UMESH CHANDRA BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS application is directed against an award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal dated 14th June 1983 in pursuance of an order of reference being No. 12012/32/78-D; 11a dated 4th April 1979. ( 2 ) THE issue referred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal for adjudication was :- "whether the action of the management of the State Bank of India, Local Head Office, Jivan Deep, 1, Middleton Street, Calcutta in dismissing Shri Tarun Kumar Banerjee, Cashier from the service of the bank with effect from 31st March 1977 is justified? If not, to what relief is the workman entitled? ( 3 ) THE management of the State Bank of India dismissed Shri Tarun Kumar Banerjee with effect from 31st March 1977 on the basis of an enquiry report dated 27th February 1974 wherein the Enquiry Officer found Shri Tarun Kumar Banerjee guilty of the change of misconduct. ( 4 ) I may briefly refer the facts relevant for the present purpose. Sri Tarun Kumar Banerjee (hereinafter referred to as the concerned employee) joined the State Bank of India as a Messenger-cum-Cash colly and after passing his School Final Examination in 1970 he was appointed as Cashier on six months probation with effect from 28th June 1971 and transferred to Naktala Branch on 7th July 1971. Subsequently, the concerned employee was, however, confirmed as a cashier with effect from 28th December, 1971. ( 5 ) ON 23rd June 1973 one Sm. Parul Rani Chowdhury as savings bank constituent of the aforesaid Naktala Branch of State Bank of India handed over Rs. 2,002/- to the concerned employee being respondent No. 3 who was acting as the head cashier on that day for deposit of Rs. 1000/- to her Savings Bank Account and for issuance of two drafts for Rs. 1000/- each. The said constituent thereafter left the bank with her pass book and the draft. On a reference to the said Pass Book on the same day as she did not find any entry relating to the deposit of Rs. 1000/- in her Pass Book, she immediately came back to the bank and demanded this excess amount of Rs. 1000/- from the concerned employee but after being refused by the Cashier, she lodge a complaint with the Branch Manager about the same. 1000/- in her Pass Book, she immediately came back to the bank and demanded this excess amount of Rs. 1000/- from the concerned employee but after being refused by the Cashier, she lodge a complaint with the Branch Manager about the same. Pursuant to the complaint as aforesaid the then Branch Manager Sri A. R. Dutt arranged for verification of Cash at the cash department and when the missing cash was not found a thorough body search was directed for all the employees. In the process when the employees assembled before the Accountant and the search was being effected the Accountant as well as the Branch Manager and in the presence of various members of the staff, the concerned employee took out a bundle of hundred rupee notes from his socks and threw the same on to the floor. The Branch Manager picked up the said cash from the floor and kept it in his safe in a sealed cover. The day however being a Saturday, no steps could be taken in regard thereto but on 25th June being the next Monday the concerned employee was served with a memorandum dated 25th June, 1973 calling upon to explain his conduct in the matter of misappropriation of Rs. 1000/- and by another Memorandum issued on 25th June 1973. On the same date the concerned employee said to have been sent a note confessing his guilt and begged for pardon. ( 6 ) ON 10th October 1973 the concerned employee was issued with a charge sheet requiring him to show cause why the disciplinary action should not be taken against him. Relevant portion of the charge-sheet reads as follows: -"that at about 11 A. M. on the 23rd June 1973 one Sm. Parul Rani Chowdhury a constitutent of the Bank handed over to you over the Branch cash counter a sum of Rs. 3,002. 40along with two draft application each for Rs. 1,001. 20. Thus although on your own admission you received an excess amount of Rs. 1,000/- (Rs. 3,002. 40) from Sm. Chowdhury, you did neither refund the excess amount to the depositor nor make any enquiry about the disposal of the excess amounts and nor arrange for the excess amount to be deposited to the Branch Sundry Deposits Account in contravention of the Bank's instructions. 1,000/- (Rs. 3,002. 40) from Sm. Chowdhury, you did neither refund the excess amount to the depositor nor make any enquiry about the disposal of the excess amounts and nor arrange for the excess amount to be deposited to the Branch Sundry Deposits Account in contravention of the Bank's instructions. Instead, in your own admission you retained the excess amount in your own person with the intention of misappropriating the same. Subsequently at about 1. 30 P. M, on the same day when the said Sm. Chowdhury came to the Branch and demanded the amount handed over to you in excess viz. , Rs. 1,000/- you on your own admission flatly denied having received the excess amount. On a report thereafter being made by Sm. Chowdhury to the Branch Manager, the latter enquired of your about the matter but you did not acknowledge receipt of the excess amount of Rs. 1,000/- from Sm. Chowdhury. When preliminary searches failed to trace the amount and a physical search of all employees present was being conducted, you, on your own admission apprehensive of being caught red handed threw away the sum in question from your person on the floor. The manner in which you acted in the instant case shows that you actually received an excess amount of Rs. 1,000/- from Sm. Parul Rani, a constituent of the bank, retained the amount with you with a criminal intent to misappropriate the same and thereby lowered the image of the bank in the eyes of the public and thus acted in a manner highly prejudicial to the interest of the Bank. ( 7 ) ON 26th October 1973 a reply to the said charge sheet was sent by the concerned employee wherein all the charges were denied and the concerned employee claimed to be innocent. In the reply to the charge sheet, the concerned employee stated as follows: -"on the 25th June, 1973 the Branch Manager has issued a memorandum no. B. M.-1 to me directly involving me in an alleged misappropriation allegedly held on the 23rd June, 1973 and immediately after that he has compelled me to sign a typed letter which I was not allowed to go through even. Immediately after that he handed over to me another memorandum No. B/m-2 dated the 25th June, 1973 conveying my suspension order in connection with some alleged misappropriation of money. Immediately after that he handed over to me another memorandum No. B/m-2 dated the 25th June, 1973 conveying my suspension order in connection with some alleged misappropriation of money. Issuance of two memorandum to me and simultaneously getting signed one typed letter by me under coercion and all the three actions in connection with the above alleged misappropriation happening within a very short period gives me the impression that I am the victim of a serious conspiracy specially while after me recent promotion from a messenger to a cashier. I was looking forward for a brighter future, to be achieved by more diligence, perseverance and honesty to works. I again deny all the charges levelled against me and claim to be innocent. " ( 8 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, the Regional Manager, Region-1 of the State Bank of India decided to hold domestic enquiry into the charges and for that purpose appointed one Shri D. P. Bhattacharyya the then Agent of the State Bank of India, Ballygunge as an Enquiry Officer. A domestic enquiry was held on 6th February 1974 with notice to the concerned employee, who was assisted and represented in the enquiry by one Shri Ranjit Das the then working President, State Bank of India Employees' Association (Bengal Circle) as his defence helper. Examinations and cross-examinations of the bank's witnesses were had and there was no grievance whatsoever in regard to the method of conduct of the domestic enquiry. It should be noted, however, that the concerned employee did not adduce any evidence neither offered himself for examination. ( 9 ) THE Enquiry Officer Shri D. P. Bhattacharyya submitted findings of his enquiry and held him guilty to the charge of misconduct levelled against the concerned employee. ( 10 ) ON the basis of the finding of the domestic enquiry a letter dated 27th January 1976 was sent to the concerned employee by the Regional Manager intimating him about the proposed disciplinary action viz, dismissal without notice. By the said letter the concerned employee was also required to appeal personally before Naktala Branch Manager and to show cause why punishment should not be imposed. Subsequently however, the hearing was given by the Regional Manager, Region I, in the presence of the staff officer, Grade III, Region I Calcutta. At the personal hearing the concerned employee did appear and a written statement was submitted. Subsequently however, the hearing was given by the Regional Manager, Region I, in the presence of the staff officer, Grade III, Region I Calcutta. At the personal hearing the concerned employee did appear and a written statement was submitted. The Officer conducting the hearing was informed by the concerned employee that he had no further submissions to make. The Regional Manager, Region-I after consideration of facts and the written submission of the concerned employee held that the decision taken earlier ought not to be changed and the ends of justice would be met if the decision of dismissal is carried into effect and the same would be for the best interest of all concerned specially for a service institution like the State Bank of India. The dismissal order was communicated to the concerned employee by a memorandum dated 31st March 1977. Against the said decision an appeal was preferred before the General Manager, (Operation) being the appellate authority on the ground that the order of dismissal was biased, prejudiced and bad in law. The General Manager, operation again gave the concerned employee an opportunity of hearing on the issue of order of dismissal and at that hearing also another written statement was filled without any oral submission. Subsequently, however, the said order of dismissal was confirmed. ( 11 ) AFTER the confirmation of the said dismissal order the respondent no. 3 being the State Bank of India Staff Association initiated an Industrial Dispute and an order of reference followed on 4th April 1979. ( 12 ) IT is the finding of the Tribunal that has been challenged in this proceeding by the State Bank of India. ( 13 ) BEFORE consideration of the matter on its merits it is pertinent to record that during the course of hearing before the Tribunal a preliminary issue as to the validity of the domestic enquiry held by the petitioner against the respondent no. 1 was raised and the Tribunal by its order dated 3rd February 1983 inter alia held that the natural justice was not violated and as such the domestic enquiry cannot be said to have been vitiated and the Tribunal directed hearing of the mater of merits. 1 was raised and the Tribunal by its order dated 3rd February 1983 inter alia held that the natural justice was not violated and as such the domestic enquiry cannot be said to have been vitiated and the Tribunal directed hearing of the mater of merits. Prior to the commencement of hearing on merits, the management prayed for an opportunity to adduce further evidence but the Tribunal declined to accede to the prayer for further evidence and there after the Tribunal heard the matter on merit, and came to a finding that there is no proper evidence on record to sustain the dismissal and as such the dismissal order was set aside and the Tribunal directed re-instatement of the concerned employee with full back wages and all consequential benefit to which he was entitled. ( 14 ) MR. R. C. Deb appearing in support of the application contended firstly that refusal by the Tribunal to allow the writ petitioner to adduce further evidence or fresh evidence is an error apparent on the face of the award and as such the finding has been totally vitiated and the award should be quashed by the Writ Court. Mr. Deb submitted that proviso to section 11a is not a bar and as such the Tribunal committed a grave error of law. The proviso to section 11a read as follows: -"provided that in any proceeding under the section the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any further evidence in relation to the matter. " ( 15 ) MR. Deb contended that the materials on record should mean and imply whatever materials have been collected during the entire course of investigation and should be considered by the Tribunal Mr. Deb submitted that domestic enquiry though a requirement but can not be said to be so sacrosanct that document not produced before the domestic enquiry would not be allowed to be ever produced for being considered by the Tribunal. ( 16 ) I am of the view the proviso prohibits the Tribunal from taking any fresh evidence either for satisfying itself regarding the misconduct or for altering the punishment. The language of the proviso is to be considered in the proper perspective in which it has been used. ( 16 ) I am of the view the proviso prohibits the Tribunal from taking any fresh evidence either for satisfying itself regarding the misconduct or for altering the punishment. The language of the proviso is to be considered in the proper perspective in which it has been used. The legislature has deliberately used the expression "fresh evidence" and that makes the meaning of the proviso clear and unambiguous. Once a domestic enquiry which was challenged to be bad and illegal is found to be in order and not defective in nature, the question of further evidence does not arise before the Tribunal enquiry is found to be defective or violative of the principles of natural justice then and in that event the Tribunal would be authorised to take fresh evidence. This view finds support in the decision of the Supreme court in the case of The Workmen of M/s. Fire Stone Tyre and Rubber Company of India Limited v. The Management and Ors. , reported in AIR 1973 S. C. 1227. ( 17 ) IN that view of the matter and since the Tribunal came to a definite finding that the domestic enquiry was not vitiated, the question of error of law by reason of refusal of fresh evidence by the petitioner does not and cannot arise. In view of the above the first contention of Mr. Deb fails. ( 18 ) MR. Deb next contended that the award proceeds on an erroneous assumption of law. Mr. Deb submitted that the Tribunal came to a conclusion that the evidence relied upon by the enquiry officer in the domestic enquiry was not direct evidence but hear-say. Mr. Deb contended that the Tribunal has failed to appreciate the distinction between hear-say and permissible evidence which may not be direct evidence, e. g. circumstantial evidence. ( 19 ) MR. P. Sengupta, the learned advocate submitted that the evidence tendered and accepted by the Enquiry Officer is nothing but hear-say evidence and the Tribunal has rightly rejected the same. ( 20 ) THE Tribunal held that the domestic enquiry proceeded on the basis of hear-say evidence and as such it would be difficult to act upon it in the circumstances of the case. The Tribunal held that Parul Rani Chwodhury was the only proper and appropriate person to speak of the circumstances in which the excess amount of Rs. ( 20 ) THE Tribunal held that the domestic enquiry proceeded on the basis of hear-say evidence and as such it would be difficult to act upon it in the circumstances of the case. The Tribunal held that Parul Rani Chwodhury was the only proper and appropriate person to speak of the circumstances in which the excess amount of Rs. 1000/- said to have been given to Shri Banerjee being the concerned employee. If she would have been produced as a witness the delinquent could have cross-examined her and could have ellicted facts and circumstances relating to the money. As a matter of fact the Tribunal held that the failure to examine the vital and material witnesses namely, Parul Rani Chowdhury and her husband torpedoed the entire edifice and vitiated the findings of the Enquiry Officer. ( 21 ) IN testing the nature and credibility of the evidence led on a domestic enquiry the law is now well settled and I need not dilate much on it. It would suffice if I refer to the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Rattan Singh reported in AIR 1977 SC 1512 ; In that decision the Supreme Court observed that it is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. ( 22 ) WHILE it is true that direct evidence is always entertained to be the best evidence but that does not mean that circumstantial evidence cannot be looked into. It is now well settled that both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence would be legal evidence. ( 23 ) THE Delhi High Court in the case of State Bank of India vs. J. D. Jain reported in 1977 (II) LIC 1041 observed that the distinction between hear-say evidence and direct evidence is not so obscure that a judicial tribunal should be unaware of it. Hear-say evidence is to be distinguished from the legal evidence. The legal evidence may be direct or indirect or direct or circumstantial. So long as the evidence has a probative value and nexus it would be relevant evidence. Hear-say evidence is to be distinguished from the legal evidence. The legal evidence may be direct or indirect or direct or circumstantial. So long as the evidence has a probative value and nexus it would be relevant evidence. ( 24 ) THE question therefore falls for determination in this case as to whether the evidence tendered before the domestic tribunal can be termed as a mere hear-say evidence or be treated as legal evidence and the law laid down by the Supreme Court as referred to above, should not however be lost sight of, in dealing with the said question. ( 25 ) BEFORE the Enquiry Officer the writ petitioner examined the following witnesses:1. SRI S. Roy Chowdhury, the Branch Manager 2. Sri A. R. Dutt and 3. Sri S. K. Mitra. ( 26 ) AT the relevant time Sri S. Roy Chowdhury was the Accountant and he categorically stated that he examined the cash at the Receipt counter and no excess was found. Thereafter the then Branch Manager, Sri A. R. Dutt asked him to search the socks and shoes of all members of the staff and, during the process of search the Branch Manager came out of his room and found the money at the end of the Accounts counter on the floor. Sri Roy Chowdhury further stated that the then Branch Manager gave him to understand that Sri Tarun Banrejee had admitted before him that he had taken the money. ( 27 ) SRI A. R. Dutt, the then Branch Manager stated before the Domestic Enquiry that since the Accountant reported that no excess cash was found he had asked to search the cashier and the members of the staff by taking off their socks and shoes. Sri Dutt further stated that as the Accountant started checking he came out of his room and saw Sri T. K. Banerjee throwing a bundle of notes by the side of the wall in the Accounts Department and he immediately took possession of the same. ( 28 ) SRI Dutt further stated that on being questioned as to whether the money was kept the concerned employee admitted him that he had put the money in his socks. In cross-examination also Sri Dutt reiterated his statement and said that he saw the throwing of the bundle of notes. ( 28 ) SRI Dutt further stated that on being questioned as to whether the money was kept the concerned employee admitted him that he had put the money in his socks. In cross-examination also Sri Dutt reiterated his statement and said that he saw the throwing of the bundle of notes. There is however no cross-examination in regard to his statement of obtaining possession as also in regard to his statement that the concerned employee admitted before him that the money was kept in his socks. ( 29 ) SRI S. K. Mitra the Head Clerk, was also examined at the Domestic Enquiry. Sri Mitra in his evidence before the Domestic Enquiry stated that he was an eye-witness to the incident and Sri Tarun Banerjee took out ten pieces of hundred rupee note from out of his socks and threw it on the floor of the Accounts Enclosure. Sri Mitra further stated that the Branch Manager who was standing nearby took the money from the floor. From the records it appears that there is no cross-examination on this score by the representative of the concerned employee though he was otherwise cross-examined in details. ( 30 ) THE learned Tribunal however ascribed the aforesaid evidence as hear-say evidence and observed that such hear-say evidence is difficult to accept in the circumstances of this case. The failure on the part of the managements to call Sm. Parul Rani Chowdhury or her husband has weighed with the learned Tribunal in coming to the said conclusion that the entire evidence is nothing but hear-say. ( 31 ) IN the instant case the misconduct alleged by the bank was that the concerned employee has kept to himself in his socks a sum of Rs. 1000/- belonging to a customer with an intention to misappropriate the same. The evidence on which reliance has been placed by the writ petitioner is the circumstantial evidence, namely the physical search of the employee and throwing of 10 hundred rupee notes on the floor by the concerned employee. This evidence has been adduced by two eye witnesses being two senior officers of the bank. For the purposes of a departmental enquiry complaint substantiated by circumstantial evidence is enough. (See in this connection the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1982 SC 673 J. D. Jain vs. The Management of State Bank of India ). This evidence has been adduced by two eye witnesses being two senior officers of the bank. For the purposes of a departmental enquiry complaint substantiated by circumstantial evidence is enough. (See in this connection the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1982 SC 673 J. D. Jain vs. The Management of State Bank of India ). In any event, the Supreme Court in that decision reiterated the law laid down in the case of State of Hariyana v. Rattan Singh (supra) and observed further that there is no allergy to hear-say evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. No evidence has been tendered to prove that the two officers had at any point of time any enmity or malice or personal grudge against the concerned employee. As a matter of fact no reason has also been given by the Tribunal as to why the two senior officers would stop down so low as to perjure themselves against a junior member of the staff. It is true that if Parul Rani Chowdhury or her husband were called that would have been the primary and material evidence but the facts remains to be seen as to whether this Tribunal was justified in law in rejecting the entire evidence on record. The concerned employee has not tendered any oral evidence nor even examined himself before the Enquiry Officer at the domestic Tribunal. When asked by the Enquiry Officer the concerned employee only submitted a letter said to be a diary registered with the Jadavpur Police Station at 7 P. M. on 25th June 1973. The diary, however, did not record anything else but a statement that his signature was obtained under duress and coercion and without any opportunity of even going through the contents of the document. There is therefore no denial atleast on two counts namely, a) that the concerned employee threw the money on the floor of the branch office and the same was picked up by the Branch Manager and b) on being questioned by the Branch Manager the concerned employee admitted to the Branch Manager that the money was kept in his socks. ( 32 ) IN my view, the evidence tendered before the domestic enquiry cannot simplicitor be discarded as hear-say. Even assuming that the evidence led before the Tribunal be termed as hear-say, but the Tribunal was in error in discarding the said evidence. ( 32 ) IN my view, the evidence tendered before the domestic enquiry cannot simplicitor be discarded as hear-say. Even assuming that the evidence led before the Tribunal be termed as hear-say, but the Tribunal was in error in discarding the said evidence. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in quite clear on the subject. As long as the evidence on record has a reasonable nexus and a probative value, it would be relevant. The evidence tendered before the Tribunal has due probative value and a reasonable nexus with the misconduct alleged and as such the same would be relevant evidence. The Tribunal, in my opinion, has committed a grave error of law in that regard. As per the law laid down by the Supreme Court strict and sophisticated rules of evidence may not apply in the case of domestic enquiry. The Tribunal was in error further in holding that failure to call Sm. Parul Rani Chowdhury or her husband has torpedoed the entire edifice of the case. While it is true that if Parul Rani Chowdhury or her husband was called that would have been the best evidence but on the basis of the evidence on record it cannot be said that failure to call the best evidenced has vitiated the entire enquiry proceedings. The Tribunal ought to have considered that the standard of proof required in a criminal prosecution entailing conviction and sentence need not be had in the present case. In the case of a domestic enquiry guilt need not be established beyond all reasonable doubt and proof of misconduct would be sufficient. The factum of throwing of money and subsequent statement to the Branch Manager who was called to give evidence that the money was kept by the concerned employees in his socks cannot, in my opinion, be discarded. The Tribunal it seems has equated the domestic enquiry with a criminal prosecution which by itself is an error of law capable of being set right by the High Court in Writ jurisdiction. The only test that is to be admitted by the Tribunal in coming to a finding as to the guilt or otherwise of the concerned employees is to see whether the evidence tendered before the domestic tribunal can reasonably be said to establish the misconduct. The only test that is to be admitted by the Tribunal in coming to a finding as to the guilt or otherwise of the concerned employees is to see whether the evidence tendered before the domestic tribunal can reasonably be said to establish the misconduct. It is not a criminal trial but Tribunal is to see whether the misconduct alleged has been reasonably established by the evidence. In my view the Tribunal on an erroneous assumption of law in the matter of standard of proof has arrived at that conclusion which is patently untenable and contrary to all recognised principle of law. ( 33 ) MR. Sengupta appearing for the concerned employee placed strong reliance in the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Jay Bhagwan vs. Ambala Central Co-operative Bank ltd. and Anr. reported in 1984 (1) LLJ 52 and submitted that in the absence of Parul Rani Chowdhury or her husband no case could be said to have been made against the employee as has been observed in the decision of the Supreme Court. In that decision Supreme Court was considering the award of the Industrial Tribunal upholding the order of termination on the facts that one Phulel Singh had a savings account with the Naraingarh Branch of the Amabala Central Co-operative Bank Limited. A cheque for Rs. 4,200/- purporting to have been signed by Shri Phulel Singh, drawn on the Amabala Central Co-operative Bank was presented through the Punjab and Sind Bank Limited. Dhukot, and the proceeds were duly remitted to the later bank. The account of Shri Phulel Singh was debited with that amount. Later, when Shru Phulel Singh presented his pass book, appropriate entries were made. Shri Phulel Singh objected to the entry relating to the debit of Rs. 4,200/ -. He alleged that he had never issued the cheque for Rs. 4,200/- said to have been issued by him. A complaint was also lodged with the police. The present appellant who was clerk cum cashier of the Naraingarh Branch of the bank, and who was apparently suspected in connection with the presentation of the bogus cheque, was interrogated by the police and his statement was also recorded. A first information report was registered against him, but the case ended in discharge. In the meanwhile, the Managing Committee of the bank placed the appellant under suspension. A first information report was registered against him, but the case ended in discharge. In the meanwhile, the Managing Committee of the bank placed the appellant under suspension. Shri Hans Raj an Assistant Manager was appointed to enquire into the matter in order to ascertain the genuineness of the complaint made by the customer. The appellant was advised to be present at the Naraingarh branch of the Bank on July 29, 1974, in connection with the enquiry. No charge-sheet was ever issued to the appellant. The statement of the appellant was, however, received by the enquiry officer on July 29, 1974, along with the statement of several other persons. The enquiry officer submitted his report on August 21, 1974 and came to a finding, that there might be truth in the complaint of the customer that a bogus cheque was presented and his account debited with the amount. There was, however, no indication in the report that the appellant, Jai Bhagwan was guilty or had anything to do with the presentation of bogus cheque. ( 34 ) FURTHER as found by the Supreme Court that there was a total breach of the natural justice. The appellant was never asked to answer of any charges, there was no enquiry against him, no notice was issued to him to show cause why his services should not be terminated and even the order of termination of service failed to mention any reason and on that view of the matter the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the order terminating the services of the appellant was wholly unsustainable. The Supreme Court observed in the facts of the aforesaid case. That if the bank wanted to sustain the order terminating the services of the employee it was upto the bank to leave necessary evidence to prove such charges. The witnesses examined by the bank could neither prove that the cheque was a forgery or that it had been presented by the employee. ( 35 ) IN my view the aforesaid case is clearly distinguishable on facts and as such is of no assistance to Mr. Sen Gupta. ( 36 ) IN this context it would not be out of place to note the finding of the Tribunal on the preliminary issue. ( 35 ) IN my view the aforesaid case is clearly distinguishable on facts and as such is of no assistance to Mr. Sen Gupta. ( 36 ) IN this context it would not be out of place to note the finding of the Tribunal on the preliminary issue. Relevant extract from the order of the Tribunal is set out herein below:"it is not disputed and cannot be disputed that proper notice of the enquiry was sent to the concerned workman. The concerned workman was represented by Sri R. Das at the enquiry. A. R. Dutt, the then branch Manager deposed and signed the proceedings. S. Roy Chowdhury, another Branch Manager also signed the proceeding. Another witness of the bank was S. K. Mitra. Both A. R. Dutt and S. K. Mitra were fully cross-examined by Sri R. Das the representative of the concerned workman who also signed the proceeding. M. W. 1 gave al opportunity to the delinquent to the defend himself. The delinquent adduced documentary evidence which were accepted by the Enquiry Officer. There was no objection as to the procedure of the enquiry at any stage. It is clear from the enquiry proceedings that opportunity to defend was given to the delinquent. He cross-examined the witnesses and also filed two documents. He filed written argument also. He availed of the opportunity given to him. Therefore, natural justice was not violated. It is contended by Sri Mazumdar, appearing for the workman that neither Mrs. Chatterjee complainant for the complaint were produced before the Enquiry Officer for their production. The grievance was made during the enquiry. Even before this Tribunal when Mr. Bhattacharya, the Enquiry Officer was examined no question was put to him that the delinquent had ever asked him to examine the lady complainant. " ( 37 ) THE other aspect of the matter which is to be noted is the finding of the Tribunal that a plan was hatched up by someone in order to implicate Sri Banerjee for the purpose of dismissing him. The Tribunal held further that the charge-sheet had been issued with initial prejudice against him and the enquiry on the basis of charge-sheet was farce. The Tribunal further held that Sri A. R. Dutt the then branch Manager was to trap him to get credit from the members of the staff association. The Tribunal held further that the charge-sheet had been issued with initial prejudice against him and the enquiry on the basis of charge-sheet was farce. The Tribunal further held that Sri A. R. Dutt the then branch Manager was to trap him to get credit from the members of the staff association. These finding of the Tribunal indicate the basis of the award. There is however no evidence whatsoever for such finding, while it is true that certain allegations to that effect through find place in the pleadings of the concerned employee, but no attempt has been made to substantiate the same. In my view, since Tribunal proceeded on no evidence all, there also exists an error of law. ( 38 ) THE other decision cited by Mr. Sen Gupta namely 1984 1 LLJ 203 is strictly not relevant in the facts of this case. The Tribunal further found :"another peculiar feature of this case is that the charge-sheet mentions that on his own admission Sri Banerjee received an excess amount of Rs. 1,000/ -. There is no evidence on record to show it. The charge-sheet next says that on his own admission Shri Banerjee retained the excess amount in his person with the intention of misappropriating the same. There is no evidence to support it. The charge sheet next days that on his own admission Sri Banerjee flatly denied at 1. 30 p. m. having received the excess amount to Sm. Parul Rani Chwodhury. There is no evidence to prove it. The charge-sheet further says that on his own admission Sri Banerjee, apprehensive of being caught red-handed threw the money from his person on the floor. There is no evidence to support this assertion". ( 39 ) THE evidence on record shows that there was a complaint by Sm. Parul Rani Chowdhury and her husband about an excess payment of Rs. 1000/- at the cash counter manned by Sri T. K. Banerjee. There is also evidence on record that cash at the bank till did not have that excess Rs. ( 39 ) THE evidence on record shows that there was a complaint by Sm. Parul Rani Chowdhury and her husband about an excess payment of Rs. 1000/- at the cash counter manned by Sri T. K. Banerjee. There is also evidence on record that cash at the bank till did not have that excess Rs. 1000/- and that when body search was directed by the Branch Manager the concerned employee threw 10 pieces of hundred rupee notes on to the floor and further there is also uncontradicted evidence on record that when asked by the Branch Manager as to where the money was kept the concerned employee admitted that he kept the money in his socks. The learned Tribunal has completely ignored the aforesaid evidence on wrong assumption of law and came to a finding that there exist no evidence whatsoever. ( 40 ) MR. Sen Gupta contended that since the Tribunal has considered the evidence and upon such consideration came to the finding as embodied in the award and as such the writ Court ought not to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal even if the Writ Court comes to a different conclusion. In support of the said contention Mr. Sen Gupta relied on the decision of Supreme Court reported in AIR 1964 SC 477 . The Supreme Court while dealing with the jurisdiction of the Writ Court observed :"the question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Act. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by the inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result or the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the fact of the record can be corrected by a writ put not an error of fact, however grave it may appeal to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted in admissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was in sufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the interference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the said points cannot be agitated before a Writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. " ( 41 ) IN my view this decision of the Supreme Court is also of no assistance to Mr. Sen Gupta. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. " ( 41 ) IN my view this decision of the Supreme Court is also of no assistance to Mr. Sen Gupta. ( 42 ) WHILE it is true that the writ Court ought not to interfere, with the appreciation of evidence by the Tribunal, in my view if the Tribunal fails to consider the evidence on an erroneous assumption of law and commits an error of law, it would be pertinent for the Writ Court to interfere and set right the error. ( 43 ) IN my view I have taken I need not further examine the other contention of Mr. Deb that in any event the order of reinstatement ought not to have been passed by reason of express lack of confidence of the bank. ( 44 ) SINCE elaborate submissions have been made by both the parties at the hearing of this writ petition in regard to merits, and since I have also gone in to the merits of the case, I am of the view that no useful purpose would be served in remitting this matter to this Tribunal more so by reason of preponderance of evidence on record to support the finding of domestic enquiry. ( 45 ) IN that view of the matter this application succeeds. The Rule is made absolute. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case there will however to no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.