Judgment :- 1. The revision is directed against an order by which the appellate court-the District Court, Trichur dismissed an application filed by the respondent in the appeal questioning the maintainability of the appeal itself. 2. The revision petitioner instituted a suit against the Trichur Municipality for an injunction. On the date to which the suit was posted, the Municipality had omitted to file the written statement. The trial court decreed the suit. It inter alia observed in the judgment: "Counsel for the defendant concede, that there is no written statement". The Municipality took the matter in appeal. It is at that juncture the petition challenging the maintainability of the appeal itself was filed by the revision petitioner. As noted earlier, that was dismissed by the court below. 3. The contentions raised in the revision petition are the same as had been urged before the court below. They were to the effect: (1) that no appeal is maintainable from a judgment rendered under Order VIII R.10 CPC.; and (2) that the decree passed by the court below, if it is treated as a decree, was a consent decree and consequently S.96(3) of the CPC., barred the appeal. 4. Both the contentions are devoid of merit. It is true that prior to the amendment of the CPC. in 1976, an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(b) was provided against an order under Order VIII R.10 CPC. That has been deleted under the amendment. It must however be noted that under the very same amendment, R.10 of Order VIII was recast to read as follows: "Procedure when party fails to present written statement called for by court. Where any party from whom a written statement is required under R.1 or R.9 fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, as the case may be, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit and on the pronouncement of such judgment a decree shall be drawn up." sis supplied) It is thus evident that the drawing up of a decree is a mandatory requirement under the amended R.10. The trial court is given a discretion to pronounce the judgment in a situation where the defendant fails to file the written statement. Formerly an appeal under Order XLIII rule 1(b) did lie. The trial court is given a discretion to pronounce the judgment in a situation where the defendant fails to file the written statement. Formerly an appeal under Order XLIII rule 1(b) did lie. Since an appeal was maintainable as from an order, the adjudication of the court was taken out of the definition of "decree" as contained in S.2(2) of the CPC. (see the later portion of the section which says that the decree shall not include "any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order). With the deletion of Order XLIII Rule 1(b), the excluding clause of the definition of "decree" was not applicable to a judgment rendered, under Order VIII R.10 CPC. To all intents and purposes it was a decree. And as a decree it was appealable. The finding of the court below on this point is perfectly correct. 5. The second contention is equally untenable. It is well-settled that a mere omission to oppose does not amount to a consent. The failure to file the written statement would not therefore amount to a consent for a decree to be passed in the case. Counsel for the revision petitioner performed a difficult feat of intellectual aerobatics when he urged an extreme contention. It was to the effect that the Municipality's counsel virtually said that they were willing to have a decree in favour of the plaintiff, and as prayed for by him. Much arguments were addressed on the sentence extracted above, with emphasis placed on every shade and on every word. I am not however inclined to place the interpretation on that sentence as suggested by the counsel for the revision petitioner. That there was no written statement of the Municipality in the court on that date was a fact. It may be that the court did not require an added concession for projecting that factual situation. Counsel for the Municipality had not stated that it is not intending to file any written statement. It roust be realised that the client whom that counsel was representing in the trial court was a local authority A decision to consent to a decree against such a local authority, has to be normally taken after due and diligent compliance with the understandable formalities prescribed under the law. It roust be realised that the client whom that counsel was representing in the trial court was a local authority A decision to consent to a decree against such a local authority, has to be normally taken after due and diligent compliance with the understandable formalities prescribed under the law. Even when such a decision is duly taken by the local authority, ordinarily, a consenting attitude reflected in a resolution passed in that behalf, would normally be filed in the court, when the litigation is conducted with responsibility. It is not possible to assume that all these necessary safeguards in relation to the conduct of a suit expected of from a local authority, had been thrown to the winds, when the submission about a factual absence of a written statement in the court was made. I am in agreement with the court below when it holds that the decree in the circumstances cannot be termed as one passed by the court "with the consent of parties". 6. In as much as both the contentions urged on behalf of the revision petitioner fail, the CRP. has to be, and is hereby dismissed, and with costs. Dismissed.