Judgment :- 1. The first of these appeals is against the judgment in L. A. R. No. 48 of 1978 and the second one against the judgment in L. A. R. No. 46 of 1978, both disposed of by a common judgment dated 24-2-1979 by the Subordinate Judge of Mavelikkara, on reference applications filed by the respective respondents herein under S.20 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act. An extent of 5.89 ares of land in Sy. Nos. 349/5-5 and 349/5-4 and an extent of 8.95 ares in Sy. No. 349/1-8 of Aranmula Village bad been acquired for the P. I. P. The appellant in L.A.A. No. 192 of 1979 is the wife of the appellant in L. A. A. No. 197 of 1979. The two reference applications, which gave rise to these appeals were disposed of by a common judgment by the court below, and accordingly we heard these appeals together, and they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The respondent in L.A.A, 197 of 1979 does not appear to have made any claim for any specific amount of compensation at any time before the passing of the award on 22-12-1975. According to the court below, the award notes disclosed that the parties had claimed Rs.500/-and Rs. 450/-. per cent respectively. In the reference application the respondent in L.A.A. No. 197 of 1979 claimed land value at the rate of Rs. 600/-per cent. The 1st claimant in L. A. R. No. 48 of 1978 who is the 1st respondent in L. A. A. No. 192 of 1979 in a statement filed on 18-12-1975 claimed land value at the rate of Rs. 450 per cent. In another statement filed by the parties they claimed land value at Rs. 600/-per cent. The Land Acquisition Officer fixed the compensation under two categories (i) for yielding trees capitalised value was given; (ii) for the remaining land, land value was given at the rate of Rs: 450/-per are in both the cases. It was aggrieved by the quantum of compensation awarded that these references had been made at the instance of the claimants before the court below. In the court below the claimants filed statements demanding Rs. 1100/- per are as the land value. That claim was opposed by the appellant-State.
It was aggrieved by the quantum of compensation awarded that these references had been made at the instance of the claimants before the court below. In the court below the claimants filed statements demanding Rs. 1100/- per are as the land value. That claim was opposed by the appellant-State. The court below raised two points for determination: (1) Whether the failure to prefer a definite claim before the Land Acquisition Officer could be condoned; (2) Whether the claimants were entitled to additional land value and, if so, at what rate? 3. Both the cases were jointly tried and evidence was recorded in L. A. R. No. 46 of 1978 out of which L. A. A. No. 197 of 1979 has arisen by the court below. The properties are stated to have been lying adjacent to each other. On the first point, namely, whether the failure on the part of the claimants to prefer a definite claim before the Land Acquisition Officer could be condoned, the court below took the view that as there was no evidence to show that proper notices under S.9 (3) of the Act were served on the claimants by the Land Acquisition Officer, requiring them to put forth their definite claim, the delay had to be condoned. Accordingly, the delay was condoned. On the question regarding the enhancement of the compensation the court below, after discussing the material placed before it, came to the conclusion that land value at the rate of Rs. 1100/- per are was the compensation to which the claimants would be entitled. 4. The Advocate-General appearing for the appellant-State raised two contentions:- (i) In regard to L. A. A. No. 197 of 1979, arising out of L. A. R. No. 46 of 1978, it was his submission that there was no specific claim in regard to compensation submitted by the respondents; and the court below was therefore not justified in condoning the delay on the part of the claimant in making the claim and (ii) In L.A.A, No. 192 of 1979, arising out of L.A.R. No. 48 of 1978, the land value awarded was excessive. He had also a case that the fixation of compensation by the multiplication of the net annual income by 20 was erroneous. 5. We will now deal with the first of the contentions.
He had also a case that the fixation of compensation by the multiplication of the net annual income by 20 was erroneous. 5. We will now deal with the first of the contentions. S.27 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act reads as follows: "When the applicant has refused to make such claim or has omitted without sufficient reason (to be allowed by the judge) to make such claim, amount awarded by the Court shall in no case exceed the amount awarded by the Collector". This has to be read along with the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of S.27 which reads as follows? "When the applicant has made a claim to compensation. Pursuant to any notice given under S.9 the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not exceed the amount so claimed or be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under SM." (emphasis supplied) From the wording of sub-section (1) of S.27 extracted above, it is clear that the claim to compensation is to be made pursuant to any notice given under S.9. In other words, for the operation of sub-section (2) of S.27 the giving of notice under S.9 of the Act is a condition precedent. Sub-section (3) of S.9 of the Act specifically provides: "the Collector, shall also serve notice on all such persons known or believed to be interested therein" The court below, on the facts of the case, under point No. 1, has recorded a finding that there was no evidence to show that proper notices were served on the claiments by the Land Acquisition Officer under S.9 requiring them to put forth their definite claims, and that for that reason the delay had to be condoned. Strictly speaking, no question of condoning the delay would arise in a case where there was no proof of the notice envisaged under S.9(3) of the Act had been served on the person interested in the land.
Strictly speaking, no question of condoning the delay would arise in a case where there was no proof of the notice envisaged under S.9(3) of the Act had been served on the person interested in the land. Apart from that, sub-section (3) of S 27 provides as follows: "When the applicant has omitted for a sufficient reason (to be allowed by the judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not be less than, and may, exceed, the amount awarded by the Collector." Actually the condonation by the court below was not the delay in filing the statement by the respondent, but the failure on his part to file a statement which normally used to be filed pursuant to a notice 'under S.9. For doing so he has authority by virtue of the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of S.27 of the Act. The exercise of that power depends upon the satisfaction of the court, which, no doubt, has to be objective, in regard to the question of sufficient reason for not making the claim. The words "to be allowed by the judge" in bracket indicate that the reasons for invoking the power under the sub-section have to be recorded by the Judge. That there was no evidence of the notice under S.9 having been served on the claimant was sufficient reason for the court below to pass an order which would enable the claimant to receive compensation which might exceed the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. We, therefore, find no merit in the contention raised by the appellant-State that the court below committed an error in allowing the respondent to receive compensation in exercise of what was awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. 6. We will now proceed to consider the second point raised by the Advocate General. Pw-1 proved Ext. A1 which is the registration copy of sale deed dated 15-2-1968 for 3 cents of land for a consideration of Rs. 1,650/-. The rate of land value in Ext. A-1 works out at Rs, 550/- per cent. According to Pw-1, Ext A-1 property was located just 3/4 furlong away from the acquired properties. There is some dispute as to the exact distance between the land acquired in the present case on the one hand and Ext. A-1 property on the other.
1,650/-. The rate of land value in Ext. A-1 works out at Rs, 550/- per cent. According to Pw-1, Ext A-1 property was located just 3/4 furlong away from the acquired properties. There is some dispute as to the exact distance between the land acquired in the present case on the one hand and Ext. A-1 property on the other. All the same, it would go to show that they are not lying far away from one another. Ext. A-2 is a registration copy of the sale deed dated 20-5-1975 proved by Pw-2 Ext. A-2 property is 10 cents in extent with a small thatched building. The consideration for Ext. A-2 property is Rs. 8,500/-. According to Pw-2, the building had fallen down subsequently. However, it has to be noticed that Ext. A-2 sale deed came into existence after the publication of S 3(1) notification on 29-11-1973 Pw-3, the claimant in L.A.R. No. 46 of 1978, and the 2nd claimant in L A.R. No. 48 of 1978, when examined as Pw-3 had stated in his oral evidence about the importance of the location of the land acquired in view of the business places, schools and Offices situated in the neighbourhood. Dw-1 the Village Officer admitted in cross examination that there was a village road leading to the acquired property from the Kotta Kidangoor Road by the side of which Exts.A1 and A2 properties were lying though the acquired property was lying fifty meters away from that main road. We do not, therefore, find any reason for taking a view different from what was taken by the court below on the question of compensation for the extent of land valued on centage basis. 7. The last point urged by the Advocate-General relates to the compensation for the portion of the land which was fixed by the multiplication of the annual net income. The argument advanced by the Advocate-General is that there was absolutely no justification for fixing the compensation by multiplying the annual net income by twenty. We find force in this contention. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case we are inclined to hold that multiplication by 15 times of the annual net income from the land in question would represent the amount that may have to be awarded by way of compensation for that portion of the land When calculated on that basis a sum of Rs.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case we are inclined to hold that multiplication by 15 times of the annual net income from the land in question would represent the amount that may have to be awarded by way of compensation for that portion of the land When calculated on that basis a sum of Rs. 1,293-70 in L. A. A. No. 197 of 1979 arising from L. A. R. No. 46 of 1978 and a sum of Rs. 155.85 is L. A. A. No. 192 of 1979 arising out of L. A. R. No. 48 of 1978 would have to be reduced from the amount decreed by the court below by way of compensation. 8. The result, therefore, is that the appeals are allowed in part and the compensation payable in L. A. R. No. 46 of 1978 which has given rise to L.A A. No. 197 of 1979 shall stand reduced by Rs. 1,293-70 and compensation payable in L.A.A. No. 192 of 1979 arising out of L.A.R. No. 48 of 1978 shall stand reduced by Rs. 55 85 solatium and interest payable also shall stand accordingly reduced in the respective appeals. The judgment and decree of the court below shall stand modified to the extent indicated above. In all other respects the decree and judgment of the court below shall stand confirmed. No costs.