S. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision by accused Suresh Chandra Choubey is directed against the order dated 6. 3. 1982 passed by Shri P. S. Rawat, Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur in Criminal Case No. 584 of 1981. ( 2 ) THE relevant facts are these, according to complainants Sushil Kumar Khandelwal and Kishanlal Khandelwal, accused Suresh Chandra Choubey and co-accused Ram Chandra Sanghi committed offences punishable under Sees. 448 and 379 read with Sec. 34 of the Indian Penal Code on 18. 11. 1975. On 24. 3. 1976, the complainants filed the first complaint against the two accused in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur for the above said offences. The complaint was registered by the Judicial Magistrate and the summons were issued for their appearance in the Court. After the two accused made their appearance in the case, the case was fixed twice for recording evidence of the complainants - once on 2. 8. 1978 and for the second time on 10. 10. 1978. On both the dates the complainants committed default by their failure to summon their witnesses. Even, then the Judicial Magistrate granted them one more opportunity and fixed the case for recording the evidence of their witnesses on 22. 3. 1979. However, on this date also there was no improvement in the situation. Not only there was again a failure on the part of the complainant in summoning their witnesses but there was also default of appearance committed by them and their counsel. In the circumstances, the Judicial Magistrate was left with no other alternative but to dismiss the complaint filed by the complainants and discharge the accused. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER, the complainants made an application to the Judicial Magistrate for restoration of their complaint on 27. 3. 1979. It was stated in the said application that it was on account of they and their counsel having noted the date wrongly that they retained absent on 22. 3. 1979. The complainants also filed a revision against the dismissal of the complaint in this court. This Court vide its order dated 15. 9. 1979 passed in Criminal Revision No. 307 of 1979 dismissed the revision. ( 4 ) AFTER that, on 8. 5. 1980, very strangely the complainants withdraw their application for restoration of their complaint that had been made by them to the Judicial Magistrate on 27. 3. 1979. This Court vide its order dated 15. 9. 1979 passed in Criminal Revision No. 307 of 1979 dismissed the revision. ( 4 ) AFTER that, on 8. 5. 1980, very strangely the complainants withdraw their application for restoration of their complaint that had been made by them to the Judicial Magistrate on 27. 3. 1979. On the ground that they did not want to press the said application. It was thereafter that they filed a fresh second complaint against the accused in respect of the same offences on 13. 5. 1980. It is from the said second complaint that the present revision arises. ( 5 ) BEFORE taking cognizance of the second complaint, the Judicial Magistrate, vide his order dated 13. 11. 1980, recorded his satisfaction to the effect that the delay in filing the same was properly explained. Thereafter, in pursuance of the summons issued to him the accused attended the court on 5. 9. 1981. On the note date i. e. 21. 12. 1981 he raised an objection to the effect that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case there was no valid ground for extending the period of limitation and that the complaint filed by the complainants was liable to be dismissed on the short ground of being barred by limitation. The said objection was rejected by the Judicial Magistrate vide his order dated 6. 3. 1982. It is being aggrieved by it that accused Suresh Chandra Choubey has filed this revision in this Court. It may be pointed out that co-accused Ramchandra Sanghi died during the intervening period and as such the proceedings against him abated. ( 6 ) NOW, Section 468 of the Code of Criminal produce provides - a bar to the Court taking cognizance of certain offences after the expiry of the period of limitation provided in respect of them. It is not in dispute that in the present case the period of limitation in respect of the offences alleged against the accused was three years and the said period expired on 18. 11. 1978. Sec. 473 Cr. P. C. in the nature of an exception to Sec 468. It is not in dispute that in the present case the period of limitation in respect of the offences alleged against the accused was three years and the said period expired on 18. 11. 1978. Sec. 473 Cr. P. C. in the nature of an exception to Sec 468. As per the said section, even where cognizance is barred by limitation according to Sec. 468 the Court may take cognizance of an offence after expiry of such period of limitation if the court is satisfied, from the facts and circumstances of the case, that (a) the delay was properly explained; or (b) it was necessary, in the interest of Justice, to take cognizance of such time barred cases. It is true that the condo nation of delay, in accordance with Sec. 473, should take place before cognizance of the offence is taken beyond the period limited by Sec. 468 because the Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance as long as Sec. 468 is not overcome by condo nation. It is what was done in the present case by the Judicial Magistrate vide its earlier order dated 13. 11. 1980. But, then in the opinion of this, Court, it does not mean that when the accused appeared and takes preliminary objection as to limitation, the Court cannot decide that question and exercise the power under Sec. 473. In such an event, the earlier order, if any, passed by the Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, becomes a provisional one and he is required to dispose of the matter afresh in a judicial manner after hearing both the parties. That being the position, there is no substance in the argument that the objection taken by the accused after he made his appearance in the Court in pursuance of the summons issued to him was not maintainable in view of the earlier order dated 13. 11. 1980 passed by the Court. ( 7 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties, this court is satisfied that the order dated 6. 3. 1982 passed by the Judicial Magistrate rejecting the objection as to limitation taken by the accused is no proper judicial order in the eye of law at all and is liable to set aside. ( 8 ) AS pointed out by their Lordships in State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, the object of Sec. 468 Cr. 3. 1982 passed by the Judicial Magistrate rejecting the objection as to limitation taken by the accused is no proper judicial order in the eye of law at all and is liable to set aside. ( 8 ) AS pointed out by their Lordships in State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, the object of Sec. 468 Cr. P. C. in putting a bar of limitation on prosecutions was clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after long time, as a result of which material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of the process of the Court by filing vaxatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of the offence. The object which the statute seeks to sub-serve is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Art, 21 of the Constitution. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that any prosecution, whether by the state or a private complainant must abide by the letter of law or take the risk of the prosecution failing on the ground of limitation. It is needless to say that it is in the question with regard to proper judicial exercise of discretion vested in the Court under Sec. 473 pertaining to the condonation of the delay is required to be considered. ( 9 ) IN the present case, as a perusal of the order dated 6. 3. 1982 passed by the Judicial Magistrate would show; there was n, proper exercise of judicial discretion vested in him under Sec. 473 Cr. P. C. at all. In fact, the order was a cryptic one and did not disclose any reason for the Judicial Magistrate reaching the conclusion that on the facts and in the circumstances of the Case the delay of about more than one and half years was properly explained by the complainants. There was no consideration by him of the fact that in the present case the period during which the first complaint had remained pending did not furnish any proper explanation for the delay of about more than one and half years. There was absolutely no explanation by the complainants as to why they had failed to summon their witnesses on the two dates of hearings i. e. 22. 3. 1978 and 10. 10. 1978 fixed by the Court during the pendency of their first complaint. There was absolutely no explanation by the complainants as to why they had failed to summon their witnesses on the two dates of hearings i. e. 22. 3. 1978 and 10. 10. 1978 fixed by the Court during the pendency of their first complaint. Again, it was only a lame excuse on their part that on the third date of hearing i. e. 22. 3. 1979 they and their counsel did not remain present for the reason that they noted the wrong date. Further more, there was absolutely no explanation by them of the facts as to why after, pursuing their application for restoration of their first complaint for a period of about more than one year they suddenly chose to withdraw the said application on 8. 5. 1980 and filed the present second complaint on 13. 5. 1980. It was writ large on the facts and circumstances as stated above that the complainants were not at all interested in prosecuting their complaint and their only object in filing the present second complaint long after the date of the offence was only to harass the accused. Needless to say, the filing of the present second complaint by them amounted to abuse of the process of the Court and there existed no valid ground whatever for the condonation of the delaying filing said complaint. ( 10 ) FOR the reasons stated above, the revision is allowed. The provisional order dated 13. 11. 1980, as also the final order dated 6. 3. 1982, passed by the Judicial Magistrate, condoning the delay in the filing of the complaint by the complainant are set aside. The complaint is dismissed for the reason that its cognizance is barred by limitation according to Sec. 468 Cr. P. C. and there is no ground for the condonation of the delay in filing the same under Sec. 473. Consequently. It is ordered that accused Suresh Chandra Choube, shall stand discharged. Accused discharged .