Order: 1. The tenant is the petitioner in this civil revision petition directed against the order of eviction passed by the authorities below on an application filed in H.R.O. No. 96 of 1981, Rent Controller's Court; Tirupat-tur by the 1st respondent herein under sections 10 (2) (i) and 10 (2) (ii) (e) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1963 (as amended by Act 23 of 1973) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). According to the case of the 1st respondent, he along with his brother and sister are the owners of the property in the occupation of the petitioner and the petitioner and entered into on agreement of tenancy with the 1st respondent agreeing to pay rest at the rate of Rs. 70/- per month. The 1st respondent stated that the petitioner had committed wilful default in the payment of rents from June, 1981 onwards. Further the petitioner, according to the 1st respondent, had without the consent in writing of the 1st respondent, sublet the property let out to him to the 2n d respondent herein for running a typewriting institute. A notice was sent to the petitioner bringing to his notice wilful default as well as the subletting and demanding vacant possession but the petitioner did not send any reply at all. It was under these circumstances that the first respondent prayed for an order of eviction. 2. In his counter, the petitioner resisted the application on the ground that the 1st respondent alone was not competent to maintain the application for eviction, that the tenancy commenced under the father of the 1st respondent and after his death, the rents had been paid to the first respondent regularly, that there was no wilful default in the payment of the rents, that if at all the rents had remained unpaid from 1st November, 1981 and even in respect of that, when the rents were tendered against a demand for receipt’ there was a refusal to issue receipt and therefore, the rent from 1st November, 1981 onwards upto 31st May, 1982 was deposited into court on 29th June, 1982 and that the subletting was not true and therefore the eviction petition should be dismissed. 3. Before, the Rent Controller (District Munsif, Tirupattur) on behalf of the 1st respondent Exs. A-1 to A-6 were marked and the 1st respondent and another were examined as P.Ws. 3. Before, the Rent Controller (District Munsif, Tirupattur) on behalf of the 1st respondent Exs. A-1 to A-6 were marked and the 1st respondent and another were examined as P.Ws. 1 and P.W. 2, while, on behalf of the petitioner, Exs. B-1 to B-4 were filed and the petitioner and another were examined as R.W.1 and R.W.2. On a consi-deration of the oral as well as the documentary evidence, the learned Rent Controller found that the petitioner had committed wilful default in the payment of the rents from June 1981 as claimed by the 1st respondent and that the petitioner had also sublet the premises in his occupation in favour of the 2nd respondent without the consent in writing of the 1st respondent. On the conclusions, the order for eviction was passed against the petitioner. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner preferred an appeal in R.C.A. No. 13 of 1983 before the appellate authority (Sub-Court, Tiruppatur) on an exhaustive reconsideration of the case of the petitioner as well as the 1st respondent on the basis of the evidence let in is that behalf, the appellate authority upheld the conclusions of the Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this civil revision petition. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner first contended that the authorities below had not adverted to the objection raised by the petitioner regarding the maintainability of the application for eviction and that would vitiate the order. According to the learned counsel, even as per the case of the 1st respondent. In his application for eviction, his brother and sister were co-owners of the property tenanted in favour of the petitioner and since they have not joined in the application for eviction, it would not be open to the 1st respondent alone as one of the co-owners to institute proceedings seeking an order for eviction. Reliance in this connection was also placed by the learned counsel upon the decision in A. Alagiyanathan v. N. Swaminatha Pillai1 On the other hand, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that the petitioner had admitted the payment of rents by him to the 1st respondent and it would therefore be not open to the petitioner to urge that the non-joining of the brother and the sister of the 1st respondent in the applications for eviction would be fata¡ to its maintainability. The learned counsel for the 1st respondeat relied upon Exhibits B-3 and B-4 and the evidence of R.W. 1 to contend that rents had been paid by the petitioner to the 1st respondent. 5. Though in paragraph 3 of the counter filed in opposition to the application for eviction the petitioner had raised an objection that the 1st respondent alone is not competent to maintain the application for eviction, such an objection does not appear to have been persisted in by the petitioner during the course of the proceedings before the authorities below. Indeed, a perusal of the order of the Rent Controller does rot show that one of the points in controversy between the parties was in relation to the maintainability of the application for eviction, in the absence of a specific point for decision in that regard, the matter had not been naturally investigated by the Rent Controller. When the matter came up before the appellate authority, at least, one could have expected the petitioner to draw its attention on the omission by the Rent Controller to consider this aspect of the matter. Even here, it is seen from the grounds of appeal filed by the petitioner before the appellate authority that there is no whisper about the maintainability of the application for eviction filed by the 1st respondent herein on the ground stated by the petitioner in his counter and there was therefore no occasion even for the appellate authority to go into this question. In the memorandum of civil revision petition since the objection regarding the maintainability of the application for eviction has not been specifically raised the learned counsel for the petitioner was frank to concede this. Even so, the objection regarding the maintainability of the application for eviction being a basic or fundamental one. can be considered with reference to the facts and the circumstances of the case. Even according to the petitioner as per his stand in paragrah 4 of the counter filed by him in the application for eviction, his tenancy commenced under the father of the 1st respondent 15 years back and that after his death, the rents had been paid by the petitioner to the 1st respondent. Even according to the petitioner as per his stand in paragrah 4 of the counter filed by him in the application for eviction, his tenancy commenced under the father of the 1st respondent 15 years back and that after his death, the rents had been paid by the petitioner to the 1st respondent. Exhibits B-3 and B-4 are the receipts dated 1st April, 1978 and 1st June, 1979 respectively admittedly issued by the 1st respondent in favoar of the petitioner in respect of the rents paid by him for months of March and May, 1979. These receipts clearly establish the payment of rent by the petitioner to the 1st respondent, In the course of his chief-examination, the petitioner, examined as R.W. 1 has admitted that the rent receipts are Exhibits B-3 and B-4. A consideration of Exhibits B-3 and B-4 in the light of the evidence of R.W.1 and the fact that the 1st respondent is the person who has been receiving or is entitled to receive the rent with reference to the building in the occupation of the petitioner and would therefore be himself a “landlord” within the meaning of section 2 (6) of the Act the objection raised by the petitioner that the brother and the sister of the 1st respondent should also have joined in the application for eviction, therefore, lacks substance. 6. Even assuming that the 1st respondent was only one of three co-owners of the building it in the occupation of the petitioner, he had been receiving the rents and also entitled to receive the rents not only on his behalf, but also on behalf of the other co-owners as well and would, therefore, be a landlord under section 2 (6) of the Act. Apart from this, a co-owner is as such an owner of the entire property as any owner of a property is. In Sri Ram Pasrichav. Jagannath and others1 the Supreme Court had occasion to consider whether a co-owner would be the owner within the meaning of section 13 (1) (f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The Supreme Court pointed out that jurisprudentially it is incorrect to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner as such co-owner owns every part of the composite property along with others and he cannot be said to be a part owner or a fractional owner of the property. The Supreme Court pointed out that jurisprudentially it is incorrect to say that a co-owner of a property is not its owner as such co-owner owns every part of the composite property along with others and he cannot be said to be a part owner or a fractional owner of the property. It was further laid down that there will be a change in the position only when a partition takes place and therefore, person who is land-lord and co-owner of the premises would be within the meaning of the expression ‘owner’ occurring in section 13(1) (f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and it is unnecessary for the co-owner to establish that he is the only owner of the property so long as he is a co-owner and had been acknowledged as the landlord. To similar effect is the decision of the supreme Court in Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak and others2. In that case, the question arose whether with reference to the proceedings initiated under section 14 (4) of the Delhi Rent Control Act 59 of 1958, it would be necessary to implead the other co-heirs as landlords and whether the omission to do so will be fatal to the application itself. After referring to the decision in Sri Ram Pasricha v.Jagannath and others1 the Supreme Court observed hat the law had been put beyond doubt in that decision and that the absence of the other co-owners on record would not disentitle one of the co-owners from suing for eviction. In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court which clearly laid down that the presence of the other co-owners is unnecessary, the objection in that regard raised by the petitioner cannot be countenanced at a1l. That leaves for consideration the decision in Alagiyanathan v. M. Swaminatha Pillai3 relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In that case, on facts it was found that the respondent and his brother were living separately and had been independently collecting the rents and a suit for partition was also pending between the co-owners. It was also further found that possession of the building was not sought on behalf of all the co-owners but only for his personal benefit. It was under those circumstances that it was held that application for eviction filed by one co-owner without refer-ence to the others was held to be not maintainable. It was also further found that possession of the building was not sought on behalf of all the co-owners but only for his personal benefit. It was under those circumstances that it was held that application for eviction filed by one co-owner without refer-ence to the others was held to be not maintainable. In view of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court referred to earlier, the. applicability of the decision in A. Alagiyanothan v. M. Swaminatha Pillai3 should be confined to its facts and cannot be made applicable to a case like this where the relationship of landlord and tenant is clearly made out between only the 1st respondent and the petitioner. Thus, the objection regarding the maintainability of the application has no substance at all and has to be rejected. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the authorities below have erroneously concluded that the petitioner had; committed wilful default in the payment of rents: but this contention cannot be accepted. The application for eviction had been preceded by a notice addressed to the petitioner as well as the 2nd respondent that has been marked as Ex. A-1. In paragraph 2 of Ex. A-l, the 1st respondent has clearly stated that the petitioner had failed and defaulted to pay the rent at the rate of Rs. 70/- p.m. from June, 1981 onwards. Ex A-l had been served on the petitioner under Ex. A-2. If, in fact, the petitioner had paid the rents for the period in question, one would have expected him to immediately send reply to Ex. A-1 to the effect that the rents had been paid. No reply at all has been sent to Ex. A-1 and this clearly establishes that the petitioner had not paid the rents as a matter of fact. Besides, the case of the petitioner that there was a refusal to issue receipts and that led to the non-payment of the rent appears to be unacceptable. Exs. No reply at all has been sent to Ex. A-1 and this clearly establishes that the petitioner had not paid the rents as a matter of fact. Besides, the case of the petitioner that there was a refusal to issue receipts and that led to the non-payment of the rent appears to be unacceptable. Exs. B-3 and B-4 clearly show that whenever rents are paid by the petitioner to the 1st respondent, receipts had been issued and the issue of receipts had also been admitted by the petitioner in his evidence as R.W. 1 In addition, R.W. 1 would state that the rents for the premises had been paid from the funds of a political party but such payment had not been proved by the production of any account. 11 is thus manifest that the case of the petitioner that the rents from June. 1981 upto 31st October, 1981 had been paid cannot be accepted. If, as the petitioner would have it, there was a tender of the rent by the petitioner for the period in question and a wrongful refusal on the part of the 1st respondent to receive the rents so tendered, then the petitioner should have issued a notice to the 1st respondent or at least taken the necessary steps to protect his rights as a tenant without being exposed to the risk of eviction. No such notice was issued, nor steps had been taken by the petitioner to countenance the wrongful refusal alleged against and attributed to the 1st respondent. Besides, the conduct of the petitioner in depositing a lump sum of Rs. 500 only on 29th June, 1982 for a period of about 7 months also indicates that the petitioner had not been regular in the payment of the rents. Indeed, there is no satisfactory or acceptable explanation at all on the part of the petitioner for his omission to pay the rent periodically as at?d when such rents fell due. More than anything else in this case, a notice had also been issued to the petitioner drawing his attention to the non-payment of the rent from June, 1981 onwards and the inaction on the part of the petitioner clearly establishes supine indifference on his part in the payment of rents. The authorities below were therefore quite justified in concluding that the petitioner had committed willful default in the payment of the rents. 8. The authorities below were therefore quite justified in concluding that the petitioner had committed willful default in the payment of the rents. 8. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the subletting of the premises by the petitioner in favour of the 2nd respondent without the consent in writing of the 1st respondent has not been established. Here again, having regard to the materials available, the contention has to be rejected. There is no dispute that in the premises in the occupation of the petitioner there is a typewriting institute. R.W.1, in the course of the chief examination and cross-examination would admit that Saravana Typewriting Institute is housed in the premises and the licence for this stands in the name of the wife of the 2nd respondent. He would also further admit that no permission was obtained. Thus, on the admission of R.W. 1, a clear case of subletting is established. Besides, it is seen from Explanations A-4 and A-5 that a decree had been obtained by Mini Finance Corporation against the 2nd respondent herein, and others in Small Cause Number 17 of 1981 D.M.C. Tirupathur on 10th December, 1981 for a sum of Rs. 126-50 and the typewriter in the institute run by the 2nd respondent was directed to be attached in execution of the decree. The attachment of the typewriter belonging to the 2nd respondent in the premises tenanted to the petitioner clearly shows that the 2nd respondent was in occupation of the premises for purposes, of running a typewriting institute even as admitted by R.W.1. The existence of the name board of the typewriting institute and the admission of the petitioner as R.W. 1 to the effect that the licence for the institute stands in the name of the wife of the 2nd respondent and the attachment proceedings under Exhibit A-5 clearly establish that the promises let out to the petitioner was under the occupation of the 2nd respondent herein for the purpose of running a typewriting institute in the name of his wife. It is not the case of the petitioner that be had obtained the consent of the 1st respondent in writing to so part with the possession of the premises in favour of the 2nd respondent for running the institute. Under those circumstances, clearly a case of sub letting has been established in this case. It is not the case of the petitioner that be had obtained the consent of the 1st respondent in writing to so part with the possession of the premises in favour of the 2nd respondent for running the institute. Under those circumstances, clearly a case of sub letting has been established in this case. On a careful consideration of the evidence, the authorities below have concurrently found, as a fact, that the petitioner had committed wilful default in the payment of rents from June 1981 onwards and that he had also without the consent in writing of the 1st respondent sublet the premises to the 2nd respondent. Those conclusions of fact are amply supported by the materials on record and as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Sri Rajalakshmi Dyeing Works and others v. Ramaswamy Chettiar Sri Rajalakshmi Dyeing Works and others v. Ramaswamy Chettiar (1980) 2 R.C.J. 165:A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1253concurrent findings of fact supported by evidence ought not to be interfered with in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under section 25 of the Act. All the sumissions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner having failed, this civil revision petition is dismissed with costs. Ratnam. J --- The learned counsel for the petitioner praya that the petitioner may be granted some time to vacate and band over vacant possession of the premises in his occupation to the first respondent and the learned counsel for the first respondent agrees to give three months’ time for that purpose. Besides, the learned counsel for the first respondent also brings to the notice of the Court that the petitioner is in arrears of rent to the tune of Rs. 970, and prays that suitable safeguards must be made in regard to such arrears. Taking this late account, the petitioner is granted three months’ time from today to vacate and band over vacant possession of the premises to the first respondent, subject to the condition the petitioner pays to the first respondent or deposits to the credit of R.C.O.P. No. 96 of 1981, Rent Controller's Court, Tirupathur the sum of Rs. 970 within two weeks from this day and also files an affidavit undertaking that he would vacate at the end of three months, time before this Court within the same time. 970 within two weeks from this day and also files an affidavit undertaking that he would vacate at the end of three months, time before this Court within the same time. If the petitioner fails to comply with any one of these conditions, the order of eviction can be put into execution forthwith. Petition dismissed.