Judgment :- "The tenant is the petitioner. The property in disputed measured 77 X 21 in No. 48, Strahans Road, Madras-12. Admittedly, this property belongs to the respondent Masjid. In ejectment suit No. 179 of 1975, the respondent herein prayed for a decree against the petitioner directing him to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the the property in his occupation. After the service of summons in that suit, the petitioner herein filed M.P. No. 2265 of 1975 claiming benefits under section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act (hereinafter refrered to as the Act). Two objections were raised by the respondent in that application. The first was that as per G.O. Ms. No. 1252, Commercial Taxes and Religious Endowments, dated 27th November, 1980, a lessee of wakf land will not be entitled to claim any compensation for any building put up by him while surrendering possession of the land to the wakf and since no compensation is payable in respect of the superstructure, the tenant cannot, also seek the benefits of section 9 of the Act. The second was that the land in question being part of mosque would partake the character of res extra commercium and therefore inalienable and cannot form the subject-matter or an application under section 9 of the Act. 2. Before the Court below on behalf of the petitioner Exhibits P-1 to P-23, were marked and the petitioner and another Civil Engineer were examined as P.W.1 and P.W.2, while, on behalf of the respondent Exhibits D-1 to D-7 were filed and D.W.1 and D.W.2 have given evidence. The learned IV Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras on a consideration of the oral as well as the documentary evidence found that the G.O. relied on by the respondent cannot be pressed into service to deprive the petitioner of the rights under section 9 of the Act and having regard to the use of the property in dispute by the petitioner as a firewood depot for nearly 40 years and the sale of an adjacent property to one Alwar Nadar under section 9 of the Act. Section 9 of the Act would apply even with reference to the property in dispute In that view, the application filed by the petitioner claiming the benefits of section 9 of the Act was allowed and a commissioner was appointed to value the land. Section 9 of the Act would apply even with reference to the property in dispute In that view, the application filed by the petitioner claiming the benefits of section 9 of the Act was allowed and a commissioner was appointed to value the land. Aggrieved by this, the respondent herein preferred Ejectment Appeal No.11 of 1982 before the Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras. With reference to the plea raised by the respondent that G.O.M.S. No. 1252, Commercial Takes and Religious Endowment dated 27th November, 1980 would apply to deprive the petitioner of the benefits of Section 9 of the Act, the appellate Court was of the view that the rights available under section 9 of the Act cannot be defeated by the G.O. and that the petitioner can claim such benefits. However, the appellate Court was of the view that the property in question is a res extra commercium and inalienable and therefore, the petitioner cannot claim that such property should be sold to him under section 9 of the Act. In that view, the appeal was allowed and the application filed by the petitioner claiming the benefits under section 9 of the Act was dismissed. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this civil revision petition. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the appellate Court was in error in having concluded that the property in dispute would be res extra commercium and pointed out that in order to be land appur-tenant to the mosque, the land should also have been used by the mosque for its benefit. Relience in this connection was also placed upon the meaning of the word appurtenant as given in Black’s Law Distionary, 5th edition at page 94. The learned counsel further pointed out that the evidence on behalf of the respondent disclosed the requirement of the property in the occupation of the petitioner for its own purposes and that having regard to the exclusive use of the property by the petitioner as a firewood depot for nearly 40 years, it could not have been used at all by the respondent as an appurtenant land and the were requirement of the respondent for its own purpose would not render the property inalienable as res extra commercium. Though the respondent in this revision petition had been served, it had not appeared either through an advocate or by any other person duly authorised. 4. In considering the question whether the property in dispute is appurtenant to the mosque, the appellate Court has not adverted to the requirements to be satisfied or fulfilled before such property can be really termed as an appurtenant one. In this case, there is no dispute that the petitioner has been in exclusive possession, occupation and enjoyment of the disputed property for over 40 years as a lessee under the respondent. The respondent could not have, therefore, been using the land either for its purpose or for its benefit. The mere circumstance that the property in question is next or contiguous to the mosque will not by itself make it res extra commercium. Indeed it is seen from the documents that the immediate adjacent property formed the subject-matter of an application under section 9 of the Act at the instance of one Alwar Nadar and this is shown by Exhibits B-6. Unfortunately, there is no reference in the order of the appellate Court to Exhibits B-6. at all. Besides, the admission of D.W.1, the photographer, who had taken the photographs Exhibits D-3 and D-4, would show the existence of a wall between the mosque and the property in the occupation of the petitioner. Even D.W. 2 states in the course of his cheif-examination that there is a wall in between the property leased out to the petitioner and the mosque. P.W.1 also in the course of his chief-examination has stated that there is a well in existence between the property leased out to him and the mosque land and in the course of his cross-examination, he has reiterated the existence of the compound wall by stating that the property in his possession is on one side of the wall. P.W. 2 would also state in his chief-examination that there is an intervening wall between the mosque and the property in the occupation of the petitioner. P.W. 2 would also state in his chief-examination that there is an intervening wall between the mosque and the property in the occupation of the petitioner. The evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 and D.W. 1 and D.W. 2 referred to above would thus disclose the existence of a wall between the property in the possession and enjoyment of the petitioner and the mosque and if that be so, then, the property in the occupation of the petitioner could not have been used by the respondent for purposes of the mosque for its benefit. That is also probable in view of the admitted exclusive occupation and enjoyment of the property in dispute by the petitioner as a lessee for more than 40 years. The report of the Commissioner has not been properly considered and appreciated. The bulk of the report of the Commissioner is devoted to physical features of the building viz., the mosque, which was really unnecessary for purposes of considering the application of the petitioner under section 9 of the Act taking into account the character of the property forming the subject matter of such an application, Towards the concluding portion of the report, the Commissioner has stated that the western side wall divided the mosque and the respondents (petitioner herein) portion, that the Mosque and the respondents (petitioner herein) portion had separate main entrances and that there was no door-way outside the western wall. Recently in Palani Roman Cotholic Mission through Rev. Father A. Kulandaiswamy v. Murugan & Co., (1984) 97 L.W. 74: A.I.R. 1984 Mad. 126, I had occasion to examine the question of the applicability of section 9 of the Act to certain properties owned by a church claimed by it to be appurtenant to the church. In doing so, a decision of this Court in Sam-bandan Chetti v. St. Francias Xaviers Church, (1973)2 M.L.J. 2 : (1973) 56 L.W. 5167 was referred to and it was held that there was clear demarcation of the church and its appurtenant properties by compound walls and fence the property which formed the subject-matter of the application under section 9 of the Act cannot be considered to be a property appartment to the church. The decision in Sambadhan Chetti v. St. The decision in Sambadhan Chetti v. St. Francis Xavier’s Church, (1973) 2 M.L.J. 2 : 56 L.W. 5167 was held to be inapplicable the facts as in that case it was found that the property forming the subject matter of the application under section 9 of the Act was within the church compound itself, which cannot be the case in Palani Roman Catholic Mission through Rev. Father A. Kulandaiswamy v. Murugan & Co., (1984) 97 L.W. 74: A.I.R. 1984 Mad. 126. In order therefore to ascertain the true charact -er of the property whether it is really ap-purtenent to the church or is otherwise clearly demarcated therefrom by compound walls and other fences or ridges, it would be necessary to record a clear finding of fact touching upon that aspect on the basis of the materials made available to the Court. In this case, as seen earlier vital pieces of oral as well as documentary evidence have not been taken into account and their evidentiary value assessed and that had led to the appellate Court to come to an erroneous conclusion regarding the character of the property forming the subject-matter of the application under section 9 of the Act that is res extra commercium. In order to precisely ascertain the character of the property, it would be necessary to consider in detail the features of the property in the occupation of the petitioner particularly whether it is cut off or excluded from the mosque portion of the property by walls or fences, as the case may be. The mere existence of a closed doorway or the opening out of the windows would not be decisive of the question, if the property in the occupation of the petitioner had not been put to use by the mosque for its benefit and its purposes along with its other lands, as in such a case, it cannot be called appurtenant to the mosque. Inasmuch as these aspects have not been referred to or considered by the appellate Court, its conclusion that the property in the occupation of the petitioner is res extra commercium cannot be sustained and has to be set aside with a direction that question should be considered afresh in the light of the observations contained in this order and also the available evidence on record. Consequently, the civil revision petition is allowed and the order of the appellate Court dismissing M.P. No. 2265 of 1975 filed by the petitioner under section 9 of the Act is set aside and Rejectment Appeal No. 11 of 1982 is remitted to the lower appellate Court for a reconsideration on its merits and in the light of the observations contained herein. There Will, however, be no order a to costs.