JUDGMENT Hari Lal Agrawal, J. In this batch or three writ applications which have been referred to Division Bench by a learned single Judge and have been heard together, the question of law arising for consideration is the effect of a transfer by the purchaser of the land in question on the date of the filing of the application under section 16 (3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. The petitioners in all the three cases are the purchasers and arc related to each other so much so that petitioner no. 2 of the first case is the petitioner of the second case and brother of petitioner no. 2 of the third case. These petitioners purchases certain lands situate in village Harnathpur in the district of East Champaran, from respondent no. 5 and 6 under three separate sale deeds for Rs.9,000/- each which Was registered on 29.9.1977, and according to their case the lands conveyed to the petitioners under the three sale deeds formed one compact block. 2. On 21.11.1977 respondent no. 4 filed applications for pre-emption in the court of Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Sikrahna at Motihari for transfer of the lands in question to him claiming himself to be an adjacent raiyat thereof, and on the same day, i.e. 21.11.77, the petitioners in their turn, had also executed separate sale deeds in favour of different persons for the lands/part (sic), which were, however, registered on 17.12.1977. On the notice of show cause being issued by the Deputy Collector. the petitioners challenged the right of the pre-emptor, inter alia, on the ground that they were not adjoining raiyata of all the lands and that the petitioners themselves were adjoining raiyats to one of the plots being plot no.1407, that being an ancestral plot of all the petitioners purchased by their ancestor Sukhram Sah, as recorded in the name of Gauri Shanker Sah. The Deputy Collector by his order dated 10.7.78 (Annexure 2) rejected the pre-emption application on the findings that the pre-emptor was not the adjoining raiyat of all the lands transferred to the petitioners and that the purchasers, namely, the petitioners, themselves were also in the western boundary of plot no.1407. The Deputy Collector by his order dated 10.7.78 (Annexure 2) rejected the pre-emption application on the findings that the pre-emptor was not the adjoining raiyat of all the lands transferred to the petitioners and that the purchasers, namely, the petitioners, themselves were also in the western boundary of plot no.1407. It is necessary, however, to mention that one of the points taken by the petitioners in their defence was that the pre-emption applications were defective for not impleading the subsequent transferees from them. The transferees had also made applications before the Deputy Collector (vide Annexure 12) for being made parties to the proceeding on the ground that they were bonafide purchasers and in possession of the lands in question. They had also challenged the report of the Auchal Adhikari (Annexure B) against them. The pre-emptor, however, filed a rejoinder objecting to the prayer of the subsequent transferees for being added as parties vide his rejoinder dated 7.12.1977 (Annexure 13). His stand was that the transferees were farzidars of the petitioners. 3. It was conceded at the Bar that the Deputy Collector did not pass any separate order on the petition of the subsequent transferees and, although outing the course of hearing Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh, appearing for the petitioners, on the instructions of the junior, stated before us that in his order (Annexure 2) also the Deputy Collector did not pass any order in this regard, I, however, find from the scrutiny of the order of the Deputy Collector that he has made all observation that the transfer of the lands by the petitioners on 21.11.77 did not appear to be farzi. 4. The pre-emptor also failed before the Collector of Motihari in his appeal, who by his order dated 30.5.79/13.6.79 (Annexure 3), relying upon a Bench decision of this Court in Chandradip Singh and another v. The Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar dismissed the appeals mainly on the ground that the petitioners having transferred the land to a third party on the date the application for pre-emption was made, no order could be passed against them. The pre-emptor then filed revision before the Board of Revenue. The pre-emptor then filed revision before the Board of Revenue. The learned Additional Member of the Board allowed his application on committing a serious error of law, contrary to the view of this Court in a large number of decisions, that despite the sale deeds in favour of the subsequent transferees which were registered after the date of the pre-emption applications, the petitioners had still subsisting title in the lands and therefore, there was no impediment in the way of the pre• emptor for the order of pre-emption in his favour. It may be stated that before the Board of Revenue the pre-emptor's stand that the petitioners had no status of boundary raiyat, was not challenged. The fact that the pre-emptor is in the boundary of one of the plots of the block of the land in question is also an undisputed fact. The purchasers, therefore, have come to this Court, as already said earlier. 5. It appears from the order of reference of the learned single Judge that the question mooted before him was as to whether the general principle of lis pendens as contained in section 52 of the Transfer of property Act, which is otherwise applicable to such alienations and transfers, would also apply to cases coming within the mischief of section 16(3) of the Act. Before us also, Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh on the first day of the hearing had made long arguments in support of his contention that the Ceiling Act, being a special statute, must be considered to be a self-contained Act. and the principles of general law unless specifically made to apply, could not be attracted to govern the rights of the parties. It may be mentioned that this Court in several decisions, although there the question as such was not raised, applied the principle of lis pendens, and notwithstanding that Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh on the second day of his argument submitted that this question being a debatable one the matter may be remanded on other question, I, however, in order to clinch the issue and avoid any further unnecessary controvercy would like to record my views. I do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. Singh in this regard. The rights of the citizens of India must be governed by the law they are governed. I do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. Singh in this regard. The rights of the citizens of India must be governed by the law they are governed. The transaction of sale of agricultural lands, the matter under Chapter V of the Ceiling Act, has been provided only for carrying out the intentions of this special law, namely, to avoid fragmentation and maintaining compactness of agricultural holdings, and not for any other purpose. Simply because a provision of preemption has been made under Chapter V of the Ceiling Act, imposing certain restrictions on future acquisition keeping in view the scheme and purpose of the Act, the principles of general laws otherwise governing the law of transfer such as the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, and the Registration Act, etc. cannot be avoided. Section 3 of the Ceiling Act, containing a non obstante provision that the provisions of this Act, shall have effect not-withstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law, custom or usage for the time being in force, or even any decree or order of any court, in my opinion, does not mean that such provisions which are not contrary or in conflict with the provisions of this Act, could also have no application altogether. The argument of Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh that unless the provisions of the general law were not specifically adopted by special mention in any local law or statue they will have no application, in my opinion, must be rejected. 6. As already said earlier, this Court has repeatedly applied the law of pre-emption in the cases of a subsequent transfer by the purchaser for considering its effect on the rights of the pre-emptor. Reference at least to three reported cases can be at once made namely, (1) Smt. Sudama Devi and others V. Rajendra Singh and others (2) Abdullah Mian V. Jodha Raut and others my own judgment) and Chandradip Singh (supra). 7. It is true that the law of pre-emption was not known in India before the advent of the Mogbul Rule, but in course of time customs of pre-emption grew up and were adopted in village communities in different forms (see Digambar Singh And Ahmad Khant XLII Indian Appeal 10 at 18). 7. It is true that the law of pre-emption was not known in India before the advent of the Mogbul Rule, but in course of time customs of pre-emption grew up and were adopted in village communities in different forms (see Digambar Singh And Ahmad Khant XLII Indian Appeal 10 at 18). However, after the Constitution the law of pre-emption was held to be invalid by the Supreme Court in the cases of Bhan Ram V. Baijnath Singh and others and Bhan Ram and others V. Kabhu Singh and others. Protection therefore has to be provided to this legislation by including it in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution to save it from being struck down as being violative of Article 19(1)(f) or the Constitution. 8. Be that as it may, the fact that the registration of the sale deeds in question in favour of third parties on 17.12.71 would date back to their execution on 27.11.77 in view of section 4 of the Registration Act. is now a well settled law a repeatedly held by this Court including in the cases of (1) Sudama devi (Supra) and (2) Chandradip Singh (Supra). The claim for right of the pre-emptor on the round of being an adjacent raiyat to the vended lands in favour of the petitioners would have clearly succeeded on this ground inasmuch as to neutralize that right, the plea of the petitioners being also adjacent raiyats to the plots/vended in their favour from before, was given up before us. Question, therefore is as to what will be the effect on the obvious right of the pre-emptor by transfer of the properties to third parties by the petitioners. 9. In the case of Ramchandra Yadav v. Anutha Yadav and others Court considered three situations of subsequent transfers by a purchasers namely (1) second purchaser taking a document executed and registered before the filling of the application. In such a case the second transferee gets a good title to the property and there is no question of his right being defeated by a subsequent application for pre-emption; (2) second case deed being executed and registered after the filing of the application for pre-emption. In such a case the second transfer is clearly hit by the doctrine of lis pendens; and (3) document of sale being executed before the filing of the application for pre-emption, but registered after its tiling. In such a case the second transfer is clearly hit by the doctrine of lis pendens; and (3) document of sale being executed before the filing of the application for pre-emption, but registered after its tiling. In such a eases also the application for pre-emption would fail on account of the fact of registration of the document dating back to the date of execution of the deed. The instant Cases, however, are not covered by say of the above situations inasmuch as here the execution of the sale deeds in favour of the third parties was done on the very date of the application for pre-emption. I sitting singly was faced with exactly a similar situation in the case of Mir Rafique vs. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar & others where after consideration of the authorities. On the point I held that in such a case it was not possible to decide the question of priority of either the execution of the sale deed or the making of the application for pre-emption in point of time and, therefore, it must be assumed that both the events took place simultaneously and stood on equal footing. Mr. Singh could not indicate any reason to take a different view in such a situation. He had to concede that it would be very difficult to find any way out to reach to a conclusion regarding priorities. In that view or the matter, the rule or lis pendens would not apply to such a case as the transaction was made before the lis (application for pre- emption) would have started its operation to attract this doctrine, The only ground on which the transfer by a purchaser in favour of third parties could be defeated was to establish that the subsequent transfer was either farzi or a sham transaction. Undisputedly the burden to prove this fact would lie on the bead or the person who makes out such a case (see Chandradip Singh, case-supra), and as already seen this was the stand of the pre-emptor also vide his objection petition (Annexure 13). Except making this assertion in his rejoinder objecting to the prayer of the subsequent transferees to be impleaded as parties to the proceedings no effort wall made by him to prove his stand. Except making this assertion in his rejoinder objecting to the prayer of the subsequent transferees to be impleaded as parties to the proceedings no effort wall made by him to prove his stand. No material was brought to our notice to allow that the Deputy Collector refused to take any evidence by the pre-emptor on this question. It was, however, argued before us on the basis of some authorities of this Court where this Court had remitted the matter to the first court for deciding such a question in presence of the subsequent transferees. But the situations in all those cases were different. Firstly they were cases where the transfers were made subsequent to the date of the filing of the pre-emption application and the argument was that the sole intention for three transfers was to defeat the claim of the pro-emptor, or where the question was decided in the absence of the subsequent transferees and where it was held that such a question must be decided in presence of those transferees in order to bind them. In Mir Rafique,s case (supra), I, however, deriving support from the case of Bishan Singh vs. Khezan Singh took a view that the law of pre-emption engrafted in section 16(3) was a right still weaker in nature than the customary law of pre-emption, and the application of the pre-emptor must fail if the purchaser and the pre-emptor have equal rights, since the weaker right must give way to the right acquired by the vendee. The right of a pre-emptor is a mere right to the offer of a thing about to be sold and such a right is called secondary right or remedial right to follow the thing sold. In these cases, therefore, it is not possible to hold that a different principle or standard should be applied as the present facts and circumstances are very much similar to those of Mir Rafique,s case (supra). The only exception to this principle can be a case where a subsequent transfer is either a sham or a farzi deed because in that event the subsequent transferee has got no independent status and does not acquire any legal rights. 10. The only exception to this principle can be a case where a subsequent transfer is either a sham or a farzi deed because in that event the subsequent transferee has got no independent status and does not acquire any legal rights. 10. Before parting with these cases, however, I may mention that at one stage the learned counsel for the pre-emptor submitted that the question of 'farzi' should be decided in presence of the purchasers and, therefore, the matter should be remanded back to the first court for re-determination of the question of ‘farzi’ and disposing of the petition (Annexure 12) in presence of the subsequent purchasers, this contention has lost its significance in view of the fact that the pre-emptor led no evidence in support of this plea, save and except making one sentence rejoinder in his application (Annexure 13) and therefore, never intended to discharge his burden. In that view of the matter the Deputy Collector could not have taken any other view than to observe in his order that the subsequent transactions were not farzi in nature, which has also been confirmed in appeal. Since this finding is in. favour of the subsequent transferees, their absence was not material as no prejudice can be said to be caused to them in view of this conclusion. Of course, if a contrary finding would have been recorded, then that could not have been done, without bringing them on the record, and in that event I might have thought to remit the matter back to the Deputy Collector for re-examining this question in presence of the parties including the subsequent transferees. The pre-emptor, therefore, cannot be heard to say now for a remand. 11. All the three applications, therefore, must succeed and the orders of the Board of Revenue be quashed. I would accordingly allow the applications and quash the orders of the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, contained in Annexure 4', but, in the circumstances, shall make no order as to costs. S. Shamsul Hasan, J :- I am entirely in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by my learned Brother. I, however, wish to add a few words of mine. The question of application of the rule of lis pendens has already been settled by several decisions which have been referred to by my learned Brother and the point, in my view, is no longer res integra. I, however, wish to add a few words of mine. The question of application of the rule of lis pendens has already been settled by several decisions which have been referred to by my learned Brother and the point, in my view, is no longer res integra. The submission of Mr. Balbhadra Prasad Singh that the Bihar land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus land) Act, 1961, (in short 'the Act') being a self-contained Act, precludes the application of general law is entirely untenable. Section 16(8) of the Act, introduces the principle of pre-emption but it relates to the sale and transfer conducted under the Transfer of Property Act, and the Registration Act, and, therefore, the restrictions imposed or the rights created by the enactment 'in question certainly affects any transaction under section 16(3) and that will include the applicability of the law of lis pendense. In my view, the whole question in this case is, however, academic, since it is a common ground that the transferee was also boundary raiyat of the transferred land. The pre-emptor has no right to pre-empt such a transferee. It may be that the point was not canvassed before the last Court or hi this Court but the Courts of fact have stated this fact as correct and this point was raised before those Courts. Learned junior counsel appearing for the petitioners stated that this point was actually raised before the Board also. Be that as it may, the pre-emptor does not acquire any right in the circumstances of this case. Applications allowed.