JUDGMENT : Ashwini Kumar Sinha, J.- This second appeal is by the plaintiffs against a JUDGMENT : of reversal. The suit was for declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of 16 bighas 8 kathes and 11 dhurs of land under Jamabandi no. 42 situate in mauza Khurkdanga, P. S. Maheshpur district Santhal Parganas. 2. The plaintiffs founded their title over the property in dispute on the following facts ;- Admittedly in the instant case, the parties are Santhals of Santhal Parganas. The plaintiffs' case was that the parties were governed by the customary Jaws of Santhals in. the district of Santhal Parganas. According to the plaintiffs the suit land was recorded in the name of one Somai Soren in the last survey settlement records. The plaintiffs' case was that Somai Soren got the disputed properties on a partition between him and his brothers Kundan Soren and Kanhu Soren. According to the plaintiffs' after the said partition Somai Soren came in separate possession over the properties in dispute and his separate possession was specifically recorded in the last survey settlement parcha. The plaintiffs' further case was that Somai Soren had a son named Ragda Soren and also a daughter named Dulhan Soren. According to the plaintiffs, Ragda Soren (the son) died during the life time of his father leaving behind a daughter named Sahdeya Soren. Thus, according to the plaintiffs, Ragda Soren the only son of Somai Soren predeceased his father and thus to Somai Soren only remained a daughter Dulhan Soren. 3. The plaintiffs' case further was that after the death of Ragda Soren (the only son of Somai Soren), Somai Soren married his daughter Dulhan in Agumit Ghar Jamai form of marriage with one Bhim Hembrom of village Khaksa after observing all the ceremonies and formalities of Agumit Ghar Jamai form of marriage. According to the plaintiffs after his marriage Dulhan Soren and her husband Bhim Hambrom (i.e. the son-in-law of Somai Soren) began to live in Somai Soren's house and also began to look after the properties. Somai Soren, according, to the plaintiffs, died in the year 1939, and, according to the plaintiffs, his Shradha was performed by his daughter Dulhan Soren and his son-in-law Bhima Hembrom. Somai Soren, according, to the plaintiffs, died in the year 1939, and, according to the plaintiffs, his Shradha was performed by his daughter Dulhan Soren and his son-in-law Bhima Hembrom. The plaintiffs claimed that his daughter (i. e. Somai Soren's daughter Dulhan) and the son-in-law (Bhima Hembrom) inherited all the properties of Somai Soren including the suit land in dispute and remained all along in peaceful cultivating possession of the same and were also paying its proportionate rent. 4. Plaintiffs further averred that the son-in-law (Bhima Hembrom) died in the year 1951, leaving behind three sons, who were the plaintiffs in the instant suit. 5. Further case of the plaintiffs was that after the death of Bhima Hembrom, the plaintiffs' mother (Dulhan) was possessing the suit land peacefully along with her sons. She also died in the year 1964 in the house of her father (Somai Soren) and after her death, according to the plaintiffs, they were the only legal heirs who inherited the suit properties and came in peaceful possession of the same. According to the plaintiffs, difficulties arose in payment of the proportionate rent which necessitated the plaintiffs to separate their rent from the other co-sharers, but the Pradhan of the village went in collusion with the defendants and refused to accept the rent from them. This led to the filing of a petition by the plaintiffs before the Subdivisional Officer, Pakur against the action of the Pradhan. This was registered as revenue miscellaneous case no. 137 of 1966-67, but the Sub divisional Officer rejected the petition by his ORDER :dated 7.10.1967. Subsequently in November, 1967, according to the plaintiffs, after the Sub-divisional Officer had rejected the petition filed by the plaintiffs, the defendants forcibly dispossessed the plaintiffs from the suit lands though they were still residing in the house of Somai Soren. Hence, the instant suit by the plaintiffs. 6. The suit was contested by the defendants" (other than defendants nos. 6 & 8). Their defence, besides tile general defence, was that the plaintiffs' case that Ragda Soren had predeceased his father Somai Soren was incorrect. Their main defence was that Dulhan Soren (daughter of Somai Soren) was never married in Agumit Ghar Jamai form of marriage with Bhima Hembrom. They further denied that Somai Soren had kept his daughter (Dulhan) and his son-in-law (Bhima. Hembrom) in his house. 7. Their main defence was that Dulhan Soren (daughter of Somai Soren) was never married in Agumit Ghar Jamai form of marriage with Bhima Hembrom. They further denied that Somai Soren had kept his daughter (Dulhan) and his son-in-law (Bhima. Hembrom) in his house. 7. Their further defence was that Dulhan was married in ordinary form of marriage and that she was living in the house of her husband at village Khaksa. According to the defence, Somai Soren had died much earlier than 1939, and it were' not the parents of the plaintiffs -who performed the Shradha of Somai Soren. According to the defence, Dulhan Soren, having been married in ordinary form of marriage and not in Agumit Ghar Jamal form of marriage, did not inherit the properties of Somai Soren nor had they ever come in .possession over the same nor had paid the proportionate rent. 8. According to the defence, the plaintiffs' mother (Dulhan) never came in possession of the properties in suit along with her sons (the present plaintiffs) after the death of her husband (Bhima Hembrom). The defendants also denied that the plaintiffs' mother (Dulhan) died in the house of her father Somai Soren at village Khurkdanga. The defendants' case was that the plaintiffs never came in possession over the suit land after the death of their mot her Dulhan. 9. In other words, the short case-of the defendants was that Duthan Soren having been married in ordinary form of marriage, got no right, title and interest in the suit land, and, accordingly, the plaintiffs (who are the sons of Dulhan) had no right, title and interest in the suit properties. According to the defendants, they were the rightful owners of the properties and were in possession of the same in their own right for the last thirty years and bad also acquired adverse possession over the same. According to the defendants, it were they who were paying the entire rent of the suit land. 10. The contesting defendants were the heirs of Kundan Soren and Kanhu Soren (the two other brothers of Somai Soren). According to the defendants, on the death of Ragda Soren (the son of Somai Soren) these defendants being the rightful legal heirs of Somai Soren and Ragda Soren, inherited the properties in suit and these defendants came in peaceful possession over the same. 11. According to the defendants, on the death of Ragda Soren (the son of Somai Soren) these defendants being the rightful legal heirs of Somai Soren and Ragda Soren, inherited the properties in suit and these defendants came in peaceful possession over the same. 11. It is true that these defendants admitted that the parties were governed by the Santhal customs prevalent in the district of Santhal Parganas. It is also true that the defendants did not deny the allegation of the plaintiffs that Somai Soren had got one third share in the partition with his other two brothers. They also did not deny that Somai Soren got his separate possession specifically recorded in the last survey settlement Parcha in respect of the properties that he got on partition. 12. Defendant no. 6 is nobody else other than Sahdeya (the daughter of Ragda son of Somai Soren). Her case was that Somai Soren died earlier than her father Ragda. She was married in Ghar Jamai form of marriage with one Sahle Hansda by her father Ragda Soren. According to her, Ragda Soren died about thirty years ago and she and her husband remained in joint possession of the suit land since the fife time of her father. 13. According to her (defendant no. 6), the plaintiffs' mother (Dulhan) was married in ordinary form of marriage and not in Agumit Ghar Jamai form of marriage, as alleged by the plaintiffs. Her case also is that the plaintiff or their parents never acquired any title or possession over the properties in suit. According to her, her father (Ragda Soren) out of love and affection had allowed the plaintiffs' mother (Dulhan) to occupy a portion of the house-hold land in village Khurukdanga. This defendant no. 6 claimed to have acquired title and also claimed to be in peaceful possession over the suit properties by vitue of the marriage of Ghar Jamai form by her father and claimed to pay proportionate rent of the same and to be in peaceful and uninterrupted possession over the suit land. 14. According to her, her husband Salhe Hansda and her son Budhari Hansda were necessary parties to the suit, as they were members of the joint family and in joint possession of the properties in suit with her, and, hence, according to her, the suit was fit to be dismissed. 15. Defendant no. 14. According to her, her husband Salhe Hansda and her son Budhari Hansda were necessary parties to the suit, as they were members of the joint family and in joint possession of the properties in suit with her, and, hence, according to her, the suit was fit to be dismissed. 15. Defendant no. 8 neither filed any written statement nor adduced any evidence nor cross-examined any witness. 16. The trial court decreed the suit. It disbelieved the story of defendant no. 6 that she was married in Ghar Jamai form of marriage and held that she (defendant no. 6) never came in possession of the suit land, nor she had any right, title or interest over the same. 17. However, the trial court believed the story of the plaintiffs and held that the plaintiffs' mother (Dulhan) was married in Agumit Ghar Jamai form with Bhima Hembrom and hence she succeeded to the properties of her father (Somai Soren) and came in possession thereof after his death. The trial court negatived the defence of the contesting defendants. 18. Against the JUDGMENT : and decree of the trial court, the contesting defendants (other than defendant no. 6), preferred an appeal before the court of appeal below. It is pertinent to state' here that defendant no. 6 (Sahdeya) though had put an adverse claim to the claim of the plaintiffs and had lost before the trial court, did not prefer any appeal in the court of appeal below. Thus, the contest remained between the plaintiffs and the main contesting defendants. 19. The main point for consideration, therefore, was whether Dulhan Soren (the mother of the plaintiffs) was married in Agumit Ghar Jamai form and hence, she succeeded and came in possession of the properties in suit after the death of her father Somai Soren or whether Dulhan Soren was married in the ordinary form of marriage and hence neither Dulhan Soren nor the plaintiffs, in law, got any right, title and interest in the properties left by Somai Soren. 20. The court of appeal below held that the plaintiff's mother (Dulhan Soren) was never married in Agumit Ghar Jamai form of marriage as alleged by the plaintiffs, but she was married only in the ordinary form of marriage with Bhima Hembrom. 20. The court of appeal below held that the plaintiff's mother (Dulhan Soren) was never married in Agumit Ghar Jamai form of marriage as alleged by the plaintiffs, but she was married only in the ordinary form of marriage with Bhima Hembrom. The court of appeal below also held, on the question of possession, that there was not a single chit of paper filed on behalf of the plaintiffs to show that the plaintiffs ever came in possession over the disputed land. It further held that there was no reliable evidence on the part of the plaintiffs to show that the plaintiffs ever paid the rent. Thus, the court of appeal below negatived the plaintiffs, case in its entirety. 21. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants advanced three submissions before me; firstly, that the JUDGMENT : and the decree under appeal should be interfered with by this Court and set aside as, the court of appeal below while reversing the JUDGMENT : and decree of the trial court, has not considered the reasons of the trial court and while developing this point contended (1) that the evidence of two of the witnesses adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs ( i. e. the evidence of P. Ws. 10 and 12), though considered by the trial court, were not considered by the lower appellate court; (ii) that the reasons given by the trial court in rejecting the evidence of D. Ws. 6.7, 8, and 11 were not considered by the appellate court & (iii) that the circumstances as detailed in paragraph 17 of the JUDGMENT : of the trial court Were also not considered by the lower appellate court; Secondly, that in the absence of specific denial in the written statement about the non-existence of the Agumit Ghar jamai form of marriage, whether any evidence could be looked into for deciding the matter, and, Thirly, that whether any custom or usage recognised as part of the Hindu law in force ceased to have effect after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, specially when the Santhals of Chotanagpur were governed by the customary law of Santhal Parganas. 22. 22. I take up the second submission, as advenced by learned Counsel for the appellants, first to the effect that whether any evidence could be looked into for deciding the matter in the absence of specific denial in the written statement about the non-existence of the Agumit Ghar jamai form of marriage. The plaintiffs founded their title exclusively on the averment that Dulhan Soren was married to Bhima Hembrom in Agumit Ghar jamai form of marriage. This from of marriage which is the foundation for the plaintiffs' title was pleaded in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the plaint. According to the plaintiffs, this was not specifically denied by the defendants in their written statement. Learned Counsel for the defendants-respondents drew my attention to paragraphs 11 and 12 of the written statement and showed to me that the statements made in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the plaint were specifically denied. In my opinion, this submission advanced by learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants was under a total misconception. Thus there is no substance in this submission advanced by learned Counsel for the plaintiffs. 23 Now I take up the first submission, as stated above, advanced by learned Counsel for the appellants. learned Counsel has contended that the lower appellate court was the final Court of fact and as a final court of fact, it was incumbent upon it to consider the reasons given by the trial court, specially when it was reversing the JUDGMENT : and decree of the trial court and the court of appeal below not having done so, the JUDGMENT : and the decree under appeal was not accordance with law. 24. Learned Counsel for the respective parties have taken me through the JUDGMENT :s of the trial court as well as that of the court of appeal below in detail. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants mainly relied upon as to what was stated in paragraphs 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the JUDGMENT : of the trial court and, as already stated above, by adverting on this point alone, the court of appeal below did not consider the evidence of P. Ws. 10 and 12. 25. It is no good repeating the three circumstances which the learned Counsel for the appellants placed by way of non-consideration by the court of appeal below as those three circumstances have already been stated above. 26. 10 and 12. 25. It is no good repeating the three circumstances which the learned Counsel for the appellants placed by way of non-consideration by the court of appeal below as those three circumstances have already been stated above. 26. It is well settled that if a finding of fact is recorded without any discussion of the evidence, it is no JUDGMENT : at all. The lower appellate court is the final court of fact and a very important duty is cast upon it. It is for this court to decide finally the questions of fact on which the disposal of the suit might depend. On a perusal of the JUDGMENT : of the lower appellate court, it would appear that it made an honest endeavour to make a proper appraisement of the merit of the case, put forward by the parties. In a case of reversal, it is all the more important for the court of appeal below to consider the evidence and also the reasonings of the trial court and only thereafter to give its own reasons for not agreeing with the findings of the trial court. A perusal of the JUDGMENT : must show that the lower appellant court, has applied its mind independently to the evidence on the record. 27. It is also well settled that mere non-consideration of the reasons given by the trial court in a JUDGMENT : of reversal is not enough for interference by the High Court in appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. What has to be seen is whether tile lower appellate court has failed to consider any material evidence, and if it has, then in that case finding is not binding on the High Court. If the finding arrived at by the lower appellate court is sustainable on the reasonings given by it, in that case the finding cannot be interfered with in second appeal. 28. With the aforesaid settled principle of law it has to be seen whether the findings of fact arrived at by the lower appellate court are such findings which can be interferred with. 29. As already stated above, learned Counsel for the respective parties took me through the JUDGMENT :s of the trial court and the lower appellate court in detail. With the aforesaid settled principle of law it has to be seen whether the findings of fact arrived at by the lower appellate court are such findings which can be interferred with. 29. As already stated above, learned Counsel for the respective parties took me through the JUDGMENT :s of the trial court and the lower appellate court in detail. I have gone through JUDGMENT : of the court of appeal below as a whole and find that though it is true that the evidences of P.Ws. 10 and 12 have not been considered by the court of appeal below, yet the JUDGMENT : under appeal does not suffer of any infirmity, whatsoever, as it deals with the evidences of other P.Ws. (except the formal P. Ws.) and, in my opinion, there was no relevancy in dealing with the evidences of P. Ws. 10 and 12 in view of the fact that one of the plaintiffs himself (P. W. 11 Baresh Hembrom) stated that he did not inherit any land in his Nanihal; rather he cultivated and was in possession of the lands of his own grand -father. This plaintiff, has further stated and that, too; in his examination-in-chief itself that his father (Bhima Hembrom) lived not only in village Kurukdanga, but also in village Khaksa. The plaintiffs themselves demolished their own case, In that view of the matter the non-consideration of the evidence of P. Ws. 10 and 12, as considered by the trial court, is of no significance, whatsover. As the learned Counsel for the parties have taken me through the JUDGMENT : under appeal as a whole, I find from the well considered JUDGMENT : of the court of appeal below, that the witnesses adduced by the plaintiffs themselves did not support the case of the plaintiffs (as dealt with by the court of appeal below). The evidence of the witnesses adduced by the plaintiffs showed that the plaintiff's father Bhima Hembrom was already married before in the ordinary form of marriage with Dulhan and it was only subsequently that he was married Agumit Ghar jamai form of marriage. 30. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants has conceded that if there was an earlier marriage in the ordinary form of marriage, then one, amongst the Santhals tribes, could not inherit the properties left by the father-in-law. 30. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants has conceded that if there was an earlier marriage in the ordinary form of marriage, then one, amongst the Santhals tribes, could not inherit the properties left by the father-in-law. In other words, if already married in ordinary form of marriage, that earlier marriage could not be converted into Agumit Gharjamai form of marriage subsequently. 31. The contesting defendants had urged in the courts below that there: was nothing like Agumit Ghar jamai form of marriage in the Santhal customs and the word 'Agumit Ghar-jamai form' was a coinage by the plaintiffs themselves in ORDER :to lay a false claim over the properties in suit, which, according to the contesting defendants, exclusively belonged to them as legal heirs of their brother-the recorded tenant Somai Soren. The inheritance to properties, so far as Santhal tribes are concerned, is dealt with in the Final Report on the "Revision Survey & Settlement Operation in the District of Santhal Paraganas by Mr. J.F. Gantzer, Settlement Officer, 1922-35". This book has been taken as authentic book on the customs prevalent amongst Santhals in the district of Santhal Paraganas and it has been also relied upon in the case of Kandan Soren & others v. Jitan Hembrom (A.I.R. 1973 Patna 206) Wherein the law of inheritance amongst the Santhal tribes, as reported in the official report of the aforesaid Mr. J. F. Gantzer, has been quoted in extenso in paragraph 7 of the decision, and it is pertinent to quote again hereunder :- "In the Final Report on the Revision Survey and. Settlement Operations in the District of Santhal Parganas 1922-35 by J. F. Gantzer, the Santhal Tribal law of inheritance has been stated as follows :- . "According to the Santhal Tribal law, only males can inherit land, Sons jointly succeed their father. If brothers are co-sharers in a holding and one brother dies without issue, the surviving brothers and sons of pre-deceased brothers inherit this share per stirpes. The Hindu or Mohammedan laws of succession do not apply to Santals. Santal tribal Jaws quit~ definite in not allowing females to inherit, but this law is gradually undergoing a change and the situation. created by this change is discussed in a separate paragraph below. The Hindu or Mohammedan laws of succession do not apply to Santals. Santal tribal Jaws quit~ definite in not allowing females to inherit, but this law is gradually undergoing a change and the situation. created by this change is discussed in a separate paragraph below. According to tribal custom, it is permissible for a man with daughters and no sons to take a son-in-law into his house as ghar-jamai and to give him thereby all the rights of a son. The adoption of a ghar-jamai is a formal proceeding leaving no room for doubt as to the father-in-law's intention and resulting in the ghar-jamai cutting off all connection with his own family as far as his rights to property are concerned, and becoming to all intents and purposes the son of his father-in-law. When such adoption has been formally made, the ghar-jamai can succeed as a son and oust other male relatives. It is of importance to note that a ghar-jamai can be adopted only by a deliberate public act in the presence of the village community at the time of the marriage, and that according to tribal law a father-in-law cannot at a later stage convert an ordinary son-in-law into a ghar-jamai. A widow cannot in any circumstances create a ghar-jamai. There is a distinction between a ghar-jamai and a ghardi-jamao In both cases the bridal party goes from the bride's house to fetch the prospective husband and no dowry (pon) is given, but whereas the ghar-jamai is adopted permanently as a son, ghardi-jamai merely Jives and labours in his wife's home for a previously stipulated period which may extend up to five years. He thereby works off the debt due on account of the non-payment of pon. A ghardi-Jamai is not entitled to get anything from his wife's family but the woman herself is usually. given a small present (arpa) annually at the harvest season, and this is utilised for setting up her new home. At the expiry of the stipulated period, the ghardi-jamai is free and may return to his Own home with his wife. When a Ghar-jamai has succeeded to his• father-in-law's estate the holding has usually been recorded in his sole name. In some cases, at the request of the parties, the wife has been jointly recorded with her husband." (The words have been underlined for emphasis). When a Ghar-jamai has succeeded to his• father-in-law's estate the holding has usually been recorded in his sole name. In some cases, at the request of the parties, the wife has been jointly recorded with her husband." (The words have been underlined for emphasis). Thus the accepted law of inheritance amongst the Santhal tribes was that the Hindu Law or the Mohammendan La w of Succession did not apply to Santhal. Under the Santa tribal law only males can inherit land and sons jointly succeed their father. The Santa tribal law was quite definite for not allowing females to inherit, but as already quoted above, the law was gradually undergoing a charge and the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants submitted that in some area the Santals had started allowing daughters also to inherit along with the sons. It is pertinent to mention here that this statement by learned Counsel on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants remains just as a statement as the plaintiffs have not founded their claim under such a situation. The plaintiffs have not pleaded that in the instant case, the Santal tribes of the locality in question had adopted a change and, according to that change, Dulhan (the plaintiffs' mother) became entitled to properties of Somai Soren. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants very fairly conceded that it was not their case in the plaint and, therefore, he submitted that the instant case is to be decided on the case pleaded, as the plaintiffs were not entitled to plead a new case. 32. The court of appeal below, on proper appraisal of the evidence on record adduced by the plaintiffs and the defendants, came to a categorical finding that 'the plaintiffs' mother was not married in Agumit ghar jamai form of marriage, as alleged by the plaintiffs, but she was married in ordinary form of marriage with Bhima Hembrom of village khaksa. This is a pure question of fact, and, I am satisfied that the lower appellate court has taken pains to discuss all the material evidence on the record and it has also given a very proper appraisal of the same On sound reasons with regard to each finding. All the material evidences on record have been discussed by the lower appellate court. All the material evidences on record have been discussed by the lower appellate court. Only because one or two reasonings of the trial court have not been considered by the lower appellate court is not enough for interference by the High Court. In my opinion, the non-consideration of the evidence of the two witnesses (P. Ws. 10 and 12) was not material in view of the evidence of the plaintiff (P. W. 11) himself who gave a go bye to his own case as pleaded in the plaint. 33. The other circumstance argued by learned Counsel for the appellants was that the court of appeal below had not dealt with reasonings of the trial court when it dealt with the evidence D.Ws. 6,7,8 and 11. Learned Counsel for both the parties placed before me relevant paragraph of the JUDGMENT : of the court of appeal below where these witnesses were discussed by it. I am satisfied that the court of appeal below has applied its judicial mind independently to the evidence adduced by these witnesses and having thus applied its judicial mind independently believed them and only then it came to a finding that the defendants had title and possession over the 'disputed lands in their own right and that their possession could not be disturbed. If there was a case that the court of appeal below had omitted to consider the evidence of these witnesses, whose evidence were rejected by the trial court; in that case, certainly, the JUDGMENT : and decree under appeal would have suffered• of the infirmity, but the court of appeal below has discussed the evidence of all these witnesses, applied its judicial mind independently and only then it came to the finding in favour of the appellants before it and as such it cannot be said that, it is a case of non-consideration of the reasonings of the trial court. In my opinion, therefore, there is no force in this submission as well advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. 34. Then learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the circumstances as detailed in paragraph 17 of the trial court JUDGMENT : were also not considered by the court of appeal below. Learned Counsel for the contesting defendants-respondents has placed before me the JUDGMENT : under appeal. 34. Then learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the circumstances as detailed in paragraph 17 of the trial court JUDGMENT : were also not considered by the court of appeal below. Learned Counsel for the contesting defendants-respondents has placed before me the JUDGMENT : under appeal. I am satisfied that there is no force in this submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants as well. In my opinion, the learned court of appeal below has taken into consideration the relevant circumstances for coming to a finding in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiffs. 35. Thus the first submission, as stated in the earlier part of the JUDGMENT :, advanced by learned Counsel for the appellants also fails. 36. Then remains the third submission to be considered which was -whether any custom or usage recognised by Hindu Law ceased to have effect after commencement of the Hindu. Succession Act, specially when the Santhal of Chotanagpur were .governed by the customary law of Santhal Parganas. 37. This point was formulated by the court at the time of admission. I take it that the formulation of the point by the Court, was on the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellants. Besides, that submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants, as submitted, refers to the Santhals of Chotanagpur and not of the Santhal Parganas. The parties to the present case are Santhals of Santhal Parganas and not of Chotanagpur. Therefore, in my opinion, this point does not arise in the instant case at all and hence, it does not need any decision. As and when occasion arises, in an appropriate case the question may be gone into and examined. 38. In the instant case, it is enough to say that the question-whether persons of non-Hindu origin have been sufficiently Hinduised so as to attract the provisions of the Hindu Law in matters of inheritance and succession is a mixed question of law and fact. The test to be applied for determination of the question whether a non-Hindu tribe has been so Hinduised are (i)the adoption of Hindu names, (ii) employment of priests, (iii) performance of Pujas, such as Durga Puja, Mansa Puja, Kali Puja etc; (vi) offering of Pindas, (v) observance of mourning (vi) performance of funeral ceremonies. Further they should acknowledge themselves to be Hindus and adopt social usages. Further they should acknowledge themselves to be Hindus and adopt social usages. The formal conversion was not a prerequisite to a person becoming a Hindu. It was not necessary that the people of non-Hindu origin must be completely Hinduised and follow the rules of Srutis and Smritis and completely give themselves up to Brahminical rules and rituals. It is enough, if they are sufficiently Hinduised, for then they will be deemed to be Hindus notwithstanding the retention of a few relics of ante-Hinduism period and will be governed by the Hindu Law of succession. 39. The above being the settled law, as decided in the case of Budbu Majbi & another vs. Dukhan Majhi & others (A.I.R. 1956 Patna 123 : 1955 B.L.J.R.557), the question arises-whether in the instant case, the plaintiffs (Santhals of Santal Parganas) Hinduised themselves; if not, the question of application of Hindu Law did not arise as under the law of inheritance amongst Santhals, as quoted in extenso earlier, the Hindu Law or the Mohammedan Law of inheritance did not apply to Santhals. As already stated above, it was a mixed question of fact because it needed many factors (as just stated above) to be pleaded and proved. 40. Firstly, the plaintiffs have not founded their claim on the above principle; secondly, it is a mixed question of fact and law, thirdly, a question which is a mixed question of law and fact and which need inverstigation off act, cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in second appeal. It was never raised by the plaintiffs in the courts below, and hence, this last submission, as advanced by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants, has no force at all; as besides other reasons stated above, it does not arise out of the pleadings of the parties. For all these reasons, this submission, as advanced by learned Counsel for the appellants, cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time at the stage of second appeal. Thus this point, as raised, does not need to be decided. As and when occasion might arise, this point will be decided in an appropriate case. Hence, this submission advanced by learned Counsel for the appellants also fails. No other point was raised. 41. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no ORDER :as to costs.