JUDGMENT K.P. Singh, J. - By means of this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for' the judgment of the appellate. court dated 31-5-1977 and that of the second appellate court dated 24-2-1981. 2. Necessary facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the petitioner has filed a suit under S. 209 of the UPZA and LR Act against the contesting opposite parties. It has been alleged that a similar suit was filed by the petitioner in the year 1959. Thereafter the suit giving rise to the present writ petition has been ear 1975 Before the Trial .filed in the court an application was moved on behalf of the contesting opposite parties that the suit should be abated under the provisions of S. 5 of the UPCH Act The trial court rejected the application. Thereafter it appears that in appeal the defendants -opposite parties succeeded in getting the order of abatement of the suit together with appeal. The second appeal on behalf of the petitioner has failed as is evident from the impugned judgment dated 24-2-81. Against the judgment of the second appellate court the plaintiff-petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that the subject matter of the suit is only grove and during the consolidation operation It has been decided between the parties that the consolidation courts would have no jurisdiction over the grove, hence the appellate court and the second appellate court have patently erred in abating the suit together with appeal giving rise to the present writ petition. 4. In reply the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties raised a number of preliminary objections and invited my attention to CA-3, CA-6 and CA-12. In substance the preliminary objections are to the effect that the suit and the second appeal were not maintainable as there was no valid resolution contemplated by Para. 128 of the U.P. Gaon Sabha and Bhumi Prabandhak Manual. The second preliminary objection was that the plaintiff-petitioner had not impleaded the State of U.P. hence the suit was not maintainable. Third preliminary objection was that the second appeal was not maintainable as it was not accompanied by the decree against which the second appeal was filed. 5. 128 of the U.P. Gaon Sabha and Bhumi Prabandhak Manual. The second preliminary objection was that the plaintiff-petitioner had not impleaded the State of U.P. hence the suit was not maintainable. Third preliminary objection was that the second appeal was not maintainable as it was not accompanied by the decree against which the second appeal was filed. 5. On merits the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has submitted that the appellate courts were fully justified in abating the petitioner's suit. According to him proceeding under S. 12 of the UPCH Act between the parties is still pending hence the provisions of S. 52 of the UPCH Act would be attracted and the consolidation would not be deemed to have been closed despite the notification under S. 52 of the UPCH Act in respect of the village in question in the year 1964. 6. It has also been submitted that the subject matter of the dispute between the parties is not only grove but also agricultural plots hence even if grove is excluded from the operation of S. 5 of the UPCH Act, the abatement of the suit in respect of agricultural plots would be fully justified and no interference should be made with the impugned judgment. Section 5 of the UPCH Act reads as below :- Sec. 5(1). "Upon the publication of the notification (under sub-section (2) of section 4) in the Official Gazette, the consequences, as hereinafter set forth, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, from the date specified thereunder till the publication of notification under section 52 or sub-section (1) of section 6, as the case may be, ensure in the area to which the (notification under sub-section (2) of section 4) relates, namely. (a) ................. (b) (i) ..................... (c) .................... (i)............... (ii)............. Provided .................... (2) Upon the said publication of the notification under sub-section (2) of section 4 the following further consequences shall ensue in the area to which the notification relates, namely : Explanation :.................... (a) ................. (b) (i) ..................... (c) .................... (i)............... (ii)............. Provided .................... (2) Upon the said publication of the notification under sub-section (2) of section 4 the following further consequences shall ensue in the area to which the notification relates, namely : Explanation :.................... (a)-Every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area, or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regarding which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any Court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision, shall, on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending stand abated : Provided ................. Provided .................... (b) Such abatement shall be without prejudice to the right of the persons affected to agitate, the right or interest in dispute in the said suits or proceedings before the appropriate consolidation authorities under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder." Section 52 of the UPCH Act 1953 reads as below : "As soon as may be, after fresh maps and records have been prepared (under sub -section (1) of section 27), the State Government shall issue a notification in the official Gazette that the consolidation operation have been closed in the suit and village or villages forming part of the suit shall then cease to be under consolidation operations; Provided that the issue of the notification under this section shall not affect the powers of the State Government to fix, distribute and recover the cost of operations under this Act. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), any order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction in cases of writs filed under the provisions of the Constitution of India, or in cases or proceedings pending under this Act on the date of issue of the notification under sub -section (1), shall be given effect to by such authorities, as may be prescribed and the consolidation operations shall, for that purpose, be deemed to have not been closed." 7. Before me undisputed facts are that proceedings under S. 12 of the UPCH Act are pending between the parties and now on showing the Gazette notification by the petitioner, the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party admits that the village was de-notified under S. 52 of the UPCH Act in the year 1964. 8. In view of the above facts I fail to understand how the appellate courts have abated the plaintiffs suit under S. 209 of the UPZA and LR Act against the opposite parties which appears to have been filed in the year 1975. Bare reading of the provisions of S. 5 read with S. 52 of the UPCH Act indicates that the purpose of abatement of the suit is to provide litigants an opportunity to contest their claim before the appropriate consolidation authorities. In the present case when de notification had taken place in the year 1964 the abatement of the plaintiff's suit by means of the impugned judgment is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. 9. The contention of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party that in view of the pendency of proceedings under S. 12 of the UPCH Act between the parties and the provisions of S. 52 of the UPCH Act the consolidation operations would not be deemed to have' come to an end in respect of the disputed land is not at all acceptable to me. To my mind the effect of the provisions of S. 52 of the UPCH Act in the circumstances of the present case would be if any final order is passed between the parties in proceedings under S. 12 of the UPCH Act that would be given effect to by the relevant authority despite the fact that notification under S. 52 of the UPCH Act had taken place. I am unable to hold that de-notification took place in the year 1964 regarding the village in question a suit filed in the year 1975 can ever be abated in the year 1977 or 1981. Therefore, I have no manner of doubt to hold that the judgments of the appellate courts are patently erroneous and deserve to be quashed. 10. According to the recent decisions of this Court it is quite clear that the consolidation authorities have jurisdiction to decide the question of title of the claimants to a grove lands during the consolidation operation. Therefore, I have no manner of doubt to hold that the judgments of the appellate courts are patently erroneous and deserve to be quashed. 10. According to the recent decisions of this Court it is quite clear that the consolidation authorities have jurisdiction to decide the question of title of the claimants to a grove lands during the consolidation operation. It is noteworthy that in the year 1961 when the dispute between the parties was decided the trend of the authorities was that the consolidation courts could not decide the question of title to grove land, hence it was indicated at that time. that the grove was excluded from the jurisdiction of consolidation authorities. Before me the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted that because title to grove land can be decided by the consolidation authorities, the appellate Courts were fully justified in abating, the suit. 11. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party invited my attention to a large number of rulings: such as 1974 Unrep. Rev. Cas 184 Mangat Singh v. Board of Revenue, U.P., Allahabad, 1974 Unrep. Rev. Cas 567 Yadram Singh v. Board of Revenue, U.P., Allahabad, 1968 Rev Dec 83 Ram Adhar Singh v. Ram Roop Singh, 1977 Rev Dec 108 (BR), Ram Dulare v. Ram Charan etc. and 1979 Rev Dec 40 : AIR 1979 NOC 125 Anant Ram Gupta v. Assistant Director of Consolidation and has emphasised that the consolidation authorities can decide the dispute between the litigants regarding the grove land, hence despite decision between the parties that grove was excluded from the jurisdiction of the consolidation courts the order of abatement is fully justified. He has emphasised the ruling reported in 1979 Rev Dec 40 : AIR 1979 NOC 125 Anant Ram Gupta v. Assistant Director of Consolidation. According to him since the recent decisions have laid down that the consolidation authorities can decide the dispute regarding the grove land the order of abatement passed by the appellate authority should he maintained. To my mind the contentions of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party in this regard are not correct. According to him since the recent decisions have laid down that the consolidation authorities can decide the dispute regarding the grove land the order of abatement passed by the appellate authority should he maintained. To my mind the contentions of the learned counsel for the contesting opposite party in this regard are not correct. Even on the analogy of the dictum of law laid down in 1979 Rev Dec 40 : AIR 1979 NOC 125 Anant Ram Gupta v. Assistant Director of Consolidation it may safely be observed that due to recent amendment in the provisions of Sections 209 and 210 of the UPZA and LR Act the petitioner gets a fresh cause of action to evict the trespassers from its property and in view of the amended provisions of law the plaintiff can take benefit of the amended provisions of law and evict the contesting opposite parties from the disputed land. This aspect of the matter has not been raised and considered by the revenue courts, hence I have mentioned the law so that the parties may take their stand hereafter. 12. Regarding preliminary objection of the contesting opposite parties it is proper to quote para 128 of the UP Gaon Sabha and Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti Manual which reads as below : "The conduct of Gaon Sabha litigation shall not depend upon the individual discretion of the Chairman of the Bhumi Prabandhan Samiti (Land Management Committee) but shall be a matter of a resolution of the Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti (Land Management Committee) as a whole. In urgent cases, however, the Chairman can take action on his own and seek ratification of the Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti (Land Management Committee) afterwards, by including in the agenda of the next ensuing meeting." 13. It would be proper to mention that the disputed property has been claimed by the petitioner and if its claim is established to the disputed land, technicalities should not stand in the way of the court to grant requisite relief to the plaintiff-petitioner. Before me it has been contended by the petitioner that Sri Dulha Khan was authorised to contest the claim of the petitioner on behalf of the petitioner as back as the year 1960. Before me it has been contended by the petitioner that Sri Dulha Khan was authorised to contest the claim of the petitioner on behalf of the petitioner as back as the year 1960. The second appellate court does not appear to have considered the question whether Dulha Khan was really authorised to contest the claim of the petitioner and what would be the effect of such authorisation on the present litigation. The second appellate court has also not considered this aspect of the matter that if there is no proper resolution of the Gaon Sabha whether the defect can be cured by the ratification of Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti of the litigation initiated by the petitioner through Dulha Khan. Since the second appellate court has failed to consider the relevant law contained in para 128 of the Gaon Sabha Manual and has not adhered itself to the dispute as to whether the petitioner could prosecute the litigation through Dulha Khan, I think it proper to quash the. impugned judgment of the second appellate court and ask the second appellate court to examine the question in greater detail. 14. In this connection the rulings reported in 1976 Rev Dec 188 (BR) Gaon Sabha v. Doongar Singh and 1978 Rev Dec 366 (BR) Aparbal Singh v. Gaon Sabha have been cited and their effect would be considered by the second appellate court when the matter is taken up hereafter. 15. As regards preliminary objection of the contesting opposite parties that the second appeal was defective hence the second appellate court was fully justified in dismissing the second appeal, it is note -worthy that the trial court did not accept the prayer of the defendant-opposite parties regarding the abatement of the suit. It appears that against the order of the trial court the defendants-opposite parties had preferred an appeal and in appeal the order of abatement of the suit was passed and against the order the second appeal had been filed, which has been characterised by the second appellate court as defective on various grounds in its impugned judgment. It appears that against the order of the trial court the defendants-opposite parties had preferred an appeal and in appeal the order of abatement of the suit was passed and against the order the second appeal had been filed, which has been characterised by the second appellate court as defective on various grounds in its impugned judgment. It is to be seen whether the first appeal lay against the order of the trial court and if the matter has come to the notice of the second appellate court which would also be a revisional court in the circumstances of the present case, hence it would be proper for the second appellate court to see whether the present petitioner could file revision against the order of the appellate court or at the instance of the defendants-opposite parties the first appeal could be only in the shape of a revision and in that circumstance if the second appeal filed by the petitioner is treated as revision petition, whether the defects pointed out by the second appellate court in the impugned judgment would stand in the way of the petitioner any more, I think that the second appellate court has not considered the question whether the second appeal deserves to be treated as revision petition and the petitioner could be granted requisite relief. Since the appeal filed by the defendants-opposite parties itself appears to me in the form of a revision petition, I think that the plaintiff petitioner should have approached the Board of Revenue by means of a revision petition and in that circumstance the Board of Revenue should examine whether the revision could be termed as defective for want of various grounds given by the learned Member in the impugned judgment. 16. As regards the want of decree of first appellate court and the judgment of the trial court it is sufficient to observe as to why the second appeal was not dismissed at the initial stage and if the second appeal was entertained at the initial stage whether the plaintiff petitioner is entitled to condonation of delay in the circumstances of the present case. This aspect of the matter has not at all been considered by the learned Member Board of Revenue. This aspect of the matter has not at all been considered by the learned Member Board of Revenue. If it is found that the first appeal could be entertained only in the form of revision petition, hence the second appeal could easily be converted into revision and various defects pointed out by the learned Member in the impugned judgment should be examined in the light whether the plaintiff-petitioner deserves condonation of laches on his pArticle 17. As the second appellate court has not considered the question as to whether the revision against the order of the first appellate court was entertain able, I think it proper to quash the impugned judgment and ask the Board of Revenue to examine the question as to whether a second appeal or revision would lie to it in the circumstances of the present case and whether the laches on the part of the petitioner deserve to be condoned and whether the petitioner can press its claim for ejectment of the defendants-opposite parties in the light of the amended provisions of law under Sections 209 and 210 of the UPZA and LR Act. 18. As regards objection about nor impleadment of State of U.P. in the suit it is sufficient to mention that S. 209 of the UPZA and LR Act does not require impleadment of State of U.P. in the suit filed by a Gaon Sabha. This objection was raised only for mention and reject of outright. 19. To my mind the impugned judgments of the appellate courts patently erroneous on merits and second appellate court has not consider the various aspects and has taker technical views which are not quite correct, hence its order deserves to quashed. 20. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the second appellate court is hereby quashed and the second appellate court is directed to, examine the various aspects mentioned above and thereafter pass final order in the case. When order of the first appellate court is bad in law on merits and no appeal lay against the order of the Trial court the desirability of asking the Trial court to proceed with the suit expeditiously should be kept in view. There would be no order as to costs.