G. R. Luthra, J. ( 1 ) THE present appeal of the Municipal Corporation ofdelhi (hereinafter referred to as Municipal Corporation) is directed againsttb6 judgment dated 3/02/1977 of Shri J. D. Kapoor, Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi acquitting all the respondents in respect of an offence punishableondet section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulterationact. ( 2 ) SATINDER Kumar Jain, Smt. Phool Wati, Davinder Kumar and Rakesh Kumar (respondents 1 to 4) were partners. They, at the relevant time,were carrying on business of manufacture of besan for sale under the nameand Style of M/s. Raj Dhani Floor Mills at 6549, Kutub Road, Delhi. ( 3 ) 0n 29/03/1973 at about 12-30 p. m. , R. P. Chauhan (PW3), afood inspector, went to the aforesaid premises No. 6549, Kutub Road, Delhi. At that time only Satinder Kumar Jain, respondent No. J, was present fromwhom the former purchased besan weighing 450 grams. The said Foodinspector. . divided the besan into three equal parts and put them in separatecontainers and sealed them. One of the samples was handed over to Satioderkumar Jain, another was sent to the Public Analyst and the third one wasretained by him. The Public Analyst gave a report dated 7/04/1973 to theeffect that besan was analysed on 5/04/1973 and that the same was adulterated due to the presence of 15% Kesari dal starches. After receipt of thesaid report, the Municipal Corporation through Shri Ganga Ram, Assistantmunicipal. Proseputor (PW1), filed a complaint for prosecuting and punishingall the respondents for offence punishable under section 7 read with sectionl6 of the Act. Satinder Kumar Jain, respondent No. l,was sought to beprosecuted as seller of besan. It was alleged in the complaint that respondents 2 to. 4 were partners of the firm, respondent No. 5, and that they wereliafele-to be. punished for the aforesaid offence as they were in charge of andresponsible to the said firm for the conduct of business. The complaint wasdirected against respondent No. 5 also. ( 4 ) THERE is and was no dispute about the factum of taking sample. However, it was urged before the learned Magistrate that there was noncompliance with Rule 22 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. forshort Rules) and that, therefore, the respondents were entitled to acquittal. The complaint wasdirected against respondent No. 5 also. ( 4 ) THERE is and was no dispute about the factum of taking sample. However, it was urged before the learned Magistrate that there was noncompliance with Rule 22 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules. forshort Rules) and that, therefore, the respondents were entitled to acquittal. Rule 22 aforesaid (as it existed then) says that the quantity of sample of foodto be sent to the Public Analyst/director for analysis shall be as specified inthe table given in that Rule. That table, at the relevant time, did not specifythe quantity in respect of besan. besan was treated as cereal vide item No. A-18 of the Appendix B to the Rules. Rule 22 specified quantity of sample as250 grams for cereal. As by way of dividing the total quantity (for 450 gms.)purchased by the food inspector into three, the quantity in one sample cameto 150 gms. , it was found by the learned Magistrate that the quantity wasless than that prescribed (250 gms.) by Rule 22. He, therefore, held that dueto violation of the aforesaid rule, respondent was entitled to acquittal. ( 5 ) THE view of the learned Magistrate was then justified by a judgmentof the Supreme Court in Rajaldas Gurunamal Pamanani v. The State ofmaharashtra, 1975 (1) F. A. C. I. The propositions of law laid down in thatjudgment was that provisions of Rule 22 being mandatory, non-compliancecaused not only infraction of the provisions but also injustice in as much asquantities mentioned in Rule 22 were required for correct analysis and thaton account of aforesaid non-compliance accused was entitled to acquittal. ( 6 ) BUT that judgment was specifically overruled by a later judgment ofthe Supreme Court in State of Kerala etc. etc. v. Alaserry Mohammed etc. etc. ,1978 (1) F. A. C. 145. It was held that Rule 22 was purely directory, that it wasfor the Public Analyst to see whether the quantity of the sample sent to himwas sufficient or not for making necessary analysis and that if the Public Analyst had; no complaint, no accused could be acquitted on the mere groundof non-compliance of Rule 22. It was held that Rule 22 was purely directory, that it wasfor the Public Analyst to see whether the quantity of the sample sent to himwas sufficient or not for making necessary analysis and that if the Public Analyst had; no complaint, no accused could be acquitted on the mere groundof non-compliance of Rule 22. However, the acquittals, which were challengedbefore the Supreme Court, were not converted into convictions and thefollowing observations were made in the concluding paragrah of thejudgment: "for the reasons stated above, we dispose of these appeala bymerely laying down the correct proposition of law but do not makeany consequential orders setting aside the acquittal of any of therespondents or sending back the cases to the Courts below or convicting any of them by an order of this Court. "relying on the aforesaid judgment, in subsequent cases, accused prayed formaintaining acquittal notwithstanding that they were guilty. In Ramdosbhikaji Chaudhari v, Sada Nand and others, 1979 (2) F. A. C. 215, it was held bysqpreme Court that in appropriate cases acquittal recorded on the ground ofnon-compliance of Rule 22 could be set aside and conviction recorded. Theresult was that in that case, the Supreme Court converted the acquittal intoconviction but having regard to the fact that the prosecution was started longago in 1971, only sentence of fine of Rs. 2,000. 00 (and not of imprisonment)was awarded. ( 7 ) THE appeal has been contested by the respondents on the groundthat it is barred by limitation and also on merits it is liable to be dismissedagainst the respondents 2 to 4. Both the pleas, as is being mentioned hereinafter, have force. . ( 8 ) THE present appeal is liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation. It was filed under section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for shortcr. P. C. ). It is in sub-section (5) of that section that the period of limitationis provided. That sub-section reads as under : " (5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of specialleave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertainedby the High Court after the expiryo f six months, where thecomplainant is a public servant, and sixty days in everyothercase, computed from the date of that order of acquittal. That sub-section reads as under : " (5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of specialleave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertainedby the High Court after the expiryo f six months, where thecomplainant is a public servant, and sixty days in everyothercase, computed from the date of that order of acquittal. " ( 9 ) IT is clear from the above that a longer period of limitation has beenprovided where a complainant is a public servant. If the complainant is apublic servant, the period of limitation is six months otherwise the said periodis sixty days. Therefore, the first question to be determined is as to who isthe complainant in the present case and then it is to be decided as to whetherthe complainant is a public servant or not. The word complainant is notdefined Criminal Procedure Code Its obvious meaning is one who files a complaint. ( 10 ) FOR the purpose of finding out as to who could file the complaintin the present case, we have to refer to the provisions of the Prevention offood Adulteration Act. It is section 20 of the said Act, which deals with thecognizance and trial of offences. That provision, as it existed at the time ofthe commission of the offence in the present case, (the aforesaid provision wasamended afterwards in the year 1976) reads as under : "20. Cognizance and trial of offences. (1) No prosecution foran offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, orwith the written consent of, the Central Government or thestate Government or a local authority or a person authorisedin this behalf by general or special order, by the Centralgovernment or the State Government or a local authority :provided that a prosecution for an offence under thisact may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in section12, if he produces in Court a copy of the report of the publicanalyst along with the complaint. (2) No Court inferior to that of a Presidency Magistrate or amagistrate of the first class shall try any offence under thisact. (2) No Court inferior to that of a Presidency Magistrate or amagistrate of the first class shall try any offence under thisact. "the term local authority is defined in section 2 (viii) of the Prevention offood Adulteration Act Which reads as under; " (VIII) "local authority" means in the case of: (1) a local area which is : (a) a municipality, the municipal board or municipalcorporation; (b) a cantonment, the cantonment authority ; (e) a notified area, the notified area committee. (2) any other local area, such authority as may be prescribed the Central Government or the State Governmentunder this Act. " ( 11 ) IT is clear from the aforesaid provisions that prosecution can beinstituted by any of the following and, therefore, any of the following can becomplainant:1. Central Government. 2. State Government. 3. Local authority which, inter alia, includes Municipal Corporation having jurisdiction in the area where offence wascommitted. 4. Any person who is in possession of written consent of eithercentral. Government or State Government or local authority. 5. Any person authorised by a general or special order by thecentral Government or the State Government or local authorityto institute a complaint. 6. By a purchaser, as referred to in section 12 of the Prevention offood Adulteration Act. ( 12 ) IT is apparent that it is a question of fact as to who is a complainantin a particular case. In the present case it was by and in the name of themunicipal Corporation that complaint was filed through Shri Ganga Ram. Inmunicipal Corporation of Delhi v. Jagdish Lal and another, AIR 1970 Supremecourt 7, the Supreme Court held that even if the complaint had been filed byand in the name of a person authorised in that behalf by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, it was the Municipal Corporation who was the complainantentitled to file an appeal against acquittal under section 417 of the old Code ofcriminal Procedure, which was similar to section 378 of the present Cr. P. C. In that case, one Sham Sunder Mathur was authorised to institute a complaint for prosecution of some persons under the provisions of Prevention offood Adulteration Act. That prosecution resulted in acquittal. The appealwas filed by Municipal Corporation and not by Sham Sunder Mathur. It washeld by the High Court that the complainant being Sham Sunder Mathur, theappeal filed by Municipal Corporation was not maintainable. That prosecution resulted in acquittal. The appealwas filed by Municipal Corporation and not by Sham Sunder Mathur. It washeld by the High Court that the complainant being Sham Sunder Mathur, theappeal filed by Municipal Corporation was not maintainable. Accordingly,the appeal was dismissed by the High Court. The Municipal Corporation wentin appeal to the Supreme Court who while accepting the appeal held asunder: "it is true that Shri Sham Sunder Mathur filed the complaint petitionon 20/08/1960. But in filing the complaint Shri Mathur wasnot acting on his own personal behalf but was acting as an agentauthorised by the Delhi Municipal Corporation to file the complaint. It must, therefore, be deemed in the contemplation of law that tiledelhi Municipal Corporation was the complainant in the case. " ( 13 ) SHRI P. R. Monga, learned counsel for the Municipal -Corporation, reliedupon a division bench judgment of this court in Oriental Bank of Commerceand another v. Delhi Development Authority and others, 1982 Cril. J. 2230 Inthat case, Delhi Development Authority launched a prosecution under section29 (2) of the Delhi Development Act for using a premises in contravention ofthe Master Plan. The accused in that case felt aggrieved and brought a revisionpetition, inter alia, urging that the complaint filed by the Secretary of Delhidevelopment Authority was barred by limitation as provided by section 468cr. P. C. The dispute was in respect of starting point of limitation whichmatter is dealt by section 469 Criminal Procedure Code That section 469 Cr. P. G. reads asunder: "469. (1) The period of limitation, in relation to an offender,shall commence: (a) on the date of the offence; or (b) where the commission of the offence was notknown to the person aggrieved by the offence ofto any police officer, the first day on which suchoffence comes to the knowledge of. such personor to any police officer, whichever is earlier ; or (e) where it is not known by whom the offence wascommitted, the first day on which. the identity ofthe offender is known to the person aggrieved bythe offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is, earlier. (2) In computing the said period, the day from which suchperiod is to be computed shall be excluded. " ( 14 ) WHILE interpreting the words person aggrieved occurring in section469 Cr. the identity ofthe offender is known to the person aggrieved bythe offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is, earlier. (2) In computing the said period, the day from which suchperiod is to be computed shall be excluded. " ( 14 ) WHILE interpreting the words person aggrieved occurring in section469 Cr. P. C. , it was held (by M. L. Jain, J. speaking for the bench )that both thedelhi Development Authority, and the officer who actually filed the complaintwere the aggrieved persons and thus complainants. ( 15 ) LEARNED counsel for the Municipal Corporation contended that inview of that judgment, the complainant in this case were both the Municipalcorporation as well as Shri Ganga Ram who filed the complaint on behalf ofthe Municipal Corporation. The learned counsel for sugporting the aforesaidproposition also relied upon a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court (consisting of R. N. Aggarwal, J. and myself) in Delhi Development authorityv. Sh. K. P. Shankara, 1983 Rajdhani Law Reporter 530. In that case,interalia, showing inclination to agree with the view expressed in the jndgment ofthe Division Bench in Oriental Bank of Commerce and another (supra), it washeld that both the Secretary of the Delhi Development Authority and thedelhi Development Authority were the complainants in respect of a complaintfiled under section 29 (2) of the Delhi Development Act against KP. Shankara. ( 16 ) BUT the authorities relied upon by tile teamed counsel for the Municipal Corporation have no application in the present case. They relate tofiling of complaint under the provisions of Delhi Development Act by Delhidevelopment Authority. As noticed in para 13 of the judgment of M-L-lain, J. On case of Oriental Bank of Commerce) the provisions. of section 20 of theprevention of Food Adulteration Act are different from the!. provisions relatingto filing of complaint contained in section 49 (l) of Delhi Development Act. The former provides for filing of complaint inter alia by Municipal Corporationwhereas the latter does not contain any similar word providing for filing of acomplaint by Delhi Development Authority itself. The Development Actprovides for filing of a complaint only by an officer authorised by Delhidevelopment Authority. Moreover, in the aforesaid Division Bench judgment (in Oriental Bank of Commerce and another v. D. D. A.) interpretation of words"persons aggrieved" was involved whereas in the present case the interpretationof those words is hardly relevent. The Development Actprovides for filing of a complaint only by an officer authorised by Delhidevelopment Authority. Moreover, in the aforesaid Division Bench judgment (in Oriental Bank of Commerce and another v. D. D. A.) interpretation of words"persons aggrieved" was involved whereas in the present case the interpretationof those words is hardly relevent. Concept of a person aggrieved is widerthan a complainant. So, as already stated, it is a question of fact to bedetermined in each individual case as to who is the complainant under theprovisions of section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. In thepresent case, as already help, Municipal Corporation of Delhi is complainant. ( 17 ) THE aforesaid being the situation, it is to be seen if the Municipalcorporation is a public servant or not. The words public servant are notdefined in the Criminal Procedure Code However, in section 2 (y) of Criminal Procedure Code it is stated thatwords and expressions used in the said Code and not defined but definen inindian Penal Code have the meanings respectively assigned to. them in thelatter Code. Therefore, for the purpose of finding out meaning of the words public servant, we have to refer to the provisions of Indian Penal Code. Thewords public servant are defined in section 21 of the said Code. It is clearfrom a bare reading of the said definition of public servant that it is only anatural person who can be a public servant. In fact, the very word servant denotes that it is only a natural person who can have that capacity. Municipalcorporation cannot be and is not a public servant within the meaning ofsection 21 of Indian Penal Code. On the other hand, Municipal Corporationis master or employer and, therefore, not a servant under clause twelfth (b) of section 21 of Indian Penal Code which reads as under : "twelfth. Every person: (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporationestablished by or under a Central, Provincial or State Actor a Government Company as defined in section 617 of thecompanies Act, 1956. Illustrationa Municipal Commissioner is a public servant. Every person: (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporationestablished by or under a Central, Provincial or State Actor a Government Company as defined in section 617 of thecompanies Act, 1956. Illustrationa Municipal Commissioner is a public servant. " ( 18 ) THAT being so, the period of limitation within which the presentappeal could be brought was 60 days from the date of the order of acquittalin Municipal Corporation v. Arnrit Lal, 1981 R. L. R. I,a Division Bench ofthis Court held that Municipal Corporation of Delhi or Delhi Developmentauthority is not a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of IndianpenalCode and that the period of limitation for filing appeal under section 378cr. P. C. , by the Municipal Corporation is 60 days from the date of order ofacquittal. Of course, the time spent in obtaining the certified copy of theorder is to be excluded under the provisions of section 12 (3) of the limitationact. ( 19 ) WE have now to make necessary calculations. The date of order ofacquittal was 3/02/1977. The appellant applied for obtaining certified copy of judgment of 15/02/1977, and the copy was ready on 14/03/1977. The appeal was filed on July 11, 1977. In that way, after excludingthe time spent on obtaining certified copy of the judgment appealed against,the appeal was filed after expiry of 139 days. Therefore, it was clearly barredby limitation. ( 20 ) ON merits, but for the reason that entire appeal is being dismissed asbarred by limitation, the acquittal of Satinder Kumar Jain, respondent No. 1and the firm respondent No. 5 would have been converted into convictionin view of charge (as mentioned already) of interpretation by the Supremecourt inrespect of Rule 22 of the Rules. ( 21 ) ACQUITTAL of respondents No. 2 to 4, however, must be maintainedon merits also. Liability on them is sought to be fastened merely becausethey are partners of respondent No. 1. It was held by us on 20/09/1984 in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Des Raj and others. Criminal Appealno. 337/77. ( 21 ) ACQUITTAL of respondents No. 2 to 4, however, must be maintainedon merits also. Liability on them is sought to be fastened merely becausethey are partners of respondent No. 1. It was held by us on 20/09/1984 in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Des Raj and others. Criminal Appealno. 337/77. that under Section 17 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, apartner of the firm who had not sold the article of Food Inspector could beliable only if the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that at the timeof the commission of the offence he was in charge of and responsible to thefirm for the conduct of the business of the firm. In the present case, admittedly,respondents 2 to 4 were not present at the time of the commission of theoffence. They also did not sell the besan to the Food Inspector. There isno evidence that respondents 2 to 4 were in chnrge of and responsible to thefirm for the conduct of the business of the firm. Reliance of the Corporationis on the following statement of Shri R. P. Chanhan, Food Inspector. (P. W. 3): "three four times I visited the firm premises for finding out theworking partners of the firm I saw Satinder Kumar Jain, Davinderkumar Jain and Rakesh Kumar Jain but I never met Phool Wati. I also came to know from Satinder Kumar Jain that accused No. 1to 4 are the active partners of the firm. " ( 22 ) IT was urged by the learned counsel for the Municipal Corporationthat the statement showed that Davinder Kumar Jain and Rakesh Kumar Jain,- respondents were also taking part in the carrying on of the business of thefirm and that, therefore, it must be held that they were in charge of andresponsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm. But theaforesaid statement refers to a point of time later than the date and time ofthe commission of the offence, while according to the provisions of section 17of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the relevant time when partnershould be in charge of and responsible to the firm for the conduct of thebusiness should be the time of the commission of the offence i. e. the sale of besan in the present case. ( 23 ) UNDER the above circumstances, the appeal is hereby dismissed and the acquittal of the respondents is maintained.