JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE decision in this petition shall also dispose of Misc. Petition No. 376 of 1982 {mahendra Pratapsingh v. State of M. P. and four others) arising out of the order of dismissal dated 17-3-1981 having its origin in departmental proceedings against the petitioner regarding his misconduct on 14-12-1980 between 4. 30 p. m. and 7. 15 p. m. The grounds raised therein are also substantially the same as raised in this petition. ( 2. ) BY this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner prays for quashing the order (Annexure F) of 1-4-1981 of the Deputy inspector General of Police, Indore Range, Indore (respondent No. 3) dismissing the petitioner from his employment, and directing him and the other respondents (Nos. 1 and 2) to continue his employment uninterrupted with all the intervening benefits, and the costs of the petition. ( 3. ) THE petitioner Mahendra Pratap Singh was appointed as a Sub-Inspector in 1971. On 16-12-1980 when he was acting as a Sub-Inspector at the Control Room, Central Kotwali, Indore, he was suspended. On 18-12-1980, the Superintendent of Police, District Indore (respondent No. 4)initiating a departmental inquiry against him charged him with the shouting of unbecoming slogans at the Police Station, Palasia on 14-12-1980 at 12. 30 noon, causing obstruction in the recording of the report by the Head moharrir there and unauthorizedly using a police van No. M. P. P. 1798. ( 4. ) HE was called upon to submit his reply but without being supplied with the statements of witnesses proposed to be examined and the documents to be relied upon (by the Administration) then and there; he was supplied with them afterwards on 24-12-1980. Though the petitioner had submitted his reply to be placed before the Inspector General of Police (respondent No. 2), it was not so done. Though the petitioner along with six others who were jointly being proceeded against submitted an application to the Superintendent of Police, District Indore (respondent no. 4) though the Inquiry Officer, the City Superintendent of Police (respondent Nd. 5) objecting to his appointment (respondent No. 5) as the Inquiry officer, the respondent No. 5 without forwarding it to the respondent No. 4 rejected it with an endorsement to that effect on the application. 4) though the Inquiry Officer, the City Superintendent of Police (respondent Nd. 5) objecting to his appointment (respondent No. 5) as the Inquiry officer, the respondent No. 5 without forwarding it to the respondent No. 4 rejected it with an endorsement to that effect on the application. Though the inquiry against the petitioner (and others) was to begin on 29-1-1981 the intimation of it was given to him only on 28-1-1981. On 29-1-1981, the petitioner (along with others) made a joint application for legal assistance (of an advocate) to the respondent No. 4. The respondent No. 5, the inquiry Officer allowed him to bring only a Government officer for his legal assistance even which he could not avail. He was supplied with the copy of the report made by one of the departmental witnesses Mr. Khan, Town inspector, Police Station, Palasia against him only during the course of inquiry. The evidence of one Mr. R. P. S. Chouhan, one of the witnesses in the inquiry, was recorded in his absence on 18-2-1981, though on 21-2-1981 he was supplied with the copy of the examination in chief of this witness and was also given opportunity of cross-examining him. ( 5. ) IN Inquiry Officer found two of the charges established but not the charge of preventing the Head Moharrir from recording the report and submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Indore, who by his order dated 1-4-1981 dismissed him. The petitioner appealed to the Inspector General of Police, M. P. Head Quarters Bhopal, which has still to be decided. ( 6. The petitioner appealed to the Inspector General of Police, M. P. Head Quarters Bhopal, which has still to be decided. ( 6. ) THE petitioner prays that the order dismissing him from service is liable to be quashed on several grounds including : (1) That the respondent No. 4, the Superintendent of Police, District Indore was not competent to initiate a departmental inquiry against him or frame a charge; (2) That the respondent No. 5 the City Superintendent because of his bias against the petitioner did not conduct the inquiry with an open mind; (3) That he did not observe the rules of natural justice in not recording some of the evidence in his presence; (4) That he conducted the inquiry against the petitioner not in isolation but along with six others; (5) Not giving him opportunity of defending himself by providing him with legal assistance atleast of a Government servant; (6) Not summoning some of the witnesses for the defence and not examining some of the witnesses, though produced; (7) Recording the additional evidence without giving him sufficient notice in advance; and (8) The conclusion culminating in his dismissal could not have been arrived at by the tribunal reasonably on the basis Of the evidence oral and documentary given before the Inquiry Officer ( 7. ) ONLY for the sake of convenience, I first deal with the ground no. 3. Ordinarily, audi alteram partem (hear the other side) one of the principles of natural justice requires the recording of the evidence of a witness in the presence of the party against whom that evidence is likely to be used, but there is substantial compliance with this principle, if the witness is later on made available to the party for the purpose of cross-examining him. The petitioner admits that even though the evidence of a witness had been recorded in his absence, he was later on allowed opportunity to cross-examine him. This ground, therefore, has no force. ( 8. ) REGARDING the ground No. 4, it is true that the departmental wrongs of a delinquent should ordinarily be inquired into separately, but where several delinquents have joined in committing departmental wrongs, as in the present case, the allegations against them could be inquired into together. This ground, therefore, has no force. ( 8. ) REGARDING the ground No. 4, it is true that the departmental wrongs of a delinquent should ordinarily be inquired into separately, but where several delinquents have joined in committing departmental wrongs, as in the present case, the allegations against them could be inquired into together. The discretion to conduct a joint inquiry is to be exercised fairly and honestly, the guiding principles always being whether as a result of joint inquiry, a delinquent is not likely to be embarrassed or prejudiced. In circumstances, such as the ones presented in this case, a joint inquiry apparently was with a view to avoiding embarrassment to the delinquents. No prejudice caused to him has been shown. The argument that he could not examine any of the co-delinquent as a witness for him is more apparent than real. ( 9. ) AS regards the ground that he was not given any legal assistance, ordinarily the help by a lawyer is not envisaged in a departmental inquiry. In absence of any aid by a lawyer does not in itself involve the violation of one of the principles of natural justice. If the subject-matter of the inquiry be of a technical nature or where the evidence be voluminous or where some technical experts are examined, it may be necessary to afford a delinquent the opportunity of being defendant by an expert in law. The nature of allegations in his departmental inquiry had not required the provision to the delinquent of a lawyer. It appears that the delinquent himself had conducted his defence well and had not apparently needed the assistance of even a Government servant. ( 10. ) AS regards not summoning some of the witnesses for the defence and not examining some of those, who though produced and additional evidence being taken without giving him notice in advance, the reference has been made to the documents H I J K L M. They if considered together do disclose violations of one of the principles of natural justice. Audi alteram per tern. ( 11. ) ONE of the important grounds the ground No. 1 however is whether the Superintendent of Police (respondent No. 4) was competent to initiate a departmental inquiry against the petitioner or frame a charge against him. Audi alteram per tern. ( 11. ) ONE of the important grounds the ground No. 1 however is whether the Superintendent of Police (respondent No. 4) was competent to initiate a departmental inquiry against the petitioner or frame a charge against him. Regulation 228 lays down as follows : - "in every case of removal from service, reduction in rank, grade or pay or withholding of increment for a period in excess of one year, a formal proceeding must be recorded by the Superintendent in the prescribed form, setting forth:- (a) the charge: (b) the evidence on which the charge is based : (c) the defence of the accused : (d) the statements of his witnesses (if any): (e) the finding of the Superintendent, with the reasons on which it is based : (f) The Superintendents final order or recommendation, as the case may be : provided that it shall not be necessary to record a formal proceedings, if due to exigencies of service and not by reason of any misconduct or fault on his part, a police officer is transferred from a post carrying a special or specialist pay in the special armed force, motor transport or Radio Telegraphy section to a post hot carrying such pay and reduction in his pay is caused by reason of such transfer. " It will at once be noticed that the Superintendent, though can frame a charge in every case of removal from service, reduction in rank, grade or pay, or without of increment for a period in excess of one year, has not been empowered to frame a charge also in a case of dismissal. ( 12. ) IN State of M. P. and others v. Shardul Singh 1971 MPLJ 363 (sc ). , their Lordships of the Supreme Court were dealing with C. P. and Berar Police Regulations 228 and 229. That regulation framed on the basis of section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935 had read as follows : "in every case of dismissal, reduction in rank, grade or pay, or withholding of increment for a period in excess of one year. . . . . . " Rest of the terms upto clause (f) were the same as they are in the present regulation 228. . . . . . " Rest of the terms upto clause (f) were the same as they are in the present regulation 228. In short, where as the Regulation 228 of the C. P. and berar Regulations had included the power of the District Superintendent to frame a charge in case of dismissal also, it takes away the power of the framing of the charge for dismissal under the present regulation. ( 13. ) NO doubt regulation 229 A envisages the penalty proposed to be also of dismissal by the authority empowered to punish a delinquent but only because of the proposed penalty among others being of dismissal does not confer on the Superintendent of Police the power to frame a charge which leads to eventual dismissal of that delinquent. No doubt the Police act, 1861 particularly section 7 and the Police Regulations form a Code in themselves determining the conduct of the police officers and personnel but it does not mean that the Civil Service Regulations do not apply to them. The Police Act and the Regulations of course hold the field where there is a specific provision in them but where they are wanting the civil service regulations would apply, particularly if the Police Act and the Regulations are wanting in the matter of observance of principles of natural justice. ( 14. ) IN Premchand Dhalpuria v. State 1970 MPLJ 430 majority of the Judges held that the temporary employment of Premchand Dhalpuria as a Sub-Inspector was regulated by rule 8 of the M. P. Civil Services (General Conditions of service) Rules, 1961 framed under Article 309 of the Constitution so as to make his appointment terminable with one months notice. It was held per Krishnan J. "the civil service regulations, as in force in the State are applicable to all civil Departments including the police. Within that department, there are the police regulations which naturally prevail whenever there is conflict between them and the civil service Regulations but in a field like temporary employment, for which there is no special police regulation, the civil service Regulations as in force in this State, apply. A probationary Sub-Inspector can be removed without a proceeding under article 311, unless he has been confirmed during the interval. Of course, if a probationary officer is to be sent away with a black mark, then proceedings would be necessary. " ( 15. A probationary Sub-Inspector can be removed without a proceeding under article 311, unless he has been confirmed during the interval. Of course, if a probationary officer is to be sent away with a black mark, then proceedings would be necessary. " ( 15. ) WE have already noted the provisions contained in regulations 228 and 228a. Then there are regulations 228b, 229, 230, 232 and 233, but neither of them specifies the mode of conducting a departmental inquiry exhaustively. To elaborate neither of these Regulations lays down that the hearing has to be in the presence of a delinquent, that he has the right to cross-examine the witnesses appearing against him, that he has the right to himself examine as a witness for the defence and that he has a right to summon all witnesses or produce documents in his defence. ( 16. ) THERE is no evidence in this case that the authority competent to dismiss the petitioner had itself applied its mind whether there was material against the petitioner to be proceeded against and that it had authorized the framing of the charge by the Superintendent of Police, Indore who, as already seen, was not competent to frame a charge under Regulation no. 228, which does not include a case of dismissal. ( 17. ) THERE is no doubt that it is open to the dismissing authority to take the help of some subordinate authority for exercising that power, for example, asking him to inquire and report (State of M. P. v. Shardul Singh), but it does not imply the framing of the charge by that subordinate authority who lacks inherently the power to frame a charge. The charge has ordinarily to be framed by the authority competent to dismiss the delinquent, if the eventual punishment is dismissal. The Superintendent of Police, district Indore (respondent No. 4) being incompetent under Regulation 228 to frame a charge with regard to dismissal, the proceedings are void ah initio. ( 18. The charge has ordinarily to be framed by the authority competent to dismiss the delinquent, if the eventual punishment is dismissal. The Superintendent of Police, district Indore (respondent No. 4) being incompetent under Regulation 228 to frame a charge with regard to dismissal, the proceedings are void ah initio. ( 18. ) IT is true that the very nature of employment of the petitioner being a police officer requires him to vigorously conform to the rules of discipline, but it cannot be lost sight of that he was a member of the Arajatrit Police Karmachari Sangh approved and authorized by the administration and he like others had freedoms of expression, movement, meeting and the like, provided he did not slander or defame anyone, did not repass on anyones land or property and did not turn his meeting into an unlawful assembly or the like. He also does not only on account of being a member of the police force cease to have constitutional remedies available to the people at large. ( 19. ) AS regards ground No. 2 bias is a corollary of the other principle of natural justice; nemo debet essee judex inpropria causa (No one can be judge in his own cause ). Merely the institution of a departmental inquiry by the Department against a delinquent does not violate this principle particularly where the inquiry officer is different from the punishing authority. For bias, pecuniary interest, however small or a personal bias resulting from the peculiar relationship of the inquiry officer with the delinquent being hostile or the like has to be shown. Simply a vague allegation of bias as the petitioner has done, would not do. It is true that he had moved an application against respondent No. 5 conducting his departmental inquiry which he did not forward to be dealt with by the disciplinary authority but merely because of it, it cannot be inferred that the inquiry officer was conducting the inquiry with a closed mind. No doubt justice should not only be done, but it must be manifestly shown to have been done. In departmental inquiries however, strict rules of evidence and procedure do not apply. ( 20. No doubt justice should not only be done, but it must be manifestly shown to have been done. In departmental inquiries however, strict rules of evidence and procedure do not apply. ( 20. ) APART from these grounds in order to support the ground No. 8 I have been taken through instances like the petitioner having not been supplied with the statements of the witnesses proposed to be examined and the documents to be relied upon by the department then and there, his application objecting to the appointment of the respondent No. 5 as the inquiry officer not being forwarded to the disciplinary authority. The inquiry against him being conducted the very next day, i. e. 29-1-1981 of which the notice to him had been given only on 28-1-1981 and some of the evidence not being recorded and the like. Each of these circumstances if taken in isolation may not have any substance but if all of them considered together they do lead one to conclude that though outwardly this was observance of the principles of natural justice, they in spirit had not been complied with. ( 21. ) TO conclude, the respondent No. 4 having no jurisdiction under regulation No. 228 to frame a charge more so in the absence of any authorization by the appointing authority leading to the eventual dismissal of the delinquent, the initiation of the inquiry and its being conducted by the respondent No. 5 were without jurisdiction. The departmental inquiry itself though had pretented to follow the letter of law but had not followed its spirit. ( 22. ) THE petitions, therefore, are allowed. The orders of the respondent No. 3 dated 1-4-1981 and 17-3-1981 dismissing the petitioner from his employment are set aside. The concerned respondents are directed to let the petitioner continue in his employment uninterrupted granting him all the intervening benefits. The parties shall bear the costs of these petitions as incurred. The amounts of security deposit be refunded to the petitioner. Petitions allowed.