JUDGMENT G.F. Couto, J.-Tbis Criminal Miscellaneous Application is filed under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code whereby the judgment dated 7th April, 1984, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Panjim, is being challenged. 2. A few facts are necessary for the understanding and disposal of this case. The petitioner is the owner of a building where a hotel known as "Hotel Diwar" is installed. It appears that the respondents No. 2 to 5 had been occupying some rooms in the said hotel and a dispute arose between the petitbner and the said respondents in respect of the said rooms. As a result of this dispute, the said respondents approached the poHce with a complaint that there would be likelihood of breach of peace on account of the said dispute. However, the Police did not take any action and therefore, the same respondents filed a suit against the petitioner on 8-11-83 and at the same time, an application for injunction was moved. The said injunction was refused and thereafter, a fresh application for injunction was moved by the said respondents on 18-11-83. Ex-parte injunction was rejected and a show cause notice was given to the petitioner. After she files her reply, the learned Civil Judge was pleased to reject also the fresh application for injunction on 21st November, 1983. In the meanwhile; the said respondents moved an application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Panjim, alleging that there was likelihood of breach of peace on account of the same dispute. The learned Magistrate issued a preliminary order on 3rd November, 1983, under Section 145(1) Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioner filed her reply on 8-11-1983 and on 23rd November, 1983, she filed a representation bringing to the notice of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that a suit was pending and that the applications for injunction filed by the respondents No. 2 to. 5 had been dismissed by the learned Civil Judge. On the very next day, i.e. on 24.11.1983. the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed an order under Section 146 Criminal Procedure Code and appointed a receiver to six rooms existing in the said building. In the said order, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate stated that it was on the basis of a fresh application filed by the respondents that she was convinced that there was likelihood of breach of peace and that it was necessary to appoint a receiver. 3. In the said order, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate stated that it was on the basis of a fresh application filed by the respondents that she was convinced that there was likelihood of breach of peace and that it was necessary to appoint a receiver. 3. Aggrieved by this order of the SubDivisional Magistrate, Panjim, the petitioner herein filed a revision application to the Sessions Judge, Panjim, who by the impugned order dated 7th April, 1984 dismissed it. 4. Now, the petitioner approaches this Court under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code on the grounds that the intervention of this Court is required for the ends of justice and that the process of the Court had been abused by the respondents. 5. Mr. Oswald Gomes, learned counsel appzaring for the petitioner, has contended that, first of all, there should be a dispute and a Iike1ihood of bearch of peace for the issuance of a preliminary order under Section 145 (1) Criminal Procedure Code. If such conditions are not fulfilled, then, proceedings under Section 145 cannot be instituted and if instituted, will be without jurisdiction. He placed reliance in support of this submission on the decision of the Mysore High Court in 'M. Gurumurthappa v. Commissioner, Corporation of the City of Bangalore1 and on 'Bisse Gowda and others v. State of Mysore by Bothamangala Police, Bangarapet Taluk, Kolar District and others2. Then, the learned counsel contended that, in the present case, the Executive Magistrate has failed to set out the grounds on which the preliminary order has been issued as well as to define precisely the subject-ma Her of the proceedings. In the circumstances, therefore, according to the learned counsel, the preliminary order itself is vitiated and consequently, all the following proceedings. Thirdly, the learned counsel submitted that while in the preliminary order the identity of the premises, subject-matter of the proceed ins, was one, in the final order the premises are different. This also, according to him, vitiates the order passed by the learned Magistrate. 6. On the order hand, Mr. Teles, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 2 to 5, submitted that, first of all, this application is liable to be dismissed on the preliminary grounds that on application under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code lies when the party has already approached the Court under the provisions of Section 397 Criminal Procedure Code. 6. On the order hand, Mr. Teles, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 2 to 5, submitted that, first of all, this application is liable to be dismissed on the preliminary grounds that on application under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code lies when the party has already approached the Court under the provisions of Section 397 Criminal Procedure Code. In fact, according to the learned counsel, the petitioner has approached the Sessions Court in revision and the Sessions Court has dismissed the said application on merits. Now, Section 397 Criminal Procedure Code provides for concurrent jurisdiction of the Sessions Court and of the High Court and if a party approaches either Court under the said Section, the said party is debarred from approaching the other Court on the same point. Thus, if a party has once approached either the Sessions Court or the High Court in revision, it is not permissible for such party to circumvent the provision of Section 397 and approach the High Court under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code. He further submitted that the mere fact that the respondents No. 2 to 5 had approached the Civil Court is not a bar to approach the Sub.divisional Magistrate under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code. He placed reliance in support of these submissions on 'Kuldip Singh and others v. The State of Himachal Pradesh and others3 and Amarnath Rula Ram and others v. Kanwar Joginder Singh and others4. 7. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for both the parties, it is expedient to first of all deal with the contention of Mr. Teles that no application under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code lies in the facts and circumstances of this case. As already stated, it is the case of Mr. Teles that once a party approaches the Sessions Court with an application for revision under Section 397 Criminal Procedure Code, such party is debarred from approaching the High Court with an application under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, since this will amount to circumvent the provision of the Criminal Procedure Code which prohibits two consecutive revision applications against the same order. 8. It is not disputed that the petitioner herein has challenged the order dated 24th November, 1983, passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Panjim, in a revision application filed to the Sessions Court. 8. It is not disputed that the petitioner herein has challenged the order dated 24th November, 1983, passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Panjim, in a revision application filed to the Sessions Court. The said revision application was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge by bis judgment dated 7th April, 1984. Section 397 Criminal Procedure Code provides that the High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any criminal court situated within its or his local jurisdiction fot the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on bail or on h is own bond pending the examination of the record. Sub-section (2) provides that powers of revision conferred by sub-sectIon (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. And sub section (3) lays down that if an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the order of them. It is thus clear that.a concurrent revisional jurisdiction is given to. the High Court and to the Sessions Judge and if a party chooses to approach either of them, he will be precluded from approaching thereafter the other. Therefore, there cannot be a dispute about the correctness of the submission of Mr. Teles that after having approached the Sessions Court with a revision application, the petitioner herein was not entitled to approach this Court with a revision application against the same order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. But the question is that the petitioner did not approach this Court with a revision application filed under Section 397 Criminal Procedure Code. What the petitioner did was to challenge the order of the learned Sessions Judge under the provisions of Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code. It is necessary, therefore, to advert to the said provision of law. 9. But the question is that the petitioner did not approach this Court with a revision application filed under Section 397 Criminal Procedure Code. What the petitioner did was to challenge the order of the learned Sessions Judge under the provisions of Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code. It is necessary, therefore, to advert to the said provision of law. 9. Section 482 provides that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Mr. Teles, relying on the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in 'Soni and others v. State of Haryana and others5, contended that a concurrent jurisdiction is vested under the law in the Court of Sessions and High Court and the Sessions Judge can exercise powers of revision. He further submitted that if an' application for revision is made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, on further anlication by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them. And if an application under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code is made to circumvent the provision of Section 397 (3), such application is not maintainable. There cannot be any dispute about the proposition advanced by Mr. Teles and held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the aforesaid case. But the question is whether an application is filed under Section 482 only to circumvent the bar in Section 397 (3) Criminal Procedure Code. Thus, what is necessary to be seen is whether in the facts and curcum6tances of each case an application moved under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, after an application under Section 397 is dismissed, is moved to circumvent or not the provisions of Section 397 (3) Criminal Procedure Code. 10. It is therefore necessary to look into the facts of this case. As already mentioned, it appears that a dispute arose between the petitioner and the respondents No. 2 to 5 in respect of some rooms occupied by the latter in a building belonging to the petitioner. 10. It is therefore necessary to look into the facts of this case. As already mentioned, it appears that a dispute arose between the petitioner and the respondents No. 2 to 5 in respect of some rooms occupied by the latter in a building belonging to the petitioner. On account of this dispute admittedly, the respondents approached the' Police with a complaint and in order to get proceedings under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code instituted. It is common ground that the police did not take action under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code, particularly the police did not file any report to the competent Executive Magistrate to the effect that proceedings under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code ought to be instituteo since there was likelihood of breach of peace on account of the dispute existing between the parties. After the failure to get the machinery of the police to moye, the respondents No. 2 to 5 filed a civil'suit against the petitioner where the subject-matter is the rooms occupied by them. -Alongwith the suit, they moved also an application for injunction and the learned trial tudge did not grant any ex parte injunction. The respondents did not then press the said application for injunction, but later on, they moved a fresh application for ex parte injunction and once again, the learned Civil Judge rejected the application. However, he gave a show cause notice to the petitioner and thereafter he dismissed the application for injunction. While this was going on, the respondents appear to have moved an application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate alleging that there was a dispute in respect of the said rooms and that there was likelihood of breach of peace. The learned Magistrate, on basis of such complaint. issued the preliminary order dated 3rd November, 1983. She did not mention the grounds why she was satisfied that there was likelihood of breach of peace and generally stated that the dispute was in respect of "premises of the above Hotcr Diwar Panjim", The petitioner filed her reply and on 23rd November, 1983, moved a representation to the SubDivisional Magistrate bringing to the notice of the latter that a civil suit has been filed in respect of the same subject-matter by the respondents and that two applications for injunction had been refused by the Civil Court. Immediately on the next day, i.e. on 24th November, 1983, it appears that the respondents No. 2 to 5 moved a fresh application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate submitting that there was likelihood of breach of peace on account of the said dispute since the police had not taken any action on the matter. Surprisingly, though, it has been brought to the notice of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that the Civil Court has rejected the applications for injunction filed by the respondents, the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate issued a direction appointing a receiver to six rooms in the building by her order dated 24th November, 1983. 11. From the facts above, it is apparent that after having twice failed to obtain an interim relief in the Civil Court, the respondents No. 2 to 5 moved a fresh application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and obtained the said order of appointment of receiver. It may be pointed out also that, admittedly, they had approached first the police and the police had not filed any report to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that the dispute between the petitioner and them was likely to cause any bre ach of peace. In the circumstances, therefore, it would appear that the fresh application made by the respondents No. 2 to 5 to the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court. It may be borne in mind that, strictly speaking, proceedings under Section 145 are of civil nature, but considering that there is a likelihood of breach of peace and that a criminal offence may be committed, some powers had been given to the Magistrate to take urgent interim steps in order to avoid and prevent such breach of peace. However, the final determination of the dispute is obviously left to the competent Civil Court. This being so, if a Civil Court is already seized of the matter of the dispute, it will not be ordinarily open to a Magistrate to act under the provisions of Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code. This does not mean, of course, that in a given case where, inspite of the orders of the Civil Court, fresh facts occur, justifying the finding that there is likelihood of breach of peace, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate cannot act under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code. This does not mean, of course, that in a given case where, inspite of the orders of the Civil Court, fresh facts occur, justifying the finding that there is likelihood of breach of peace, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate cannot act under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code. However, in such a case it is necessary for a party who moves an Executive Magistrate under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code to satisfy that fresh and serious facts have occurred after the Civil Court has taken cognizance of the matter. Mr. Teles placed reliance, as already stated, on the cases of Kuldip Singh, Amarnath Rula Ram, and Soni v. State of Haryana (supra), to submit that if the Civil Court bas passed an order of injunction in favour of the petitioner regarding the same subject matter between the same parties, jurisdiction of the criminal court under Section 145 of the Code cannot be restrained. This sub divission of the learned counsel is, as already stated, generally correct. However, it holds good only when fresh facts had occurred after the Civil Court has passed orders and there is, therefore, a-likelihood of breach of peace after the orders of the Civil Court had been passed. This being so, the aforesaid authorities cited by Mr. Teles in no manner advance the case of the respondents before me. I already observed that, in the particular set of circumstances of this case, the action taken by the respondents No. 2 to 5 to approach the Sub-Divisional Magistrate after having failed to obtain injunction in the Civil Court amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. 12. Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code saves the inherent powers of the High Court and lays down that nothing shaH limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Courtto make such orders as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of 'any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In this case, where clearly the respondents No. 2 to 5 had abused the process of the SubDivisional Magistrate's Court, I have no doubt whatsoever that though the petitioner had prior approached the Sessions Judge with a revision application, nevertheless, the interference of this Court in the exercise of its powers under Section 482 is fully "warranted. Thus, I find no substance in the preliminary point raised by Mr. Teles. 13. Thus, I find no substance in the preliminary point raised by Mr. Teles. 13. I may turn, now, to the merits of the case. As already said, the learned counsel for the petitioner has first contended that the proceedings under Section 145 instituted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate are vitiated and without jurisdiction, since fhe grounds to hold that there is likelihood of breach of peace had not been set out in the preliminary order and there is nothing as to show on what basis the learned Magistrate was satisfied that such was the case. I may make a reference to the preliminary order dated 23rd November, 1983. The said order reads in the relevant part, as follows: "Whearas I am satisfied on the undermentioned grounds the complainant filed in this Court that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning the following ]and/water/boundary situated in the suits of my jurisdiction at Panaji. "Premises of above Hotel Diwar, Panaji”.” 14. A bare reading of the aforesaid order, justifies an inference that this order was passed without carefully applying the mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. I say so because surprisingly, when the dispute is in respect of some rooms in one buj]ding situate at Panjim, reference is made to land/water/ boundary. Secondly, it is stated in the said order that the learned Magistrate is "satisfied on the undermentioned grounds" and the said grounds are not at all mentioned in the order. Thus, one is at a Joss to find what was the basis for the satisfaction of the learned Magistrate. In Bisse Gowda's case (supra), the Mysore High Court has observed that a mere statement in the preliminary order made under Section 145(1) by the Magistrate that he was satisfied from the Police report that a dispute is likely to cause breach of peace is not enough, but he must state the grounds of his being so satisfied which alone entitles him to make such an order. Non-compliance not only renders such preliminary order without jurisdiction, but also vitiates the entire subsequent proceedings and therefore, the mere fact that subsequent final order has been passed will not have the effect of rendering the proceedings valid and the final order is liable to be quashed. Non-compliance not only renders such preliminary order without jurisdiction, but also vitiates the entire subsequent proceedings and therefore, the mere fact that subsequent final order has been passed will not have the effect of rendering the proceedings valid and the final order is liable to be quashed. In our case, we go a step further, since admittedly there is no report of the Police at all and the only thing before the Magistrate was a bare application filed by the respondents No. 2 to 5. In the circumstances, the learned Magistrate was specially bound to give the grounds for her satisfaction that there was likelihood of breach of peace. In the circumstances, therefore, where the learned Magistrate has complete]y failed to give the grounds for her satisfaction the preliminary order made by her is undoubtedly vitiated and without jurisdiction and on the authorit'y of the above ruling of the Mysore High Court, with which I respectfully agree, the whole proceedings under Section 145 that followed are also vitiated. I may also make a reference to the decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in 'Ram Saran and others v. Ramdas6. It was observed that there is a consensus of authority and a string of rulings of all High Courts which have clearly brought out what are the essential requirements of a preliminary order under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code. It was further observed that many a genuine case falls through because of the incompetence or in attention of the trial Magistrate and that it is too late in the day to reiterate what are the essential conditions of a preliminary order under this section. It should contain (1) a statement that the Magistrate is satisfied as to the existence of a dispute likely to cause breach of peace; (2) the grounds of his being so satisfied; (3) a correct description of the property in respect of which the proceedings are initiated; (4) the parties concerned in such dispute and (5) a direction requiring the parties or either of them to attend the Court on a particular day and put in the written statement of their claim in respect of the fact of the actual possession of the land in dispute. In our case, as already said, the grounds of the satisfaction of the learned Magistrate are completely omitted, and therefore, it is clear that the preliminary order is vitiated with the result that the whole proceedings instituted under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code are also vitiated. 15. In view of the discussion above, it is lIot necessary for me to go into the merits of the other contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The petition succeeds on the above ground alone. 16. In the result, therefore, this petition is allowed and consequently, the impugned orders dated 24th November, 1983 and 7th April, 1984 passed, respectively, by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Panaji and the learned Sessions Judge, Panaji, are hereby set aside. Magistrate's orders set aside. 1. A.I.R. 1969 Mys. 160 2. 1969 Cr. L.J. 1170. 3. 1977 Cr. L.J. 1848. 4. 1976 Cr. L.J. 394 5. 1983 (2) Crimes 508. 6. A.I.R. 1965 J. K. 49