions as occupancy raiyats under the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885. So far as the holding of agricultural lands is concerned, there will be now only one class of tenant and that is a raiyat. The class of tenant, known as under raiyat, now stands abolished as section 4 of the Land Reforms Act came into force on 7.6.1965. 29. Annexure "A" as indicated hereinbefore relates to lands at Birbhum and Mr. Basu claimed and contended that the initial proceedings as initiated in respect of the lands at Murshidabad and Birbhum as concerned or connected with the respective appeals, were not separate proceedings. He further claimed that the lands in dispute were recorded in the initial khatians standing in the names of Shiva Prosanna Ram Bhakat and Brahamadeo Ram Bhakat. According to him, the jointness of the lands in question prier to the vesting should be presumed in this case and such presumption should hold good unless contrary is proved and established. He further claimed that the lands in dispute were recorded in the initial khatians standing in the names of Shiva Prosanna Ram Bhakat and Brahamadeo Ram Bhakat. According to him, the jointness of the lands in question prier to the vesting should be presumed in this case and such presumption should hold good unless contrary is proved and established. Such submissions were sought to be supplemented by Mr. Basu on a reference to the determinations in the case of A. Ragharama & another vs. A. Chenchamma & another, AIR 1964 SC 136 , wherein it has been observed that there is an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of proof burden of proof lies upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proofs. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. It is well-settled that a person who seeks to displace the natural succession to property by alleging an adoption must discharge the burden that lies upon him by proof of the factum of adoption and its validity. In view of the law as above, Mr. Basu stated that the onus to established disruption of the joint coparcenary or the jointness of the properties or the partition of them, lay on the appellants and such onus has not admittedly been duly discharged by them. The above contentions were sought to be supplemented by Mr. Basu with the following recordings as made by the order dated 28.7.1967 in the said Birbhum appeal:- "But as the Registered Partition Deed before the date of vesting is an essential factor in such a case Sri Bhattacharjee was asked to produce the Registered Partition Deed, if any, in support of the claim. In reply Sri Bhattacharjee stated that the parties will not be able to produce the partition deed whatever in support of the claim as no partition deed was ever executed through the parties and that will not be possible for him as such, to prove defined and definite shares of each coparcener in the properties concerned to. When asked for production of necessary papers and partition deed in support of the claim, the parties representative Shri Madan Mohan Bhattacharjee stated that he has no papers in support of the claim and that no. When asked for production of necessary papers and partition deed in support of the claim, the parties representative Shri Madan Mohan Bhattacharjee stated that he has no papers in support of the claim and that no. partition deed whatsoever sciented amongst the parties and registered and that for that reason the parties will not be able to produce the partition deed any time." 30. Mr. Basu also pointed out with reference to the recording by the order dated 11.7.1961 in the said Birbhum Appeal to the effect that "It may further show that in the revisional settlement operations the parties have all along been representing their cases as governed under Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law and when delated as Big Raiyat took the plea of being governed under Mitakshara for advantage sake, that the appellants have also been inconsistent in their stand and in fact the subsequent stand was taken by them to avoid the effect of the said Act and thus to remain more lands than they would be entitled to under the same. It was the submissions of Mr. Basu that the jointness of the coparceners or their properties as propounded in the Special Bench determinations of this Court has also recorded and followed the law and determinations as in the case of A. Ragharama & another vs. A. Chenchamma & another (supra). 31. The said Birbhum appeal, according to Mr. Dutt, related to Big Raiyat case and on the said Murshidabad appeal, according to him, related to five suo motu proceedings, which again according to Mr. Dutt were initiated and concluded without application of mind and the orders as made were further claimed to be rubber stamp orders. Mr. Basu of course, on reference to the concerned order sheets stated and established that those suo motu proceedings were initiated with notice and they were completed after hearing and opportunities to the appellants or their authorized representatives. In view of our findings as and determinations as above, regularization would come within the word revise as in section 44(2a) and as such, the initiation as made would not be without jurisdiction and authority as claimed. In view of our findings as and determinations as above, regularization would come within the word revise as in section 44(2a) and as such, the initiation as made would not be without jurisdiction and authority as claimed. That apart, in the Murshidabad appeal, it has also been recorded that the parties could not produce any evidence to prove that they were guided by Mitakshara School of Law and produce a registered deed of partition before the date of vesting, which was an essential prerequisite to get the individual shares as claimed. The admissions regarding the non availability of a registered deed of partition in both the proceedings were made by the representatives of the appellants or their learned advocates. 32. As mentioned earlier Mr. Basu stated that the initial khatians in respect of the lands both at Birbhum and Murshidabad were in the names of two persons as mentioned above and since in the return of Form-B as submitted by Shew Prosanna Ram Bhakat, option was given to retain both agricultural and non-agricultural lands in both the districts so there was no need or any necessary to make a further and formal determinations in respect of the lands at Murshidabad, as such determination was made in the proceedings connected with the said Birbhum Appeal and the effect of such determination was given in respect of the lands involved in the said Murshidabad appeal. The admissions made to the effect that there was no registered partition deed could not be denied by Mr. Dutt, but he claimed that such admissions by a representative or a learned advocate on behalf of the appellant petitioners would not bound them and that too in the facts and circumstances of this case. It was stated by Mr. Dutt, on a reference to the statements as made by mistake however the lands in question were recorded in the record of rights of the last revisional settlement, only in the names of two members of the joint Hindu family viz. Shew Prosanna Bhakat and Brahma Deo Prasad Bhakat and the same was really a bona fide mistake and the same was sought to be corrected by the subsequent acts of the appellants. To establish that such mistakes can be corrected and cured, Mr. Dutt referred to the case of Messers Ganges Manufacturing Co. Shew Prosanna Bhakat and Brahma Deo Prasad Bhakat and the same was really a bona fide mistake and the same was sought to be corrected by the subsequent acts of the appellants. To establish that such mistakes can be corrected and cured, Mr. Dutt referred to the case of Messers Ganges Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal & another, 76 CWN 389, where it has been observed that it is only a clerical or similar mistake of an apparent character that can be corrected under section 45 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. The word bonafide used to describe the nature of mistake indicates that the mistake contemplated is an error or omission that is patent, correction of which does not involve a decision on any controversial issue. Unlike as in the case of section 44(2A) or section 42A, the statute does not provide an appeal from an order made under section 45 and this confirms the view that the mistake that can be corrected under section 45 is of an apparent and innocuous character. A different construction of section 45 enlarging its scope would make it co-extensive with section 44(2A) in which event section 45 would be quite superlouous. A statute is not to be construed in a manner that would make it redundant especially when this is not the only possible manner of constructing the provisions. 33. The law relating to the right of holding under the said Act viz. one unit for Mitakshara family has been well settled by the decision in Fate Chand Maheswari's case (supra), and as such it appeared to us that out of despair Mr. Dutt wanted to fall back on the other submissions as indicated hereinbefore and which again were neither appropriately taken in the pleadings nor urged before the learned single Judge. Points of law can ordinarily be allowed to be argued in an appeal even though they were not urged initially, if such points are available on admitted facts or on proper pleadings. The facts of these cases and the state of pleadings would not bring them within such state of the law. Points of law can ordinarily be allowed to be argued in an appeal even though they were not urged initially, if such points are available on admitted facts or on proper pleadings. The facts of these cases and the state of pleadings would not bring them within such state of the law. The tests and reasons as laid down in Fate Chand Maheswari's case (supra), for the purpose of holding that one unit would be available for a Mitakshara family do apply with full force in these cases, really there was no partition of the joint property by any deed or even by expression of such intention to partition their properties before the date of vesting and that being the position, there is no other way but to dismiss the appeals by upholding the determinations as impeached. The appeals thus fail and they are dismissed. There will of course be no order as to costs.