JUDGMENT R.M. Sahai, J. - Fate of this defendant's appeal arising out of suit filed under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code after obtaining permission from the Advocate General, hinges primarily on determination if the house mentioned in Schedule A described and known as Thakurdwara since more than a century is a public or private temple. But no less important is the controversy raised by the learned counsel for appellant about the maintainability and competency of the suit filed by lesser number of persons than those in whose favour permission was granted. 2. Although it was raised at the fag end of arguments, to be more accurate while concluding rejoinder, and does not appear to have been raised before trial court nor any issue was framed yet it was entertained as from judicial decisions it is apparent that in representative suit filed under section 92 C. P. C. filing of suit by entire body of persons in whose favour permission was granted is mandatory. In Narayan Lal v. Sundar Lal Tholia, AIR 1967 SC 1540 it was held, "an authority to sue given to several persons without more is a joint authority and must be acted upon jointly and the suit by some of them is not competent". The Hon'ble Court approved the following principle laid down by Privy Council in Mst. Ali Begum v. Badurul Islam Ali, AIR 1938 P.C. 184, "where the consent in writing of the Advocate General or Collector has been given to sue by three persons as plaintiffs, the suit cannot validly be instituted by two only. The suit as is instituted must conform to the consent.". 3. Permission to sue u/s 92 C. P. C. for filing the suit was granted by Advocate General to eleven persons but the plaint was presented on 22nd May, 1956 by five persons only. The Hindi order sheet at time of presentation reads that the plaint has been presented, report of the Munsarim has been examined and it is ordered that the plaint be registered in register No. 3 and the plaintiffs counsel may file the permission of the Advocate General within three ' days when permission was filed and it appears to have transpired that it was in favour of eleven persons the Court directed on 25-5-1956 that array of parties may be corrected in accordance with it. Consequently on 28th May, 1956 an application was presented on behalf of remaining six persons stating that their names had not been mentioned in the plaint presented on 22-5-1956, therefore, they were moving the application for being impleaded as plaintiffs in the suit. The application was allowed on 29th May, 1956. All eleven persons in whose favour permission was granted thus stood impleaded on 29th May, 1956. Thereafter plaint was registered again as the English order sheet of that day reads, 'Seen Register'. 4. Learned counsel for respondents argued that even the suit filed by five persons was competent as on the application under section 92 C. P. C. the Advocate General had called for the report which was submitted by the Tehsildar and only five persons thereafter had moved the application before Advocate General. According to him although permission was granted to eleven persons but in fact only five having applied subsequently it should be construed in favour of those five only. It was also urged that five persons, having filed the suit it was in conformity with S. 92 C. P. C. According to learned counsel the Privy Council in Mst. Ali Begum, AIR 1938 PC 184 (supra) having repelled the submissions that persons who instituted the suit on sanction of Advocate General or Collector become one plaintiff it follows that failure to file the suit by some did not amount to variation of the consent and so long suit was filed by more than two persons it was competent and in accordance with S. 92 C. P. C. It was also urged that such technical objection as has been raised by the learned counsel for appellant should not be entertained. Whatever may be the merit of the submission advanced by the learned counsel for respondents but in view of Narayan Lal's case, AIR 1967 SC 1540 (supra) it is not open to this Court to adjudicate upon these issues. Nor it is possible to accept the submission that as a result of some application moved by five persons latter the permission should be confined to them only. 5. All the same neither the decision in Narayan Lal's case nor Mst. Ali Begum's case (Supra) is of assistance to the appellant. Nor it is possible to accept the submission that as a result of some application moved by five persons latter the permission should be confined to them only. 5. All the same neither the decision in Narayan Lal's case nor Mst. Ali Begum's case (Supra) is of assistance to the appellant. In the former, the suit was held to be incompetent because one of the persons in whose favour permission was granted having died before institution of suit, filing of suit by remaining persons without obtaining fresh permission was not accepted as sufficient. Mst. Ali Begum's case was concerned with death of one of the persons in appeal. Therefore, apart from the broad principle laid down that a suit under section 92 C. P. C. to be competent must be instituted by all the persons in whose favour permission was granted, these decisions do not throw any light as to what happens where all the persons in whose favour permission was granted were added after amendment of plaint, or allowing of an application for impleadment. The one decision which can be considered nearest and on which great reliance was placed by the learned counsel for appellant is Sibte Rasool v. Sibte Nabi, AIR 1943 All 74 where a Division Bench of this Court held that 'impleadment of party in whose favour consent was granted could not cure the invalidity in institution of the suit. The ratio, however, cannot be read without appreciating the context in which it was given. The left out plaintiff was impleaded at time of pronouncing of the judgment. It was held 'the mere fact that he should be said to have been represented when judgment was delivered could not disentitle him from saying that he was not bound by the ultimate decision when the pleadings, the production of evidence, the arguments and the whole conduct of the case, were in the hands of the persons who were not competent on his behalf. Basis of incompetency as explained was-not that a person in whose favour permission was granted could not be impleaded subsequently but it was held that his impleadment at such late stage was of no consequence as he had no opportunity to participate in the proceedings. Basis of incompetency as explained was-not that a person in whose favour permission was granted could not be impleaded subsequently but it was held that his impleadment at such late stage was of no consequence as he had no opportunity to participate in the proceedings. The decision therefore, does not help the appellants as all persons in whose favour permission was granted not only participated in the proceedings but they were impleaded even before the plaint was registered. 6. Although in the Hindi order sheet on 22nd May, 1956 the plaint is noted to have been registered but as a matter of fact it should have been treated as defective because it being a suit under section 92 C. P. C. could not have been accepted as valid and properly instituted so long the permission by the Advocate General was not filed along with it. And when that was filed it was found that the plaint was not in conformity with sanction. It became so on 28th May, only when application for impleadment was allowed and the plaint was ordered to be registered. In absence of all the persons in whose favour permission was granted under section 92 C. P. C. the plaint should not have been entered in the register of suits as contemplated in O. IV R. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code A suit is deemed to be instituted only when it is registered under the orders of the Court to which it is presented. As the plaint was registered after having become in conformity with the sanction given by the Advocate General on 29th May, 1956 only, it is this date which should be deemed to be the date of institution of the suit within Order IV R. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code And as on that date all the eleven persons in whose favour permission had been granted had been arrayed as plaintiffs the suit shall be deemed to have been validly instituted and the submission of the learned counsel for appellant that it should be dismissed as incompetent cannot be accepted. It was argued by learned counsel for appellant that presentation of plaint under section 26 of the Civil Procedure Code is institution. According to him the suit is deemed to be instituted by presentation and not by registration. It was argued by learned counsel for appellant that presentation of plaint under section 26 of the Civil Procedure Code is institution. According to him the suit is deemed to be instituted by presentation and not by registration. Reliance was placed on Ponnu Swami v. Kaliaperumal, AIR 1929 Mad 480 , and Maharaja of Cooch Behar v. Raja Mahendra, AIR 1921 Cal 277. He urged that if the argument of the respondents was accepted that suit shall be deemed to have been instituted when the plaint was registered then there was no institution on 22nd of May, 1956 and if it was so then no amendment could have been allowed on 29th May, 1956. The decision in Ponnuswami's case (Supra) was overruled by a larger bench of the same court. In Calcutta decision the plaint was presented within three years from the date -.in order under section 145 Cr. P. C. was passed. But it was registered after verification beyond three years. It was held that the suit was not time barred as it shall be deemed to have been instituted on the date when it was presented. Section 26 has to be read with Rr. 1 and 2 of 0. IV of the Civil Procedure Code and a combined reading of these provisions leaves no room for doubt that the suit shall be deemed to be instituted only when it is registered after removal of defects etc. It is another matter that the institution may relate back to the date of presentation. 7. Reverting to the main dispute namely, if the house mentioned in Schedule A was public or private temple and the shop mentioned in Schedule B was for its maintenance the plaintiff -respondents filed the suit for the right of management and Pooja of the temple known as Thakurdwara and Bare Hanumanji which has idol of Sri Radha Krishna and Sri Thakurji in inner portion and very large idol of Sri Hanumanji, Sri Gangaji, Sri Mahadeoji, Sri Ganeshji, Sri Parvatiji and Sri Nandeshwarji installed in outer portion since long. It was alleged that plaintiffs, all the Sanathan Dharmi Hindus of Meerut in general and those of Mohalla Qanoongoyan, Chah Memran, Lala Ka Bazar and of neighbouring mohallas visit the temple to have Darshan, perform Pooja and make offerings. It was alleged that plaintiffs, all the Sanathan Dharmi Hindus of Meerut in general and those of Mohalla Qanoongoyan, Chah Memran, Lala Ka Bazar and of neighbouring mohallas visit the temple to have Darshan, perform Pooja and make offerings. According to plaint the ancestors of plaintiffs who belonged to Quanoongoyan family constructed the Asthan of this temple at their own cost, and installed therein the idols for the benefit of general public. Members of their family visit the temple to have darshan at time of Ghurchari an auspicious occasion of marriages, offer Bhent, Charhawa etc. for meeting expenses in connection therewith the shop mentioned in Schedule B was dedicated to the temple, and to perform Pooja Goswamis of Mathura, namely Goswami Kanahiya Lal and Goswami Jagannath Prasad who were ancestors of appellant and Smt. Chhanno Kunwar, since deceased, were appointed and they generation after generation continued to perform the Pooja. But appellant who is adopted son of the cousin of Goswami Girdhari Lal, deceased husband of Smt. Chhanno Kunwar, who lived in a portion of the temple performed Pooja etc. alleged the property appurtenant to temple to be his own, demolished rooms of the temple after obtaining permission in his own name from Municipal Board, got door frames fixed in inner varanadah, shifted idols installed in inner portion to outer portion, utilised inner Asthana for his residence, causing great blow to plaintiffs who have faith and are devoted to the temple, stopped and are devoted to the temple, stopped persons from performing pooja and misbehaved with man and woman. 8. Smt. Channo Kunwar in her written statement admitted plaintiffs' case and agreed for proper management of the temple. Appellant contested the suit denying the house mentioned in Schedule A to be dedicated property or religious or charitable trust. He claimed the house of Schedule A and shop of Schedule B to be his personal property since the time of his ancestors. Installation of deities in outer portion was admitted but it was claimed for their own pooja. It was alleged that as ancestors of appellant were Katha-vachak and famous worshipper of devtas they of their own accord have been permitting persons who are devotees of Hindu religion to have darshan. Allegation of the temple being gifted or public was denied. It was stated that the house was famous by name of Thakurdwara Gosainji. It was alleged that as ancestors of appellant were Katha-vachak and famous worshipper of devtas they of their own accord have been permitting persons who are devotees of Hindu religion to have darshan. Allegation of the temple being gifted or public was denied. It was stated that the house was famous by name of Thakurdwara Gosainji. It was also pleaded that in fact ancestor of plaintiffs had gifted another house situated in Lala Ka Bazar by gift deed dated 27th Aug. 1864 and it was in this temple that Ghurchari etc. was performed. 9. Large number of oral and documentary evidence was produced by both appellant and respondent. The trial court while deciding issue Nos. 1 and 5 which related to nature of property that is whether it was public, religious or charitable trust or it was private and ancestral property of appellant held that from oral evidence of plaintiff it was established that the house mentioned in schedule 'A' was of very old origin, that idols of deities Radha Krishnaji, Ganeshji and Nandeshwarji were installed in it, that people in general go into the temple for worship, that members of Qanoongoyan family go into the temple for Ghurchari ceremony and that there was no latrine in temple till one was constructed in 1888 in the Abchak. The trial court found that it was admitted even to appellant that the house was of very old origin, that there existed idol of deities and that people go into the house for worship. In respect of Ghurchari and latrine the trial Court found in favour of respondent. And as there was no document about the property in suit the claim of parties was decided on the user and reputation of property. It was found that from oral evidence as well as circumstance it was established that the house was used by the public as a public temple. The Court held that although there was no evidence that Sadhus were fed in the house and money was subscribed by the public for this purpose but there was evidence that idols of numerous deities were installed, that Hindus had free access for worship, there was no lavatory and pooja was regularly done. Therefore, the house was not a private residential house. Therefore, the house was not a private residential house. He did not find any merit in submission of appellant that as respondents witnesses were not able to depose about the author or founder of the trust or about the necessary ceremonies that were necessary to be performed in connection with consecration of idol the suit was liable to be dismissed because in a trust of old origin it was not possible to give direct evidence about these. He held that in such cases it was the evidence of user only which was material. 10. Prior to adverting to evidence and arguments by learned counsel for parties it may be mentioned that there is no document of title in favour of either appellant or respondent. In such a case, the task of the Court becomes difficult and it has to rely merely on circumstantial evidence regarding the nature of the user of the temple. Radha Kant Deb v. Commrs. of Hindu R.E., AIR 1981 SC 798 . Learned counsel for appellant argued that none of the tests found to have been established were sufficient to find that house in dispute was a public temple. He urged that although in paragraph 4 of the plaint the respondent gave out specifically that the trust was created by their ancestors for benefit of general public but it was conspicuous by absence of any plea of user. Learned counsel maintained that worship of public, access to temple. Ghurchari ceremoney, evidence of idols, absence of lavotory' which have been found to be established were not sufficient for holding the temple to be public temple. He urged that even feeding of Sadhus although it has not been found to be taking place, would not have been of any consequence. According to him the only test which has received approval of Supreme Court in numerous decisions is the user of temple by public as of right. He urged that even if it was assumed that public were using the temple for pooja it would not render it a public temple as in absence of any evidence that it was used as of right it could be held to be private temple only. 11. He urged that even if it was assumed that public were using the temple for pooja it would not render it a public temple as in absence of any evidence that it was used as of right it could be held to be private temple only. 11. On the other hand learned counsel for respondents urged that it being admitted to the appellant that number of deities were installed in the house in dispute it was indication that it was a public and not a private temple. If there would have been one idol then probably there could have been some merit in the submission advanced on behalf of appellants. Learned counsel urged that Pran Prathista is never performed in a private temple. He urged that Para 2 of the plaint discloses the necessary ingredients which go to constitute a public temple. He urged that it was not necessary for the defendant to assert user of the temple by public as a matter of right. He urged that in fact, it being not disputed that there was a temple the burden was on the other side to show that public was permitted to enter the temple with their permission. He submitted that allegations that public used to perform puja and darshan and offerings which was not disputed by appellants were sufficient to establish the right of user and the nature of the endowment. Reliance was placed on Deoki Nandan v. Murli Dhar, AIR 1957 SC 133 , where it was observed by Supreme Court that, where beneficiaries are not members of the family of specified individual then the endowment can only be regarded as public. Learned counsel urged that if it was established that idol was owner of a particular property then proof of user by public without interference was cogent evidence of dedication and that the endowment was public endowment. He urged that three situations can arise in respect of an endowment. A person can be owner of idol and the house, or the endowment may be for benefit of family or it may be for the benefit of the public. According to him in the first category there is no trust or endowment whereas the second, is a private endowment and the last one is a public endowment. He urged that Deoki Nandan's case (supra) was concerned with second and third category of cases. According to him in the first category there is no trust or endowment whereas the second, is a private endowment and the last one is a public endowment. He urged that Deoki Nandan's case (supra) was concerned with second and third category of cases. According to him the case of respondents was public endowment whereas appellant claimed to be private owners. It was never claimed by them that the house in dispute was a private endowment. They, therefore, cannot claim now in appeal that the property in dispute may be treated as private endowment. Reliance was placed on G.S. Mahalaxmi v. Shah Ranchhod Das, AIR 1970 SC 2025 . 12. In this decision it was held that in a case where the defendant claimed in the written statement that property in dispute was private property it was not open to him in appeal to take up a case which was, wholly inconsistent with that pleaded and urge that, 'it was a private endowment'. In the written statement and also in oral evidence the consistent case of appellant was of private ownership. He cannot, therefore be permitted to urge that house in dispute was, private endowment. It is another matter as argued by the learned counsel for appellant that if the respondent failed to establish necessary ingredients of the house being a public temple then suit may fail. But there appears no merit in his submission that reply to interrogatory No. 4 that house was constructed as temple should be construed as contrary to plaint. If there is one single consistent test for determination of nature of endowment it is user of the temple by public. In Deoki Nandan's case (supra) it was observed, 'The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine or the general public or any specified portion thereof. The principle was reiterated in Radha Kant Deb's case, AIR 1981 SC 798 (supra) where the Supreme Court after reviewing earlier cases laid down certain tests to determine if endowment was private or public. The principle was reiterated in Radha Kant Deb's case, AIR 1981 SC 798 (supra) where the Supreme Court after reviewing earlier cases laid down certain tests to determine if endowment was private or public. It was held : "There the origin of the endowment cannot be ascertained, the question whether the user of the temple by members of the public is as of right." Whether user by public was of right or by courtesy is determinative of the nature of endowment. In Deoki Nandan's case (supra) it was observed that if endowment was temple and it was not established that beneficiary was an individual or specified then the endowment had to be regarded as public. It having been alleged on behalf of respondents in para 4 of the plaint that temple was constructed and idols were installed for the benefit of the public and the respondents and all Santan Dharmi Hindus of Meerut in general and of Qanoongoyan family in particular visit the temple to have Darshan, perform Pooja and offering, the suit cannot be dismissed for being vague. Absence of words as of right in the plaint do not result in vagueness or lack of necessary averment in the plaint. If the respondents are able to establish their claim or appellant's fail in their attempt to show that it was private ancestral property then in peculiar circumstances the inference shall be irresistible that the nature of endowment was public who were using it as a matterof right. In Deoki Nandan's case (supra) the Supreme Court inferred that where, "villagers were worshipping, the temple freely and without any interference," it was as a matter of right.' 13. Learned counsel for appellant criticised the statements of witnesses after witnesses produced on behalf of respondents and urged that either they were not reliable or their evidence was not sufficient to establish that the house in dispute was a public temple. He urged that P.W. 1 Shyam Sundar Lal no doubt stated that festival of Janmasthmi was performed in the temple and Katha was held Offerings were made and members of Qanoongoyan family performed Ghur but he admitted that he did not know was the owner. Therefore, he was not good witness of dedication and as entire claim of respondent was founded dedication which they failed to prove the suit was liable to be dismissed. Therefore, he was not good witness of dedication and as entire claim of respondent was founded dedication which they failed to prove the suit was liable to be dismissed. So far user by way of right was concerned the learned counsel urged that it was not only not pleaded but this witness did not even say a word about it. Learned counsel drew attention to admission by the witness that, upper portion of the house was used for residential purposes and urged that it was not only unheard of in a temple but was consistent only with case of appellant that it was a private temple. The statement of P.W. 2, a lawyer, was criticised as worthless since although he stated that he used to visit the temple but did not anywhere state that public used it as a matter of right. For some reason the evidence of P.W. 5 Raghubir Saran and P.W. 6 Madhusadan Das was described as useless. It was also pointed out that in fact statement of P.W. 6 established that there was no Kalas or Burji in the temple, nor any Parikrama took place nor there was any stone slab fixed in the temple. This was more consistent with appellant's case that it was his ancestral property. It was urged that no reliance should be placed on statement of P.W. 6 as he was not a plaintiff. It was also urged that inference should be drawn against respondent for withholding Sir Sita Ram, a man of status, and Ram Saran and Rattan Prakash who were important and vital witnesses. The learned counsel urged that evidence being against pleadings and specific case of dedication should be disbelieved. He urged that it was'admitted by all witnesses that there was no Kalas or Burji which is the primary requirement of a temple. According to learned counsel Pooja on special occasion or Ghurchadi which was not regular were insufficient to establish that it was public temple. Learned counsel urged that distribution of Prasad on Tuesday was a neutral circumstance. It by itself does not convert a private temple into a public temple. According to him offering in temple was a colourless circumstance. Appellant and his ancestors were professional Pujaris who were inclined to accept anything as offering. But their acceptance was in their capacity as Pujari of their own temple not because they were pujaris of public temple. It by itself does not convert a private temple into a public temple. According to him offering in temple was a colourless circumstance. Appellant and his ancestors were professional Pujaris who were inclined to accept anything as offering. But their acceptance was in their capacity as Pujari of their own temple not because they were pujaris of public temple. Learned counsel maintained that in order to establish that the temple was a public temple the respondent had to prove by positive evidence that the temple was dedicated either by documents or evidence of installation but both were missing. He urged that mere visit or frequent visit by public was not sufficient for making it public temple unless it was proved that the temple was used by public as of right. And this could be established by producing residents of locality and evidence of participation in management. But both were missing. 14. From oral evidence it stands established that there were and are number of deities in the temple, public are allowed free access to place of worship, Janmasthmi and other festivals are celebrated, Katha is performed twice a month and offerings are made to Hanumanji, every Tuesday, Ghurchadi ceremony is performed and Bhent is offered by bridegroom of Qanoongoyan's family on occasion of marriage. There are no Kalas and Burjis, appellant and his ancestors had been residing in a portion of the temple, there was latrine in abchak in the east of the temple, no Parikrima was performed. Allegations in plaint about large numbers of idols was not denied in written statement. Only this was claimed that these were in outer portion. In a temple where many deities are installed it can easily be considered to be an extensive temple. In Narayan's case, AIR 1967 SC 1540 (Supra) it was held by the Supreme Court that, 'the extensiveness of the temple' was a, 'pertinent circumstance, to be taken into account for judging f;;C nature and extent of the public right'. It was stated by P.W. 1 Lala Shyam Sundar Lai, and P.W. 2 Bal Kishan, a practising lawyer that the temple was made for the entire public and all people were allowed to visit it. They were supported by P.W. 5 Raghubir Saran, a non-Qanoongoyan, P.W. 6 Madhusudan Das stated that public freely visited the temple. P.W. 7 Trilok Chand retired Military accountant, follower of Arya Samaj supported respondents. They were supported by P.W. 5 Raghubir Saran, a non-Qanoongoyan, P.W. 6 Madhusudan Das stated that public freely visited the temple. P.W. 7 Trilok Chand retired Military accountant, follower of Arya Samaj supported respondents. P.W. 9 Sri Radhey Lal not only supported respondents but stated that he was never stopped by anyone from performing worship in the temple. P.W. 10 Ram Saran Das and P.W. 11 also deposed that it was public temple. Their version stood corroborated by the statement of appellant himself who appeared as D. W. 1. Although he stated that his ancestors installed the idol after constructing the building but he admitted that public were permitted to come in the temple to have Darshan, perform Pooja and offer Bhent. He stated that he never forbade people to come to the temple because their coming was profitable. It is, therefore, established beyond dispute that public is allowed free access to the temple without hindrance to perform worship. Learned counsel for respondent rightly urged that what has to be seen is free access of public and not the motive of appellant. Once the factum of free public access was proved it was for appellant to establish that it was their private property. The documentary evidence in this respect shall be examined later. As observed earlier in Deoki Nandan's case, AIR 1957 SC 133 (Supra) the Supreme Court inferred entry of public as of right where free access of public to worship was proved. . 15. Further P.Ws. 1, 5, 9 and 10 have stated about celebration of Janmasthmi and other festivals, holding of Katha and offering of Prasad on Tuesday and Saturday. It had been admitted even by appellant. In cross-examination he stated that Katha used to be recited at a place where idol of Thakurji and Hanumanji were installed. The greatest blow to appellant's case comes from his own deposition when he stated towards the end of his cross-examination that Prasad was not offered to the idol of Hanumanji every Tuesday. In a temple whether private or public where access of public is free and the motive of owner as stated by him was to accept offering and Bhent it is unbelievable that Prasad is not offered to Hanumanji on Tuesday. It is so common.. and general that its denial by appellant discredits his testimony. In a temple whether private or public where access of public is free and the motive of owner as stated by him was to accept offering and Bhent it is unbelievable that Prasad is not offered to Hanumanji on Tuesday. It is so common.. and general that its denial by appellant discredits his testimony. It manifests his anxiety not only to hide the truth but give a coloured version. The evidence of free access of public was so overwhelming and natural as well considering the extensive nature of the temple, the number of idols and deities installed therein that - the appellant did not dare deny it but attempted to twist it by turning to his advantage. But truth came out when he denied offering of Prasad on Tuesday. He cannot be believed when he said that ceremony of Ghurchadi by bridegrooms of Qanoongoyan's family was not performed in this temple. He could not deny that such ceremony was performed at all. But according to him it was performed in another temple. It is very difficult to believe it. P. Ws. 1, 6, 9, 10 and 11 have in unequivocal terms stated about it. P.W. 4, is a'Professor in Meerut College, Meerut. P.W. 7 and P.W. 8 are persons who deposed that their Ghurchadi ceremony was performed in this temple. P.W. 5 is a Photographer who stated that he took the photographs of P.W. 4 on occasion of Ghurchadi ceremony in this temple. These overwhelming statements of local persons of status have to be preferred and accepted over the interested and unreliable evidence of the appellant. 16. Much capital was made out of admission by respondents' witnesses (P. Ws. 1, 4 and 8) about absence of Burji and Kalas. Learned counsel for appellant urged that the temple having been constructed in British period the explanation offered by respondents' counsel on strength of observation in Mahalaxmi's case, AIR 1970 SC 2025 that Hindus constructed the temples in houses without Burjis and Kalas to avoid wrath of fanatic Muslim Rulers cannot be accepted. According to him absence of these was indicative of the temple being private property or private endowment. It being admitted that property mentioned in Schedule 'A' is a temple the presence or absence of Burjis or Kalas is not very material. At least it is not decisive. According to him absence of these was indicative of the temple being private property or private endowment. It being admitted that property mentioned in Schedule 'A' is a temple the presence or absence of Burjis or Kalas is not very material. At least it is not decisive. It was observed in Mahalaxmi's case (Supra), 'though the appearance of temple is a relevant circumstance it is by no means decisive. The architecture of temple differs from place to place. The circumstance that a public or section thereof have been regularly worshipping in the temple as a matter of course and they can take part in the festivals and ceremonies conducted in that temple apparently as a matter of right is a strong piece of evidence to establish public character of a temple. And for that there is ample evidence. In Narayan's case, AIR 1967 SC 1540 (Supra) it was held, 'it seems that nothing really turns upon the existence of a dome or Kalas.' 17. Similarly absence of Parikrima does not change the nature of endowment. In Deoki Nandan's case, AIR 1957 SC 133 it was observed that public endowment could be created without performance of any particular ceremony. How can absence of Parikrima, therefore, lead to an inference that the temple was private? Parikrima is not a ceremony. It is the practice of the worshippers to go round the temple after Darshan. Its absence or presence is immaterial for deciding the nature of endowment. Statement of P.W. 1 that Parikrima is performed in Shiva temple only has not been contradicted. 18. Lot of argument was advanced on existence of latrine and residence of appellant in part of temple. D. W. 1 himself admitted that latrine was constructed in the Abchak purchased in 1883 D. W. 3 admitted that latrine is adjacent to the house. From map it is clear that it is outside the house in which deities are installed. The trial Court, therefore, rightly held that there was no latrine till 1883 and the one which was constructed in 1883 was outside the house in the Abchak. The presence of latrine in Abchak does not militate against the house in dispute being a public temple. Nor can it be said to be ancestral house of appellant because he or his ancestors were residing in part of it. According to respondents they were Pujaris. The presence of latrine in Abchak does not militate against the house in dispute being a public temple. Nor can it be said to be ancestral house of appellant because he or his ancestors were residing in part of it. According to respondents they were Pujaris. Their residence in part of house did not detract it from being a public temple. The two witnesses examined on behalf of appellant are not very reliable. D. W. 2 Attar Singh is a clerk in Income -tax Department. He was out to support appellant. In that anxiety he contradicts him even. He deposed that he did not see any Charkhi for putting fan nor did he see any offering on festive occasions. Both these were admitted by appellant. D. W. 3 Mangat Ram is a peon. He has not in any manner improved the case of appellant. 19. Before proceeding further it is necessary to examine the decision in Radha Kant Das case ( AIR 1981 SC 798 ) as entire argument of learned counsel for appellant has revolved round this case. It was urged that the Supreme Court after reviewing earlier decisions held that essential distinction between a private and a public endowment was that, 'whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specified individuals, in the latter they are general public or class of unascertained people. Learned counsel urged that the Supreme Court itself laid down the tests to determine and observed, that it follows that one of the crucial tests to determine the nature of the endowment would be to find out if the management of the property dedicated was in the hands of strangers or members of the public or in the hands of founders or their descendants. Other factor that may be considered would be the the nature of right of worshippers that is to say, whether the right to worship in the temple is exercised as of right and not as a matter of concession (page 800 para 7). Reliance was also placed on pars 18 and para 21 of the reports. Other factor that may be considered would be the the nature of right of worshippers that is to say, whether the right to worship in the temple is exercised as of right and not as a matter of concession (page 800 para 7). Reliance was also placed on pars 18 and para 21 of the reports. Emphasis was laid on observation at page 801, 'the mere fact that the members of the public used to visit the temple for the purpose of worship without any hindrance or freely admitted therein would not be a clear indication of the nature of the endowment', and on para 804 where the Hon'ble Court observed that, another circumstance that weighed with the High Court was that bhogs were offered during the day which according to High Court, was in consonance with the rules observed by the public. This circumstance also is not of much consequence because bhogs are offered even in private temple. Learned counsel urged that if principle laid down in this decision was applied then the appeal was bound to be allowed as there was no evidence of dedication oral or documentary, there was consistent and continuous evidence of possession of only one family right from the beginning till now, there was no evidence or even assertion in pleading of participation of any member of the public in management, there was unrebutted evidence that shops were let out and its income was realised and appropriated by appellants and their ancestors, there was no evidence that any other property moveable or immoveable was even dedicated and mere visit on festivals does not render it public temple. 20. 'In it the dispute was whether endowment was public or private. And its determination depended on construction of two documents Exts. A and Al. It was not a case where the nature of endowment. was to be determined by circumstances. The Hon'ble court held that from the two documents it was clear that deity was, 'installed in the temple purely as a family deity and the dedication was made only for a group of individuals'. Therefore, access of public for worship, massive structure of the temple, offering of bhogs during day were not found sufficient to convert it into a public endowment. Therefore, access of public for worship, massive structure of the temple, offering of bhogs during day were not found sufficient to convert it into a public endowment. The circumstances that there,-'was no provision for framing any scheme by associating the members of the public or consulting them' or there 'was no recital in any of the documents to show that the members of the public or villagers of the place where the temple was situated were entitled to worship as of right' were construed in favour of appellant as dedication having been created by a document' absence of these recitals militated against the endowment, being public. The intention of the founder having been found to be creation of endowment for family benefit the various circumstances of access to worship, offering of bhog etc. which are usually common both in private and public temples were held to be of no consequence. The Hon'ble Court observed that the crucial test to determine whether an endowment was private or public was to find out, if the management of property dedicated was in hands of strangers or founders, whether the right to worship was exercised as of right. But where, however, it is proved that the intention of the testator or the founder was to dedicate the temple merely for the benefit of the members of the family,, or their descendants, the endowment would be of a private character. In other words if by document of title an endowment isg private then presence of any ingredient would not make it public. Then the evidence of P.W. I as extracted at page 804 of reports is materially different from that of D. W. 1 in this case. There it was stated, members of public have no right to have darshan or to offer bhog to the deity. The villagers do not make Kirtans before the deity or take part in any festival of the deity. The deity has no Bahari Jatra. No member of the public makes any gift to the deity. No Khairat is ever given'. The statement of appellant on the other hand in examination-in-chief itself, 'Lalawalas or Patharwalas did not have any connection with this building. They have not used it for public purpose. I let the public come to this building for this purpose that they may have the Darshan of the idols perform Puja and make offerings to them. The statement of appellant on the other hand in examination-in-chief itself, 'Lalawalas or Patharwalas did not have any connection with this building. They have not used it for public purpose. I let the public come to this building for this purpose that they may have the Darshan of the idols perform Puja and make offerings to them. I take this offering. Before this my ancestors were to take the offering made. I never forbid people to come to the building because their coming is profitable to me'. In cross -examination it was admitted 'the Katha used to be recited at the place where idols of Thakurji or Hanumanji are installed. The Kathas of Bhagwan Krishna were recited there'. The two statements are materially different. The appellant admits presence of all those elements which are in public temple. They may not be individually sufficient. But they cannot be ignored as well. Then the crucial test of management of temple with outsiders is also established as appellant or his ancestors were only Pujaris and manager. Admittedly there being no document creating the endowment the nature of the property has to be decided on the circumstances. Free access to temple, holding of festivals, offering of Bhent etc. assume importance. One or the other circumstance by itself may not be sufficient but in absence of any document they become strong evidence from which it can be inferred that the nature of endowment could not be private. As observed in Deoki Nandan's case, AIR 1957 SC 133 (Supra), once these things are established then the burden is on the person claiming it to be private endowment to prove the same. Fortunately in this case the documentary evidence further clinches the matter in favour of respondents. 21. They may now be examined. Learned counsel for appellant urged that the documents filed by respondents relating to earlier litigation specially Ext. 12 etc. could not be construed as admission that temple in dispute was a public temple. According to him most of the property regarding which there was earlier litigation were different than the house in dispute therefore, no reliance could be placed on them. Learned counsel argued that in fact these documents relied on by respondent itself establish that appellants did acquire certain property which was their ancestral property and that establishes their case that house in dispute was their private property. Learned counsel argued that in fact these documents relied on by respondent itself establish that appellants did acquire certain property which was their ancestral property and that establishes their case that house in dispute was their private property. He urged that in any case these admissions were not evidence of dedication. He urged that it being admitted that portion was demolished and shops were reconstructed in 1952 to which no contribution was made by anyone in public, admission in earlier suit relied on by respondents did not establish it to be public temple. 22. 'Learned counsel for respondent on the other hand urged that apart from oral evidence the case of respondents stood supported by documentary evidence which comprised of admission by appellant or his ancestor in earlier suits that the house-in dispute was temple of which they were managers, omission on their part to mention the property in encumbered estates proceedings thereby giving rise to inference against appellant, Municipal records relating to assessments etc. furnishing supporting circumstances and maintenance of accounts etc. in respect of repairs and offerings filed by appellant which cuts across the plea of house being private ancestral property. 23. 'Ext. 12 is a copy of plaint and Exts. A-25 and A-26 are judgments of trial court and appellate court in suit No. 12 of 1908 filed by deity Sri Radha Mohanji through Banmali (father of appellant) seeking declaration that auction of two bighas 3 biswas of Khasra No. 466 of village was void. It has been found to be most important document by trial court in favour of respondents. In para 1 of the plaint it is alleged that plaintiffs were Pujaris and managers and from the time of ancestors had been performing worship as such of Thakurdwara situated in Mohalla Chahmemran alias Bazar Lala. In para 2 it is stated that ancestors of Qanoongoyan ex resident of Meerut dedicated the property meeting expenses, bhog etc. and appointed ancestors of plaintiff as Pujari and Karkum (workers) on behalf of Sri Thakurji. Counsel for appellant argued that there was nothing that temple of Sri Radha Mohanji mentioned in the plaint was the temple in dispute. In the alternative the learned counsel submitted that even assuming it to be so the property mentioned in the plaint did not relate to temple. And in any case allegation did not go to establish that it was a public temple. In the alternative the learned counsel submitted that even assuming it to be so the property mentioned in the plaint did not relate to temple. And in any case allegation did not go to establish that it was a public temple. He also urged that suit having been dismissed by both the courts without adjudicating on merits the admission if any, had no binding effect. The argument of learned counsel for appellant that admission in plaint did not relate to property in suit cannot be accepted as the trial court while discussing this document observed, 'it is not disputed before me that Thakurdwara mentioned in para 1 of the plaint is- the same house which is involved in this suit.' Even ignoring the admission noted in the judgment of the trial court the recitals in the plaint leave no room for doubt that it referred to house in dispute. In para 1 of the plaint it is mentioned that plaintiff, that is, appellants' ancestors were Pujaris and managers who have been performing worship of Thakur Radha Mohanji from the time of their ancestors whose Thakurdwara is situate in Mohalla Chahmemran alias Bazar Lala. The reference in it to Thakurwara is decisive as it is admitted even by appellant that the house in dispute is known as Thakurdwara. Further its situation being admitted to be Chahmemran, the trial Court rightly held that it related to property in dispute. It was rightly pointed out by learned counsel for respondent that it provided the necessary link. Nor is there any merit in the submission that due to non-adjudication on merits the admission by appellant's ancestor lost its importance. Admission is the best evidence. It may not be conclusive but it is decisive. Although the suit did not relate to property in dispute but it was claimed that property was auctioned for loan taken by one Nand Lal who was pujari of Tkurdwara, that is the property in dispute, for his personal expenditure, therefore the auction be declared property of that suit was endowed or waqf property may be correct or not, whether it may have been decided or not but the averment that Thakurdwara was dedicated by Qanoongoyan of which the appellants were manager only cannot be ignored. 24. Exts. 13 and 14 are statements of Banmali Lal and Girdhari Lal in suit No. 299 of 1910 and Exts. 24. Exts. 13 and 14 are statements of Banmali Lal and Girdhari Lal in suit No. 299 of 1910 and Exts. A-29 and A-30 are its judgment and decree in the suit. That was a case filed by one Kanahiya Lal claiming to be vendee from one Nandan Lal who it was alleged had half share in the house along with Banmali and Girdhari IIral It was contested and it was claimed that the house belonged to Thakur Radha Mohanji. In his deposition Banmali as D. W. I stated that house belonged to Thakur Radha Mohan and Hanumanji. It was offered by one Sujan Singh. It was not the property of deponent or Girdhari Lal. They were only managers. It was entrusted to their family three or four generations ago. The idol was installed by their ancestors. Girdhari Lal stated that someone in Qanoongoyan had given the aforesaid house besides which Thakurji was owner of a shop, one piece of land near Delhi Darwaza etc. He performed Puja in the temple. Income accruing from temple was spent over maintenance of Thakurji. A door of the temple had fallen down. He repaired it after taking loan from Shanker Lal His ancestor had performed Asthan of idols. They had purchased land and constructed Dalan. Counsel for appellant urged that these statements although filed by respondent established that only part was dedicated and that also in favour of appellant's ancestor and not the idols. Admission of Banmali, therefore, could not be construed in favour of respondent. And as regards _Girdhari Lal he stated that temple was nearby. And even if it was assumed that property was gifted to temple then according to' learned counsel it was gift made to pujaris of temple. At least it did not establish that property was dedicated. Further in the judgment Ext. A-29 the house was held to be private property. These statements support respondent's case that the house in dispute has always been treated not only as a temple by appellat's ancestor but they have admitted to be its Pujaris only. The statement that the ancestors of the deponent Banmalilal had installed the idols of Hanumanji and Radha Mohanji and a portion of it was purchased by their ancestors has to be read in the context it was made. The statement that the ancestors of the deponent Banmalilal had installed the idols of Hanumanji and Radha Mohanji and a portion of it was purchased by their ancestors has to be read in the context it was made. It was admitted by the witness unequivocally that there was a temple of Thakur Radha Mohanji and Hanumanji of which the appellant and his ancestors were only managers. From Ext. A-29 it is clear that the suit in which these statements were made was in respect of property situate in South of the temple in dispute in which it was claimed by appellant's ancestors that it was dedicated to temple. Although their claim was not accepted but that did not lessen or weaken the effect of the admission in these depositions. The appellant is bound by it. Even in the judgment there is observation that there is a temple in the Mohalla called after Qanoongoyan family. This again, therefore, is strong evidence in support of respondent's case. 25. 'Exts. 15, 16 and 17 are written statements, and judgments in suit No. 2129 of 1936 under Encumbered Estates Act. Learned counsel for appellant urged that Ext. 15 was relied on as in those proceedings house in dispute was not shown as property of appellants. But under section 24 of the Act the residential house was exempt, therefore, no adverse inference could be drawn against appellant. It was refuted by the learned counsel for respondent who urged that in those proceedings the appellant did not disclose this house as his property. He referred to Ext. 16 and urged that even houses other than that in dispute were claimed by appellant to be endowed property. It was objected to by the creditors and the Court after examining the evidence in detail held that those houses were private property of appellant. It is urged that so far as the house in dispute was concerned even the creditors did not take up any objection that it should also be treated as personal property of appellant. According to learned counsel this indicates that neither appellant nor public in general ever treated the house in dispute to be private ancestral house of appellant. It is urged that so far as the house in dispute was concerned even the creditors did not take up any objection that it should also be treated as personal property of appellant. According to learned counsel this indicates that neither appellant nor public in general ever treated the house in dispute to be private ancestral house of appellant. He urged that S. 24 of the Encumbered Estate Act on which reliance was placed was not relevant as from S. 8 it was clear that it was incumbent on the appellant to have included all the property as held in Appasaheb T. Desai v. Bhal Chandra Thube, AIR 1961 SC 589 and Smt. Chandrawati Tewari v. U.P. Government, AIR 1961 All 183 (FB). He referred to the statement of appellant on pages 80 and 83 of the paper book where it was admitted by appellant that house and shop in dispute had not been auctioned in connection with proceedings under Encumbered Estate Act. Learned counsel submitted that this was an admission by omission and the appellant was as much bound by it as by his admission in Ext. 12. There appears substance in the argument of learned counsel for respondent. The conduct of the appellant in not disclosing the house in those proceedings cannot be ignored. It has to be judged in the light of the appellant's effort to save houses from encumbered estates proceedings. If it would have been his personal property he would certainly have claimed its exemption. More important than this is that even the creditors did not lay any claim to the house or the shop. The absence of objection by creditors for shop even, that is Schedule 'B' property, indicates that not only appellant but residents of Meerut were treating the property as endowed property. This circumstance again leans in favour of respondents. 26. Apart from these admissions and depositions in earlier litigations there are documents relating to Municipal assessments which have been subject of lot of argument. Ext. 18 is copy relating to assessment of house-tax for 1929-30. From perusal of the original document which is in Urdu it is clear that the nature of property is mentioned as Ibadat Gah (place of worship) and in the column of owners Ahal Hanud is mentioned meaning thereby for all. Exts. A-100. A-101 and A -99 were filed by appellant. Ext. From perusal of the original document which is in Urdu it is clear that the nature of property is mentioned as Ibadat Gah (place of worship) and in the column of owners Ahal Hanud is mentioned meaning thereby for all. Exts. A-100. A-101 and A -99 were filed by appellant. Ext. A-100 relates to assessment of house tax for house No. 8 of Chahmemran. The nature of property is mentioned as temple, Smt. Janki Devi is shown as owner and in the column of tax it is mentioned exempted. Ext. A 101 relates to house-tax for 1946-47. The old number of house is mentioned as 8 and new as 10, Smt. Janki Devi is shown as owner and column of tax is blank. The document is in Urdu, Column No. 4 is nature of house (Kism Jaydad). It mentions 'Makan Pukhta Mai Mandir' that is, cemented house with temple. Ext. A-99 relates to the shop of Qazi Bazar. It is assessment of house tax of 1942. Smt. Janki Devi is mentioned as owner but in the column of tax it is mentioned as exempted. According to learned counsel for appellant no reliance could be placed on Ext. 18 as it does not mention any name, therefore, it cannot be connected with property in dispute. He urged that even assuming it related to property in dispute it is shown as place of worship, but that alone was not sufficient as it does not mention whether it was private or public. In respect of Exs. A-100, A-101 and A-99 it was urged that Smt. Janki Devi having been shown as owner it is clear that property was treated in Municipal records as private property of appellant. On the other hand learned counsel for respondent submitted that recitals in Ext. 18 showing the property as Ibadatgah and for Ahal Hamud left no room for doubt that it was public property. He urged that this paper related to house in dispute as the number of it is mentioned as 8. According to him from Exts. A-100 and A-101 themselves it was. established that till 1942 the old number of the house in dispute was 8 and, thereafter sometime it became 10 as is clear from Ext. A-101. Learned counsel urged that Smt. Janki Devi was wife of Girdhari Lal and not Jagannath, as was clear from Ext A-101. According to him from Exts. A-100 and A-101 themselves it was. established that till 1942 the old number of the house in dispute was 8 and, thereafter sometime it became 10 as is clear from Ext. A-101. Learned counsel urged that Smt. Janki Devi was wife of Girdhari Lal and not Jagannath, as was clear from Ext A-101. He urged that name of Smt. Janki Devi as owner was a misnomer as it was stated by P.W. 1 that after Jagannath it was Smt. Janki Devi and after her Smt. Chhanno Kunwar who were the Pujarin of the temple in dispute and this fact being not disputed by the other side the name of Janki Devi has to be read not as owner in the sense in whih counsel for appellant wanted to read it but in the capacity of Manager of the temple. He urged that although there was no direct evidence except the evidence of P.W. 1 referred to above but it was not denied that her husband was manager and in absence of any other material the case of respondent was proved that she after the death of her husband was manager of the property in dispute. Learned counsel drew attention to the last column of Ext. A-100 where in the column of tax it is mentioned exempted. 'He urged that this indicates that house in dispute was a public temple as under Municipalities Act a public temple is exempt. In respect of Ext A-101 he urged that from original document which is in Urdu it was clear that in column No. 4, which relates to the nature of the property : it is mentioned 'Makan Pukhta Maya Mandir? It is, therefore, urged that these documents in fact support the case of respondents. Ext. A-99 relates to assessment of shop which is mentioned in Schedule 'B'. In this also Smt. Janki Devi is mentioned as owner and in the column of assessment it is shown as exempted from tax. Learned counsel urged that this proved that even shop was treated as dedicated to the temple and, therefore, not assessed to any tax. Ext. A-99 relates to assessment of shop which is mentioned in Schedule 'B'. In this also Smt. Janki Devi is mentioned as owner and in the column of assessment it is shown as exempted from tax. Learned counsel urged that this proved that even shop was treated as dedicated to the temple and, therefore, not assessed to any tax. The argument of learned counsel for appellant that in Chhitta Kham relating to assessment of house-tax wherein the property has been described as temple was not sufficient to establish the nature of it as it being the case of appellant itself that the house in dispute was their private temple, the trial court wrongly drew an inference or that this Court should ignore it cannot be accepted. It was not the case of appellant that the house in dispute was a private endowment. They claimed it to be their own personal property. Description of such property in Municipal records as temple cannot be considered normal. It is more indicative of the fact that it was treated as a public temple. It is rather difficult to expect that the property should have been described as a private or public temple in Municipal records. Moreover, in Urdu in the column of nature of property it is mentioned as Ibadatgah. One may claim that Ibadatgah may be a private or public place but normally the description of the property in dispute as Ibadatgah is more in consonance with concept of public endowment. Further the use of the word Ahal Hanud, in column of name of owner, dispels any doubt if there was any that the house in dispute was not only a place of worship for Hindus but it was for public in general. It has rightly been argued by the learned counsel for respondents that mention of Smt. Janki Devi in Exts. A-97, A-100 and A-101, various forms relating to assessment of house-tax as owner did not make any difference as she being wife of deceased Girdhari Lal acted as manager and Pujari of the temple. These documents further show that the house was exempt from payment of tax which again is a circumstance in favour of respondents. 27. 'Exts. A-34 to A-43 are rent receipts to show that they were issued in favour of appellant treating the appellant as owners. Ext. These documents further show that the house was exempt from payment of tax which again is a circumstance in favour of respondents. 27. 'Exts. A-34 to A-43 are rent receipts to show that they were issued in favour of appellant treating the appellant as owners. Ext. A-32 is an application of one Chetan Prakash to the Superintendent, Water Works, Municipal Board for water connection in the house, Ext. A-33 is an agreement between Chetan Prakash in reference to his application referred to in Ext. A-32 that in case permission was granted by Municipal Board then he shall conform and abide by the rules. Ext. A-95 is the permission granted by the Municipal Board to appellant for affixing certain doors and making minor repairs in the house in dispute. Ext. A-49 is the letter sent by appellant to Executive Officer, Municipal Board that Chetan Prakash is agent who got connection fitted in the house in dispute. He vacated the house and had gone away. It was an intimation that he has ceased to be his agent. Ext. A -50 is the agreement executed by the appellant to the Municipal Board that in case permission was granted he shall abide by the rules and conditions. Reliance was placed on Exts. A-34 to A-44 and A-32 and A-33 etc. to show that the appellant or his agent was treating the property as their personal property, Ext. A-36 was a letter sent by appellant to the Resident Engineer, Martin Burn and Company, Meerut informing him that Chetan Prakash had nothing to do and he was the owner of the house in dispute. In the body it is mentioned that the property was temple. Similarly, Ext. A-37 is the report of Electric Inspector. This again refers to the property as Mandir property. Ext-A 38 was relied on to show that Chetan Prakash was claiming it as his property, and, therefore, it could not be public temple. In this the property is mentioned as temple and' 28. Although great reliance was placed on these documents but in most of them the property is mentioned as temple. Issuing of receipts in favour of appellant does not establish that property was private property. The receipt could have been in favour of Thakurdwara or the temple or in name of Manager. Although great reliance was placed on these documents but in most of them the property is mentioned as temple. Issuing of receipts in favour of appellant does not establish that property was private property. The receipt could have been in favour of Thakurdwara or the temple or in name of Manager. Merely because it was in name of appellant who was manager it cannot be construed as a circumstance in his favour nor any inference can be drawn that it was not public temple. Similarly Exts. A-128 and A-129, copy of judgment in suit No. 342 of 1957 and appeal in proceedings for ejectment of one Rameshwar Dayal is not of much assistance to appellants. The appellant being manager was acting on behalf of the temple. Then it was a suit after the litigation had started therefore the conduct of appellant in filing the suit in his personal capacity cannot be construed in his favour. Reliance was then placed on Ext. A-23 a compromise deed of 1883 filed in suit No. 392 of 1954 between Krishna Murari Lal and Govind Prasad and others. The dispute was resolved and it was mentioned that all the parties shall be entitled to collect rent etc. from ancestral plots of land and house in Meerut, Amroha and Sambhal. According to learned counsel the appellant does not own any other property except the property in dispute in Meerut. The compromise, therefore, referred to the house and the shop regarding which the suit has been filed and from this no other inference was possible except that this was personal property otherwise there was no question of referring it as ancestral house. Ext. A-24 isa sale deed dated 9th March, 1883 executed by Thakur Prasad in favour of Goswami Madan Lal, Kanahiya Lal and Raghunath referred to in Ext. A-23. According to learned counsel it shows that sale was made not to Thakurdwara but to individual persons mentioned in it. Ext. A -112 was an award between persons who are not parties in this suit. In it the southern boundary is mentioned as shop of Goswami Mathura Wala. It was urged that the recital indicates that the property was owned by the appellant in personal I capacity. Similarly Ext. A-13, another award dated 6th Feb. 1914 is relied to show that the house in dispute is not referred to as temple. Ext. In it the southern boundary is mentioned as shop of Goswami Mathura Wala. It was urged that the recital indicates that the property was owned by the appellant in personal I capacity. Similarly Ext. A-13, another award dated 6th Feb. 1914 is relied to show that the house in dispute is not referred to as temple. Ext. A-15 is a sale deed executed by outsiders in which southern boundary is shown as shop of Goswami Ext. A-69 is relied to show that western boundary was mentioned as temple of Sri Goswamiji. None of these documents are sufficient to show that the property in dispute was private ancestral property. Mention of the house as temple of Goswamiji or Gosain Mathurawala etc. do not militate against the claim of respondents. The boundary in the documents could have been described as temple or temple of Goswamiji. Once it is admitted that the house is known as Thakurdwara then whether it is mentioned as such or is associated with name of its managers is hardly of any consequence. Gosain of Mathura were appointed as its Pujaris. They are continuing from generation. It is, therefore, not surprising that boundary was described as temple Goswami by that it does not become his personal property. Description of the house by designation or characteristic of its managers cannot be construed as a circumstance in favour of appellant. 29. Ext. A-31 was a letter sent from Jagannath Goswami to one Krishna Chaubey. This was relied to show that the house in dispute needed repairs and the appellants ancestor were doing it on their own and inviting contributions from their family members. And there was no public participation. Ext. A-66 is detail of expenditure incurred in repair of doors etc. It was filed in suit No. 392 of 1954. This again is not a circumstance which can outweigh the admission of appellant's ancestor made as far back as 1910 specially when a copy of plaint in suit No. 830 of 1954 shows that appellant had started abusing his position and claiming the property to be his personal There appeares substance in argument of learned counsel for respondent that normally keeping of account of Bhent and Charhawa etc. is not consistent with a private temple. He referred to Ext. 13 statement of Banmali in suit No. 299 of 1910 where in he admitted that Pujari maintained account on paper. is not consistent with a private temple. He referred to Ext. 13 statement of Banmali in suit No. 299 of 1910 where in he admitted that Pujari maintained account on paper. Even appellant admitted this in his deposition. Reference was made to Ext. A-66 as well wherein it is mentioned Mandir committee. According to learned counsel this is more consistent with the temple being public. 30. Then there are certain judgment copies of which have been filed by the appellant and on which great reliance was also placed. Ext. A-29 is copy of judgment in partition suit No. 229 of 1910 filed by one Kanahiya Lal vendee from one Nandan Lal brother of Banwari Lal and other. It was claimed that although they purchased share in the house three years ago but they were not paid rent. It was contested by appellant's ancestor. They claimed that Nandan Lal had no interest in the property as it was dedicated to Radha Krishnaji. The suit was decreed. It was held that property was not dedicated although it was observed that there was a temple called after the Qanoongoyan family. Learned counsel for appellant argued that it was in respect of different property, therefore, it was not relevant at all. It was also urged that admission if any in this case was in favour of appellant. How can the judgment be taken in favour of appellant is not easy to understand. It was no doubt in respect of different property. But the appellant's ancestor did claim that it was dedicated property and they were managers. It appears to have failed to explain the deposition of Banmali Lal and Girdhari Lal in Exts. 13 and 14 which have been referred earlier. But it is doubtful if appellant had succeeded in it. In fact the deposition and the judgment establish that there was a temple which was dedicated by Qanoongoyan of which they were managers. 31. Ext. A-56 is the judgment in a suit for permanent injunction filed by one Chetan Prakash against appellant claiming that he was the occupier of house No. 10 and had got water and electricity connected. The appellant claimed to be the owner. It was relied to show that appellant was claiming the house in dispute to be his personal property. Learned counsel for respondent urged that the judgment was irrelevant under section 43 of Evidence Act. The appellant claimed to be the owner. It was relied to show that appellant was claiming the house in dispute to be his personal property. Learned counsel for respondent urged that the judgment was irrelevant under section 43 of Evidence Act. Reliance was placed on Madhusudan Das v. Narayan Bai, AIR 1983 SC 114 , Paras 120 and 121 and it was urged that it being between third partner could not be relied. Even assuming it to be relevant it was a suit filed in 1951 that is few years before filing of the suit by respondents alleging abuse of position and mismanagement by appellant. The conduct of appellant must have been spread over years. Then the suit was dismissed because Chetan Prakash admitted that he was neither the owner nor tenant of the house. The court found that there was no obligation in his favour which could be enforced in a court of law. For same reason Ext. A-55 statement of Smt Channo Kunwar who was one of the defendants in this suit is not of any help to appellant. Moreover, it is not disputed that appellant and Smt. Channo Kunwar and their ancestor always resided in a portion of the temple. Even if the dispute was in respect of residential portion how will it result in rendering the temple private property of appellant. . 32. Ext. A-92 is the judgment in appeal arising out of suit for possession of three yards of dwelling land filed by Gosain Gokul against Hussain Ali. It was held that the land belonged to Gosain Gokul Chanel Learned counsel for appellant urged that the suit was for some land adjoining the temple. It was a judgment given in 1818. This coupled with Ext. A-159 a Vakalatnama (power of attorney) executed by Gokul Chand on 19-10-1918) in favour of Budha Singh to appear in cases before Collector as he was not free on account of Sewa (Service) of Thakurji, according to learned counsel fixes the time when trust was created. He urged that according to plaintiffs it was Kanahiya Lal and Jagannath who were appointed Pujaris But a perusal of pedigree would show that they are much lower in it. Therefore. if there was some temple as is clear from Ext. A-159 it must have been personal property of Gokul Chand. As Ext. He urged that according to plaintiffs it was Kanahiya Lal and Jagannath who were appointed Pujaris But a perusal of pedigree would show that they are much lower in it. Therefore. if there was some temple as is clear from Ext. A-159 it must have been personal property of Gokul Chand. As Ext. A-92 was in respect of property which was adjacent to the house which is in dispute the adjudication in favour of Gokul Chand cannot be considered as establishing appellant's case even indirectly. At regards Ext. A-159 it no doubt mentiom Sewa of Thakurji but it is very remote and not very safe for relying to hold that the property in dispute was private property of appellant. 33. Ext. A-123 is the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 632 of 1956 decided on 18-10-1958. It was suit for permanent injunction by appellant restraining one Govind Prasad and others from flowing the water through the drains fixed in their western wall falling in Abchak, between his house and that of defendants. It was contested by defendants and it was claimed that the house was the temple of Thakurji and Abchak belonged to defendants. The plaintiff that is appellant had nothing to do with it. It was held that defendant was not the owner of Abchak. But as it was contended by defendants that even if they were not owners the suit was liable to be dismissed because it did not belong to appellant but to the temple and he had filed the suit in his personal capacity. The appellate Court found that Abchak belonged to appellant and the temple was in a portion of the building. It was held that there was nothing, on record to show that whole building had been dedicated to Sri Thakurji. The Court further observed that although building was known as Thakurdwara of Goswami but that alone did not make it a public temple. It was also observed that merely because a temple existed it could not necessarily be inferred that it was a public endowment and the temple was a public one. Great reliance was placed on these observations by the learned counsel for appellant as prima facie they support appellant's case. It was urged by the learned counsel for respondent that it was not a suit for public right, therefore, it was not admissible. Great reliance was placed on these observations by the learned counsel for appellant as prima facie they support appellant's case. It was urged by the learned counsel for respondent that it was not a suit for public right, therefore, it was not admissible. According to him the question of the house being public temple was only incidentally and collaterally in issue. He urged that in fact both claimed private right in the Abchak. Apart from the argument of learned counsel for respondent even this judgment establishes that there was a temple in the house in dispute. What was its nature could not have been decided in that suit for two reasons, one it having been found that appellant was owner of abchak the finding that it was not temple property was irrelevant. Second it was held that temple was not a public temple because there was no evidence about it. Then these litigations started when appellant in contrast to his ancestors started alleging that property was his own. 34. Exts. A-28 and 129 are judgments of trial and appellate Courts in suit No. 342 of 1957 and Appeal No. 836 of 1958 filed by appellant against one Rameshwar Dayal for recovery of rent and ejectment in which it was claimed by defendant that the suit was not maintainable as property belonged to trust. The suit was decreed. But the Court observed that although there was no. evidence that house was trust property it could incidentally be looked into. It was found that there was sufficient evidence that plaintiff that is appellant was dealing with house as owner. This was a suit which was filed after filing of the suit in dispute. Any finding in it touching the controversy in dispute cannot be deemed relevant. Moreover the Court itself observed that the matter could be looked into incidentally only. 35. Ext. 24 is the judgment in suit No. 435 of 1957 filed by appellant against one. Gopi Chand and others. The appellant claimed that he was owner of house under gift deed executed on 27th Aug., 1864 by ancestor of defendant in favour of ancestor of appellant. in which idols of Sri Hanumanji and Sri Radha Mohanji were installed and appellant's ancestors were appointed its Pujaris. It was contested by defendant who claimed to be owners in possession for more than 12 years. in which idols of Sri Hanumanji and Sri Radha Mohanji were installed and appellant's ancestors were appointed its Pujaris. It was contested by defendant who claimed to be owners in possession for more than 12 years. It was found that plaintiff failed to prove that he got the disputed house by gift because there were interpolations in it and it was not conceivable that a temple opened to public would remain closed for seven years. Reliance was placed by learned counsel for appellant on Ext. A -121 the plaint of suit Ext. A-124 written statement and Ext. A-125 Commissioner-'s report in it. It is not necessary to discuss it as the learned counsel for respondent appears to be justified in arguing that it was filed as a counter-blast to respondent's suit. The allegations made in the plaint being purposive could not be construed in appellant's favour. 36. While examining oral evidence it has been found that witnesses examined on behalf of respondents are men of status, and have been candid in their depositions. Even from the testimony of appellant and his witnesses it has come out clearly that public have free access to temple, they have always been permitted in the temple without any obstruction, celebrations are held on Janamasthmi, Shiv Ratri, etc. Katha is held and offerings are made. The claim of respondents that Ghurchari is performed also stands established as appellant himself admitted that Ghurchari was performed but in the other temple. It, however, having been found in a suit (suit No. 435 of 1957) filed by appellant himself that was not a public temple there appears merit in submission of learned counsel for respondent that Ghurchari should be deemed to have been performed in the temple in dispute. These aspects coupled with admission of appellant in Ext. 12 and statement of appellant's ancestor in Exts. 13 and 14 leave no room for doubt that the house in dispute was a public temple. The admission of appellant's ancestors that they were appointed as Pujaris and managers and they having failed in proving that there was any other temple to which these could apply or deemed to have been referred the crucial test laid down by Supreme Court in Radha Kant Deb's case, AIR 1981 SC 798 (Supra) of management of trust being in hands of strangers stood satisfied. The inference drawn by trial Court from Exts. The inference drawn by trial Court from Exts. 15, 16 and 17 appears to be justified. Non-disclosure of properties in Encumbered Estate proceedings is certainly a circumstance which taken together alongwith other circumstance militates again appellant. Mention of the house as place of worship for Hindus in Ext. 18 relating to assessment of house-tax is a strong circumstance which favours respondents. Use of word Ibadatgah is significant. It is normally used for a place which is used by public. Not only this even in the inspection note Ext. 21 made by the Munsif as far back as 1910 it was found that there was a temple in which idols were installed. Reference of it as residential double storeyed house was, as argued by learned counsel for respondents descriptive of outer appearance. Report of Commissioner and map prepared by him further supports respondent's case. Presence of Chawk (raised platform) in inner room is sign that deities used to remain installed on it. Ante room for rest of idols and Ghirri that is, wheel for facility of pulling fan etc. do indicate that the house was temple and not private ancestral property of appellant. From whatever aspect the case is examined it appears beyond dispute that the house in dispute, was and is a public temple of which appellant and his ancestors were only managers or pujaris. And as the appellant abused his position and claimed ownership of the property the trial Court did not commit any error in decreeing the suit. 37. For the reasons stated above this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.