Judgment :- 1. The petitioner was convicted for an offence under S.16(1)(a)(i) and (ii)of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 11/2 months. This conviction and sentence were confirmed by the Sessions Court. The petitioner has thereafter come in revision. The facts admitted are that the Food Inspector purchased 600 grams of bengal-gram flour from the petitioner on 10-10-1978. The sample was sent to the Public Analyst as per the provisions of the Act and the Rules and the Public Analyst reported that the sample was adulterated and it contains 12 percent tapioca starch. At the instance of the petitioner, the report of the Director, Central Food Laboratory, was also obtained (Ext. P16) in which also the opinion was given thus: "The sample does not conform to the standards laid down for "Besan" under the provisions of the P.F.A. Act 1954 & Rules thereof in that (1) it is not free from the presence of foreign ingredient identified as tapioca starch." 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner raised three contentions: (1) There is violation of S.13(2) of the Act and thus the conviction cannot stand; (2) There is violation of the mandatory provisions contained in S.13(2-B) as well and for that reason the petitioner was entitled to acquittal and (3) There is a violation of R.18 3. Under S.13(2) of the Act or. receipt of a report of the result of the analysis by the Public Analyst to the effect that the article of food is adulterated, the Local Health Authority shall, after the institution of prosecution against the person from whom the sample of the article of food was taken, forward a copy of the report to such person. It is seen, in this case, that the Food Inspector filed the complaint on 2-3-1979, the court took cognizance of the case on 14-3-1979 and the report of the result of the Public Analyst was sent to the accused on 13-3-1979. It is, therefore, contended that the report was sent before the prosecution was instituted on 14-3-1979. 4. This takes us to the question of the meaning of the expression "institution of proceedings". Does this mean "the lodging of the complaint" or "the taking cognizance of the case?" 5. It is, therefore, contended that the report was sent before the prosecution was instituted on 14-3-1979. 4. This takes us to the question of the meaning of the expression "institution of proceedings". Does this mean "the lodging of the complaint" or "the taking cognizance of the case?" 5. Complaint is defined in S.2(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure thus: "Complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report;" The conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings are contained in Chapter XIV of the Code. S.190 of the Code provides that the Magistrate may take cognizance of any offence (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; and (c) upon information received from any other person. 6. The filing of a complaint to the Magistrate making allegations with a view to take action under the Code will therefore amount to institution of prosecution because it satisfies one of the conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings as provided in S.190. It is only after the prosecution is initiated that the Court takes cognizance and thereafter decides to issue process to the accused. The words 'initiation of prosecution' in S.13(2) of the Act cannot, therefore, admit of any narrow interpretation as to confine it to a stage, after taking cognizance by the Court. In this case as the complaint was filed on 2-3-1979 and the report under S.13(2) was sent on 13-3-1979, it was sent'after the institution of the prosecution' and thus there is no violation of S.13(2) of the Act. It is also necessary to remember that the object of the provision is to ensure communication of the report of the analysis to the accused without delay so that his right to move for fresh analysis is not affected. Delay in taking cognizance by Court after the complaint is filed cannot prejudice the accused and thus on the filing of the complaint under the Act the prosecution is initiated. 7. It may also be useful to refer to an unreported decision of my learned brother Justice U. L. Bhat who stated thus in Crl. R.P.No.133/81: "The complaint was filed on 12-5-1978. 7. It may also be useful to refer to an unreported decision of my learned brother Justice U. L. Bhat who stated thus in Crl. R.P.No.133/81: "The complaint was filed on 12-5-1978. There can be no doubt that the intimation was sent before the lodging of the complaint. What S.13(2) of the Act requires is the sending of a copy of the report with the necessary information after the institution of the prosecution." My learned brother has proceeded on the footing that lodging of the complaint would constitute 'initiation of the prosecution'. I entirely agree with this view. 1981 Crl. L. J. 181 (P. Raveendran v. Sadasivan) also takes the same view. 8. The second contention is that there has been a violation of S.13(2-B) of the Act. S.13(2-B) insists that the Court shall first ascertain that the mark and seal or fastening as provided under the statute are intact and the signature or thumb-impression is not tampered with and then despatch the part or one of the parts of the sample under its own seal to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. The contention is that it is for the Court to ascertain that the conditions prescribed under S.13(2-B) are satisfied before the sample is despatched to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory and if there are no materials to show that the Court applied its mind to this statutory duty, there is a violation of the mandatory provisions which entails acquittal of the accused. It is also contended that the records of the Court should show that the Court has discharged its duty under this provision. 9. True, the case diary does not mention that the Court has ascertained that the mark and seal etc. were intact before the sample was sent to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. However, in the application filed by the accused for sending the sample to the Central Food Laboratory, there is an endorsement, "sample produced", ' Sample not tampered with", with a signature. The learned counsel attempted to submit that the signature contained under this endorsement was not that of the Magistrate. However, in the application filed by the accused for sending the sample to the Central Food Laboratory, there is an endorsement, "sample produced", ' Sample not tampered with", with a signature. The learned counsel attempted to submit that the signature contained under this endorsement was not that of the Magistrate. Apart from the fact that no basis has been made for any such submission before the Court below, there is one other circumstance which would show that the court had applied its mind to these salient features prescribed under S.13(2-B) before the sample was despatched to the Central Food Laboratory. The samples were despatched as per a communication dated 23-7-1979, in which there are detailed particulars of the sample packet, the seal etc. which would show that the seal and signature were intact. Moreover, the report of the Analyst, Ext. P16, also specifically mentions that the seals were "intact and unbroken." The seal of fixed on the container tallied with the seal impression sent separately along with the memo. If, therefore, the Central Food Laboratory obtained the sample with seals intact and unbroken, and the letter which was sent by the court also referred to the details on the sample packet, regarding the seal etc., it can safely be concluded that the endorsement made on the application by the accused was by the Court and that the court had applied its mind as contemplated under S.13(2-B) of the Act. There is thus no violation of S.13(2-B) of the Act either. 10. When an accused exercises his right under S.13(2) for a fresh analysis by the Central Food Laboratory, he has himself a duty to alert the court of its responsibilities to satisfy whether there was any tampering of the packet and seal of the sample and to insist the court to make a record of its verification. The accused cannot at a later stage of the trial, or in appeal or revision contend that there is no record by the Court for the purpose. A technical lapse of court, even if there is any, of a formal record of verification of the sample by Court, cannot be taken advantage of by a party who never objected to the defect of the packet of the sample before it was despatched and who waited till the receipt of the report from the Central Laboratory. 11. A technical lapse of court, even if there is any, of a formal record of verification of the sample by Court, cannot be taken advantage of by a party who never objected to the defect of the packet of the sample before it was despatched and who waited till the receipt of the report from the Central Laboratory. 11. The last contention is that there is a violation of R.18 of the Rules which state that a copy of the memorandum and a specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet shall be sent to the Public Analyst separately by registered post. pw.1, the Food Inspector, states that the memorandum was sent separately but he did not mention about the specimen impression and that according to the counsel, vitiated the entire prosecution. 12. But it has to be noted that the report of the Public Analyst is superseded by the certificate of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory in view of the specific provision in Clause.3 of S.13 of the Act. The petitioner availed of his statutory remedy to obtain a certificate from the Director of Central Food Laboratory. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that there was any violation regarding the despatch of the sample to the Public Analyst whose report stands statutorily superseded. 13. Though these points, in the way in which they were argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner before this Court were not taken up before the court below, I have considered these points on the merits with reference to the evidence and the statutory provisions. There is no case before me that if the certificate of the Central Food Laboratory is accepted and there is no defect as contended by the counsel, the article of food is not adulterated. In the result, the conviction and sentence against the petitioner have to be upheld. This Crl. revision petition is dismissed. Bail Bond cancelled. Dismissed.