JUDGMENT M.P. Menon, J. 1. In the year 1949 the Travancore Government accorded sanction to one E.V. Narayanan to start a middle school at Brahmamangalam. Narayanan passed away in December, 1975. Iysha, Narayanan's daughter and the petitioner herein, thereupon claimed the right to manage the school. Under the Kerala Education Act and the Rules, transfer of ownership and management of schools has to be approved by the officers of the Education Department. The Director of Public Instruction declined to uphold Iysha's claim, apparently for the reason that in his opinion, the school belonged to the "Brahmamangalam School Committee", and not to Sri. Narayanan in his individual capacity. The matter was taken up before Government who thought that entrustment of the school to a loose body like the committee was not desirable. Accordingly, by Ext. P-7 order, dated 15th October 1977, Government held that the management of the school "be vested with Smt. Iysha Narayanan". Ext. P-7 was promptly challenged before this court by the office-bearers of the committee, and by Ext. P-9 judgment, Chandrasekhara Menon, J. held that the rival claims had to be ultimately settled by a civil court. His Lordship directed that as an interim measure, pending decision by a civil court, both parties should jointly manage the school. The decision was challenged in writ appeals 152 and 191 of 1978, and resulted in Ext. P-11 judgment of a division bench. That bench took the view that questions relating to right of management had to be decided by the authorities under the Education Act themselves, to the best of their ability, and that this statutory duty of theirs could not be assigned to civil courts. Ext. P-9 judgment was accordingly reversed and the Government was directed to reconsider the question, The Government did so and passed Ext. P-12 order on 30th October 1979, holding that the school vested in the Committee, and not in the late Sri Narayanan or his heirs. 2. It is Ext. P-12 order which is now being challenged in this Original Petition, by Iysha Narayanan. 3. he real controversy is about the ownership of the school, because ordinarily, the right to manage goes with ownership. The proper forum to settle disputes about ownership is the civil court. Ext. 2. It is Ext. P-12 order which is now being challenged in this Original Petition, by Iysha Narayanan. 3. he real controversy is about the ownership of the school, because ordinarily, the right to manage goes with ownership. The proper forum to settle disputes about ownership is the civil court. Ext. P-11 judgment of the Division Bench did not go to the extent of suggesting that this jurisdiction of the civil courts stood ousted by the revisions of the Kerala Education Act and the Rules. All that the judgment indicated was that the possibility of a civil litigation could not relieve the Educational Authorities of their duties under the Act, for the purposes of the Act. It is indisputable that the statutory authorities are bound to exercise their functions, and the availability of another forum for finally settling civil rights, will be no excuse for them to abdicate their functions. We do not understand Ext. P-11 judgment to lay down the proposition that the decision of the authorities under the Act would be final and conclusive in respect of title to property and civil rights, except for the limited purposes of the Act. 4. When a similar question recently arose before this court in Abdul Rahim v. State of Kerala 1984 KLT 773 and the correctness of the view taken in judgments like Ext. P-11 was canvassed, one of us (Bhaskaran, Ag. C. J.) said:- "We understand the Division Bench ruling as one laying down that it is for the statutory authorities constituted under the Kerala Education Act and the Rules framed thereunder, to the best of their resources and ability, to decide the question of the right of management of the school. We do not, however, understand it as one laying down a proposition that such decisions taken by the Educational Authorities would conclude the civil rights of the parties to the properties involved. The decisions of the Educational Authorities are not meant to settle civil rights of the parties to such properties. These decisions are in the nature of summary determination for the sake of expediency, without waiting for the result of a protracted litigation in a civil court. The decisions of the Educational Authorities are not meant to settle civil rights of the parties to such properties. These decisions are in the nature of summary determination for the sake of expediency, without waiting for the result of a protracted litigation in a civil court. There could be no doubt that the right to agitate on questions of civil rights in a civil court would remain unaffected in spite of the decision by the Educational Authorities for the limited purpose of carrying on the functions and fulfilling the obligations under the Act. It does not, and cannot oust the jurisdiction of the civil court in matters touching the civil rights of the parties." 5. When the right to the ownership of a school is seriously in dispute, a proper decision thereon can be rendered only by examining a large volume of evidence, oral and documentary, which the parties will be interested in adducing. The Educational Officers and the Secretary to Government would be unequal to the task of adjudicating such a dispute. Exts. P-7 and P-12 are illustrative of the accidents' involved in entrusting the final decision to them. Of course, if the statute provides that they, and they alone, could decide the matter, that policy will have to be given effect to. But as we said, the statute in this case does not confer any such exclusive jurisdiction on them, except for the purposes of administering the Act. The civil courts' power remains untouched. 6. While upholding Ext. P-12, therefore, on the ground that the view taken therein is a possible one and agrees with that taken by the Director of Public Instruction, we make it clear that the petitioner, if she is so interested, can approach the civil court with a properly constituted suit for establishing the rights claimed in respect of the school. Subject to above, the Original Petition is dismissed. No costs.