Judgment B.P.GRIYAGHEY, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 6th July, 1972, passed by second Subordinate Judge, Gaya on an application filed before him by the judgment-debtor of Execution case No. (sic) of 1968 (sic) (which was for delivery of possession) pending in his court, which application of the judgment-debtors was filed under S.151 of the Civil P.C. (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"), the learned lower Court treating that application as that filed under S.47 of the Code, has allowed the objection of the judgment-debtor against the decree-holder"s execution case for delivery of possession. 2. The facts giving rise to that application filed by the judgment-debtor lie on a narrow compass like this, one Parmeshwar Prasad Bhadami had in 1959 borrowed a sum of Rs. 2,80,000.00 from Empire Insurance Company, Bombay (which subsequently merged into the Life Insurance Corporation of India, the present appellant). For that loan, a promissory note was executed by Parmeshwar Prasad Bhadani and his father Chatturam Bhadani who also gave in security a landed property situated within the jurisdiction of the court of Subordinate Judge, Gaya. Since the head office of that Insurance Company was at Bombay, the loan was taken at Bombay by the deposit of title-deeds by the loanee at Bombay. Then the Life Insurance Corporation of India filed Mortgage Suit No. 272 of 1954 in the original jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay as the Bombay High Court in its original jurisdiction had jurisdiction to receive and determine such suit under Cl.12 of the Charter of Letters Patent under the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. The Bombay High Court passed a preliminary decree on 21-7-1959 and then finally decreed on 19-2-1960 with a direction to the judgment-debtor to pay the decree within certain time failing which the mortgage-property be put to sale and if the same would not be sufficient, the remaining money will be realised by a personal decree against the judgment-debtor. That landed property of Gaya was sold on 23-11-1964 in an auction in the execution of that decree at Gaya under the supervision of an Officer of the Bombay High Court according to the rules provided in this respect. The decree-holder purchased the property in the auction-sale and the sale was confirmed on 29-1-1965 and a sale-certificate thereof was granted by the High Court of Bombay. The decree-holder purchased the property in the auction-sale and the sale was confirmed on 29-1-1965 and a sale-certificate thereof was granted by the High Court of Bombay. Thereafter an application by the decree-holder for Dakhaldahani was sent for execution to the Subordinate Judge at Gaya (through the District Judge, Gaya) by transfer of the decree. That application for the Dakhaldahani was registered in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Gaya as Execution case No. 4 of 1966. In that execution case, the judgment-debtor, namely, the present respondent filed an application under S.151 of the Code raising an objection that no Dakhaldahani could be effected by the decree said to have been passed by the Bombay High Court as the decree passed by that Court is a nullity in view of the fact that it was a mortgage-suit with respect to land which lay within the jurisdiction of Gaya Court and not within the jurisdiction of Bombay Court. The decree-holder resisted that objection of the judgment-debtor, but the executing court, namely, the Second Subordinate Judge"s Court of Gaya, accepted the objection of the judgment-debtor holding that the High Court of Bombay had no jurisdiction to pass the decree in question and as such it was a nullity, and thus refused to execute the decree and the Dakhaldahani in pursuance to that. The decree-holder, namely, the Life Insurance Corporation of India has filed this appeal against that order of the Second Subordinate Judge, Gaya. 3. In this appeal the respondents-judgment-debtors have supported the order of the lower court basing on the selfsame ground of objection against the Dakhaldahani which they had taken before the lower court (executing court) claiming (i) that the decree passed by the Bombay High Court was a nullity and could not be executed; (ii) that the Gaya Court could not give Dakhaldahani on the strength of the sale-certificate granted by the High Court, which sale certificate rather could be treated as a decree satisfied by the sale and as such there was nothing for the Bombay High Court to transfer the decree to the Subordinate Judge, Gaya for execution and to give Dakhaldahani. The appellant-decree holder has challenged the order of the learned lower court on the ground (i) that the Bombay High Court had jurisdiction to pass the decree under Cl.12 of the Letters patent; (ii) that the judgment-debtor had raised an objection regarding jurisdiction in the suit itself which was decided against him and since he did not prefer any appeal against it, it was final and would operate as res judicata; (iii) that the Bombay High Court was competent to try the suit, and that the objection as to the territorial jurisdiction is such which did not go to the root of the jurisdiction of that High Court and, therefore, the decree could not be said to be a nullity, and (iv) that the sale-certificate granted by the Bombay High Court will be treated to be in law as a decree which could be executed by a transferee court, namely, the Gaya Court. 4. On such objections raised by the judgment-debtor (the respondent) and the point raised against the maintainability of such objection in the execution case, the first question that arises for determination in this appeal is as to whether the judgment-debtor"s objection that the decree passed by the Bombay High Court was not executable as that Court had no jurisdiction to pass the decree, can be entertained in an objection under S.47 C.P.C. by the judgment-debtor in the execution case. The law in this respect has been laid down by the Supreme Court in a case of Hiralal Patni V/s. Kali Nath reported in AIR 1962 SC 199 that the validity of a decree can be challenged in an execution proceeding only on the ground that the Court which passed the decree was lacking inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seisin of the case, because the subject matter was held foreign to its jurisdiction. It was, however, further observed in that case that the objection as to the local jurisdiction of a court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of the Court to try a case. It was further observed that competence of a Court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. 5. It was further observed that competence of a Court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. 5. The first point, therefore, that falls for determination in this appeal is as to whether the Bombay High Court was lacking inherent jurisdiction in passing the decree which it has passed in the present case. The Bombay High Court will be considered as lacking inherent jurisdiction if the subject-matter was held foreign to its jurisdiction. In this connection, it would be first important to quote here below Cl.12 of the Charter of the Letters Patent under which the High Court of Bombay has exercised jurisdiction in the suit and had passed the decree in question :- "And we do further ordain, that the said High Court.........in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, shall be empowered to receive, try, and determine suits of every description, if, in the case of suits for land or other immovable property, such land or property shall be situated, or in all other cases if the cause of action shall have arisen, either wholly, or, in case the leave of the Court shall have been first obtained, in part, within the local limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the said High Court, or if the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit shall dwell, or carry on business, or personally work for gain within such limits; .................." 6. It may be noted that under that clause, which applies to the High Court of Bombay also, it has in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, power to try (i) suits for land or other immovable property which is situated within its jurisdiction; (ii) other suits- (a) if the cause of action has arisen wholly within its jurisdiction; or, (b) if the cause of action has arisen in part within its local limits, with the leave of the Court, or (c) if the defendant resides or carries on business or personally works for gain within such limits. In the present case the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court is claimed on the ground that it was not a suit for land, and it was a case where part of the cause of action had arisen at Bombay, namely, that the loan was advanced at Bombay by the Company having its head-Office at Bombay to the judgment-debtor and the mortgage was made by deposit of title-deeds in the Bombay Office and that since part of the cause of action had arisen at Bombay, the suit was filed thereafter obtaining the leave of the Court. 7 The question as to whether it was "a suit for land" within the meaning of the term used in the aforesaid Cl.12 became very much important in this appeal as the learned counsel for both the parties have principally directed their arguments on this question. The relevant fact relating to this question is that it was a suit for recovery of a loan said to have been advanced on a mortgage of certain lands lying within the district of Gaya, and with respect to that further the title-deeds were deposited by the mortgagor. The suit was for recovery of the loan by the sale of the mortgage-land and that if the same be not satisfied by that, the remaining amount would be realised by a personal decree against the debtor. A question has been mooted at the Bar as to whether a mortgage-suit, which is for the recovery of the mortgage-money by the sale of the mortgage land is "a suit for land" or not. On this point, it appears that there is difference of opinion amongst several High Courts. The learned counsel for the respondent (the judgment-debtor) has taken his stand that a mortgage- suit as such is a suit for land as by the decree that would be passed in the suit, there will be sale of the land and that thus it will affect the title of a land by the decree and in support of his stand he relies principally on a Full Bench decision of Nagpur High Court in a case of Muralidhar Sriniwas V/s. Gorakh Ram Sadhu Ram reported in AIR 1936 Nag 1. The learned counsel for the respondent also refers to four decisions of the High Court of Calcutta in Sudamadih Coal Co. V/s. Empire Coal Co. The learned counsel for the respondent also refers to four decisions of the High Court of Calcutta in Sudamadih Coal Co. V/s. Empire Coal Co. reported in (1915) ILR 42 Cal 942 : (AIR 1916 Cal 557), Manindra Chandra Nandi V/s. Lal Mohan Rai reported in AIR 1929 Cal 358, Hariram Sarawagi V/s. Rameshwar Lal reported in ILR (1946) 2 Cal 63 and Jnan Chand Chugh V/s. Jugal Kishore Agarwal reported in AIR 1960 Cal 331 . In this connection, reliance is also placed upon two decisions of the Privy Council in Harendra Lal Rey V/s. Smt. Haridasi Devi reported in AIR 1914 PC 67 and the other in Raja Setrucherla Ramabhadra Raju V/s. Maharaj of Jeypore reported in (1919) 46 Ind App 151 : (AIR 1919 PC 150). On the other hand, the learned counsel for the decree-holder takes a stand that a suit for recovery of the mortgage-loan, even if the property mortgaged is land, it is principally a suit for recovery of loan, and not a suit for land, and in support of this stand, the learned counsel relies on Full Bench decisions of the Bombay High Court in a case of Hatim Bhai Hassanally V/s. Framroz Eduljee reported in AIR 1927 Bom 278 and also two Bench decisions of this Court in Chathu Ram Bhadani V/s. Life Insurance Corporation of India reported in 1974 BLJR 650 : 1974 BBCJ 454 : ( AIR 1974 Pat 371 ) and the other in Janak Sahi V/s. Jamuna Sahi reported in 1980 Pat LJR 304 : ( AIR 1981 Pat 62 ). 8. On proper consideration of the interpretation of the term "a suit for land" used in Cl.12 of the Charter of Letters Patent aforesaid and having taken into consideration the reasonings given by different High Courts on this point in the cases referred to above, in my opinion, the views expressed in the Full Bench case of Bombay High Court reported in AIR 1927 Bom 278 (supra) is more cogent than the view expressed in the Full Bench case of High Court of Nagpur reported in AIR 1936 Nag 1 (supra). My ground for preferring the views of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court is that it was observed by their Lordships in that case that a suit to be one "for land" should substantially relate to land and High Court in AIR 1936 Nag 1 (supra) is based, is that because any decree passed in a mortgage suit recovery of money by the sale of the mortgage-land directly affects the title to the land mortgaged and that as such the suit of that nature is a suit for land, does not appear to be of a reasoning based on logic. The reasoning does not seem to appear to be based on logic because of connotation of the term "a suit for land" used in Cl.12 of the Letters Patent which in its grammatical meaning has been correctly and logically interpreted in the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court referred to above. It may be mentioned at this place that the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respondent-judgment debtor of the High Court of Calcutta, namely, AIR 1929 Cal 358, ILR (1946) 2 Cal 63 and AIR 1960 Cal 331 (supra) do not decide the question directly and, therefore, those decisions cannot really be relevant for resolving this question. Similarly, the decisions of the Privy Counsel, namely, AIR 1914 PC 67 and 46 Ind App 151: (AIR 1919 PC 150) also do not decide this point directly and are not logical. On the other hand, I find that the reasoning given by the Full Bench case of the Bombay High Court stated above is very sound reasoning which has been accepted by this Court also in a Division Bench in 1974 B. L. J. R. 650 : (AIR primarily be judged by considering what is the nature of the relief sought for. A suit for land grammatically means a suit for possession of the land. The Hon"ble Chief Justice who was a party in that Full Bench in his separate judgment observed that the words "suit for land" referred to suit to obtain or recover land or alternatively the suit which substantially involved the recovery of land or its equivalent. The preposition "for" in the expression "a suit for land" would seem to indicate that the title to possession of immovable must be primary object of the action. The preposition "for" in the expression "a suit for land" would seem to indicate that the title to possession of immovable must be primary object of the action. The primary object of a suit to enforce mortgage by sale is money. Similar was the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court in a case of Sudamadih Coal Co. ILR 42 Cal 942 : (AIR 1916 Cal 557) (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the judgment-debtor respondent himself in which it was observed that such suit would be a suit for land in which substantial question is the right to the land. On the other hand, the reasoning given by Nagpur High Court in its Full Bench case reported in AIR 1935 Nag 250 on which the later Full Bench case of that 1974 Pat 371) mentioned above. It is very important to mention that this decision of this Court is most relevant and important in view of the fact that this very question arising between these parties with respect to a matter exactly similar was decided by this Court in this decision. It may be also added that in another matter which was a question under the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act as to whether a suit for redemption of mortgage would be a suit with respect to land which as such would abate by virtue of S.4(c) of that Consolidation Act. In that case also in a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 1980 Pat LJR 304: ( AIR 1981 Pat 62 ) mentioned above, the same view was taken which was earlier taken by another Bench decision of this Court mentioned above that such a mortgage suit would not be a suit for land, but would be deemed only a suit for the recovery of loan. On these grounds my considered opinion is that a suit for recovery of loan, even by the sale of the mortgage-land is not a suit for land within the meaning of the term used in Cl.12 of the Letters Patent, but as a suit for recovery of loan. In this view of the matter, the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court was not to be ousted in the present case on account of the fact that the mortgage-land lay within the district of Gaya. In this view of the matter, the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court was not to be ousted in the present case on account of the fact that the mortgage-land lay within the district of Gaya. The jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court vested under the second part of Cl.12 quoted above, namely, that a part of the cause of action had arisen at Bombay by the loan having been advanced at Bombay by the Insurance Co. having its head office at Bombay and that the loan having been secured by the deposit of title-deed at Bombay. Since that part of clause 12 relating to the vesting of the jurisdiction provides that if the part of cause of action arises within the High Court, such a suit shall lie there only with the leave of the court. In the present suit, the suit was filed in the Bombay High Court after obtaining the leave of the court. Thus, this cannot be a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction in the High Court of Bombay in passing the decree. As such, when it is not a case of lack of inherent jurisdiction, the decree could not be challenged in the execution court at Gaya on the basis of the above-mentioned decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1962 SC 9. Besides that, this judgment-debtor respondent who was a defendant in the suit had raised objection in the Bombay High Court challenging its jurisdiction to entertain that suit and that objection was overruled by the Bombay High Court and decided against the judgment-debtor. That order was not set aside in appeal or revision. In that view of the matter the present judgment-debtor was estopped from raising the same point challenging the decree on the ground of want of jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court passing the decree because that was barred by res judicata. In a case of Satyadhyan Ghoshal V/s. Smt. Deorajin Devi reported in AIR 1960 SC 941 that if a question has been decided at the initial stage of the proceeding between the parties and there is no appeal, the same point cannot be allowed to be reagitated at the later stage of the same litigation as the principle of res judicata applies as between the two stages of the same litigation. The learned counsel for the decree-holder appellant also rightly contends that even the judgment of this Court in Chathhuram Bhadani V/s. Life Insurance Corporation of India reported in 1974 B. L. J. R.650 : ( AIR 1974 Pat 371 ) besides being a decision on this point, would also operate as res judicata against the judgment debtor in view of the fact that it was inter partes in which the same very question of law was decided against the judgment debtor, and in this connection the learned counsel rightly relies on a decision of the Supreme Court in a case of Smt. Raj Lakshmi V/s. Dasi Banamali Sen reported in AIR 1953 SC 33 in which it was held that to hold that a particular decision would operate as res judicata the test is the identity of title on which the question of inter partes is decided, and not the identity of the property in the two litigations. In the present case, there was identity of title decided inter partes in that decision of this High Court mentioned above though that was not with respect to the same loan. 10. On these grounds, I feel that the judgment of the learned lower court the executing court of Gaya, allowing the objection of the judgment-debtor respondent and holding that the decree of the Bombay High Court which was sought to be executed in the court by delivery of possession was passed by a court lacking inherent jurisdiction and as such not executable, was a judgment wholly illegal and is, therefore, set aside. The appeal is allowed. Cost is assessed at Rs. 100.00 only. BIRENDRA PRASAD SINHA, J. 11 I agree.