JUDGMENT : A. S. Qureshi, J. In these five petitions, common questions of law are involved and therefore at the request of the learned counsels, of both sides they are heard and disposed of by this common judgment. 2. These five revision applications are filed by the petitioners, who were the applicants before the trial court seeking permission to file their respective suits as indigent persons. The claim of the petitioners in all the five petitions arose out of an incident which occurred on the night of 17th April, 1980, whereby the compound wall of the respondent Kishan Oil Mill collapsed resulting’ into the death of three persons and physical injuries to other two persons. The five applications for permission to sue as indigent persons were made by the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased three persons and by the two injured persons. The learned trial judge after recording the evidence of the applicants, came to the conclusion that there was no merit in the claims of the applicants inasmuch as the evidence did not disclose any cause of action for filing the suit. The learned trial judge therefore rejected all the five applications under Order 33, Rule 7 (3) read with Rule 5 (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. Mr. M. S. Shah appearing for Mr. K. J. Vora for the petitioners in all the five petitions has urged that the learned trial judge was not justified in rejecting the applications because according to him, it was not open to the learned trial judge to decide the question of negligence for the purpose of dealing with the applications for permission to sue as indigent persons. According to Mr. M. S. Shah, at this stage the trial court has only to go into two questions, viz. (1) whether the applicants are really indigent persons, and (2) whether the facts stated and averments made in the plaint show a cause of action. According to him, at this stage, the court must restrict itself only to the question whether the facts disclose a cause of action. He has further submitted that the averments made in the applications and the evidence led before the trial court does disclose a clear cause of action, viz. the collapse of the compound wall due to the negligence of the defendant. 4. Mr. He has further submitted that the averments made in the applications and the evidence led before the trial court does disclose a clear cause of action, viz. the collapse of the compound wall due to the negligence of the defendant. 4. Mr. S. D. Shah, the learned counsel for the respondent Kishan Oil Mill in all the five petitions has urged that the learned trial judge was right in holding that on merits the applicants’ claim was not sustainable and therefore the learned trial judge was justified in rejecting the applications for permission to sue as indigent persons. Mr. S. D. Shah has relied on a decision of Bombay High Court reported in AIR, 1932, Bombay, 584, wherein it is held that - “Under Order 33, the court has jurisdiction to examine the applicant on two points-: (1) as to his alleged pauperism, and (2) on the merits of Iris claim; and if the court concludes that the definition in Rule 1 is not satisfied, or that there are no merits in the claim, it has jurisdiction to reject the application. It is obvious that the only materials, at this stage, on which the court can proceed, in coming to the conclusion that there are no materials in the applicant’s claim, are the application itself under Rule 4 and the evidence of the appellant or Iris agent.” Relying on the aforesaid observations, Mr. S. D. Shah has submitted that it is open to the trial court to go into the question of merits at the time of the hearing of the application for permission to sue as an indigent person. According to him, if the court comes to the conclusion that there are no merits in the case, then the trial court may reject the application. In the afore cited case, after hearing full arguments, the learned Subordinate Judge at Ahmedabad had held that the petitioner was a pauper, but on the merits, she had no good subsisting cause of action and rejected the petition. In that case, the High Court while reversing the decision of the trial court, held that the learned trial judge was wrong in dismissing the application and refusing the application for permission to sue as a pauper on the ground that no prima facie case on merits was made out. This decision really does not help Mr. In that case, the High Court while reversing the decision of the trial court, held that the learned trial judge was wrong in dismissing the application and refusing the application for permission to sue as a pauper on the ground that no prima facie case on merits was made out. This decision really does not help Mr. S. D. Shah because it is quite obvious that the observations with regard to examining the merits of the case only refer to finding out as to whether the applicant has a sustainable claim based on the facts stated and averments made in the plaint and on the deposition of the applicant whether a cause of action is disclosed, and that whether the applicants are likely to succeed if such facts are proved when the evidence is led. The second case cited by Mr. S. D. Shah is reported in AIR 1943 Bombay 338, wherein the High Court while rejecting the petition upheld the decision of the trial court that prima facie, no cause of action was made out by the applicant who had sought permission to file a suit in forma pauperis. The suit in that case was not tenable because in law, illegitimate child could not have claimed maintenance from its putative father. This is obviously correct because when the suit is not maintainable at all granting permission to an applicant as an indigent person would be an exercise in futility because such a suit is bound to fail. This authority also does not help Mr. S. D. Shah. 5. In Vijay Pratap Singh and Another v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh and Another, AIR 1962 Supreme Court, 941, the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that while dealing with an application for permission to sue as an indigent person, under Order 33 CPC the court has not to see whether the claim made by the petitioner is likely to succeed; it has merely to satisfy itself that the allegations made in the petition, if accepted as true, would entitle the petitioner to the relief he claims. If accepting those allegations as true, no case is made out for granting relief no cause of action would be shown and the petition must be rejected. If accepting those allegations as true, no case is made out for granting relief no cause of action would be shown and the petition must be rejected. But in ascertaining whether the petition shows a cause of action the court does not enter upon a trial of the issues affecting the merits of the claim made by the petitioner. The court cannot take into consideration the defences which the defendant may raise upon the merits; nor is the court competent to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. The jurisdiction of the court does not extend to trial of issue which must fairly be left for decision at the hearing of the suit. In the present cases, the learned judge has gone into the question whether the applicants have led sufficient evidence to establish the negligence of the defendant. The learned Judge was not right in doing so. At this stage, the applicant has to lead evidence regarding his indigence and only a prima facie cause of action. Maintainability of the cause of action must be left for the hearing of the suit when full evidence could be led to make good the claim. If negligence of the defendant, which is the cause of action in these cases is required to be established at the hearing of the applications for permission to sue as indigent persons, there would be practically nothing left for the trial and the order that would follow would not be merely a permission to sue as indigent persons but it would have to be a decree for the damages in tort. The facts stated and averments made in the applications and in evidence of the applicants, does clearly disclose that the aforesaid three persons died and two others injured as a result of the collapse of the compound wall of the defendant mill due to negligence of the defendant in not maintaining his compound wall in safe condition. This discloses a clear cause of action, viz. negligence of the defendant. As regards the details of negligence either in throwing waste against the said wall or non-repair of the wall or for any other reason could be proved by leading evidence at the trial. This discloses a clear cause of action, viz. negligence of the defendant. As regards the details of negligence either in throwing waste against the said wall or non-repair of the wall or for any other reason could be proved by leading evidence at the trial. The law does not require the details of the negligence to be proved at the stage of hearing of the application for granting permission to sue as an indigent person. The learned judge has wrongly rejected the applications and therefore the impugned order of the learned trial judge in each of the five petitions deserves to be set aside. 6. The next question argued by Mr. S. D. Shah is that the present petitions are filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and hence this court has no power to set aside the impugned orders of the trial court because they are not covered under any of the three clauses of the said Section 115. According to him, the learned trial judge had the jurisdiction to pass the impugned orders and therefore according to him, the present petitions should be rejected on that ground alone. 7. Mr. M. S. Shah, the learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the impugned orders of the trial court are quite obviously without jurisdiction because according to him, the learned trial judge was not justified in going into the question whether the defendant’s negligence is proved or not. According to him, sufficient cause of action is disclosed in the applications and in the deposition of the applicants that the deaths and injuries have occurred on account of the negligence on the part of the defendant due to which the compound wall had collapsed Mr. M. S. Shah has also urged that the learned trial judge has committed material irregularity in holding that the negligence of the defendant is not proved by the material on record. The submission of Mr. S. D. Shah is untenable and therefore it is rejected. It is quite obvious that the learned trial judge had no jurisdiction to go into tire question of evidence regarding the negligence of the defendant at this stage. Mr. M. S. Shah is right in his contention that the impugned orders suffer from material irregularity regarding the jurisdiction and therefore the impugned orders of the learned trial judge deserve to be set aside. 8. Mr. M. S. Shah is right in his contention that the impugned orders suffer from material irregularity regarding the jurisdiction and therefore the impugned orders of the learned trial judge deserve to be set aside. 8. Since in these matters, the permission is sought to sue as indigent persons, the learned Government Pleader was required to remain present and make his submissions. Mr. M. B. Gandhi, the learned A.G.P. has appeared and stated that the State has no objection if the petitions are allowed and the petitioners are granted permission to sue as indigent persons. 9. In the result, the petitions succeed. The impugned orders in all the five petitions are set aside. It is a pity that on account of an erroneous view of the trial court, the indigent applicants’ claims have been delayed for several years. The trial court is therefore directed to take up the hearing of all these five cases on a priority basis and dispose them of finally by judgments and decrees as promptly as possible not later than 31st January, 1985. Rule made absolute in all the live matters. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.