A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) WHAT should weigh with the court while granting or refusing interim relief ? Should the court be oblivious of the objectives of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 ? Is it not obligatory upon the court to see that the implementation of the under-lying policy of the Act which is in conformity with the constitutional objectives and the goals sought to be achieved through planned economic development is not frustrated on account of interim relief that may be granted by the court ? By an interim order such an irreversible situation can be allowed to be created that the vacant land may never become available to the Government and the entire provisions of the Act may become meaningless ? Should an interim order of the court become an instrument of perpetration of fraud and deceit upon the unwary members of the public ? These are some of the questions which have arisen in this application requesting to vacate ad interim relief granted earlier by the court. ( 2 ) THE Petitioner No. 2 (a) and 2 (b) are the land-owners of the land admeasuring 12 286 sq. mtrs. situated in Memnagar locality of city of Ahmedabad. The land is within the urban agglomeration area of city of Ahmedabad. The petitioners applied for permission to construct dwelling units for the weaker sections of the society under the provisions of Section 21 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 (the Act for short) and the petitioners were granted that permission on September 1 1982 The permission is produced at Annexure A to the petition. Thereafter by order dated April 29 1983 the Government issued an injunction order directing the petitioners to maintain status quo with regard to the land on the ground that the order by which the permission has been granted was contrary to the provisions of law and hence it was required to be taken in revision under Section 34 of the Act. It has been mentioned in that order that the date and time of hearing will be separately intimated. It has been mentioned in that order that the date and time of hearing will be separately intimated. Even before the show cause notice calling upon the petitioners to explain the reasons and fixing the date of hearing has been issued and served upon the petitioners the petitioners have approached this Court by way of Special Civil Application No. 931 of 1984 and have inter alia prayed that the injunction order produced at Annexure B be quashed and set aside and the Government be restrained from initiating and/or proceeding further with the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act. The petitioners prayed for interim relief also. This Court (Coram: N. H. Bhatt J.) has passed the following order on February 15 1984 rule. To be heard with Spl. C. A. 224/83. Ad interim relief to this effect that the impugned orders are stayed but further constructions if any shall be done subject to the result of this petition. Thereafter the Government filed (Civil Application No. 4330 of 1984 and prayed that the ad interim relief granted by this Court be vacated. ( 3 ) TODAY the counsel for the petitioners has submitted an application for amendment of the petition. I see no reason why the amendment application should not be allowed and hence the amendment is ordered to be granted. ( 4 ) COUNSEL for the petitioners submitted that the Government has still not filed affidavit-in-reply and therefore there is nothing to show that the averments made in the petition have been controverted and hence the ad interim relief granted by this Court earlier should be made absolute. Whether to confirm or not the ad interim relief could also be decided on the basis of the averments made in the petition and also on the basis of other facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore simply because the affidavit-in-reply has not been filed it is no ground that the hearing should not be made and the ad interim relief granted earlier should be confirmed. ( 5 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5580 of 1982 decided on March 26 1984 and Special Civil Applications Nos. 5603 and 5604 of 1983 decided on April 9 and 10 1984 I had an occasion to determine the scope and amplitude of the powers of the Government under Section 34 of the Act. ( 5 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5580 of 1982 decided on March 26 1984 and Special Civil Applications Nos. 5603 and 5604 of 1983 decided on April 9 and 10 1984 I had an occasion to determine the scope and amplitude of the powers of the Government under Section 34 of the Act. Therein I have inter alia observed as follows: The argument based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Raghav Nathas Case (supra) has been dealt with by me while deciding a similar question which arose in Special Civil Application No. 5580 of 1982 decided on March 26 1984 Therein while considering the restrictions on the power of the Government from the point of view of the time element I have referred to the following decisions of the Supreme Court and that of Kerala High Court: 1 State of U. P. v. L. J. Johnson AIR 1983 SC 1303 (=1983 GLH 1099) 2 S. P. Gupta and Others v. President of India and Others AIR 1982 SC 149 . 3 Swastic Oil Mills v. H. B. Munshi AIR 1968 SC 843 4 A. Pillai v. State AIR 1972 Kerala 39. (A decision of the Full Bench of Kerala High Court rendered by Mathew J. as he then was ). After considering the aforesaid decisions and after considering the relevant provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code as well as the provisions of `the Act and the provisions of the Limitation Act I have observed as follows: Just in Swastic Mills Case (supra) as the Supreme Court refused to read any period of limitation it is possible to say that having regard to the Scheme and the object of the Act no period of limitation can be read in Section 34 of the Act. It may be noted that the Government exercises its power under Section 34. The Government seeks to fulfil its obligation towards society. The State or the Government is not an interested party to take excess land from the individual. The interest of the Government is to see that the objects of the Act namely the prevention of concentration of urban land in few hands and prevention of speculation and profiteering in the land be achieved so that the land is equitably distributed to all. The interest of the Government is to see that the objects of the Act namely the prevention of concentration of urban land in few hands and prevention of speculation and profiteering in the land be achieved so that the land is equitably distributed to all. The Government cannot be absolved from its obligation towards society because some officers of the Government are negligent and/or indolent and do not take action in time. In such cases the principle underlying Section 10 of the Limitation Act can very well be applied. Section 10 of the Limitation Act grants a total exemption from the bar of limitation in regard to the suits mentioned therein. The reason behind the Section is that an express trust ought not to suffer by the misfeasance or non-feasance of a trustee. Similarly it may be stated that on account of the negligence or complacent behaviour of a Government officer the society should not be made to suffer. The land which otherwise would have vested in the Government as per the provisions of the Act should not be allowed to be used by an individual on account of technical pleas of limitation. From the aforesaid discussion and having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in Swastik Mills Case (supra) the limitations which can be read on the powers of the Government will be as follows:1 Is the revising authority trenching upon the powers which are expressly reserved by the Act or Rules to other authority ? If so it would be beyond the powers of the revising authority. 2 Is the revising authority ignoring the limitation meaning thereby inherent constraints in the exercise of these powers ? No such inherent limitation is pointed out in this case. However time element be considered from the stand point of reasonable and/or genuine exercise of power. Having regard to the aforesaid decisions rendered by me it is clear that the scope of the powers of the Government under Section 34 of the Act is very wide and it cannot be said that the principles laid down in Raghav Nathas Case are such that they would automatically apply to the facts and circumstances of each and every case taken under Section 34 of the Act. ( 6 ) COUNSEL for the petitioners submitted that having regard to the object of the Act underlying the provisions of Section 21 of the Act the executive action granting the permission should be viewed in the context of the constitutional provisions enshrined in Article 39 (b) of the Constitution of India. The provisions of Section 21 of the Act require that the dwelling units should be constructed having the plinth area of 80 sq. mtrs. and the members who may occupy the tenements should be belonging to weaker section of the society. Once these conditions are fulfilled it should be presumed that the provisions of the Constitution under Article 39 (b) are enhanced and advanced by the order that has been passed by the Government. True ordinarily this will be presumption in favour of an order passed under Section 21 of the Act provided the order passed is lawful and not contrary to facts. Here at this stage it is not to be decided whether the order is in conformity with the provisions of the Act or not and whether it enhances the constitutional provisions or not. At this stage the question is whether the Government should be allowed to proceed further in revision under Section 34 of the Act and should be permitted to examine the legality of the action i. e. the order passed under Section 21 of the Act. ( 7 ) HERE reference may also be made to the provisions of Article 39 (c) of the Constitution. Article 39 (c) provides that the operation of the economic system should not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. Provisions of Article 38 (1) should not be lost sight of which provides that the State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice social economic and political shall inform all the institutions of the national life. The Preamble of the Constitution also shows that the object set forth by the nation is to establish a socialist society based on the egalitarian principles. The Urban Land Ceiling Act aims to control the ownership and distribution of the scarce resources of the country. The Preamble of the Constitution also shows that the object set forth by the nation is to establish a socialist society based on the egalitarian principles. The Urban Land Ceiling Act aims to control the ownership and distribution of the scarce resources of the country. The court can take judicial notice of the fact that the country has embarked upon a programme of economic development based on the planned development of the society. Planning means that so far as the decisions with regard to savings and investment are concerned both shall be controlleed and guided by a centralised authority. Savings and investment decision should not be left in the hands of private individuals and that is the essence of economic planning. Once this is recognised in the context of constitutional provisions and once this ideology behind the planned economic development is kept in view no private individual can be permitted to distribute the social goods as he likes. The investment decision as well as the decision to distribute the same should rest with the Government in the sphere where the Government is legitimately permitted by the legislature to take actions. ( 8 ) IN the sphere of urban land the Government has been permitted by the Legislature to take action. It is on the contrary the duty of the Government and even that of the courts to see that the policy enshrined in the Act is implemented. The policy is to see that the vacant land in urban agglomeration areas is placed at the disposal of the Government. Land is a scarce commodity. The decision as to the distribution of the excess vacant land is sought to be centralised. Such decisions cannot be permitted to be taken by private individuals. After an order granting permission under Section 21 of the Act has been passed which prima facie is found to be contrary to the record and contrary to the provisions of law it is the duty of the Government to see that the scarce resources of the country are not allowed to be distributed at the will and caprice of an individual. These resources are required to be regulated as per the provisions of the Act so that the constitutional provisions and the aims and objects of the planned economic development are achieved. ( 9 ) THEREFORE these are the questions which require to be examined by the Government. These resources are required to be regulated as per the provisions of the Act so that the constitutional provisions and the aims and objects of the planned economic development are achieved. ( 9 ) THEREFORE these are the questions which require to be examined by the Government. The Government cannot be prohibited from examining all these questions in this larger perspective simply because an officer of the Government has (presumably) erroneously passed an order in favour of a land owner. At this stage all that the Government says is that it wants to examine the case because prima facie it has been found that the permission is against the provisions of law and contrary to record. At this stage it is the duty of the court as well as the Government to keep in mind the constitutional provisions and the aims and objects of the planned economic development. Without this having been taken into consideration if the Government is restrained from initiating or proceeding further with the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act it would be doing something against the very object of the Act as well as against the object of the Constitution. ( 10 ) COUNSEL for the petitioners submitted that the Government has held out promise and relying upon the promise the petitioners have spent crores of rupees and put up construction of about 200 raw houses and out of which 125 have been occupied by the respective members and the rest of the raw houses are to be occupied within a short time. The scheme is in all for 217 houses. ( 11 ) THE argument based on promissory estoppel cannot be accepted for the following reasons:1 That the Government issued prohibitory order on April 29 1983 Thereafter as a law-abiding citizen it was incumbent upon the petitioners not to proceed with any construction. The petitioners should have made it known to the unwary members of the public mho may join the scheme of construction that the entire scheme is shrouded by a cloud on account of the orders of the Government. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioners made it known to the unwary persons of the public that the scheme was very doubtful and it may happen that the entire construction may be held to be unlawful and may have to be pulled down. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioners made it known to the unwary persons of the public that the scheme was very doubtful and it may happen that the entire construction may be held to be unlawful and may have to be pulled down. One who has not made this clear before the people and who has by suppressio veri tried to defraud the people cannot be permitted to raise plea of promissory estoppel. 2 It must be seen that the object of the Act is to see that the decision as to the distribution of the land as well as the houses rests with the Government and it does not rest with the private individuals. If the construction is allowed to proceed further an irreversible situation will arise and the decision which ought to have been taken and which should be in the hands of the Government will be forestalled and the land will be actually distributed by private individuals. 3 It was known to the petitioners as far back as April 29 1983 that there is a prohibitory order. The petitioners moved this Court on February 14 1984 and obtained ad interim relief on February 15 1984 It is made very clear in the order that the construction that may be carried on shall be subject to the result of this petition. Be it noted that on February 15 1984 the petitioner obtained only ex parte ad interim order. This order was liable to be modified vacated or confirmed during the pendency of the petition at any time. Even so there is nothing on record that the petitioners have made it known to the unwary persons that on the basis of the ex parte ad interim order they were going ahead with the construction. If the petitioners have proceeded further on the basis of the ex parte ad interim order which was liable to be modified varied or vacated at any time during the pendency of the petition they have taken the risk with open eyes knowing fully well that the construction that was being carried on was not perfectly legal and valid. Even in such situation if the petitioners take risk they cannot be permitted to raise the plea of promissory estoppel. Moreover there is no estoppel against the law. Even in such situation if the petitioners take risk they cannot be permitted to raise the plea of promissory estoppel. Moreover there is no estoppel against the law. 4 In this connection it may also be noted that order passed under Section 21 of the Act is a conditional order and prima facie clause 11 of the order shows that no one can be permitted to occupy the premises without obtaining the occupancy certificate from the competent authority. Even so if the petitioners take any action against the conditions of the very order under which they thought that they were entitled to carry on the construction the petitioners do the same at their own risk and cost. 5 In fact order under Section 21 of the Act cannot be considered to be a promise held out by the Government. It is an order passed by an Executive Officer of the Government. By passing such an order the Government does not hold out any promise to the people. ( 12 ) THE counsel for the petitioners submitted that Letters Patent Appeal is admitted against my judgment in Special Civil Applications Nos. 5603 and 5604 of 1983 decided on April 9 and 10 1984 During the course of argument he has made it clear that it was on account of wrong information that it is mentioned in the amendment application that the Letters Patent Appeal is admitted against the interim order passed by me. Having realised the mistake he has not advanced any argument on this basis at all. ( 13 ) THE counsel for the petitioners has submitted that if there is a decision by another Single Judge and if this Court does not agree with the same I should refer the matter to the Larger Bench for decision. In support of this proposition the counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the following decisions: AIR 1984 SC 1789 AIR 1979 SC 621 AIR 1977 SC 1177 AIR 1976 SC 844 True it is a well-settled principle of law that judicial comity demands that when there is a judgment by another Single Judge and if a Judge deciding a matter is not in agreement with the view taken by another Judge the matter should be referred to a larger Bench. But in the instant case the question is with regard to the grant or refusal of interim relief. But in the instant case the question is with regard to the grant or refusal of interim relief. As far as the grant or refusal of interim relief is concerned there is no question of any precedent to be followed. Such questions are to be decided on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each case. Moreover not a single decision rendered by this Court either of a Single Judge or that of Division Bench has been pointed out to me wherein the contrary view is taken regarding the questions which have been dealt with by me in this order. Therefore the aforesaid decisions have no application whatsoever to the facts and circumstances of the case. There being no contrary decision pointed out to me the question of referring the matter to larger Bench does not arise. ( 14 ) THE grant or refusal of temporary injunction order is governed by the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2. This provision aims at the preservation of the property in dispute. The object of the provision is to see that till the respective rights of the parties are decided the property in dispute be preserved and not allowed to be wasted alienated or be allowed to be wrongfully sold. The principles underlying the aforesaid provisions would also be applicable to the proceedings in special civil application s. The underlying object of the aforesaid principle is to see that pending the dispute status quo be maintained and the respective rights of the parties be not disturbed and further to see that the property is preserved. Status quo may be altered even by interim order in case where it is shown that the status quo on the date of initiation of the litigation has been created by unlawful means or by practising fraud or deceit or in any unjust and grossly improper manner. In such cases even by interim orders and if necessary by invoking the provisions of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure some construction may be ordered to be put up or some construction may be ordered to be demolished. But here there is no such case. On the contrary prima facie the construction that may be allowed to be put up is unlawful. At any rate it is against the very object of the Act. But here there is no such case. On the contrary prima facie the construction that may be allowed to be put up is unlawful. At any rate it is against the very object of the Act. By the orders of the Court much less by interim orders of the court complications are not to be created they are to be avoided. If the ad interim relief granted earlier is allowed to remain in operation it would create many complications and it would be against the public interest as well as against the basic object of the Act. There is no compelling reason to continue such ad interim relief. On the contrary in view of the larger public interest it should be considered imperative and obligatory by the court to vacate such ad interim relief. ( 15 ) NO other contention is raised. ( 16 ) THE ad interim relief granted earlier on February 15 1984 is ordered to be vacated. The Government is directed to proceed further with the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act and pass final order latest before December 31 1984 The petitioners are also directed to co-operate with the proceedings. It is further directed that a copy of the order that may be passed shall be placed on the record of the case and the order shall not be implemented without the permission of this court. ( 17 ) COUNSEL for the petitioners at this stage requests that the order vacating the ad interim relief be stayed for a period of seven days so as to enable the petitioners to approach the superior forum that may be available to them. In the facts and circumstances of the case the request is granted subject to the condition that the petitioners directly or indirectly or through their agents and servants shall not proceed with the further construction and shall maintain status quo as on today and the petitioners shall file an undertaking to maintain status quo for the period during which this order is kept in abeyance. Order accordingly. .