ORDER :- This is a landlord's, petition under Art.227 of the Constitution for quashing the order passed by the Resident Deputy Collector, rejecting his application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal before him. 2. The petitioner had flied an application before the Rent Controller for grant of permission to terminate the lease of the respondent under clause 13(3)(vi) of the Rent Control Order. The arguments were heard by the Rent Controller on 25-1-1982 and the case was posted for orders on 6-2-1982. The order was passed by the Rent Controller on 6-2-1982 but as none turned up, he directed the order to be communicated to the parties. It appears, from the proceedings that the Attorney of the Counsel for the landlord appeared on 2-3-1982 and signed the order-sheet of those proceedings. There is nothing to show that any communication as such was sent by the Rent Controller to the parties after having passed the order on 6-2-1982. 3. An application for certified copy of the impugned order was made on 8-3-1982 and the applicant was told to appear on 15-3-1982. Admittedly, the applicant never appeared for taking copy on 15-3-1982. The copy of the order was delivered on 8-4-1982 and the appeal before the Resident Deputy Collector was filed on 17-4-1982 accompanied by an application for condonation of delay stating that the clerk Sharad Nampalliwar of the Advocate had appeared for taking copy on 11-3-82, 14-3-82 and 23-3-82, but the clerk concerned was, not found in his place. Nothing, however, was stated in this application as to why he did not appear on the date he was told to appear, i.e. on 15-3-1982. 4. This application was opposed and the Resident Deputy Collector, refused to condone the delay. He observed that no affidavit of the Attorney was flied and the delay from 15-3-1982 (when the applicant was told to appear) to 8-4-1982 (when the copy was delivered) was not at all explained. He observed that the appellant admittedly failed to appear on 15-3-1982 but preferred to appear to take delivery at his own convenience on 8-4-1982. 5. By this Writ Petition, it is not only the order passed by the Resident Deputy, Collector, rejecting the application for condonation of delay that is being questioned, but the original order passed by the Rent Controller rejecting the application for grant of permission is also being assailed. 6. 5. By this Writ Petition, it is not only the order passed by the Resident Deputy, Collector, rejecting the application for condonation of delay that is being questioned, but the original order passed by the Rent Controller rejecting the application for grant of permission is also being assailed. 6. At the outset, it may be pointed out that the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Art.227, as observed recently by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim (AIR 1984 S.38), is limited 'to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority, and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. The learned Resident' Deputy Collector rightly observed that no explanation was offered as to why no appearance was made to collect the copy on 15-3-1982. It is true that an affidavit of the attorney concerned was filed and the Resident Deputy Collector was not justified in observing that the application was not at all supported by any affidavit. The Resident Deputy Collector found that the delay between the period 15-3-1982 to 8-4-1982 has not been explained. Apart from the fact that this finding cannot be called in question in the exercise of the powers under Art.227, I find that the order so passed is even otherwise justified. 7. The arguments before the Rent Controller were concluded on 25-1-1982 and the case was fixed for order on 6-2-1982. It is not the allegation that no order in fact was passed on 6-2-1982. As none appeared on that day, the Rent Controller, after passing the order, directed that the order so passed be communicated. No communication of this order was, however, sent to the parties, but the Attorney of the Counsel for the landlord chose to appear on 2-3-1982 and he signed the order-sheet, while the respondent chase to appear on some other date and he also signed the order-sheet. Thus, the delay between 6-2-1982 (when the order was actually passed) to 8-3-1982 (When the application for copy was made) must also be taken into account, and in this view of the matter, the application for copy itself was made after the period of limitation which is fifteen days as prescribed under Cl.21 of the Rent Control Order. 8. Thus, the delay between 6-2-1982 (when the order was actually passed) to 8-3-1982 (When the application for copy was made) must also be taken into account, and in this view of the matter, the application for copy itself was made after the period of limitation which is fifteen days as prescribed under Cl.21 of the Rent Control Order. 8. Shri Shelat the learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that as per Cl.21 (1), period of limitation would run not from the date when the order is passed but from the date on which the order is communicated to the aggrieved party, and since in the instant case, the communication was made on 2-3-82 when the counsel's Attorney signed the order-sheet the limitation would run only from 2-3-1982. It is not possible to accept this submission of Mr. Shelat. Clause 21 (1) of the Rent Control Order, no doubt says that a person aggrieved may present an appeal "within fifteen days from the date on which the order communicated to him". Now, in a case where the date of passing of the order is given by the Rent Controller as here, and if on the said date the order is actually passed, there is no provision which requires the Rent Controller to communicate that order to the parties, in case they do not choose to appear. In fact, when a particular date is given of which the parties and the counsel take note and the order is actually passed on that date, the running of the period of limitation would not be stopped merely because the aggrieved party fails to attend on that date. The Limitation will not (run) from the date the party chooses to appear and make a note of the order passed by singing the order-sheet, without there being any communication from the Rent Controller. In such a case, the order must be deemed to be communicated to the parties when the order is pronounced on the fixed date communicated in advance. In the instant case, admittedly there was no communication sent by the Rent Controller to the petitioner about passing of the order. The expression "from the date on which the order is communicated to him", appearing in the above clause, would apply only when no date is fixed and the order is communicated to the parties. In the instant case, admittedly there was no communication sent by the Rent Controller to the petitioner about passing of the order. The expression "from the date on which the order is communicated to him", appearing in the above clause, would apply only when no date is fixed and the order is communicated to the parties. Given its natural meaning the expression must mean that but for the communication from the Rent Controller, the aggrieved party could not know about the passing of the order. The aggrieved party would always be able to control the running of the period of limitation, if it is held that the period of limitation will run not from the date the order is passed of which he had prior intimation but from the date when it chooses to appear to make a note of the same. I, thus, find that the petitioner was not justified in computing the period of limitation from 2-3-1982 and not from 6-2-82. There is no explanation, therefore, for the delay between 6-2-1982 and 8-3-1982. Under the circumstances, I see no reason to interfere with the order passed the Resident Deputy Collector rejecting the application for condonation of delay. 9. Relying upon M/s, Hyderabad Allwyn Metal Works Ltd. v. Collector (1978 Tax LR 1959) (Andh Pra), Shri Shelat submitted that the petitioner can also, in this petition, challenge the order passed by the Rent Controller refusing grant of permission what was laid down in this decision is that the doctrine of merger can have no application to orders which are void ab initio. In order to be able to say that the doctrine of merger would not apply, it is necessary to show that the order passed by the original authority is inherently void for want of jurisdiction. The error, irregularity or illegality, touching jurisdiction or procedure, committed by the inferior Court must be shown to be so patent that it leaves a stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated. In the instant case, it was alleged by the petitioner that he was himself residing in rented premises with his family consisting of ten members and that he needed the house in question for his own bona fide occupation. In the instant case, it was alleged by the petitioner that he was himself residing in rented premises with his family consisting of ten members and that he needed the house in question for his own bona fide occupation. The Rent Controller observed that during cross-examination, the petitioner admitted that his family consisted of five members only and that he did not adduce any evidence to prove his bona fide need. Thus, all that was stated by him was that he has no house of his own except the one in question. He, however, stated nothing about his present discomfort and about the necessity of moving from the present premises, though rented, to the house in question. It cannot be said that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to decide whether the petitioner really proved that he needed the premises for bona fide occupation. There is no patent illegality, nor can the order be said to be void ab initio. The second submission of Shri Shelat also is, therefore, devoid of any merit. 10. In the result, the petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.