JUDGMENT K. N. Goyal, J. 1. THE petitioner in this petition is member of the U. P. Nyayik Seva, who has been suspended by an order of this court passed on the administrative side. THE impugned order has been passed in pursuance of a decision of the Administrative committee of the court. THE order has been challenged on the ground that it was beyond the powers of the Administrative Committee to order suspension before issuance of charge-sheet, which is contended to be the starting point of "pendency" of an inquiry. Admittedly no charge-sheet has yet been issued to the petitioner though as intimated to us by learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, an Inquiry Officer has been appointed. Although the power of suspension pending or in contemplation of an inquiry, under Rule 49-A of the U. P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, has been delegated by the Governor to the High Court in respect of all judicial officers, the Administrative committee of the court has been given, under the Rules of court vide Chapter-Ill ("Executive and Administrative Business of the court"), Rule 4 (C), Item-4. power only of "suspension of officers of the subordinate judiciary pending disciplinary inquiry." THE power of suspension in contemplation of a disciplinary inquiry, although delegated by the Governor to the High Court, could not, thus, be exercised by the Administrative Committee-so the contention runs. 2. IT has further been contended that it was not permissible for the High Court to have a preliminary inquiry being made by the Vigilance Bureau. Learned Additional Chief Standing counsel has pointed out that certain allegations against the petitioner had been inquired into by the Vigilance Bureau of the High Court. The report of the Vigilance Bureau was placed before the Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice who referred the matter to the Administrative committee. The Administrative committee took the decision to hold a formal inquiry arid at the same time to order the suspension of the petitioner pending inquiry. Leaned Additional Chief Standing counsel contended that the decision of the Administrative committee, under Item No. 3, after considering the preliminary report, to direct the holding of a formal disciplinary inquiry has the effect of bringing about the pendency of an inquiry against the petitioner. As such, the matter was covered by the said Item No. 4. Leaned Additional Chief Standing counsel contended that the decision of the Administrative committee, under Item No. 3, after considering the preliminary report, to direct the holding of a formal disciplinary inquiry has the effect of bringing about the pendency of an inquiry against the petitioner. As such, the matter was covered by the said Item No. 4. Alternatively, it is contended that under Rule 4 (A), Item-6, "all residuary matters not allotted to any committee or Administrative Judge" fall within the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice. Under Rule 4 (C), Item 12, the Administrative Committee has power to take decision on any matter referred to the Administrative Committee by the Chief Justice. If the view be taken that suspension after a decision to hold inquiry has been taken but prior to issuance of charge-sheet amounts to suspension in contemplation of and not pending inquiry within the meaning of Item No. 4 of Rule 4 (B), then it follows that suspension in contemplation of inquiry is a matter which has not been allotted to any committee or Administrative Judge or even to the Full Court under Rule 4 (D). As such, if we read Item No. 6 of Rule 4 (A) read with Item No. 12 of Rule 4 (C), then the Administrative committee, on a reference being made by the Acting Chief justice, would be competent thereunder to take such a decision in the matter. 3. WE are of the opinion that the Standing Counsel's first contention itself deserves to be upheld. 4. IN State of U. P., v. Jai Singh Dixit, 1974 ALJ 862, a Full Bench of five learned Judges had occasion to interpret Rule 49-A. This Rule provides that, "a Government servant against whose conduct an inquiry is contemplated, or is proceeding may be placed under suspension pending the conclusion of the inquiry in the discretion of the appointing authority." Three expressions have been used in this Rule, namely, "contemplated", "is proceeding" and "pending the conclusion of the inquiry". It appears that the last of these three expressions, namely, "pending the conclusion of the inquiry" covers both "contemplated" and "is proceeding". The full Bench of five learned Judges thus held that an inquiry is said to be "pending" when it is either "contemplated" or is proceeding'. It appears that the last of these three expressions, namely, "pending the conclusion of the inquiry" covers both "contemplated" and "is proceeding". The full Bench of five learned Judges thus held that an inquiry is said to be "pending" when it is either "contemplated" or is proceeding'. Mathur, C. J. held in para 43 of the report that :- "......Once a firm and final decision has been taken to hold a formal departmental inquiry, such an inquiry is certain and not merely expected" IN para 45 of the report the learned Chief Justice further observed :- "Under Rule 49-A suspension pending inquiry is permissible where the departmental inquiry is proceeding or where the departmental inquiry is contemplated" (Emphasis supplied). Ojha, J. agreed with Mathur, C.J. Satish Chandra, J. (as he then was), dealing with the matter in para 69 of the report, observed in the same view as follows ;- "----Formal departmental proceedings start when a decision to hold them is taken; because the decision directly leads to and sets in motion the various ministerial steps Of the proceedings, like framing and communication of charges, calling for an explanation, hearing witnesses etc. etc. The decision to hold a formal departmental inquiry sets it in motion or initiates it from this point of time onwards the inquiry proceeds." (Emphasis supplied) In para 70 his Lordship further clarified that the word 'contemplated' pointed to a stage when the inquiry was merely 'expected', that Is, prior to the taking of the decision to hold the inquiry. The conclusion of the majority was stated in para 99 wherein it was stated that 'suspension pending inquiry' under Rale 49-A can be ordered at any stage prior to or after the framing of charges, when on objective consideration the authority concerned is of the view that a formal departmental inquiry is expected, or such an inquiry is proceeding. 5. The conclusion of the majority was stated in para 99 wherein it was stated that 'suspension pending inquiry' under Rale 49-A can be ordered at any stage prior to or after the framing of charges, when on objective consideration the authority concerned is of the view that a formal departmental inquiry is expected, or such an inquiry is proceeding. 5. A Division Bench of this court in an unreported decision in Writ petition No. 9431 of 1978, A. N. Pandey v. State of U. P. decided on 31-10-1979, has not discussed this question directly; but indirectly it has taken the same view by holding that although the suspension in that case had been ordered on November 23, 1978, and subsequently on the recommendation of the High Court, the Government had referred the allegations of corruption and misconduct for inquiry to the Administrative Tribunal and it was thereafter that the Administrative Tribunal issued a charge sheet, the mere decision of the High Court to hold disciplinary inquiry amounted to pendency of inquiry. The Full Bench decision was not referred to in that case. 6. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has relied upon P. R. Nayak v. Union of India, AIR 1972 SC 554 , in which case the difference between the words "contemplated' and 'initiated' occurring in All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, was considered. However, this decision was expressly considered by the said Full Bench of five Judges and it was pointed out that the wording of Rule 49-A was not before their Lordships of the Supreme Court and that the words of All India Services Rules in question were different. The alternative submission of the Additional Chief Standing counsel also deserves to be partially upheld. It cannot be contemplated that although power of suspension prior to issuance of charge sheet has been delegated to the High Court, it could not be exercised by any authority within the High Court on the existing state of the Rules of the Court. If it was a residuary matter, then it was for the Chief justice to take a decision under Rule 4 (A), Item-6. But as the Chief Justice could not himself decide to accept the preliminary report or direct the holding of inquiry, as this was a matter allotted to the Administrative committee, he had no option but to refer it to the Administrative committee. But as the Chief Justice could not himself decide to accept the preliminary report or direct the holding of inquiry, as this was a matter allotted to the Administrative committee, he had no option but to refer it to the Administrative committee. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that this would amount to sub-delegation of power by the Chief Justice to the Administrativ, committee cannot be accepted. As held in State of U. P. v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi, 1978 (2) SCC 102 the distribution of business between different authorities or bodies within the High Court does not amount to delegation or sub-delegation of powers. Such distribution is permissible for the effective exercise of the 'control' vested in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution. In A. N. Pandey v. State of U. P. (supra) it was held that the High Court is vested with the power to order suspension in exercise of its Constitutional power under Article 235 even apart from the power delegated by the Governor to it under Rule 49-A. In support of the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the High Court should not have acted on the report of the 'Vigilance Bureau', reliance was placed on the case in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192 . This decision was, however, considered in the case of A. N. Pandey v. State of U. P. (supra) and it was held, distinguishing the Supreme Court decision, that in our State the Vigilance Bureau, which has been placed under the direct control of the High Court, is not a governmental agency, but an agency of the High Court. It is, therefore, permissible for the High Court to have any complaint against a judicial officer inquired into by its Vigilance Bureau. 7. THE writ petition has thus no force and is dismissed in limine. Petition dismissed.