MADAN MOHAN AGARWALA v. STATE OF ORISSA — 1984 DIGILAW 265 (ORI)

B. K. BEHERA, J. ( 1 ) ACCUSED of an offence punishable under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (for short, the TAct) for contravention of clause 3 of the Orissa Declaration of Stocks and Prices of Essential Commodities Order, 1973 (hereinafter called, the Order) in the court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sambalpur, in 2 (c) C. C. No. 50 of 1982, the petitioner invokes the inherent jurisdiction of this Court exercisable under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, the TCodet) to quash the criminal proceeding as being. illegal and misconceived. ( 2 ) THREE Inspectors of Supplies, namely, Bipin Bihari Supakar, who has submitted the prosecution report, Janmejaya Panigrahr (P. Wi) and Prasanta Chandra Supakar (P. W. 2) visited the shop of M/s Budhlal Pritam Chand of which the petitioner is said to be the proprietor on November 25, 1981 and seized some commodities as per the seizure list (Ext. 2) as the petitioner, it was alleged, had committed an offence under section 7 of the Act for contravention of clause 3 of the order and clauses 4 and 6 of the Kerosene (Fixation of Ceiling Prices) Order, 1970. In the prosecution report, the allegation is that tile shop keeper had not shown the stock position and retail selling rates of white paper and kerosene oil in the board displayed in his shop. The further allegation is that the petitioner had obtained a valid registration certificate for dealing in. retail business of kerosene oil, but on inspection of his kerosene stock account, it was noticed that he had not maintained it up-to- date. He had thus violated clause 3 of the order and clauses 4 and 6 of the Kerosene Fixation of Ceiling Prices order, J 970, as alleged in the prosecution report. ( 3 ) THE petitioner was prosecuted and after the examination of three witnesses for the prosecution, a charge was Framed as follows: That you on or about the 25. 11. 81 at Sasan had a grocery shop and that did nut display the stock position and the selling rate of white paper contravening ci. ( 3 ) THE petitioner was prosecuted and after the examination of three witnesses for the prosecution, a charge was Framed as follows: That you on or about the 25. 11. 81 at Sasan had a grocery shop and that did nut display the stock position and the selling rate of white paper contravening ci. 3 of Orissa declaration of stocks and prices of B. Commodities Order 1973 and there, by committed an offence punishable under section 7 of the E. Act and within, my cog, and I hereby direct that you be tried on the said chargest ( 4 ) IT would thus be clear from the charge and it has rightly been submitted by the learned counsel for both the sides that the trial the trail court did not find a case against the petitioner in respect for which also allegation had been made in the prosecution report. Thus he was discharged in respect of the allegation for commission of the offence under section 7 of the Act for not displaying the stock and prices position of kerosene and for violation of clauses 4 and 6 of the Kerosene (Fixation of Ceiling Prices) Order referred to above. ( 5 ) MR Jam has submitted on behalf of the petitioner that in the absence of any material to show that the petitioner is a dealer in paper within the meaning of the Order, the prosecution is grossly illegal and misconceived and the only allegation against the petitioner in respect of the charge is that he had been found in possession pf one ream of white writing paper and this does not come under any of the categories of essential commodities mentioned in the Schedule to the Order. He has also invited my attention to a positive statement made by one of the Inspectors of Supplies (P. W. 2) that the petitioner is not a dealer in paper. It has, therefore, been contended that it is a fit case in which this Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction in the interests of justice and to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court and quash the proceeding so that the petitioner may not be further harassed. Mr. It has, therefore, been contended that it is a fit case in which this Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction in the interests of justice and to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court and quash the proceeding so that the petitioner may not be further harassed. Mr. N. C. Panigrahi for the opposite party has fairly submitted that in view of what has been stated in the prosecution report and on the evidence thus far adduced, there seems to be no case against the petitioner, but no interference may be made by this Court in its inherent jurisdiction in a pending proceeding and the case may be allowed to proceed and have its logical conclusion. ( 6 ) SECTION 482 of the Code reads: Saving of inherent powers of High Court.-Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to live effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justicett. ( 7 ) REFERRING to and relying on the principles hid down by the Supreme Court in a number of cases, this Court, in the case of Sarrughana Dalabehera and others v. State has observed and held: The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a criminal proceeding is to be exercised in a proper case to prevent an abuse of the process of the court or to secure the ends of justice. Where the allegations in the First Information Report or in the. complaint, even on their face value and if accepted in entirety, do not constitute an offence, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a proceeding can be exercised (See R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab A. I. R. 1960. Supreme Court 866, Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W. B. v. Mohan Singh and others A I R. 1975 Supreme Court 1002 and Dr. Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar A. I. R. 1977 Supreme Court 1754 ). Supreme Court 866, Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W. B. v. Mohan Singh and others A I R. 1975 Supreme Court 1002 and Dr. Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar A. I. R. 1977 Supreme Court 1754 ). As has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the well known case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra A. I. R. 1978 Supreme Court 47 in case of the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, the High Court may eltercise its power under section 482 of the Code. This power, however, is to be exercised very sparingly, but criminal proceedings instituted illegally or vexatiously or without jurisdiction should be quashed. At the stage of finding out as to whether a criminal proceeding is to be quashed, this Court is not to appreciate the evidence or the materials on which the complainant seeks reliance and on the basis of which cognizance of the offence has been taken nor to assess the evidence or to judge the probabilities or improbabilities in the case. At the same time, the Court cannot be oblivious of the tendency of a litigant person to implicate others by deliberately making false insinuations. As has been observed by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar A. I. R. 1982 Supreme Court 949, the liberty and property of any individual are sacred and sacrosanct and the court zealously guards them and protects them. In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court quashed the investigation as the First Information Report and the other materials did not disclose any offence. Ordinarily a criminal proceeding initiated against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible desirable and expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. Some of the categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash a proceeding can and should be exercised are: (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the, offence alleged. Some of the categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash a proceeding can and should be exercised are: (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of the, offence alleged. (ii) where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged and (iii) where the allegations made against the accused person do constitute all offence alleged, but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly Calls to prove the charge. It is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and a case where there is legal evidence which, on its appreciation, mayor may. not support the accusation in question. The High Court should not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence is reliable. This is the function of the trial court and ordinarily it should not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence, the accusation made against an accused person cannot be sustained. ( 8 ) THE High Court cannot launch on a detailed and meticulous, examination of the case on merits. Whether there is sufficient material to hold a person guilty of the charge leveled against his is to be decided at the trial. ( 9 ) IN this connection, reference may also be made to the decisions or this Court to M. S. Jaggi v. Registrar, High Court of Orissa and another Vitla Venkata Roa and others v. Sittapall Venkata Rao and others3 and Dinesh Kumar Jajodia and another v. M/s. State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd. , Bhubaneswar. ( 9 ) IN this connection, reference may also be made to the decisions or this Court to M. S. Jaggi v. Registrar, High Court of Orissa and another Vitla Venkata Roa and others v. Sittapall Venkata Rao and others3 and Dinesh Kumar Jajodia and another v. M/s. State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd. , Bhubaneswar. ( 10 ) THERE is no bar in section 482 of the Code to quash a criminal proceeding in the interests of justice and to prevent an abuse ort the process of the court even if the criminal proceeding is part- beard in which some witnesses have been examined and some have not been if clearly and without requiring an appreciation of the evidence thus far adduced, the criminal proceeding cannot be sustained. It must, however be kept in mind that while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not be justified to embark upon an appreciation of the evidence. Ordinarily this Court would be reluctant to interfere before the completion of the trial the proceeding pending before the lower court, but where the prosecution case itself, as stated in the prosecution report or the charge-sheet or on the basis of the evidence adduced clearly leads to the conclusion that there is no Case against the accused and the further prolongation of the prosecution would amount to harassment, certainly it would be the duty of the High Court to interfere by exercising its inherent powers. ( 11 ) THE contentions raised by the learned counsel for both the sides are to be judged keeping in mind the aforesaid settled principles of law. ( 12 ) THE petitioner is alleged to have committed an offence punishable under section 7 of the Act for violation of clause 3 of the Order. ( 11 ) THE contentions raised by the learned counsel for both the sides are to be judged keeping in mind the aforesaid settled principles of law. ( 12 ) THE petitioner is alleged to have committed an offence punishable under section 7 of the Act for violation of clause 3 of the Order. Crimes 3 of the Order, as it stood on November 25, 19th on which date the shop of the petitioner was visited and the articles were seized from his possession, would read: Display of list- Every dealer of essential commodities shall display prominently in the shops or showrooms a list indicating the opening stock of such commodities in his possession and retail prices thereof each day and indicate on each unit of item of the said commodities, where possible, the sale price by having the sale price either printed on the commodities or on the container or packet thereof, or by means of rubber stamp or by sticking a label on such commodity. ( 13 ) IN order, therefore, to apply clause 3 of the Order, the Petitioner must be a dealer is an essential commodity mentioned ill the Schedule to that Order. In the Schedule to the Order when it was promulgated, in clause 6 had been. mentioned the word paper. This clause was substituted by S R. O. No. 1258 dated 17-12-1976 and clause breads: 6. Paper of the following category namely 1. White printing paper not exceeding 60 grms. conforming to specification and ex factory wholesale price does not exceed Rs. 2150 per M. T. 2. while printing paper other than in (a) above 3. coloured printing paper 4. Typewriting paper 5. Creamlaid/creamswove not exceeding 65 gms provided that such paper contains no rags in substance in the form of pulp and where it contains ,rags it also contains in its substance not less than 40 per cent by weight of babass, iuti stalks or cereal straw in the form of pulp. 6. cream laid/wove paper other than in (e) above Drawing paper/cartridges paper. ' ( 14 ) AS has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, ordinary white writing paper was found with the petitioner, but certain special categories of paper enumerated in clause 6 of the Schedule come within the purview of the Order. 6. cream laid/wove paper other than in (e) above Drawing paper/cartridges paper. ' ( 14 ) AS has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, ordinary white writing paper was found with the petitioner, but certain special categories of paper enumerated in clause 6 of the Schedule come within the purview of the Order. As provided in clause 2 (e) of the Order, essential commodity means any of the commodities specified in the Schedule. There is no material that the paper seized from the possession of the petitioner comes under any of the special categories mentioned in clause 6 of the Schedule. It has also been submitted by the learned Additional Government Advocate that ordinary paper has been seized from the possession of the petitioner which may not come under any of the categories mentioned in clause 6 of the Schedule. ( 15 ) APART from this question, as I have earlier indicated, according to the prosecution report, the petitioner had not shown the stock position and retail selling rates of white paper. It has not been stated therein that the petitioner is a dealer in white paper. No evidence has been adduced by the prosecution in this regard. On the other hand, P. W. 2 has specifically admitted in his evidence: The accused was not a dealer of paper. He could not say if the petitioner had not kept the stock of paper for sale. The prosecution has assumed that because some white paper had been kept in the shop, the petitioner must have been selling white paper. No licence or any other document has been annexed to the prosecution report or produced in the court of trial to show that the petitioner was a retailer in paper. It has specifically been mentioned in the prosecution report that the petitioner had obtained a valid registration certificate for dealing in retail business, of kerosene oil, but there is no allegation that he had any such certificate for dealing m retail business of white paper. In view of what has been stated in the prosecution report itself and on the evidence adduced, even if accepted in its entirety, there is no case against the petitioner. In view of what has been stated in the prosecution report itself and on the evidence adduced, even if accepted in its entirety, there is no case against the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the learned counsel for both the sides have submitted before me that ultimately the case has to end in an acquittal in view of complete paucity of materials aglinst the petitioner. Mr. Panigrahi has, however, submitted that the trial court may be allowed to proceed with the trial and ultimately the petitioner may be found to be not guilty of the charge. My attention has been invited by Mr. Panigrahi to the case of Harbans Lal v. The State in that case, however, the High Court has refused to entertain an application under section 482 of the Code for quashing of the criminal proceeding made at the stage of arguments in respect of a charge under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that the dispute was primarily of a civil nature with the observation that it does not necessarily imply that a civil wrong may not as well result in criminal consequences. The principle decided therein would not, in my view, support the contention of Mr. Panigrahi. If on the face of it, no case has been made out and for the foregoing reasons it is found that the prosecution has been illegal and misconceived and further a conclusion can be reached without any appreciation of the evidence in order to judge its truth that the case is bound to fail, there is no reason as to why the petitioner would be further harassed at the trial. As has been laid down by the Supreme Court in L. V. Jadhav v. Shankarrao Abasaheb Pawar and others, the inherent power of the High Court should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection whether, is reason to believe that the process of law is being misused to harass a citizen. It is a fit case, in my view to quash the criminal proceeding in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court in the interests of justice and to prevent further abuse of the process of the Court. ( 16 ) I would allow the application and quash the criminal proceeding against the petitioner. It is a fit case, in my view to quash the criminal proceeding in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court in the interests of justice and to prevent further abuse of the process of the Court. ( 16 ) I would allow the application and quash the criminal proceeding against the petitioner. Consequent upon this order, the articles seized from the possession of the petitioner are to be released in his favour Petition allowed .