Lahiri, J.- This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India directed against an order passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Cal­cutta in Reference Case No. 5 of 1982. 2. The management of the F. C. I. filed an application appending therewith some documents with a prayer to receive them as evidence. But the learned Tribunal has rejected the prayer and dismissed the application by a speaking order. While doing so, learned Tribunal has observed that the services of the workmen were terminated with effect from 25.4.78 ''on the ground of over age" on the material dates of their appointment some time in January, 1978. Perhaps, learned Tribunal thought that the documents were of later dates, and as such, those were not material for the purpose of the case. We do not propose to express any view as to the corretness of the pro­position as it has not been expressed in so many words in the impugned order. Thereafter, the Tribunal observed that the management filed before the Tribunal a list of documents which it desired to prove in the case on 30.8.82, and the Union adduced oral evidence as well as documentary and closed their evidence. At that juncture the Management produced the additional docu­ments and desired to prove them. However, on perusal of the list of documents referred in the impugned order, we find that they emanate from the public offices and/or Government offices. It appears that learned Advocate who appeared on behalf of the Union raised an objection that as the Union had already closed their evidence, the documents filed by the management would cause delay in disposal of the industrial disputes. Learned Tribunal rejected the prayer of the management broadly on the following grounds :- i) that reception of the evidence would amount to acceptance of new and fresh evidence which would cause prejudice to the workmen ; ii) that most of the documents are of 1983, i. e., post­erior to the dates of appointment of the workmen and the date of the termination of their services ; iii) that the management objected to the reception of the documents. It would cause delay as the fresh docu­ments sought to be introduced would naturally call for production of the witnesses and records from the Employ­ment Exchange & Commandant, 3rd A. P. Bn. It would cause delay as the fresh docu­ments sought to be introduced would naturally call for production of the witnesses and records from the Employ­ment Exchange & Commandant, 3rd A. P. Bn. Further, it would call for re-examination or recalling the concerned workmen from Assam to Calcutta ; iv) that the management had enough opportunity to file the documents earlier. For the reasons just alluded, the learned Tribunal reached the conclusion that the prayer should be turned down and accor­dingly it did so, and fixed 6.3.84 for further hearing &f the case. 3. Mr. Kanak Chandra Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, in particular Order 11, Rule 14 and Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (as amended). Learned counsel has also drawn our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Rohtas Industries Ltd. vs. Workmen Represented by Rohtas Industries Mazdoor Sangh and anr.; AIR 1977 SC 1867 and a number of other decisions of the Apex Court. 4. We are of the firm opinion that the provisions relating to reception of evidence, oral as well as documentary are out and out procedural in nature and character. Time out of number, it has been ruled by the Supreme Court that the procedural laws are meant for dispensing justice and not to shut out justice on technical pleas. If the provisions of Rule 14 of Order & Civil Procedure Code are applicable, learned Tribunal has had undoubted power to call for any evidence at any stage of the proceedings, during the continuance of the proceedings with the sole object of doing justice, which has been manifested in the rule in the form "in such manner as shall appear just". 5. The documents do point out the age of the workmen at the relevant time, at least when they were executed. These have some evidential value. The contention so raised by Mr. Sarma has strong base. Similarly, the contention raised by Mr. Sarma that at best, for the alleged delay in making the application for the reception of the evidence, the Tribunal could have burdened the management with reasonable costs, but should have permitted the management to produce the evidence to uphold the cause of justice, has also strong force. Sarma has strong base. Similarly, the contention raised by Mr. Sarma that at best, for the alleged delay in making the application for the reception of the evidence, the Tribunal could have burdened the management with reasonable costs, but should have permitted the management to produce the evidence to uphold the cause of justice, has also strong force. Learned Tribunal could have allowed the workmen to adduce evidence to establish that the documents were either irrelevant or inadmi­ssible. Learned counsel submits that the order of rejection is positively violative of Section 11 of the Industrial Tribunal Act read with the Code of Civil Procedure. We very much appre­ciate the contentions raised by Mr. Sarma and find sufficient force in them. Mr. Sarma is absolutely justified in submitting that this case will also result in further delay as it happened in M/s. Rohtas (supra). On the ground of shutting out evidence, their Lordships quashed the impugned award made in 1974. The award was nullified and declared void by the Supreme Court in 1976. Weighing the profits and gains with the loss of time, energy and money of the workmen, perhaps the work­men ultimately suffered serious losses. It may be urged that due to- hasty action of the Tribunal, the workmen suffered much more than the rich management. 6. Indeed, the impugned order is fraught with danger. The management can take up the very same question and impugn the award to be made and the entire award may be declared void, may be on this ground alone. 7. Yet we refrain from entertaining the petition or refuse to issue a rule nisi. But why? We have before us a recent decision of the Supreme Court in D. P. Mahesree vs. Delhi Administration & Ors. AIR 1984 SC 153 , wherein their Lord­ships deprecated delay in industrial adjudications and gave a clear warning that the High Court should not, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, stop procee­dings before a Tribunal so that decisions on preliminary issue get stalled for years to the prejudice of the parties. Their Lordships have observed that in respect of decision of the Tribunal on preliminary issues this Court should not exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution, as it causes delay in disposal of the dispute at the Tribunal's end. 8. Their Lordships have observed that in respect of decision of the Tribunal on preliminary issues this Court should not exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution, as it causes delay in disposal of the dispute at the Tribunal's end. 8. If the impugned order is maintained by learned Tribu­nal and an award is given, the said order may be set aside for refusal to entertain documentary evidence by the Tribunal causing prejudice to the parties. We cannot dismiss such an appalling episode. It would be for learned Tribunal who is the best judge of the situation, to consider the ponderability of the vexed situation which we are sure, learned Tribunal would do. Learned Tribunal being duty bound, would surely resolve the ponderables in a prudent, judicious and segacious manner to uphold the cause of justice, holding a steady balance and keeping an eye to the ultimate result of the action. It would surely consider at the hearing or during the continuance of the proceedings, whether the management should be allowed to prove the documents or to allow the parties to prove and or to rebut the documents produced burdening the Management with costs commensurate with their laches. 9. In such cases, where a party suffers from laches or takes delayed procedural actions like filing of written statement or production of documents and/or amendment of the plaintj the Supreme Court has always held that on payment of costs the prayer should be allowed as no party should be held back from adducing evidence and/or contesting the case in full. Even "gross delay" on the part of the plaintiff in asking s for amendment did not stand in the way of getting the plaintiff the appropriate relief. To cite but one case, we refer to Suraj Prakash Bhasin vs. Smt. Raj Rani Bhasin & Ors : AIR 1981 SC 485 . We do not desire to stall the proceedings at this end as the petitioner has another right to contest the award on the same ground. Further, we also find that the learned Tribunal can, on the basis of a fresh application by the management, which Mr. Sarma submits that the management would do, consider the whole matter in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court and decide the question afresh as to on which side justice would title if the prayer is allowed or rejected. Sarma submits that the management would do, consider the whole matter in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court and decide the question afresh as to on which side justice would title if the prayer is allowed or rejected. Whether it would entail further delay if the prayer is rejected? Let the petitioner file such an application and the learned Tribunal shall undoubtedly consider the same. 10. We are fully conscious that certain amount of discre­tion is always there with the Tribunal. With juristic accuracy and literary felicity, Justice Cardozo expressed exquisitively the principles governing judicial discretion" in "The nature of the Judicial Process" : Yal University Press (192 J) : "The Judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spas­modic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion, disciplined by system, and subordinated to the primordial necessity of order in the social life wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains". In the instant case, apart from the question of discretion, we are confident that the learned Tribunal shall also consider that it has legal duties to perform governed and guided by the rele­vant law. We are sure that learned Tribunal was fully alive to such situations but perhaps the matter was not placed before the learned Tribunal in the matter proffered by Mr. Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioner before us. 11. With these observations that the petitioner has remedies as alluded, we dispose of the application. All the grounds taken up by the petitioner shall be open to them to be taken in a future proceeding provided the ultimate Award goes against them.